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Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to understand the role of nuclear weapons 
in Britain's defence and foreign policies. It works from the assumption 
that decisions in relation to nuclear weapons, can only be understood in 
the context of a broader overview of the British state's policies since 
the 1940's. In turn Britain's nuclear policies have made a decisive 
impact on defence policy as a whole and have had an important effect on 
international developments. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute 
to a better-understanding of the causes and effects of the nuclear weapons 
policies adopted by the UK since the 19401s. 
The thesis will focus on the politics and political economy of 
nuclear weapons and British defence policy. This central concern has 
required that a number of other important aspects of the subject have been 
given only peripheral consideration. The thesis does not attempt to 
provide a detailed technological history of Britain's nuclear force. Nor 
is it intended to provide particular new insights on the nuclear decision- 
making process. Rather it seeks to explore the underlying factors which 
have shaped both the technology and the perceptions of decision-makers. 
There is no shortage of historical accounts of Britain's nuclear 
force. The unique contribution which it is hoped that this thesis makes, 
however, does not lie so much in its subject matter as in the way that 
this subject matter is approached. In my view that approach is 
sufficiently different from those of previous works in this area as to be 
both original and of some interest to other scholars in this field. 
The thesis begins, in Chapter One, by providing a broad 
introduction to the main features of British defence policy in the period 
since World War Two. It looks at the changing position of Britain in the 
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world, and the response of the British state to this process of change. 
It examines the particularly important role that the 'special 
relationship' with the United States has played in post-war British 
policy; and it looks at how the nation's historical tradition has 
continued to influence its foreign and defence policies. 
Chapter Two provides an historical overview of Britain's nuclear 
weapons policy. It begins by seeking to explain why Britain became, and 
then remained, a nuclear weapons power. It then argues that, although the 
main elements of Britain's nuclear weapons policy have remained in place 
throughout the postwar period, the political consensus in favour of an 
independent nuclear force has never been an'absolute one. It then 
discusses the particular contradictions in that policy that have ensured 
that this should be so. 
Chapters Three to Five then provide a detailed historical 
justification of the arguments presented in Chapter Two. They look in 
turn at the periods 1940-55 (Chapter Three), 1955-68 (Chapter Four), and 
1968-85 (Chapter Five). They chronicle the elements of continuity in 
nuclear weapons policy, as well as examining the development of 
contradictions in that policy in response to economic and strategic 
developments. 
Chapter Six looks in some detail at the military rationales for 
Britain's nuclear force, and how this affects the structure of that force. 
Because of the semi-dependent character of the British force, 
considerations of its actual purpose, and of its capability for 
independent action, are of considerable significance. This chapter seeks 
to appraise the debate in this area. 
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In the last two Chapters, we consider the future. We look at the 
main alternative policies that are now available to the British 
government. We assess their relative merits. In Chapter Seven we assess 
those options that involve an acceptance of the main tenets of postwar 
policy, but also an acceptance that economic circumstances may necessitate 
some adjustments in that policy 'at the margins'. Chapter Eight, on the 
other hand, argues that a more fundamental change in British policy is 
needed. It questions the reliance on nuclear deterrence as a foundation 
for international security, and discusses the case for independent British 
disarmament initiatives. 
Finally we provide a bibliography which lists some of the articles 
and books which have proved most valuable in preparing this thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR TWO 
1. Introduction 
Before seeking to present general hypotheses on the role of nuclear 
weapons in British defence policy since World War Two, it is necessary to 
outline the broader backdrop to that role : the changing position of 
Britain in the world and the response of the British state to this 
process of change. For it is the state's reluctance to adjust its 
overseas policies to the, economic resources available, and the 
continuing priority given to inter-national status over domestic 
economic performance, that lies at the heart of the commitment to create 
and maintain an independent nuclear force. 
The aspiration for a world, or 'Great Power', role is deeply rooted 
in British history, and some understanding of that history is, 
therefore, a precondition for a full appreciation of the dilemma which 
has faced governments since the 1940s. This chapter seeks to outline the 
main elements of the foreign and defence policies chosen in the post-war 
period. Before doing this, it discusses some of the relevant trends in 
British development in the preceeding century. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain was indisputably 
the world's most powerful state. The Napoleonic wars at the beginning 
of the century had defeated Britain's main imperial rival, and the Royal 
Navy in consequence enjoyed unchallenged global military superiority. 
Together with, and indeed the basis for, this position, Britain's 
industrial revolution had made it the world's major producer of 
manufactured goods. As one author put it, "never before and never since 
has one country so dominated the world economy" (1) 
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The success of a small offshore European island in dominating the 
world economy, and directly controlling an Empire with a third of the 
world's population, was bound to'be temporary. It depended heavily on 
its unique position as the first industrial nation. Once other nations, 
such as Germany, the US and France, also started to industrialise, 
Britain's relative strength would inevitably decline. 
Indeed, in important respects, Britain's response to the challenge of 
these new industrial powers in the late 19th century was remarkably 
successful. Its initial response was to reach 'understandings' with the 
new powers to prevent conflict and preserve the status quo. Of these, 
the most longstanding proved to be the agreement to accept United States 
dominance overthe Western Hemisphere, embodied in the "Monroe 
Doctrine, " and thus lay the foundations for an alliance that would gain 
steadily in importance as Britain's own power declined. (2) An 
indication of the success of Britain's policy of forming alliances was 
its victory in the two world wars in 1914-18 and 1939-45. By using its 
diplomatic skill, many leaders believed, Britain could continue to be a 
Great Power despite its relative weakness. 
In other respects, however, Britain's response to the demands of its 
new situation proved to be inadequate. The policies, structures and 
attitudes formed in the heyday of the Pax Britannica became impediments 
to the nation's ability to adapt to new circumstances. Economic 
Policies which had served British ruling class interests well in the 
mid-nineteenth century now increasingly became costs to the economy. 
Moreover, although it had eventually achieved military victory in the 
world wars, the financial cost had been enormous. 'The massive overseas 
investments, built up over a century of capital export, and on which 
the domestic British economy had come increasingly to depend, were 
depleted in a few short years of battle. While the First World War 
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severely handicapped the British Empire, therefore, the 1939-45 war led 
to effective bankruptcy. From 1940 onwards, the survival of that Empire 
became totally dependent on economic and military assistance from the 
United States. 
The victory in 1945 strengthened the determination of Britain's 
rulers to retain their country's international status, despite both its 
weak economic position and the growing costs of military power. The war 
had accelerated a number of trends, each of which increased the pressure 
on Britain. Firstly, it saw the involvement of both the US and the 
Soviet Union, who had adopted isolationist stances in the 1920s and 
1930s, in world affairs. The Cold War, which the conflict between these 
two 'superpowers' created, in turn led to increased requirements for 
permanent peacetime military forces to provide for a possible outbreak 
of 'hot' war. Secondly, the war encouraged movements for national 
liberation throughout Asia and Africa, which threatened the continued 
existence of the Empire and increased considerably the costs involved 
in policing it. Thirdly, the rapid development of military technology 
during the war had increased the importance of scientific advance in 
warfare. Henceforth considerable resources would be needed to keep 
pace with the developing qualitative arms race between the major 
powers. 
In the period after 1945 Britain's defence policy continued to be 
decisively influenced by the requirements of its world role. As a 
result, the costs of that policy were much greater than would have 
been needed for the defence of the British Isles themselves. While in 
the past there were economic gains from the state's global military 
role, however, these had now become liabilities. British defence 
policy in the post-war period proved to be very tenuously linked, if 
at all, to the needs of either homeland security or economic gain. 
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Britain's continuing aspirations to Great Power status were 
reflected in its simultaneous adherence to five major commitments in 
defence policy; 
- the imperial, extra-European, role 
- the European commitment 
- the independent nuclear force 
- the 'special relationship' with the United States 
- the commitment to self-sufficiency in arms production 
The attempt to maintain all these commitments, and the partial 
nature of the eventual retreat from the least tenable amongst them, 
explains why British military spending has been higher than that of most 
of its allies throughout the post-war period. And it also helps us to 
understand why it is considerably higher than Britain's peacetime 
military spending before the Second World War. For, compared with that 
period, the perceived military requirements for international status 
have been greatly'increased. The European and nuclear commitments are 
both entirely new and expensive. The costs of maintaining the imperial 
role and an independent arms industry have both considerably increased. 
And the need for close co-operation with the US has both permitted the 
continuance of otherwise untenable commitments and attitudes, and has 
created pressure for Britain to make a 'special contribution' to Western 
security as a whole in order to maintain its 'special relationship'. 
. 
2. Holding on to Empire 
By the first decades of the twentieth century, the Empire was 
already, on balance, probably more of a burden on Britain's economy as a 
whole than a bonus. This burden, however, largely took indirect forms - 
the emphasis on overseas investment, the anti-technical bias in the 
upper classes, the maintenance of sterling as a reserve currency. 
The direct, military costs of Empire remained relatively cheap until 
the Second World War. After that war, however, the balance of 
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advantage shifted markedly. The rise of national liberation movements 
increased the need for military forces and provoked a series of costly 
counter-insurgency wars. Newly independent states and guerrilla fighters 
equipped themselves with modern weapons, supplied from both the West 
and the Soviet bloc, which further increased the capabilities required 
for British forces. 
The key event in transforming the balance sheet of Empire, however, 
was the gaining of independence by India in 1947. British India had 
been not only the Empire's main economic asset, an employer of a 
substantial section of the home country's middle classes and a major 
protected market for its industries. It was also the source of most of 
its military manpower and the hub round which its string of military 
bases - Suez, Aden, Singapore - had been built and without which they 
made little sense. It was therefore remarkable how slow the impact 
of Indian independence was on Britain's commitment to the retention of 
its remaining possessions. Indeed humiliation at Suez in 1956 
probably had a greater, or at least more immediate, effect on national 
opinion. 
Until the mid 1960s, reluctant retreat from Empire was accompanied 
by continued attempts to retain a residual imperial commitment. Only 
after 1965, as the country's economic plight worsened and the costs of 
the East of Suez role continued to climb, did a Labour Cabinet agree 
to withdraw from most remaining bases in the Gulf and Far East by 
1972. Even then the longing for a British military role outside 
Europe did not die. A number of residual commitments were maintained 
in the Mediterranean, Hong Kong, Belizeýand the Falklands, the last of 
which has proved extremely costly. And the structure and attitudes of 
the'armed services - particularly that of the Royal Navy - continue to 
reflect to this day a desire for an intervention role outside Europe. 
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Arguments for a return to a 'maritime strategy', in which priority 
is given to surface naval forces at the expense of the land/air 
commitment to Europe, reflect this continued yearning for a world role 
amongst Conservative MPs, many of whom have close links with the 
influential Navy lobby, and it even enjoys support from a number of 
prominent Labour politicians, Indeed, partly in response to such 
pressure, the present government has already taken important steps to 
reverse what it believes was the overconcentration of forces in Europe 
that characterized the 1970s. 
3. Committed to Europe 
In the past, the security of Britain itself, and its sea links with 
the Empire, have been ensured by a policy of preventing the domination 
of the European continent by a single power. Britain has never been 
interested in controlling its European neighbours, only in preventing 
a threat to itself and its overseas possessions. As a result, throughout 
its imperial history Britain's leaders have looked with suspicion at, 
and feared entanglement in, European politics, and have pursued a 
policy of having no permanent allies or permanent forces in Europe. 
This policy broke down temporarily, with disastrous human 
consequences, when Britain intervened in 1914 to prevent German 
domination of the Continent which, it was believed, would pose a direct 
threat to British naval power and national security. 
Immediately after that war, however, the Army was quickly withdrawn 
and Britain reverted to its traditional policy. Only in the aftermath 
of the Second World War did Britain feel forced to agree to a permanent 
military alliance in Europe - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). With the rise of Soviet military power it was believed that a 
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British commitment was now needed to ensure West European resistance to 
a further expansion of Soviet influence. In direct contrast to past 
policies, therefore, Britain actively promoted an alliance between the 
major West European powers and committed a large proportion of its 
armed forces to that alliance. This questionable strategic rationale 
- the need to avoid the possibility of Soviet dominance of Europe - 
was powerfully reinforced by the ideological antipathy of both 
Conservatives and most Labour leaders to Soviet-style socialism. Anti- 
communism - the foundation of the Cold War - became both an explanation 
of and justification for Britain's military commitments in Europe and 
elsewhere. 
However, the European commitment, as in the past, was somewhat 
ambiguous, continually competing with Britain's world role for military 
resources. In 1952, Britain refused to merge its armed forces into a 
European army - the European Defence Community (EDC) - largely because 
of its continued belief in its role as an independent world power. 
At first, it refused to join the European Economic Community (EEC) for 
the same reasons. In the 1960s, its applications for membership were 
rejected on French insistence because of its continued close links with 
the Commonwealth and Empire, and with the United States. And by the 
time Britain did succeed in joining - in 1973 - the political momentum 
for unity had been dissipated, and the economic advantages of membership 
had diminished. 
In Britain's first decade of EEC membership both main political 
parties have been eager to stress their commitment to maintaining 
national 'sovereignty' and protecting national interests. Mrs 
Thatcher appeared to be shifting foreign policy away from Europe and 
towards a strengthening of both the 'special relationship' and 
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Britain's world role. And, although some Labour opponents 
distinguished between the capitalist-dominated EEC, whichýthey oppose, 
and a united socialist Europe, which they would support, many of their 
colleagues continued to believe in quasi-imperial illusions about 
Britain's world role, of which an exaggerated importance given to 
Commonwealth economic links, inter alia, is a notable example. 
4. The Nuclear Illusion 
Reinforcing Britain's self-image as a great power has been its 
involvement with the most powerful weapons of all - the atomic and 
hydrogen bombs. In 1940, Britain had, briefly, led the world in atomic 
weapons research; and its scientists played an important role in the 
wartime Manhattan Project, which developed the weapons used on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even today, the link between international 
influence and possession of nuclear weapons is symbolized in 
the membership of the UN Security Council. The permanent members of 
that body - the US, the USSR, France, China and the UK - are the five 
states with acknowledged nuclear arsenals. Britain's nuclear force 
undoubtedly has contributed to the illusion that it is a step 
above most other medium-sized powers in the international pecking 
order, even if it is not a superpower. And, within NATO, the nuclear 
force, and the close nuclear co-operation with the United States, has 
reinforced Britain's feeling that it is number two in the alliance. 
Moreover, the nuclear force helped to encourage, especially in the 
1950s, the idea that Britain could afford to fulfil its military 
commitments in Europe and in Asia simultaneously without ruining its 
domestic economy. In Europe, it was argued, tactical nuclear weapons 
and a policy of 'massive retaliation' could compensate for NATO's 
supposed conventional inferiority. Non-nuclear land and air forces 
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could-therefore be reduced to a Itripwirel function, sufficient only 
to make it clear that a fullscale assault was underway before using 
nuclear weapons on a large scale. Even outside Europe, it was 
believed that nuclear weapons could be a cheap substitute for 
overstretched conventional forces in limited conflicts. 
Both concepts proved to be illusions. In Europe, the growth in the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal, which had been virtually non-existent in the 
1950s, led to an increasing reluctance in NATO to give up entirely the 
conventional option; and the political need for a symbol of Britain's 
commitment to Europe also meant that the cuts in its continental forces 
were not as great as had been hoped. 16 the Empire, nuclear weapons 
proved to be unusable in counter-insurgency warfare, or in limited 
confrontations such as that with Indonesia. If Britain wished to 
maintain both its European and imperial commitments, it discovered, it 
would have to pay dearly for them, or give one of them up. 
In some respects, the nuclear force clearly complemented the imperial 
commitment. By encouraging continued illusions of national power it 
reinforced support for a world role and delayed a reappraisal. Yet at 
the same time, it also proved to be a compensation for the retreat from 
that role when it did take place. At the crucial moment after the Suez 
fiasco, an increased emphasis on Britain's independent nuclear status 
helped to silence those arguing for a more radical reappraisal. The 
British place at the 'top table' of arms talks served to further quell 
doubts domestically. 
The nuclear force thus encouraged pretensions of being a world 
power, and indirectly contributed to overcommitment in defence policy 
as a whole. Its direct costs were, moreover, also considerable : 
certainly greater than governments liked to admit publicly. At the 
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peak of the V-bomber project, nuclear forces took between 10 and 20 
per cent of the defence budget. Though the proportion spent on 
strategic nuclear weapons fell in the 1960s, some of the E12,500 
million spent in the 1970s and 1980s on the Tornado bomber - now 
assigned to a 'theatre nuclear' role should also be attributed to 
nuclear spending. And, in the late 1980s, the Trident project will 
ensure that nuclear costs will rise again, on conservative assumptions, 
to as much as 15 per cent of total defence spending. 
5. A special relationahi2 
Since the Second World War, British leaders have placed a high 
priority on maintaining their 'special relationship' with the United 
States. The war itself forged extraordinary close military and 
economic ties between the two governments. And, once it had ended, 
the survival of the Empire was clearly dependent on US approval, or 
at least tolerance. Moreover, the world's capitalist economies, and 
those of Western Europe in particular, needed an American lead in the 
1940s to prevent a recurrence of the political traumas that followed 
the First World War. Binding these two ideas - tolerance of 
colonialism and aid to rival capitalist nations - together was the 
global contest with the Soviet Union. A narrow view of national 
economic advantage might have suggested that Europe, Japan and the 
British Empire were potential rivals in a conflict for domination of 
world markets, and that the Us had little interest in their economic 
reconstruction. Its assumption of the role as leader of the capitalist 
world from 1947 onwards -a Pax Americana not unlike Britain's 
nineteeth-century dominance - led to such considerations being 
subordinated to the requirements for prosperity and unity between 
advanced capitalist states in the confrontation with the Soviet bloc. 
- 20 - 
The Cold War therefore proved the cement of American foreign policy, 
enabling short-run sectional economic interests to be overcome, and 
the US to commit itself to a leadership role in the capitalist world 
system. 
If the Cold War enabled the US to reconcile the elements of its own 
foreign policy, it was the 'special relationship' with the Americans 
that was the keystone enabling Britain to retain the trappings of its 
world status despite the crippling effects of the war. Its imperial - 
and later 'out of area' - policing role in the Third World was 
supported by the US as a contribution to the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union and with national liberation movements. In Europe, the 
US supported Britain's efforts to act as a bridge between North America 
and Europe, as an ally in opposing communist expansion on the 
Continent, and in sharing the financial burden of defence in Central 
Europe and in the North Atlantic. And Britain's independent nuclear 
force could not have been maintained without American help - at least 
not without sacrificing other military commitments. 
The 'special relationship', for Britain, had an important additional 
advantage, as much psychological as material. It helped the 
transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana to be made relatively 
smoothly, and it provided the old, declining power with a role as an 
experienced advisor to the less sophisticated, if more powerful, 'new 
boy' -a role as elder statesman writ large. This conception accorded 
with British perceptions of their own greater wisdom and maturity. The 
willingness to compromise and manoeuvre, essential to Britain's past 
world leadership, would, it was thought, act as a valuable constraint 
on American impetuousness, its simplistic worldview and its reliance 
on brute power. Britain could in this way, its leaders believed, 
influence the path of world events without directly controlling them. 
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The price paid for this intangible 'advantage' was, however, 
considerable. In return Britain was expected to support the US 
stewardship of the capitalist world in words and in deeds. British 
policymakers believed that, in order to influence American policy, they 
had to support it. To preserve the trappings of its past power, 
Britain had to subordinate them to US designs. Though important 
scope remained to influence policy at the margins, especially in the 
first post-war decade, major decisions taken by the US government were 
shaped by its conception of its own interests. Britain, by contrast, 
found itself bearing the burden of a world role, while its political 
and economic influence declined still further. In return for its high 
level of military spending, it found itself with only the illusion of 
international political power, rather than the reality. The latter 
belonged to the United States. 
Britain's commitment to high defence spending was, from the United 
States' point of view, an important component of the 'special 
relationship'. If Britain wished to have greater influence in 
Washington than other medium powers, it was argued, it had to share 
the costs of America's military leadership. The most costly 
consequence of this belief occurred during the Korean war in 1950-2 
when, in response to demands from the US, Britain agreed to a massive 
rearmament programme which halted the domestic economy in its tracks. 
More than any other event, this programme handicapped Britain in 
competition with the emerging economies of West Germany and Japan, which 
had no comparable military burden. It raised defence spending to a 
higher plateau, on which it remained for the next three decades. Yet 
the increase in expenditure was motivated mostly by Britain's concern 
to retain influence in Washington and thus avoid America becoming 
embroiled in a major Asian war. Fears of a new and immediate Soviet 
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offensive - then sweeping the United States - appeared to have been 
very much a secondary factor in British considerations. 
Finally, the 'special relationship', linked as it is with imperial 
and nuclear commitments, has played some part in preventing Britain's 
transformation into a European power. Other European countries, and 
France in particular, have often voiced suspicions that the UK would 
be a 'Trojan Horse' for the Americans within Europe, as it was at 
least as interested in maintaining its close Atlantic ties as it was 
in European co-operation. Indeed the 1962 Nassau agreement, under which 
the US agreed to sell Polaris ballistic missiles to the UK, was one of 
the factors which precipitated de Gaulle's veto on British EEC 
membership shortly after. It is significant that the most 
enthusiastically pro-European Prime Minister - Edward Heath - was also 
the one who placed least emphasis on the 'special relationship'. For, 
if the 'out-of-areal and American commitments were complementary, both 
have in practice often been alternatives to closer ties with Europe. 
Under the Conservatives in the 1980s, there are signs of a modest, but 
significant, shift back towards these old priorities. 
6. Buying British 
The final factor that explains Britain's high level of military 
spending is its continued commitment to maintaining the domestic arms 
industry. Self-sufficiency in weapons supplies has been seen as an 
important requirement for both political influence and operational 
independence. Occasional doubts have found difficulty making progress 
against this view in the face of a powerful industrial and military 
lobby anxious to protect the interests of uncompetitive, but profitable, 
arms manufacturers. Yet, in reality, the arguments of that lobby 
have become increasingly dubious. For not only has the cost of only 
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'buying British' in arms grown considerably. The military value of 
such independence has also been reduced. 
The costs of remaining independent in military production have 
escalated ever since the beginning of the Second World War. The 
'advances' in military hardware during that conflict - radar, jet 
aircraft, nuclear explosives, rockets, etc. - proved to be only the 
beginning of an extended technological arms race. The post-war 
confrontation between the two superpowers created external pressures 
for continually refining weapons systems, while the acceleration in 
industrial technology as a whole provide'd new opportunities for 
military innovation. As both superpowers devoted massive scientific 
and industrial resources to improve their relative position in the Cold 
War, the costs to other powers of keeping up with them grew. Though 
the basic types of non-nuclear weapons - planes, tanks, ships - were 
the same as had been used in the 1939-45 conflict, new tecWlogies were 
transforming their destructive capabilities. And, as a result, the cost 
of producing each unit of equipment rocketed. One of the more 
remarkable, but by no means exceptional, examples of this process is 
in military aircraft. The cost (after making allowance for inflation) 
of producing 385 Tornadoes for the RAF of the 1980s will be greater 
than the cost of 21,000 Spitfires made before and during the Second 
World War. (3) 
For Britain to keep up technologically with this arms race has 
required a massive investment in military research and development (R & 
D). Growth in R&D was particularly marked in the 1950s, when it grew 
from E69 million in 1949-50 (9.3 per cent of total defence spending) to 
E204 million in 1956-57 (13.3 per cent of the total). (4) Yet it 
still proved impossible for a relatively small power, as Britain was 
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and is, to develop and produce the entire range of modern weapons. 
The R&D cost for each new type of weapon is largely independent of 
the number to be produced. Those countries with a much larger order 
book can, therefore, spread these overheads more thinly than is 
possible for the UK, and thus lower the average cost of each unit. 
I Unless British producers are able to export a considerable proportion 
of their output, or collaborate successfully internationally, they 
will start with a severe handicap in competition with larger US 
producers. 
As a result of this logic, the 1960s and 1970s saw exceptions to 
the principle of self-sufficiency being made in some of the most 
difficult 'high-tech' areas - notably ballistic missiles (i. e. Polaris) 
and military aircraft. In general, however, these concessions were 
reluctant and partial. In the 1980s Britain continues to devote a 
higher proportion of its defence budget"to R&D than any other NATO 
member, (5) and still produces a wide, though now incomplete, range of 
different weapons. The unit costs of its producers, consequently, 
often compare unfavourably with foreign competitors - and the numbers 
produced of each type has tended to diminish with each successive 
generation. If cost escalation continues at past rates, further 
erosion of the principle of self-sufficiency is inevitable. 
7. Conclusion 
As a result of the multiple commitments outlined so far, Britain 
has consistently spent a higher proportion of its national income on 
the military than most of its economic competitors. There is 
considerable evidence that this heavy military burden has made an 
important contribution to Britain's relative economic decline since 
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1945. (6) Continued poor economic performance has in turn created intense 
pressure to reduce military commitments-to match resources available, and 
a long-term process of retreat in Britain's global influence. As the 
next chapter will discuss, nuclear weapons played an important part in 
the attempt to remain a Great Power without the resources to do so. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW 
. 
1. Why Britain is Nuclear 
Britain's nuclear force has played an important role in the postwar 
external policy of the British state, and in particular in its attempt to 
retain at least some part of the international influence which it had 
enjoyed previously. The commitment to the nuclear force has been 
reinforced by, and indeed is in large part a result of, the state's 
commitment to Great Power status. At the same time, the technical 
success of the nuclear project has in turn encouraged these pretensions 
to international prestige, and thus delayed the process of reappraisal 
and adjustment in Britain's role in the world. 
In the war years and the decade that followed (1940-55), Britain's 
involvement with nuclear weapons was seen by its leaders as an essential 
component of being a Great Power. At the end of World War Two, with the 
defeat of Japan and Germany and the weakness of France and China, Britain 
was clearly if temporarily the world's number three power. It still 
possessed a worldwide empire, and in 1945 participated actively in the 
Yalta and Potsdam conferences which presided over the division of postwar 
Europe. The decision to go ahead with an independent nuclear project, 
formally taken in 1947, must be seen in the light of the general 
understanding at the time that Britain would continue to be a world power 
indefinitely. If the United States and the Soviet Union saw nuclear 
forces as essential for their own security - as they clearly did -Britain 
also needed a nuclear force of its own. Otherwise, in the words of Lord 
Cherwell, one of the most influential officials on nuclear matters in 
this early period, Britain would "sink to the rank of a second-class 
nation. " (1) 
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By buttressing a national self-image based on influence and power 
rather than prosperity, the nuclear force has been an important element 
in the ruling elite's world-view. Moreover, the commitment to the 
nuclear force has not only been overwhelmingly supported by the 
traditional 'Establishment' - senior civil servants, the armed forces, 
the Conservative Party. It has also helped to legitimise the priority 
given to international status in mass politics, and within the labour 
movement in particular. Through the first two postwar decades, the 
Labour Party's leadership was as committed to Britain's world role as the 
Conservatives, reflecting the strength of imperialist views within the 
working class itself. Although subsequent Labour governments, in 1964-70 
and 1974-79, have chosen to publicly play down the independent nature of 
Britain's nuclear force, this has been a result of internal party 
divisions. Until 1979, no substantive difference existed on nuclear 
weapons policy between the leadership of the two major parties. A 
significant minority in the Labour Party had opposed Britain's nuclear 
commitment since the late 1950s. Only during the period since 1980, 
however, has the bipartisan consensus at leadership level been 
undermined. 
In explaining Britain's continuing commitment to an independent 
nuclear force, an important role was also played by bureaucratic 
momentum. Britain was the first country to consider that an atomic bomb 
was a practical possibility. The extensive effort put into the nuclear 
programme meant that, by the time a formal decision to produce a bomb was 
taken in 1947, it had a considerable alliance of vested interests built 
up in its favour. Partly because of the secretive nature of decision- 
making, this lobby had a major advantage in internal government debates. 
Those who might have been most sceptical of a nuclear programme have not 
usually been included in these debates. Indeed even leading members of 
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the Cabinet were often unaware of crucial discussions. Those few critics 
who were involved in the internal debate often found their access to 
information reduced as their opposition became clear. 
The importance of 'momentum' must be seen, however, within the 
framework of the over-arching commitment of the state and ruling elite to 
a Great Power role. It has been the strength of that commitment and the 
unwillingness to challenge prevailing perceptions of Britain's 
appropriate world role, rather than the momentum behind an individual 
project, that has ensured the nuclear force's survival. The lack of a 
crisis sufficiently great to destroy the dominant paradigms of external 
policy has meant that adjustment to economic decline in foreign and 
defence policy has been slow and reluctant. This reluctance has been 
reflected in nuclear weapons policy. Indeed, during some periods, 
notably in the late 1950s and early 1960s, an increased emphasis on the 
independent nuclear force was used to conceal the decline in Britain's 
world role in other respects. 
Not all commentators would agree, however, with the interpretation 
of Britain's nuclear commitment presented in this thesis. In a recent 
book, for example, Peter Malone argues, for "the primacy of security over 
political considerations in British nuclear weapons policy. " He argues 
that neither the 'special relationship' nor prestige considerations - 
which for Britain have been closely connected -have been crucial. (2) 
The contrasting merits of 'prestige' and 'security' arguments 
depends in part on definitions, as Andrew Pierre has pointed out: 
"one of the salient characteristics of the nuclear 
age is that, more so than in the past, military 
power has been politicized and international 
politics have become militarized. To engage in 
debate, as has so often been done, on whether the 
British nuclear force has been maintained for 
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reasons of status or security is sterile and 
fruitless. The answer is both and the 'mix' has 
varied at different times" (3) 
What is clear is that, in defining security and status, Britain's 
relations with its Allies have played a role as, or more, important than 
those with the Soviet Union. The maintenance of a special relationship 
with the US, together with a leading military role in Europe and Asia, 
have been perceived as necessary for both security and status. 
The discussion of Malone's argument is complicated by the peculiar 
nature of the security which nuclear weapons endow. For such security is 
only achieved if deterrence 'works' and the weapons are never used. 
Those who believe Britain's nuclear force has contributed to security 
thus argue that it has 'kept the peace for forty years' precisely because 
it has never had to be used. 
Such an explanation does offer important insights into the role of 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, it can be argued that the military posture as a 
whole, functions in large part as a political signal. Yet by itself it is 
inadequate. It fails to explain why Britain has developed nuclear 
weapons while most other states have not done so. In particular, It does 
not tell us why nations under greater immediate threat - such as West 
Germany - have abstained from a national nuclear option. Only by also 
examining the political role Britain sought within the Western alliance 
can one appreciate its commitment to an independent nuclear force. 
The period since World War Two has been one of continual decline 
for Britain's rulers. As other second-rank powers recovered from war, it 
soon became clear that Britain's international ranking was considerably 
diminished. Partly because of the heavy burden of its overseas 
commitments, it failed to keep pace with the economic 'miracles' in Japan 
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and Western Europe. In addition, after Indian Independence in 1947, it 
became increasingly clear that the Empire was set on a long course of 
disintegration. For the next two decades, culminating in the 1968 
decision to withdraw from most remaining 'East of Suez' commitments, the 
long retreat from world status was a central element of defence policy. 
During this period of retreat, the nuclear force played an 
important political role. It sustained the morale of the ruling class, 
and was seen as a means of guaranteeing Britain's position as the United 
States' most important, a))y. It disguised the extent of decline by 
encouraging the perception that Britain was still a military Great Power. 
It helped to encourage an emphasis on military strength as Britain's 
main area of relative advantage compared with, economically more healthy, 
countries such as Japan and West Germany. Even in the 1980s, with the 
Empire gone and Britain now one of the weaker middle-rank powers, the 
Thatcher government has shown that the desire to use military strength to 
maintain the illusion of Great Power status has not yet disappeared. 
Since the beginning of the century, however, Britain's rulers have 
been aware that its continued world status has been dependent on the 
support, or at least tolerance, of the United States. (4) By 1941 that 
dependence had become brutally clear. The war against Germany could not 
have been continued without US financial, and then military, support. 
The British Empire itself could not survive after the war, if the US 
chose to undermine it. 
A foreign and defence policy based upon an alliance with the US, 
moreover, had unique advantages which a long term pact with Germany -or 
still less with the Soviets - would not have created. It allowed a 
relatively smooth transition from the Pax Britannica, on which the 
structure of British society and the attitudes of its elites had been 
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based, to a new world order. For, like the Pax Britannica, a world 
dominated by the US would be based on free trade and capital movements, 
enforced by maritime supremacy. In contrast, alliances with Germany or 
the Soviet Union would have had to reconcile Britain's interests with the 
protected markets, and continental military power on which those nations' 
economic strength was based. The cultural and personal links, and 
political affinity, with the US provided an additional, though probably 
subsidiary, incentive for a trans-Atlantic alliance. The common political 
system of the two nations, capitalist democracy, and their common 
language, English, made an alliance widely acceptable in a way in which 
alternative alignments, for example with Nazi Germany, would certainly 
not have been. 
Britain's rulers recognized, from 1943 onwards if not before, that 
in any post-war alignment with the US it was bound to be a junior 
partner. The US's vastly superior industrial and military capabilities, 
demonstrated in the war effort, would ensure that. They were also 
anxious, however, that Britain should not be entirely subordinate to 
American policy and priorities, and should retain some influence over 
common policy. This wish was made more pressing because most of the 
ruling class - personified in the strongly pro-imperial Winston Churchill 
- had until recently believed in the possibility of restoring the 'Golden 
Age' of 19th century British power. Through the war years, Churchill 
therefore fought a protracted campaign to ensure that, although the Pax 
Britannia could not be restored, it could be reincarnated - in the shape 
of a 'Pax Anglo-Americanal in which Britain would play an important role 
as a junior partner. This objective implied a permanent 'special 
relationship' between the two nations. The extraordinarily close wartime 
military co-operation, which went far beyond normal ties between allies 
and amounted almost to full integration, was seen by Churchill as the 
precursor for a post-war world order. 
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Britain's postwar special relationship with the US depended, 
however, on its exclusive nature. Thus Churchill was to insist that 
France be denied access to the nuclear secrets shared by the US and 
UK. Even more emphatically, Britain opposed moves towards 
conciliation between the two emerging superpowers, and urged instead a 
policy for 'containment' of the Soviet Union. British leaders were 
suspicious of American proposals which suggested the possibility of a 
postwar entente with Stalin. They feared that such an understanding 
would greatly diminish Britain's value as a junior partner of the US 
and might involve the sacrifice of perceived British interests in 
Europe and in the Empire. (5) 
Nuclear weapons played a central part in Churchill's vision of 
the post-war alliance. By freely making available to the US the 
results of the Maud Report - the first official report to recognize 
the feasibility of bomb production - Britain had accelerated the 
Manhattan Project. Wartime nuclear co-operation led Churchill and 
Roosevelt to envisage a postwar world dominated by an Anglo-American 
monopoly of atomic air power - much as the Royal Navy had been the basis 
of British power, in the 19th century. This understanding was embodied 
in the 1943 Quebec Agreement and the 'aide memoirel of 1944, in which 
the close and exclusive nuclear relationship was set out. - 
Britain's strong commitment to nuclear interdependence was 
demonstrated clearly in the policies followed immediately after World 
War Two ended. The US, under its new President Harry Truman, had 
reduced the degree of military co-operation from war-time levels, and 
virtually frozen any nuclear collaboration, in clear breach of the recent 
agreements between Churchill and Roosevelt. Even when the US decided to 
adopt a doctrine of containment, and NATO had been formed, the exchange 
of nuclear weapons information remained minimal. Not until 1954 did the 
- 34 - 
flow of such information increase significantly; and only after the 1958 
Mutual Defence Agreement did it return to war-time levels. Yet, 
throughout thirteen years of what Britain perceived as a breach of war- 
time agreements, the UK continued to be a loyal partner to the US in 
virtually every area of its foreign and defence policy. Indeed this 
longstanding loyalty was the main reason why, in 1958, co-operation was 
eventually restored and has continued albeit with some hiccups, to the 
present day. 
The resilience of Britain's nuclear relationship with the US can 
thus only be understood in the context of the wider complex of 
relationships that have reinforced Britain's importance to US objectives 
and alliances, and have cemented Britain's commitment to the Atlantic 
Alliance. Throughout the post-war period Britain has made a major 
contribution to the West's worldwide military capability, consistently 
spending a greater proportion of its national income on defence than any 
other ally with the exception of the US. In the first two decades, it 
played a major supporting role in the containment of Communism and 
national liberation movements in Asia, sending in troops to major wars in 
Korea and Malaysia. In Europe, it had a pivotal role in the formation of 
NATO, made considerable economic sacrifices to maintain permanent armed 
forces in Germany, and consistently supported the US's leadership within 
NATO even when other members, notably France, questioned that 
leadership. 
Britain's commitment to close ties with the US has perhaps been 
most clearly demonstrated by its willingness to act as a major base 
for US strategic nuclear forces. In the late 1940s, at a time when US 
support for Britain's independent force was minimal, it agreed to the 
stationing of B29 bombers at British bases. During these early years, 
the US became heavily dependent on the availability of UK airfields from 
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which to launch nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union in the event of 
war. Yet, far from seeking reciprocal concessions for these facilities, 
the British government welcomed them enthusiastically. Even the 
Americans professed themselves surprised at the ease with which the 
planes were accepted. 
In the early 1950s, new US bomber bases were constructed in the UK, 
and a growing number of nuclear weapons came to be stored in them. The 
squadrons of US strategic aircraft were reinforced in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s by the stationing of Thor ballistic missiles and Polaris 
submarines in Britain, the latter in direct exchange for American supply 
of Skybolt missiles to Britain. Though the US nuclear press, =e in 
Britain declined in the late 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s saw a number of 
new developments. By 1984, Britain again became the only foreign country 
with a 'triad' of US land, sea and air-based strategic nuclear forces on 
its territory. 
Together with the access provided to the unique and valuable 
intelligence facilities in Britain, these bases constituted an important 
incentive for the US to support Britain's own nuclear force. Indeed, 
with Britain a constant and loyal ally, the possibility that it might one 
day wish to use its nuclear force against American wishes - which worried 
US leaders in the early 1960s - has become a subsidiary concern. The 
enthusiastic support given to President Reagan by Mrs. Thatcher, and her 
reluctance to criticise US policy even when substantial differences do 
exist, demonstrates the continued convergence of outlook which has 
provided the basis for the nuclear interdependence between the two 
nations. 
Throughout the period since World War Two, therefore, British 
nuclear policy has been based on remarkably consistent principles. It 
has been founded on the state's attempt to retain perceived Great Power 
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status. Both the continuation of the wartime alliance with the US, and 
the development and possession of an independent nuclear force, have been 
used to fulfil this objective. It has been an indication of the skill 
with which this policy has been pursued that these two instruments, 
potentially in direct contradiction, have instead complemented each 
other. For the independent nuclear force has enabled Britain's leaders 
to believe they can speak with the US from a privileged position within 
the Western alliance, and thus reinforced the view that a special 
relationship still exists. And the unique military facilities and 
political loyalty that Britain has been willing to provide as part of 
that relationship has in turn cemented American willingness to support 
Britain's own nuclear forces. 
2. Contradictions 
If Britain's nuclear weapons policy has so far been iemarkably 
consistent, however, it has not been exempt from political controversy. 
While a political consensus in favour of the independent nuclear force 
has existed through most of the period, it has never been absolute; and 
dissent has grown as the disparity between the reality of economic 
decline and pretensions of national grandeur has become steadily more 
apparent. Today, of the major political parties, only the Conservatives 
are unambiguously committed to maintain the independent force. The 
Liberal/SDP alliance is clearly divided on the issue. And in the Labour 
Party the opponents of the nuclear force appear to have consolidated 
their party's commitment to non-nuclear defence. Of all the acknowledged 
nuclear powers, Britain is now the only one in which the abandonment of 
its national nuclear force is a serious political possibility. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we outline the background to these current 
debates by looking at inherent contradictions and tensions in Britain's 
policy. These tensions, it is argued, have been recurring themes 
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throughout the nuclear force's history, and together help provide an 
explanation for its peculiar vulnerability. Chapters 7 and 8 will 
discuss in more detail the significance of the erosion of the political 
consensus on nuclear weapons. 
2.1 An Incredible Deterrent 
For Britain's nuclear force to provide any military, or in the last 
analysis political, benefit there must be a perception that it could, in 
some circumstances, be used. In order to deter a potential opponent - 
usually assumed to be the Soviet Union - from actions harmful to British 
interests, that opponent must believe that the British government might 
choose to use its nuclear force'if those actions were taken. Over and 
above this deterrent function, in order to sustain domestic political 
support for the nuclear force, there must be a general perception that 
the nuclear force could, and should, be used in certain circumstances. 
In the first postwar decade, when the Soviet Union had few if any 
deliverable nuclear weapons, the credibility of the West's nuclear forces 
on both these counts was relatively high. The US had actually used 
nuclear weapons twice against a non-nuclear power in August 1945. It was 
generally believed to be willing to use them again, on a large scale, 
against Soviet cities in the event of perceived aggression. Indeed 
evidence now available shows that the US seriously considered 
the use of nuclear weapons on several occasions in the 1940s and 1950s 
(7), Even after the Soviets tested their first nuclear device in 1949, 
and had perfected a hydrogen bomb in 1955, the US remained willing to use 
nuclear weapons first in the event of a major war. (8) Until the late 
1950s it was generally assumed that a large scale nuclear first strike 
against Soviet military and industrial targets would be the likely 
response to major Soviet aggression. Because the Soviet nuclear arsenal 
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remained clearly inferior to that of the US, and most of it could be 
destroyed in a pre-emptive attack, the US nuclear force was believed to 
constitute a credible deterrent. The people of the Western democracies 
could be convinced that nuclear deterrence was 'working'. 
However, as the period lengthened during which nuclear weapons had 
not been used, despite major wars in Asia, and as their numbers and 
destructiveness increased, the political constraints on their use grew. 
Especially after the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the subsequent rapid 
expansion in the Soviet capability to attack the US itself, the 
credibility of nuclear deterrence clearly declined. As nuclear weapons 
became increasingly perceived as harbingers of universal holocaust, 
public acceptance of the policy of nuclear deterrence became dependent on 
the belief that the weapons would never actually have to be used. 
Since the West's security policy was based on the assumption that, 
in order to deter, it must be willing to implement its threats to use 
nuclear weapons, however, this condition created severe problems. It 
meant that, in periods during which the perceived likelihood of war had 
increased, public support for nuclear deterrence policy would decline - 
as it did in the early 1960s and again in the early 1980s. It also meant 
that, given the continuing growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, US 
threats to use nuclear weapons first were increasingly believed either to 
be dangerous or to be bluff. The considerable political and military 
value derived from possessing nuclear weapons, which the US had enjoyed 
in the early postwar years, had now considerably declined as a result of 
both the US's own unwillingness to use these weapons even against non- 
nuclear opponents and the Soviets' development of its own nuclear 
capability which made the US itself vulnerable to nuclear destruction. 
It is thus a notable paradox of British policy that, during the 
period when the policy of nuclear deterrence was most credible, Britain 
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itself had no strategic nuclear force of its own. While nuclear 
deterrence played an important part in Britain's defence policy 
throughout this period, particularly after the 1952 Global Strategy 
Paper, it was not until the late 1950s that its nuclear arsenal took on 
significant proportions. Between 1956 and 1961, the number of warheads 
in Britain's possession increased from 14 to 195. (9) And, coinciding 
with this buildup, the Defence White Papers of 1957 and 1958 increased 
the public emphasis on the value of Britain's 'independent deterrent'. 
Just as reliance on nuclear weapons was increasingly coming under 
question as incredible and unacceptable, therefore, Britain seemed to 
move further towards such a policy. 
There is general agreement that it'was in the first postwar decade, 
when Britain did not possess an independent nuclear force, that its 
political influence and prestige was greatest. With Germany and Japan 
disarmed and their economies devastated, and other medium powers in 
turmoil, Britain was clearly, albeit temporarily, the West's number two 
power. Although costly, the special relationship still appeared to 
afford Britain some influence over US policy in Asia and Europe. 
However, although Britain's position during this period did not depend on 
possession of an independent nuclear force, its leaders believed that 
such a force was necessary to maintain Britain's Great Power status. 
This view was powerfully reinforced both by the perceived utility of the 
US's nuclear weapons during a period in which it held a nuclear monopoly, 
and by the central role played by nuclear weapons in war plans for the 
'defence' of Western Europe. 
Awareness of Britain's economic weakness reinforced the commitment 
to develop an independent nuclear force. It was seen as a relatively 
cheap means of retaining political influence and of strengthening the 
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special relationship. Combined with a Western military doctrine which 
relied primarily on nuclear deterrence, this policy, it was believed, 
would not only reduce the crippling burden of military spending on the 
domestic economy. It would also enhance the position of the US and UK, 
the two nuclear powers, within the Alliance, thus making Anglo-American 
domination of NATO permanent despite the economic recovery and military 
buildup in both France and West Germany. (10) 
From the 1952 Global Strategy Paper onwards, therefore, Britain 
played an important role in urging the US, and NATO as a whole, to adopt 
a policy of 'massive retaliation' which provided for large-scale, and 
early, use of nuclear weapons in the events of war. The adoption of this 
policy, together with British insistence on an independent nuclear force 
as an essential attribute of Great Power status, was in large part 
responsible for France's decision to follow Britain's lead and develop 
its own nuclear force. British policy during this period therefore made 
a considerable contribution to starting a process of nuclear 
proliferation which has continued to this day. 
Britain's commitment to a NATO policy of 'massive retaliation' was 
thus in large part a response to the problem of retaining Britain's 
influence within the Western alliance despite the decline in its relative 
economic position, and therefore in the resources available for defence. 
It therefore proved relatively insensitive to the growing doubts about 
the credibility of nuclear deterrence expressed in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. These doubts convinced the US, especially after John 
Kennedy's election in 1960, to press for a revision of the policy of 
reliance on early first use of nuclear weapons. The US was concerned 
that, given the growth of the Soviet arsenal, it would no longer be 
rational to use nuclear weapons in response to small-scale conventional 
aggression. With the experience of crises in Berlin and Cuba, it was 
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believed that war, while not likely, was possible. Therefore, it was 
believed, the US and its allies must have a rational policy for fighting 
such a war. For this purpose, the US proposed a policy of 'flexible 
response' involving centralised (US) control of all NATO nuclear weapons, 
no use of these weapons before conventional defences had been given a 
chance, and increased capabilities for limited nuclear warfare. (11) 
Britain was suspicious of these proposals. It was determined to 
maintain its independent nuclear force, not because it would be a useful 
contribution to US capabilities for a 'rational' nuclear war, but because 
it was thought to enhance its own political status. It opposed American 
suggestions that this force should be run down. Instead, by skilful, 
diplomacy, and the threat of a dissolution of the 'special relationship', 
it secured US supplies of Polaris missiles, effectively safeguarding the 
future of the independent force for two more decades. 
As the military justification for Britain's nuclear force became less 
credible, however, the prestige and influence which nuclear weapons 
bestowed also declined. A growing number of people were unconvinced that 
there existed circumstances in which the force could be used. It came 
increasingly to be seen by many as a marginal, rather than a central, 
part of Britain's defence effort. 
The declining credibility of nuclear deterrence in an age of Mutual 
Assured Destruction (M. A. D. ) is a problem faced by all nuclear powers. 
In public perception at least, however, it is considerably more severe 
for medium-size states. In Britain's case the force's credibility is 
further undermined by the force's dependence on the United States for 
technology, and some targetting and operations. Chapter 6 will attempt 
to disentangle if, and in what sense, Britain's force is 'independent'. 
It is sufficient to observe at this point that Britain's open dependence 
on the US for the maintenance of a weapon system, whose primary function 
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were it truly 'independent' would be to enable the British government to 
use nuclear weapons when the US did not wish it to do so, leaves it 
vulnerable to conflderable criticism. Not only does it undermine the 
force's credibility in the perception of the potential nuclear opponent, 
the Soviet Union. It has probably never been significant for them. More 
importantly, it has opened the force to scepticism and criticism from 
allies and domestic opponents who argue that, if it is not independent, 
it is of little military value. The prestige accruing from the force 
within the Western alliance, and the perception of its value to national 
defence, are thus further reduced. 
2.2 Nuclear weapons and the defence budget' 
The commitment to an independent nuclear force has always been 
vulnerable to the economic constraints on military spending. Britain has 
consistently spent a greater proportion of its national income on defence 
than any other medium-rank power in an attempt to maintain military 
capabilities out of proportion to its economic strength. Despite this, 
however, its continued relative economic decline, to which high military 
spending may itself have contributed, has created constant pressure for 
reductions in defence spending. Expenditure on the strategic nuclear 
force has not been exempt from these pressures. 
In its first years of development in the 1940s, economic pressures 
undoubtedly lengthened the period of time before Britain possessed a 
fully-fledged nuclear force. A number of senior officials, notably Henry 
Tizard, argued that reliance on the US nuclear umbrella would be more 
compatible with Britain's reduced nuclear status. (12) Not until the 
Conservatives returned to power and the Global Strategy Paper was adopted 
in 1952 was the nuclear weapons programme given top priority. 
Through'the rest of the 1950s, however, governments argued that, far 
- 43 - 
from being constrained by the country's economic weakness, Britain's 
nuclear force could, in part at least, compensate for it. Possession of 
a nuclear force would strengthen Britain's position relative to other 
medium powers and, especially after the advent of the hydrogen bomb, 
narrow the gap between itself and the two superpowers. At the same time 
the adoption of a policy of 'massive retaliation' by NATO, based on the 
West's nuclear superiority, would allow major cuts to be made in non- 
nuclear defence spending, thus releasing resources desperately needed for 
the civilian economy. 
As we have seen already, however, the development of a large Soviet 
nuclear force soon brought the credibility of this policy under severe 
question. By 1959 Britain began to face growing resistance, from the US 
and European NATO members, to cuts in its conventional forces. At, the 
same time, rapid developments in the technology of strategic delivery 
systems, and in missiles in particular, threatened to put a credible 
nuclear force beyond Britain's financial reach. During the late 1950s 
it appeared possible that Britain might soon be squeezed out of the 
nuclear arms race by the superpowers only a few years after it had 
succeeded, at great cost, in entering the nuclear club. 
This cost crisis came to a head with the cancellation of the Blue 
Streak missile project in 1960. Intended as the successor to the V- 
bomber force, which was expected to become obsolescent in-the 1960s, Blue 
Streak proved too expensive to develop. Moreover it was thought by many 
to be excessively vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and therefore 
unsuitable for Britain's 'deterrent' force. Instead Britain decided to 
abandon the attempt to maintain an independent capability for the 
manufacture of ballistic missiles and instead purchase such missiles from 
the United States. Only by relying on the US was Britain able to keep 
pace with the superpower technological arms race at a feasible cost. The 
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self-reliance which was still judged to be necessary in most conventional 
weapons was no longer thought possible for Britain's strategic nuclear 
force. 
The French ýxperience in the development of its national nuclear 
force in the 1960s presents an interesting contrast to Britain's. 
France had no pretence to a 'special relationship' with the US, and 
indeed had established that force in part because of its distrust and 
resentment at Anglo-American domination of the Alliance. Indeed de 
Gaulle's drive for a nuclear force was accompanied by an aggressively 
independent foreign policy, the expulsion of US bases and withdrawal from 
NATO's military command. As a consequence of the estrangement from NATO, 
France felt less need than Britain to maintain its conventional forces in 
response to American pressure for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. 
Indeed, after disentangling the Army from its entanglement in Algeria, de 
Gaulle pushed through massive cuts in conventional defences. (13) 
Despite a large increase in the funds devoted to the nuclear force, total 
military spending fell considerably and allowed resources to be made 
available for France's remarkable economic recovery. In contrast to the 
UK, France's nuclear force was almost completely independently 
manufactured. As a consequence France felt no obligation to tailor its 
force, or indeed defence policy as a whole, to US priorities or doctrine. 
For Britain, however, such a course of action would have been 
inconsistent with deeply rooted principles in its foreign and defence 
policies. Britain's nuclear force has always been viewed, by successive 
governments, as one element in an overall project for retaining the 
country's international prestige, which in turn relied heavily on a close 
relationship with the United States. That alliance would have come under 
severe strain if Britain's retention of a nuclear force had been 
accompanied by heavy cuts in its conventional contribution to NATO. Nor 
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would use of the nuclear force to emphasise the country's independence 
from the US - as de Gaulle had done - have been compatible with the 
continuation of the US aid to that force which had, it must be 
remembered, only resumed fully in 1958 after a break of thirteen years. 
The agreement, signed at Nassau in 1962, for the British purchase of 
Polaris missiles, was therefore a welcome reprieve for Britain's nuclear 
force. It effectively allowed Britain to avoid, at least temporarily, a 
major choice between conventional and nuclear commitments. The most 
sophisticated nuclear system then available would be provided to Britain 
at a token development cost, and total expenditure would amount to 
considerably less than that of the V-bomber force it would replace. The 
opportunity cost to Britain's conventional forces was, as a result, 
relatively small. 
For the US the agreement had the advantage, as Macmillan forcefully 
reminded Kennedy, that it preserved Britain's position as a loyal ally 
and ruled out the possibility of a British 'Gaullist option'. (14) If 
the US had refused to aid its nuclear force in the early 1960s, on the 
other hand, Britain might well have felt obliged to follow France's 
example, reducing its conventional forces to pay for a fully independent 
nuclear force and pursuing a much more independent, and therefore 
potentially anti-American, foreign policy. Such an option was not 
attractive to either the US government or to a British elite strongly 
committed to the 'special relationship'. The Nassau agreement ensured 
that it received no serious consideration. 
The reprieve which the 1982 agreement provided for Britain's 
strategic nuclear policy may prove, however, to be only temporary. 
Today, despite a 30% rise in defence spending between 1978/9 and 1984/5, 
the defence budget is again under growing strain. Britain's weak 
economy, and in particular the likelihood of declining oil revenues in 
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the late 1980s, makes further increases, in total defence spending 
unlikely in the near future. 
With pressures for increased conventional military spending unabated, 
these circumstances are bound to make Britain's programme to purchase the 
Trident system vulnerable to cancellation on cost grounds. On 
government, estimates, Trident is planned to cost E9,265 million at 
1986/7 prices - around four times the cost of the Polaris system it 
replaces. By the late 1980s, it will account for 5-6% of total defence 
spending, and over 20% of new equipment spending. As Chapter, 7 will 
explore in detail, given current plans for the total defence budget, this 
is bound to lead to major cuts in conventional equipment spending. These 
in turn are likely to jeopardise support for Britain's nuclear policy, 
not only amongst its allies, but also within Britain itself. The 
possibility of such cuts has already been responsible for considerable 
opposition to Trident in the armed forces and the Conservative Party. It 
is possible that, in the near future, the British government could decide 
that political influence within NATO, and with the US in particular, 
might be better served by preserving conventional forces. For the 
alternative will be to cut them to pay for an incredible nuclear force 
which now provides a diminishing political dividend. 
2.3 The damaging relationship? 0ý 
The 'special relationship' has been a consistent feature of Britain's 
policy since the 1940s, and a key determinant of its nuclear weapons 
policy. As well as benefits, however, it has also involved 
disadvantages. It has exposed Britain's nuclear force to the criticism 
that it has tied the country too closely to US policies and priorities in 
defence and foreign policy as a whole. In the nuclear field in 
particular, it has led to such a degree of dependence that there must be 
severe doubts as in what sense the force is 'independent'. Over time 
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these criticisms have eroded support for the nuclear force. 
During the war years, and arguably for the first postwar decade, the 
'special relationship' did at least have the advantage that it afforded 
Britain considerable influence over US policy. As Chapter 3 discusses, 
Britain played an important role in convincing the US to adopt a more 
anti-Soviet position in the critical years between 1944 and 1947, and 
subsequently in the formatiom of NATO in 1949. It also had some 
influence, albeit probably a marginal one, on the US conduct in the 
Korean War and on its decision in 1954 to delay military intervention in 
Vietnam. This period of greatest influence was achieved despite 
Britain's lack of a national nuclear force. 
As Britain's relative decline continued, however, even the limited 
degree in influence which it exercised in the early 1950s was further 
reduced. The Suez debacle of 1956 brought home to Britain its own lack 
of power and its dependence on the US. As other medium powers recovered 
from the war, and Britain's own economy failed. to match the performance 
of its rivals, the Churchillian vision of a Pax Anglo-Americana became 
increasingly unrealistic. The special relationship became even more a 
one-way affair, in that it tied the UK to uncritical support of US 
policies, without giving it any influence on what those policies were. 
As the Vietnam war in the late 1960s and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
demonstrated, Britain was incapable of exercising any restraint on US 
involvement in dangerous conflicts of which it disapproved. 
The problem is likely to become more severe in the 1980s as American 
and European perspectives on foreign policy continue to diverge. The 
US's increasingly aggressive military p'osture has created deep unease in 
many West European countries, including the UK. -Partly as a result, the 
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broad political consensus in Britain on defence policy, in existence for 
forty years, has come to an end. The current Conservative government has 
been an enthusiastic supporter of President Reagen's militant policies, 
backing cruise and Pershing II deployment, increasing defence spending by 
over 3 per cent annually, and continuing to be the US's most loyal 
European ally. But it seems certain that any alternative government, 
drawn from the Labour and/or Alliance parties, would be much less 
sympathetic to current US policy. 
Britain's independent nuclear force is bound to be vulnerable to 
these shifting trends in the relationship with the US. If Britain 
remains loyal to the US, under its current leadership, the domestic 
legitimacy of its defence policy will be further eroded. If, on the 
other hand, it adopts a more independent position the US may not continue 
to be willing to provide support for Britain's nuclear force. 
Not only does Britain's nuclear policy tie it closely to US defence 
and foreign policy as a whole. It also involves a unique form of nuclear 
dependence. Britain is the only-country in the world which both 
possesses its own nuclear force and allows another country to station 
nuclear weapons on its soil. Moreover, primarily for political rather 
than military reasons, it is the only country, with the exception of the 
US itself, to accept a complete 'triad' of American strategic nuclear 
forces: F111 aircraft, Poseidon submarines and ground-launched cruise 
missiles. US aid to Britaints own nuclear force is undoubtedly closely 
linked, implicitly and at times explicity, to continued British 
acceptance of the bases for these forces. 
Yet the presence of these bases in Britain involves considerable 
political and security risks. As opinion polls show, they are unpopular 
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amongst a large proportion of the general public. In addition, if a 
nuclear conflict were to occur, they would constitute high priority 
targets in a Soviet pre-emptive strike. 
The presence of US bases, together with the dependence of Britain's 
own force on the US, erodes support of current policy both from a 
nationalist and from an Atlanticist position. Those who would prefer a 
more nationalist defence policy argue against dependence on the US and 
support either a system of British control over US weapons based here or 
their removal altogether. Those who believe in close ties with the US 
argue that Britain should rely on the US to provide a 'nuclear umbrella', 
and not divert large sums from conventional defence to finance a super- 
sophisticated independent nuclear force. The ambiguities and 
contradictions in Britain's nuclear relationship with the US have, 
therefore, helped leave its independent force peculiarly vulnerable and 
friendless. 
Finally, Britain's commitment to an independent nuclear force, and 
its determination to meet that commitment through co-operation with the 
US, has from its inception been in contradiction to its hopes of closer 
ties with the rest of Europe. Churchill's wartime project for a Pax 
Anglo-Americana backed by nuclear air power explicity excluded not only 
the Soviet Union but also France. In the decade immediately after the 
war, Britain's policy of using nuclear weapons to retain a privileged 
position within the Alliance was certain to be resented by other 
European powers. British decisions to stay outside the European Defence 
Community in 1950, and outside the EEC in 1957, were largely motivated by 
a national self-image aligned more to the Empire and the Atlantic 
Alliance than to continental Europe. Even after the EEC accepted Britain 
into membership in 1973, the military alignment with the US seemed to be 
in contradiction to the economic and political pressures for increased 
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West European co-operation. 
A possible solution has existed for some time to this dilemma: a 
switch from Anglo-American nuclear co-operation to co-operation with 
France. Such an alignment could make use of France's experience with 
ballistic missiles - the main area in which Britain has little expertise. 
It could in the long term provide the basis for a West European nuclear 
force. This would, its advocates argue, be a more credible deterrent 
than the US nuclear umbrella as it would be employed in 'defence' of the 
homelands of those who controlled it. In addition it would give a major 
impetus to European military and political co-operation in general, and 
enable Europe to pursue a foreign policy genuinely independent of the 
US. 
However, despite these supposed attractions, such an option would 
involve such difficulties that it is unlikely to be adopted in the near 
future. The effect of a break with the US would be disruptive and 
traumatic. And even, while it would appear to align Britain's military 
posture more clearly with its economic interests, it would produce other 
problems of its own. It would be unlikely to be cheaper than reliance on 
the US. Indeed, if an attempt were made to transform Europe into a 
third nuclear superpower, it would be much more expensive. In addition, 
such a course would inevitably involve West Germany influence, if not 
control, over nuclear weapons policy, and could create increased 
strategic instability. 
Although not a serious possibility at present, support for this 
policy does serve to underline the contradiction between Britain's close 
military relationship with the US and its commitment to European co- 
operation. As such, it constitutes a further source of weakness for both 
the special relationship and for current nuclear weapons policy. 
Although now relatively unimportant, the tensions between an Atlantic and 
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a European alignment could become increasingly significant if either the 
general direction of US policy became unacceptable to the British 
government or a renewed drive for European political and military union 
developed. If both occurred simultaneously, it is difficult to believe 
that Britain's independent nuclear force, in its current form, could 
remain unaffected. 
Conclusions 
Britain's commitment to a national nuclear force has been a 
consistent feature of its defence policy since World War Two. It has 
been supported by governments of both major parties, reflecting the 
underlying consensus between Conservative and Labour on the basic 
objectives of foreign and defence policy. 
Britain's nuclear weapons policy can, in large part, be understood by 
its commitment to the status of a Great Power in the years after World 
War Two, and by the recognition that some form of close alliance with the 
United States would be a prerequisite for achieving this ambition. 
Together, these dual objectives help to explain why Britain's nuclear 
force has, on the one hand, been used to emphasise the state's 
independent world role and status yet, on the other hand, has been 
closely integrated with, and indeed dependent upon, US technology and 
strategy. For nuclear interdependence with the US is not simply an 
unfortunate necessity forced on Britain by economic circumstances. It 
has also been a reflection of the more general perception that only by a 
close 'special relationship' with the US could Britain retain the degree 
of political influence to which, it is widely believed, its historical 
experience entitlesit. 
As Britain's relative economic and military decline continued through 
the 1950s and 1960s, however, the wartiýe vision of a Pax Anglo- 
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Americana, the basis of the 'special' relationship, ' was increasingly 
seen as an unattainable dream. British governments were forced, 
reluctantly, into a series of adjustments in defence policy most notably I 
in line with the country's reduced the withdrawal from East of Suez, 
economic resources. 
There has never been a complete domestic political consensus in 
favour of Britain's nuclear force. Much more than in other nuclear 
weapon states, Britain's commitment to such a force has been an object of 
political controversy. Although it was not until the 1980s that the 
leader of a major political party has taken a position clearly opposed to 
an independent nuclear force, the erosion in the public consensus can be 
traced back to the intensive debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Only the government's success in achieving favourable terms in the 1962 
Nassau agreement, together with the general easing of, Cold War tension 
after the Cuba crisis, enabled the pressure against nuclear weapons to 
abate. Since that time both the independent nuclear force and the 
special nuclear relationship with the US have remained secure from the 
long term process of adjustment to reduced economic status. 
Although the national nuclear force survived, the debate of the 
period from the late 1950s to the early 1960s had highlighted a series of 
contradictions in Britain's nuclear policies which would continue to 
erode its support, and would emerge with force in the 1980s. Firstly, 
there were severe doubts whether any circumstances existed in which 
Britain's nuclear weapons could be used if the US was unwilling to use 
its own. For, once the Soviet Union had acquired a substantial nuclear 
arsenal of its own, such an action would be instantly suicidal. And 
reliance on US technology and targetting plans further increased 
scepticism that it would even be technically possible. 
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Secondly, the special nuclear relationship with the US not only meant 
dependence on that country for equipment for, and maintenance of, the 
national nuclear force. It also required general loyalty to US global 
policy, the acceptance of US nuclear bases on British soil and severe 
constraints on Britain's ability to articulate clearly national 
justifications for its nuclear force. Thus a relationship intended to 
protect Britain's Great Power status has also emphasised its lack of 
independence and subordination to American plans and priorities. The 
long-term, if faltering, trend towards European co-operation, 
especially after Britain entered the EEC in 1973, only makes this 
subordination more acutely difficult to justify. 
Thirdly, the national nuclear force has been seen by many of its 
proponents as only one factor in Britain's special relationship and in 
its quest for a major role within the Western Alliance. It has therefore 
always been vulnerable to criticism when its existence appears to be at 
the expense of other components of the country's military efforts. Unlike 
France, where there is a greater willingness to concentrate a large 
proportion of the defence budget on nuclear forces, Britain's commitment 
to a national 'deterrent' depends on its relative cheapness. With its 
economy in decline, and the costs of the latest nuclear weapons 
technology rising steeply, it may not always be possible for Britain to 
reconcile its nuclear and non-nuclear military objectives. 
The Trident programme has brought all these contradictions to the 
surface in the 1980s. The debate on Trident has coincided with a 
increased level of tension between the superpowers, and with the closely 
related revival of peace and anti-nuclear movements throughout the 
Western world. These new movements have criticised the morality, and the 
rationality, of a 'defence' policy based on threats which, if ever 
carried out, would be both genocidal and suicidal. 
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Moreover by the 1980s, much more so than in the debate in the 1960s, 
the idea that Britain can be seen as a Great Power is widely viewed as 
absurd. Only a few residual possessions remain from the Empire, and the 
Falklands War is widely viewed as a tragic anomaly in an era during which 
Britain's security interests are overwhelmingly in Europe. And, with the 
US government adopting an increasingly independent and controversial 
strategic nuclear policy, support for a close relationship with the US is 
probably at a historic low. 
Trident is certain to involve a major increase in nuclear weapons 
spending in the late 1980s, during a period of static or falling total 
defence spending. For the two decades since Nassau, the fragile 
political consensus for the national nuclear force has been reliant on 
nuclear weapons remaining cheap. With Trident currently estimated to 
cost over four times the weapon system it replaces, support for the 
nuclear force is declining markedly. Long-standing anti-nuclear 
politicians have been join-eJ-- by a large body of opinion, including many 
on the Centre and Right of politics, who consider that Britain can no 
longer afford a nuclear force. 
As a result of the convergence of all these factors, the political 
consensus on defence policy, and on nuclear weapons in particular, has 
now been breached more decisively than at any time since the Second World 
War. The Labour Party, together with large sections of the Liberal 
Party, is now firmly opposed to the maintenance of a national nuclear 
force. If the Conservatives lose the next General Election, Trident will 
almost certainly be cancelled. If it is, it is unlikely that Britain's 
independent nuclear force can be sustained beyond the 1990s. The fate of 
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that force now depends, therefore, on the vagaries of an electoral 
process in which defence issues may play a minor role. It may survive 
that proce'ss. Only time will tell. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1940-55 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the years in which Britain developed 
its first nuclear weapons. It starts with the Maud Report, the first 
government-sponsored document in any country to consider that an atomic 
bomb was a practical possibility. It outlines the relationship between 
the British nucleýr weapons programme and British foreign and defence 
policy as a whole during the subsequent fifteen years of development, 
years which laid the foundations for the defence policies on which 
Britain relies today. 
The early sections of the chapter look at the drastic consequences 
for the British state of the events of World War Two, and how it chose to 
respond to these problems. In particular, it examines the acceleration 
in the decline of Britain's economic and political power which this 
conflict brought, and how this influenced the country's relationship with 
the two emerging 'superpowers'. It then discusses the role of nuclear 
weapons in the context of these overall developments in British policy. 
The chapter argues that many of the key features of Britain's nuclear 
programme can be understood by an appreciation of the importance of the 
$special relationship' with the United States in the fulfilment of UK 
postwar objectives. It shows how Britain, during the formative years of 
the Cold War, consistently attempted to, involve the US in a Pax Anglo- 
Americana, a central part of which would be its commitment to the 
'containment' of Soviet influence and power, both in Europe and 
elsewhere. 
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2. The War Years 1940-45 
2.1 Coping with Decline - British objectives for the Postwar 
World 
The World War dramatically exposed the overextended - and in the 
long run untenable'- nature of Britain's international position. Even 
before the start of the war, in the late 1930's, the Treasury had warned 
that high military spending was threatening economic stability: 
"Defence expenditure is now at a level which must 
seriously call into question the country's ability to 
meet it, and a continuance at this level may well 
result in a situation in which the completion of our 
material preparations against attack is frustrated by 
a weakening of our economic stability, which renders 
us incapable of standing the strain of war or even 
maintaining those material defences in peace". (1) 
Once 'total war' began, and Britain was forced to fight Hitler 
without allies, the situation deteriorated quickly and seriously. By 
summer 1940 the country's dollar reserves had been almost entirely 
depleted and the country faced imminent bankruptcy. A large proportion of 
Britain's overseas assets hadto be sold off, often at knockdown prices. 
All fresh purchasing from abroad had to be stopped shortly before the 
granting of Lend Lease by the US Congress in March 1941. (2) Without US 
assistance, there must be considerable doubt whether Britain could have 
avoided the choice between a likely military defeat or a negotiated peace 
with Hitler. 
When in 1941 the United States and Soviet Union entered the war 
against the Axis powers, Britain's relative decline became even more 
apparent. The massive US rearmament programme soon meant that, in 
addition to financing a large part of the British effort through Lend 
Lease, its own military power surpassed that of the UK. In the East 
Stalin's success in averting defeat in 1941 or 1942, apparently 
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against American expectations, (3) ensured-its place as a post-war 
'superpower'. While Britain remained one of a number of medium sized 
powers - perhaps even primus inter pares if one excludes the superpowers - 
the reins of global power were now clearly passing to the United States, 
and to a lesser extent to the Soviet Union. The British establishment 
remained nevertheless strongly committed at this time to a continued role 
for their country as a Great Power with a world military role, influence 
in continental Europe, and continued possession of a world-wide Empire. 
While many ordinary British people fought in the war to defeat Fascism and 
the threat to their own homes, for their leaders the preservation of the 
British Empire was a central objective of that war. (4) Indeed so 
important was the priority given to imperial over domestic economic 
concerns, that Churchill constantly argued for a greater British role in 
the war in Asia, despite the economic costs involved. (5) 
British objectives for the postwar world thus reflected its 
traditional concerns as a Great Power, modified to take account of new 
international circumstances. First was the preservation of its Empire in 
the Far East, India, the Middle East and Africa: the basis of Britain's 
claim to Great Power status. Second was to avoid the dominance of the 
European continent by a potentially hostile power. With the projected 
demise of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union was the obvious candidate for 
this role. Finally was the restoration of a world economic order 
favourable to the interests of British capital. This, it was believed, 
required restoration of free trade and capital flows and a stable 
international monetary order. 
A necessary, and central, condition for the achievement of these 
three objectives was, it was believed, the acceptance by the United States 
of its leading economic, and probably military, role in the worldspfem. 
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British leaders hoped that, in such a system, its continued military power 
and political influence would enable it to retain a privileged position - 
a 'special relationship' - as a junior partner in this enterprise. The 
successful Pax Britannica of the mid-19th century could be a model for a 
new, and equally successful, Pax Anglo-Americana. 
Given the US's superiority in economic and military resources, 
British leaders were well aware that its acquiescence would be essential 
if Britain were to preserve its overseas Empire. Moreover, in Europe 
itself, British policymakers did not believe that the UK alone could act 
as a counterweight to the military strength - or ideological appeal - of 
the Soviet Union, particularly since France, Germany and Italy would be 
gravely weakened in the aftermath of war. Finally, the struggle against 
fascism during the war had created an upsurge of popular support for 
radical change in Europe and European-controlled colonies. This support 
threatened the continued existence, not only of the British Empire, but of 
capitalism itself, over large parts of the world. A repetition of the 
recession that followed the 1914-18 war could thus have disastrous 
political consequences for the West. US leadership - through economic 
aid, currency reform and international monetary agreements - would be 
essential in restoring European economics and containing the threat to 
Britain's interests worldwide. 
During the war these British objectives were partially fulfilled. 
The entry of the US into the conflict against Hitler in 1941 ended its 
previous isolation'ist policy. President Roosevelt made it clear in 
private that he believed that the US should take a major 'policing' role 
in the postwar world. (6) Britain's aspirations were also gratified by 
its own presence at the wartime conferences between the 'Big Three' which 
decided wartime, and latterly postwar, strategy and , policy. 
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Moreover, although Roosevelt continued to keep his options open on 
postwar relations with the Soviets, the war was already cementing a 
uniquely close relationship between the US and UK. The integration of 
military planning, intelligence operations, and ecootomic planning was 
considerably closer than in a traditional alliance, and fuelled British 
hopes of a permanent partnership after the war. (7) This 'special 
relationship' stood in marked contrast to the secretive and separate 
manner in which the other Ally - Stalin - was conducting his share of the 
war against Hitler. 
At the same time, however, there was also considerable strain 
between the two countries which heightened British fears that its post-war 
objectives would not be met. Firstly there was apprehension at the 
opposition of many Americans to British colonialism and, indeed, to any 
major postwar world role for Britain. Secondly, the US remained reluctant 
to accept, at least to the same extent, the UK's fears of Soviet 
expansionism, or to alter Western policy for the prosecution of the war in 
Europe to meet those fears. 
In the first area, British leaders feared that the US was committed 
to the dismantling of old European empires, including their own, after the 
war. Britain ha&Already been forced to abandon its system of imperial 
preference in return for lend lease aid, thus opening protected markets to 
penetration by US business. It was feared that US capital would push 
Britain out of one area of the world after another if its colonies were 
given independence. As the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, commented, 
the Americans hoped that ex-colonies "once free of their masters, would 
become politically and economically dependent upon the United States". 
(8) 
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Roosevelt was blunt in his views, reflecting an antagonism towards 
an Empire in revolt against which, it must be remembered, the US itself 
was formed. In 1941, Roosevelt is reported to have told Churchill that: 
"I can't believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery and at 
the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward 
colonial policy". (9), At the Cairo conference two years later he told 
him "You have four hundred years of acquisitive instinct in your blood and 
you just don't understand how a country might not want to acquire land 
somewhere if they can get it". (10) 
Conflict in the second area - the strategy, for the war in Europe - 
became particularly acute in the last two years of the war. It was by 
this time clear, after the German defeat at Stalingrad, that Hitler would 
eventually be crushed. En route to Tehran in November 1943, Churchill 
told Harold MacMillan "Germany is finished, though it may take some time 
to clean up the mess. The real problem now is Russia. I can't get the 
Americans to see it". (11) By August 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff 
were speaking of Russia as "enemy number one" and even considering 
securing German assistance against her. (12) 
As a result of these fears, Britain pressed strongly for an Anglo- 
American Policy that would keep the Red Army as far east as possible. It 
urged a rapid military push through the Balkans in order to reach Prague 
and Vienna before the Soviets. While Eisenhower, the US commander-in- 
chief, emphasised his primary military objective - the defeat of Germany - 
Montgomery, the British commander, emphasised the political consequences 
for post-war Europe of military strategy during the war. 
The solutions of the strains between the US and Britain in these 
two areas were closely linked. British leaders believed that, to the 
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extent that the US could be persuaded to join in a policy of 'containment' 
of the Soviets in Europe, it would also gain a greater interest in both 
the viability of the British economy and the contribution of its imperial 
"peacekeeping" forces in preventing rebellion by anti-Western forces in 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Britain's Ambassador to Washington, 
Lord Halifax, summarised a generally held view in 1945: Britain's "stocks 
in the United States appreciate when those of the Soviet Union decline". 
(13) 
2.2 The beginnings of Britain's nuclear weapons project 
It is within the general context set out in the previous section 
that Britain's initial decisions regarding nuclear weapons must be set. 
The ruling elite - both Labour and Conservative -shared the assumptions 
that Britain should remain a Great Power, that a close relationship with 
the US would be a necessary condition for the fulfilment of this aim, and 
that the interests of such an alliance would probably be opposed to the 
ideological and territorial objectives of the post war Soviet Union. The 
commi, t, ment to the development of an independent British nuclear force 
once such a development was technically feasible was largely a result of 
the perceived requirement to remain a Great Power. The particular forms 
which this commitment took, however, were closely related to the means 
whereby the requirement was met - i. e. alliance with the United State in a 
policy of containment of the Soviet Union. At the same time, US wartime 
policy towards the British project also reflected their general 
ambivalence towards Churchill's attempts to give Britain a privileged 
position in such a postwar alliance. 
The beginnings of Britain's nuclear weapons programme can be traced 
to the late 1930s, when the first serious suggestions that an atomic bomb 
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might be technically possible began to circulate. On the eve of war, in 
1939, a series of articles appeared in the open scientific literature on 
new discoveries in nuclear physics, prompting C. P. Snow to write "Some 
physicists think that within a few months, science will have produced for 
military use an explosive a million times more violent than dynamite. It 
is no secret .... It may not come off (14) 
A crucial turning point came in 1940 with a short memorandum - on 
three typed foolscap pages - by two refugee scientists working in Britain, 
Otto Frisch and Rudolph Peierls. In their memorandum, they argued that an 
atomic bomb was feasible, suggested some of the basic requirements for its 
construction, and outlined a possible method for production of its raw 
material. They concluded by estimating that the radioactive fall-out 
produced would kill everybody in a strip several miles long, and arguing 
that "Effective protection is hardly possible". (15) 
By this time, Britain was already at war. The Frisch-Peierls 
memorandum received prompt attention by government, and a Committee of 
leading scientists was set up to co-ordinate further work. The "Maud 
Committee", as it was named, worked with considerable efficiency, 
heightened by the pressures of war and the possibility that Germany might 
acquire an atomic weapon first. By July 1941, the Committee was ready to 
conclude that: "As we proceeded, we became more and more convinced that 
release of atomic energy on a large scale is possible and that conditions 
can be chosen which would make it a very effective weapon of war .... we 
consider that the destructive effect, both material and moral, is so great 
that every effort should be made to produce bombs of this kind.... 
Even if the war should end before the bombs are ready the effort would not 
be wasted, except in the unlikely event of complete disarmament, since no 
nation would care to risk being caught without such a weapon of such 
decisive possibilities. " (16) 
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As a result of the Maud Committee's work, Britain led the world in 
the race to produce the atomic bomb through 1940 and 1941. Indeed it is 
extremely doubtful whether, without its preparatory work, an American bomb 
would have been ready in time for use against Japan. (17) 
The recommendation that Britain produce an atomic bomb was 
forwarded to Prime Minister Churchill who, on 30 August 1941, wrote: 
"Although personally I am quite content with the existing explosives, I 
feel we must not stand in the path of improvement. " Four days later the 
Chiefs of Staff urged that the project be given top priority, and that it 
should be conducted in Britain and not abroad. (18) 
From its very inception, Britain's nuclear programme was developed 
within the framework of its special relationship with the United States. 
Even before Churchill had himself approved the conclusions of the Maud 
Report a copy had been sent to the United States government although it 
had not yet formally joined Britain in the war against Germany. (19) 
During the same period the UK Minister of Aircraft Production, 
Colonel Moore-Brabazon, articulated what appears to have been the emerging 
official consensus when he argued that the new weapon presented the world 
with the real possibility of an international police force. If the bomb 
proved effective, he argued, America and. Britain could jointly control the 
world. They would, through this control, be able to know if other 
countries were working towards the bomb and take measures to stop them. 
(20) 
Three months after Churchill's decision to proceed with the atomic 
bomb project, on December 6th, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and the 
Americans entered the war. Partly as a result, the US government began to 
devote massive resources to their own nuclear programme; and within six 
months they had overtaken the less lavishly financed British effort. 
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In late 1941, the British has been reluctant to respond to American 
proposals for a combined Anglo-American project. By mid 1942, as the US 
surged ahead, the incentives to the latter of such a programme fell 
rapidly. By underestimating the scientific and industrial capabilities 
of the US, and thus failing to understand their own relatively weak long- 
term position, the British had missed a short-lived opportunity to 
establish a joint project on equal terms. Henceforth British 
participation in such a project, when it, came, would be in a clearly 
subordinate role. As in the war effort as a whole, Britain's relatively 
weak economic position was therefore already leading to a drastic 
diminution of its power relative to that of its major ally. By July 
1942, the US project was sufficiently advanced for Lord Anderson to warn 
Churchill that "the pioneer work done in this country is a dwindlijasset 
... unless we capitalise it quickly, we shall be rapidly outstripped. We 
now have a real contribution to make to a 'merger'. Soon we shall little 
or none. (22) 
At first, however, Britain's change of heart on a collaborative 
project proved unsuccessful. The Americans felt that they were already 
doing ninety percent of the work, and now saw little reason to give the 
British scientists access to knowledge of their new methods for production 
of fissile material. By November 1942 the free interchange of information 
which had existed a year earlier had dried to a trickle, fuelled to a 
large extent by American suspicions that Britain's main interest was in 
the commercial applications of the US research. (23) 
In fact these suspicions were quite wrong. Britain's main interest 
was in the military applications of atomic energy, and in the 
importance of nuclear weapons in ensuring its 
post-war political influence, not in the economic benefits which atomic 
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power might bring. British leaders believed that only by becoming a 
nuclear weapons power could they participate, even as a junior partner, in 
a post-war Pax Anglo-Americana. It was widely believed, on both sides of 
the Atlantic, that given the likely importance of the weapons, the 
conclusion of an atomic collaboration agreement during war time would 
undoubtedly lead to a permanent military alliance once the war was over. 
(24) 
Through 1943 and 1944, as Martin Sherwin's'excellent study reveals, 
(25) a heated debate took place within the US Administration on the wisdon 
of agreeing to British proposals. After a number of misunderstandings, 
caused mainly by Roosevelt's peculiarly secretive method of conducting 
business, this internal debate was substantially resolved with the 
crucially important Quebec Agreement of August 1943 between the leaders of 
the two countries. Under this agreement Britain expressly disclaimed its 
industrial interest in the project in return for "full and effective 
interchange of information and ideas" on the military development 
programmes in the two countries. In line with Churchill's desire for a 
post-war alliance excluding both France and the Soviet Union, the 
Agreement also specified that "we (i. e. the US and UK) will not use it 
against third parties without each other's consent" and that "we will not 
either of us communicate any information about Tube Alloys (i. e. nuclear 
weapons) to third parties except by mutual consent". (26) 
By endorsing the Agreement Roosevelt had decisively committed 
himself to supporting Churchill's hopes for an Anglo-American nuclear 
monopoly as a basis for world order. In the remaining years of the war, 
as a result of the agreement, British scientists were able to gain much 
more knowledge more cheaply than could have been obtained with an 
independent project. (27) 
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2.3 Taminq the Bomb? 
With Roosevelt and Churchill apparently firmly committed to a post- 
war joint police force, backed up by an Anglo-American monopoly of nuclear 
weapons, the chances of a post-war settlement with the Soviets were 
already slight. So far, however, the existence, far less the full impact, 
of their agreement was a closely-guarded secret. Suspicion of Britain's 
motives amongst the American public grew in response to its policy in 
Greece and elsewhere. As late as December 1944,54 percent of Americans 
dissatisfied with co-operation among the'Big Three blamed Britain, while 
only 18 percent blamed the Soviets. (28) And as we have seen already, 
the US Administration itself continued to view British policy in Europe 
and elsewhere with suspicion, and adopted a more cautious approach towards 
the Soviet Union. 
A post war accommodation with the Soviets, however, would have 
required some agreement on the atomic bomb, which Roosevelt and Churchill 
had agreed should be an Anglo-American monopoly. Their insistence on this 
policy in the last years of the war was an early demonstration of the 
persistent illusion that the ownership of nuclear weapons could be 
translated into overwhelming political power. It would also ensure that 
the post war world would have only a short respite before being plunged 
into a new and potentially more deadly conflict - the Cold War. 
While the leaders of the two Western allies were resolved on using 
nuclear weapons to police the post-war world, there were others who argued 
that such a policy was illusory and dangerous. As a result a number of 
alternative proposals were aired amongst the small number of people who 
were concerned at the implications of an atomic bomb for humankind. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, and from both politicians and scientists, the 
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last two years of the war saw successive attempts to understand the impact 
of the new bombs on international relations and to formulate solutions to 
the dangers which, it was believed, their production would pose. In doing 
so they anticipated many of the dilemmas faced throughout the post-war 
period, and which remain unresolved. Ultimately, perhaps, their failure 
may be ascribed to the inability of their leaders to realise the extent to 
which the new discovery would change the nature of international 
relations. The prospects for the radical type of solution that would be 
necessary to prevent a nuclear arms race may always have been slender. 
The commitment of the two Western wartime leaders to an Anglo-American 
nuclear alliance ensured that such a solution remained unexplored. 
The most influential of the arms control proposals was made by 
Niels Bohr, a leading Danish physicist, and Nobel Prize Winner, who had a 
major role in the series of discoveries that led to the Frisch-Peierls 
memorandum, and was widely recognised as one of the greatest scientists 
of his time. After fleeing Nazi-occupied Denmark in 1943, he learned of 4AC 
Manhattan Project and resolved to bring his own analysis of the atomic 
danger to the attention of policy makers. On Bohr's employment on that 
Project as a consultant, Oppenheimer commented: "Officially and secretly 
he came to help the technical enterprise, [but] most secretly of all .... 
he came to advance his case and his cause. " (29) 
Bohr feared a post-war nuclear arms race, and the threat to world 
peace that this would mean. He argued only international control of 
atomic energy-could prevent such a development. In such a regime, 
inspectors would have to be granted full access to all factories, military 
and civilian. Only by this substantial erosion of the sovereignty and 
secrecy of states could the world save itself from eventual nuclear 
destruction. 
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Bohr then argued that for the Soviet Union to agree to such a 
I 
scheme it would be essential for the US and UK to take it into their 
confidence before the atomic bomb was ready for use. Bohr proposed that 
the Soviets be told of the existence of the Manhattan Project, concerning 
which their espionage efforts must already have informed them, but that 
technical details be withheld. Further information would be released only 
in return for Stalin's agreement to international control. It was 
emphasised that it was essential to take this initiative before the bomb 
was ready or had been used. Otherwise disclosure would be perceived as an 
act of hostility rather than friendship. (30) 
Bohr's ideas met a favourable response from crucial individuals on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Sir John Anderson and Lord Cherwell, 
Churchill's two senior advisers on nuclear matters, urged that serious 
attention be given to the proposals. There was much to be said, argued 
Anderson, for communicating to Stalin the fact that the Americans expected 
to have such a weapon by a given date, and inviting him, to collaborate in 
a scheme for international control. Were the Soviets to refuse little 
would be lost since they would in any case learn of the existence of the 
bomb in the near future. 
Cherwell and Anderson were joined in their pleas by Sir Henry Dale, 
President of the Royal Society, and by Field Marshal Smuts, both of whom 
had been influenced by Bohr's ideas. The Prime Minister in response 
agreed to see the Danish scientist in what proved to be an unsuccessful 
meeting. Churchill's primary concern was to preserve his Quebec agreement 
with Roosevelt, on which his post-war aspirations for British power was 
based. Ideas of international control were viewed by him as utopian and a 
potential threat to his own visions, shaped as they were by the hope of a 
new world order modelled on the nineteenth century paramountcy of the 
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British Empire. As Bohr recorded later "We did not speak the same 
language. " (31) 
Though apparently more friendly to Bohr, Roosevelt's position was 
identical to that of Churchill. International control was a threat to the 
Quebec agreement and to the possibility of enhanced diplomatic leverage 
which an Anglo-American nuclear monopoly would give the Western powers. 
This identity of views was reflected in the Aide-Memoire of their 
conversations at Hyde Park in September 1944 which stated: 
"The suggestion that the world should be informed 
regarding tube alloys, with a view to an 
international agreement regarding its control and 
use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to 
be regarded as of the upmost secrecy, but when a 
'bomb' is finally available, it might perhaps, after 
mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, 
who should be warned that this bombardment will be 
repeated until they surrender. 
2. Full collaboration between the United States and 
the British government in developing tube alloys for 
military and commercial purposes should continue 
after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated 
by joint agreement. 
3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities 
of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he 
is responsible for no leakage of information 
particularly to the Russians". (32) 
Not only did the Hyde Park agreement state clearly the two leaders' 
intense distrust of Bohr and their commitment to maintaining the 'secret' 
of the bomb. It also involved two further concessions by Roosevelt to 
British requests. Firstly, it established that collaboration would 
continue after the war had ended (a point resisted by Roosevelt's advisers 
and later reversed under his successor). " Second, it lifted the 
restrictions on UK commercial use of nuclear technology imposed by the 
Quebec accord. Roosevelt now argued that the US must ensure that Britain 
remained strong, economically and militarily, once the war had ended: "the 
- 72 - 
real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete 
bankruptcy at the end of the war". (33) As Roosevelt's chief scientific 
adviser, Vannevar Bush, wrote shortly afterwards: "The President evidently 
thought he could join with Churchill in bringing about a US-UK post-war 
agreement on this subject [the atomic bomb] by which it would be held 
closely and presumably to control the peace of the world". (34) 
Roosevelt neglected to divulge the contents of the Hyde Park aide 
memoire to even his closest advisers, a decision which would later enable 
his successor to reverse American policy without appearing to contradict 
the wartime leader's wishes. Meanwhile it allowed Bush, together with his 
deputy Conant, to press an alternative policy on Roosevelt. They believed 
that an exclusive partnership with Britain "might well lead to 
extraordinary efforts on the part of Russia to establish its own position 
in the field secretly, and might lead to a clash, say 20 years from now. " 
They doubted that the present monopoly could be maintained for more than 
three or four years and warned that it would be only a matter of time 
before a 'super-super-bombl (the hydrogen bomb) would be developed, which 
would dwarf even fission bombs in destructive potential. Bush argued that 
"the close collaboration with the British, without considering 
simultaneously the entire world situation, might lead to a very 
undesirable situation indeed on the subject with Russia. " (35) His pleas 
fell on deaf ears. 
Further attempts continued to be made to change US policy, amongst 
which the Francks report of June 1945, from scientists at the University 
of Chicago, was one of the most clearly argued. (36) By now, however, 
the bomb was almost ready for use and political leaders increasingly saw 
its potential diplomatic'value in coercing the Soviet Union into accepting 
American post-war designs. Secretary of War Stimson now argued that the 
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bomb should be used to open up Soviet society, or at least keep Eastern 
Europe free of Soviet control. (36) 
In February 1945, in the spirit of compromise which Yalta 
engendered, Roosevelt appears momentarily to have faltered in his 
commitment to an Anglo-American monopoly and spoke to Churchill of 
"revealing the secret to Stalin on the grounds that de Gaulle, if he heard 
of it, [from French scientists employed on the Manhattan project] would 
certainly double-cross us with Russia. " ýChurchill persuaded him 
otherwise. As Churchill explained to Foreign Secretary Eden in March 
1945: 
"My agreement with President Roosevelt in writing 
forbids either party to reveal to anyone else the 
secret. I believe you underrate the lead which has 
been obtained by the United States, in which we 
participate ... This matter is out of all relation to anything else that exists in the 
whole world ... I shall certainly continue to urge the President not to make or permit the 
slightest disclosure to France or Russia. 
Even six months will make a difference should 
it come to a show-down with Russian, or indeed 
with de Gaulle". (37) 
This memorandum, outlining Churchill's approach to nuclear weapons, 
clearly demonstrated his preference for the special relationship with the 
US over either the prospect of West European co-operation and/or the 
search for a post-war agreement with the Soviet Union. It would be a 
preference that would continue to dominate British foreign and defence 
policy for the next two decades. 
Soon after Yalta, on April 12, Roosevelt died. Harry Truman, his 
untutored and inexperienced Vice President, took over; and was immediately 
confronted with multiple and intricate problems. Less than a month later, 
Germany formally surrendered. Three days after that, on May 11, Truman was 
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persuaded to sign an order cutting off lend-lease to the Soviet Union and 
even ordering ships en route to turn back. (38) 
In these four confused weeks the new President also accepted the 
argument of Churchill and Stimson that nuclear weapons could be used to 
persuade the Soviets to 'play ball'. It was to prove a disastrous mistake 
which, far from inducing Soviet co-operation, intensified their suspicions 
of Western intentions and helped fuel their fears for their own security. 
As Britain's Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, argued later 
that year, the leaders of the Soviet state had lived their lives in 
constant fear for their own survival and for that of the revolutionary 
state they had created. Tsarism, the civil war, foreign intervention and 
Stalin's purges had been followed by German invasion. Now, with victory 
over Hitler, "There was a great exultation of hearts that Russia could be 
made safe at last" until "plumb came the atomic bomb" threatening the 
security established at such a heavy price. 
Clark-Kerr explained that, in his view, the Russians hoped that 
their Western allies would share the bomb with them but "as time went on 
and no move came from the West disappointment turned into irritation and, 
when the bomb seemed to them to become an instrument of policy, into 
spleen. It was clear that the West did not trust them. This seemed to 
justify and quicken all the old suspicions. It was humiliation also and 
the thought stirred up memories of the past. " (39) 
In the months before the bombing at Hiroshima, Truman heightened 
these suspicions by brandishing the bomb in his diplomatic efforts with 
the Soviets. Apparently harbouring the illusion that the Soviets would 
"never" acquire a bomb, (40) or at least not in the foreseeable future, 
Truman brought forward the New Mexico test of the first atomic device to 
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July 16. This coincided with his Potsdaý conference with Stalin and 
Churchill. On hearing the 'successful' result of the test, Truman's 
reaction was instant: "He stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and 
decisive manner telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely 
could not have .... He told the Russians just where they got on and off 
and generally bossed the whole meeting. " (41) 
On July 24, a week later, Truman sought-to press his advantage. In 
an apparently casual aside, he told Stalin "that we had a new weapon of 
unusual destructive power. " The Soviet leader's response - he was "glad 
to hear it and hoped that we would make good use of it against the 
Japanese" - convinced some Americans that Stalin was unaware of the full 
impact of Truman'i disclosure. As more recent Soviet memoirs have 
disclosed, however, Stalin understood only too well. That evening he 
told Marshal Zhukov and Molotov "They simply want to raise the price. 
We've got to work on Kurchatov [director of Soviet energy research] and 
hurry thinjs up". (42) In August 1949, the Soviets would test their 
first atomic device, thus exposing the United States itself to the threat 
of nuclear destruction. The Anglo-American nuclear monopoly would last 
for scarcely four short years. 
2.4 The bomb is used 
While Truman was beginning the disastrous policy of atomic 
diplomacy in relations with the Soviets, final preparations were also 
being made for the bomb's use against Japan. Arguments for a 
demonstration use of the bomb, together with proposals for forewarning the 
Soviets, had been overruled. 
Reports that Japan was prepared to surrender with only one 
condition - that it be allowed to retain its Emperor - were brushed aside, 
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with Secretary of State Byrnes even arguing that the bomb would have to be 
used to convince Congress that the Manhattan Project had shown results for 
the $2 billion spent already. (43) The only significant 'concession' in 
the proposed military plans was made by Secretary of War Stimson who 
struck Japan's ancient capital, Kyoto, from the target list, arguing that 
the, "bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act would make it 
impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us 
in that area rather than to the Russians". (44) 
As a result of the Quebec agreement Britain had, in theory at 
least, a veto on the use of the bomb, though it took no part in the 
detailed planning of targets, etc, in the Interim Committee. Indeed 
both Anderson and Lord Halifax do appear to have had some doubts as to the 
morality or wisdom of using the bomb without warning. According to 
Churchill, however, "there never was a moment's discussion as to whether 
the atomic bomb should be used or not"; and Margaret Gowing, the official 
historian, records that the use of the bomb was not even recognised as 
being a matter of controversy, at least at minister; al level. (45) In 
June 1945, Britain recorded its formal agreement with the decision to use 
the bomb at a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee set up under the 
the Quebec Agreement. (46) 
By this time, British stock in Washington was fading under a new, 
and less sympathetic, President. The Interim Committee had already 
unanimously passed a motion in favour of revocation of Clause Two of the 
Quebec Agreement [the provision for British consent to the bomb's use]. 
(47) It is thus doubtful whether a British veto would have had any effect 
on the American decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The American decision, and Britain's easy acquiescence to it, 
illustrated the moral depths to which World War Two had brought humankind. 
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Japan and Germany had been responsible for widespread atrocities in their 
occupied territories, and the Allies had been conducting bombing campaigns 
intended to 'break the will' of urban populations in enemy cities. (48) 
Politicians who had spent years fighting a war by such vicious and 
unrestrained means were ill suited to make moral distinctions between 
conventional and nuclear genocide, and saw the bombing of Japan as an 
effective way of ending the war quickly and saving American lives. 
Despite the considerable efforts of imagination by individuals such as 
Niels Bohr, the nations' leaders still thought nuclear weapons could be 
used as a political lever in pursuit of traditional goals of military 
victory and world power. 
While the primary American motive for using the bomb was to end the 
war quickly, it is clear that the US also considered the effects that a 
powerful demonstration of the new weapon would have on the Soviet Union. 
It was widely believed that the shock of bombing Hiroshima without notice 
would have a restraining effect on Soviet behaviour. In fact, it ensured 
a heightening of Soviet fears, and contributed to the tensions that would 
soon coalesce into Cold War and an uninhibited nuclear arms race. 
With the hindsight of history, it is a tragedy of unmeasurable 
dimensions that the proposals of Bohr and others were not attempted at the 
crucial juncture which 1944 and early 1945 provided. Counterfactual 
arguments on alternative histories would be unhelpful, especially given 
the deeprooted conflicts of interest and ideology with which any system of 
international control would have had to contend. Yet it is possible to 
conclude that an opportunity, slender though it may have been, for a more 
secure world was lost as a result of the decisions of British and American 
leaders at the time. Britain's commitment to the objective of remaining a 
Great Power after the war, together with Roosevelt's commitment to 
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supporting this goal through the creation of an exclusive Anglo-American 
nuclear alliance, 'played a decisive part in ensuring that such an 
opportunity was not taken. 
3. The Cold War Beqins 1945-50 
3.1 A Post War Consensus? 
On August 14th, 1945, Japan surrendered and World War Two came to 
an end. The war had contributed to a revolution in the structure of 
international power. The United States and Soviet Union emerged as the 
primary arbiters of the post-warworld, while both the defeated middle-size 
powers (Germany, Japan, Italy) and their victorious counterparts (Britain 
and France) suffered a drastic decline in status. The forces of national 
liberation in the 'Third World' emerged strengthened, indicating that the 
era of the European colonial empires was ending. 
These shifts in the balance of international power were accompanied 
by far-reaching changes in the instrument by which that balance was 
maintained - military power. The age of 'mutual assured destruction' was 
foreshadowed by the involvement of the whole population in the war effort, 
the global nature of the conflict and, -most of all, in the role played by 
mass bombing raids on cities. The 'successful' testing of a nuclear 
device in 1945, the culmination of this process, meant that, henceforth, 
humanity would be living on borrowed time. 
For Britain the end of World War Two presented immense problems 
which its leaders had shelved during the conflict. Since 1941, Britain's 
war effort had been financed by Lend-Lease aid from the United States, 
enabling Britain to concentrate its resources on military mobilisation. 
Britain had lost about 10 percent of her pre-war wealth -25% if external 
disinvestment were included. (49) 
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In its eagerness to retain its colonies in the Far East, Britain 
had continued to devote immense resources to the war in Asia even after 
the immediate threat to the British Isles from Germany had ended. Now, 
on the same day that Japan surrendered, Keynes told the Cabinet that 
Britain faced a 'financial Dunkirk'. A paper prepared for the same meeting 
stated that without American aid the country would be "virtually bankrupt 
and the economic basis for the hopes of the public non-existent". (50) 
The Labour Party, elected with a considerable majority less than 
three weeks previously, was faced with the task of confronting these 
problems. It soon became clear that, in doing so, its leaders would 
approach them with a worldview not dissimilar to that of the 
Conservatives. Five years of coalition government had forged a consensus 
between leaders of Britain's three main parties on the broad outlines of 
post-war policy. In the wartime government Ernest Bevin had been able to 
improve working conditions and trade union participation as Minister of 
Labour, while dramatically increasing government intervention in the 
economy and helping to bring about a considerable redistribution of wealth 
and income. (51) Liberals such as Beveridge and Keynes had played an 
important role in the discussions of post-war economic and social policy. 
While the Conservatives had accepted the case for greater state planning 
and for the Welfare State, Labour leaders were now convinced of the need 
for a continuing Great Power role for Britain. Bevin, now Foreign 
Secretary, epitomised this, convergence between, and merger of, imperialism 
and reformism. (52) In 1947, he told the House of Commons: 
"Her Majesty's Government do not accept the view ... that we have ceased to be a Great Power, or the 
contention that we have ceased to play that role. We 
regard ourselves as one of the Powers most vital to 
the peace of the world and we still have our historic 
part to play. The very fact that we have fought so 
hard for liberty, and paid such a price, warrants our 
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retaining this position; and indeed it places a duty 
upon us to continue to retain it. I am not aware of 
any suggestion, seriously advanced, that by a sudden 
stroke of fate, as it were, we have overnight ceased 
to be a Great Power. " (53) 
The serious nature of Britain's crisis, and the consequent 
difficulty of transforming this ambitious consensus into reality, was 
dramatically brought home by the events of the weeks that followed. Only 
days after Japan surrendered, the supply of Lend Lease to Britain was 
abruptly stopped, forcing the government to enter immediate negotiations 
with the United States on the conditions and terms on which it would be 
granted a post-war loan. These would include, it soon became clear, 
measures that would effectively subordinate the British economy to US 
leadership of the world financial system. (54) 
Anglo-American relations also quickly deteriorated in the military 
field. In September President Truman announced the dissolution of most of 
the Combined Boards that had played a central role in the close, and 
unique, wartime military co-operation between, the two countries. (55) 
By October 1945, Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff, noted 
that there was anxiety in London that Britain was being "frozen out of the 
atomic bomb by our American friends. " (56) 
Finally, British fears were further fuelled by the confused policy 
towards the Soviet Union which the US Administration followed throughout 
the remaining months of 1945. President Truman, and his Secretary of 
State Byrnes, still hoped that a deal with the Soviets could be made. 
Many British still feared that the two superpowers might "carve the world 
into spheres of influence to suit each other, leaving Britain out in the 
cold". (57) 
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In this difficult situation, the British government's response was 
clear and consistent: a continuation of Churchill's wartime policy of 
working for a world order based on a Pax Anglo-Americana. Such a policy 
was necessary in order to, simultaneously, maintain sympathetic capitalist 
regimes in Western Europe and to preserve Britain's imperial role outside 
Europe. Only by enlisting the support of the new US president, Harry 
Truman, who did not share Roosevelt's natural sympathy for Britain, would 
this ambitious scheme be possible. British leaders feared that, without 
American support, Western Europe would soon face economic collapse, and 
the communist and socialist parties (which had formed the basis of anti- 
fascist resistance movements) would seize political power. Soviet 
influence - economic and perhaps military-would then, it was thought, 
dominate the Continent. Moreover it was realised that the survival of 
Britain's Empire depended on continued US tolerance of its existence and 
on the relative priority given by the US to containment of the Soviet 
Union versus the claims of national independence for the peoples of the 
European empires. 
In pursuit of this central objective -a permanent alliance with 
the US against the Soviet Union - Britain adopted a 'two track' approach. 
Firstly, it delayed the demobilisation of its armed forces, deploying them 
worldwide as part of an effort to 'hold the fort' against an expansion of 
Soviet influence. Secondly, it launched a campaign to convince the US 
government - seriously divided on the best course to take - that it should 
adopt Britain's proposals. 
While US overseas troop development fell rapidly, therefore, 
Britain maintained a relatively high level of military spending and a 
large worldwide military presence. British soldiers not only garrisoned 
regained colonial possessions such as Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong and 
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Burma. They also helped to restore a pro-Western 'order' in Indo-China, 
the East Indies and ex-Italian colonies in Africa. In the Middle East 
fear of Soviet intentions and unrest in Palestine required further 
commitment. In Europe, Britain maintained large occupation forces in 
Germany, Austria and Italy. In Greece, British troops fought to protect 
the rightist government against the guerilla forces of ELAS. In total, 
Britain still had half a million troops overseas in 1947. (58) 
Given the condition of its economy, however, it was clear that 
Britain could not continue this level of commitment for long. If the dual 
objectives of retaining the Empire and holding the line against the spread 
of socialism were to be achieved, US support would be necessary. 
The British government's campaign to enlist the support of US 
elites for a policy of 'containment' took many forms, most of which were 
greatly aided by the ease of personal and cultural interchange between two 
countries. In the campaign to convince Congress and American public 
opinion, however, two events in particular appeared to have had a 
considerable impact. The first was Bevin's vigorous stance at the first 
UN meeting in January 1946, in which he attacked the continuing Soviet 
occupation of Azerbaij an in northern Iran. 
Bevin's uncompromising position, which contrasted with US Secretary 
of State Byrnes' silence, prompted key US delegates -such as Senator 
Vandenberg - to press for a harder American line towards perceived Soviet 
violations of the UN charter. Partly as a result, US policy began to 
shift towards a more clearly anti-Soviet position. 
The second important development in Britain's campaign occurred 
only a few weeks later - Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri on 5 
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March, 1946. He warned that: 
"From Steltin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the 
Continent" 
and urged that: 
"Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the 
continuous rise of world organisation will be gained 
without what I have called the fraternal association 
of the English-speaking peoples. 'This means a 
special relationship between the British Commonwealth 
and Empire and the United States. " (59) 
Although publicly critical of the speech, Truman was warmly 
supportive in private. He now believed that Churchill had been right all 
along, arguing that: 
"Churchill had tried to get me not to withdraw our 
troops from Prague. I told him we were bound to do 
that by our agreements with the Russians. But if I 
had known then what I know now, I would have ordered 
the troops to go to the western boundaries of Russia'. (60) 
1 
There is little doubt that the British campaign, culminating in the 
speeches by Bevin and Churchill, helped to accelerate the commitment by 
the US to a policy of containment. As the American people became more 
anti-Soviet, moreover, the support for an alliance with Britain grew. As 
a result, 1946 saw a rearrangement of international politics in line with 
Britain's long term objectives. 
For Britain, the most important immediate consequence of the new US 
approach was the approval of the $3.75 billion Loan. During early 1946 
the loan had been in severe difficulty in Congress from representatives 
opposed to "propping up" imperialism and British welfare socialism. With 
the hardening of attitudes towards the Soviet Union in the following 
months, however, such considerations became subordinate to the perceived 
necessity of an Anglo-American alliance. (61) 
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Many Americans believed that without the loan Britain would be 
forced into bankruptcy, greatly weakening the chances for a healthy 
capitalism in Western Europe as a whole. 
The subsequent approval of the loan - in July 1946 - enabled the 
British state to postpone making hard choices in foreign and defence 
policy. It could sustain significant worldwide military forces and retain 
the trappings of a 'Great Power', albeit now clearly dependent on the US 
for economic support. Both the domestic and foreign objectives of the 
post-war consensus could be fulfilled now that US support had been won. 
3.2 Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War 
I 
The origin and cause of the 'Cold War' between the US and Soviet 
Union is the subject of considerable historical controversy. It is not 
the purpose of this thesis to examine this debate in detail except where 
it clearly relates to British defence policy and nuclear weapons. It is, 
however, necessary for this purpose to examine the role which perceptions 
(in British and the US) of the importance of nuclear weapons as a 'winning 
weapon' may have played in the origins of the post-war confrontation. 
By late 1945 a series of factors were working towards a deterio- 
ration in Soviet-American relations. British pressure had found a ready 
audience in a US ideologically hostile to Soviet communism. Soviet 
leaders, in turn, were deeply suspicious of the major Western countries, 
which had sought to strangle the Bolshevik revolution at its birth in the 
wars of intervention. Soviet suspicions were heightened by a series of 
British and American actions. First the abrupt cessation of lend lease to 
the Soviets in May 1945, with ships en-route to Russia being ordered to 
return immediately to the US. (62) Second, the close economic and 
military collaboration between the US and the UK, together with the clear 
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British interest in an anti-Soviet alliance. Third, the Western 
countries' attitude towards Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, which the 
Soviets viewed with suspicion given Western moves to support sympathetic 
regimes, and disarm the resistance, in Greece, Italy and Belgium. Fourth, 
and finally, US use of its nuclear monopoly as a diplomatic 'stick' at 
Potsdam, soon reinforced by its use against Japan, heightened Soviet 
fears. 
Partly in response to these multiple pressures, the Soviets 
tightened their control over Eastern Europe. Noncommunist politicians 
were purged. Opposition to Communist regimes was eliminated, often 
brutally. As Stalin made clear at Yalta, and thereafter, Poland (and, to 
a lesser extent, other East European countries) was central to Soviet 
aims. 
"To the Russians the Polish Question is not only a 
matter of honour, but also a matter of security ... This is only because Poland is a country bordering on 
ours ... Throughout centuries, Poland was always the 
corridor through which the enemy came to invade 
Russia. The Polish question is a matter of life and 
death for the Soviet state. " (63) 
This intransigent position in, turn fuelled the increasingly 
belligerent attitude of the US, and persuaded US leaders to adopt British 
proposals. As an important study of this period concludes: 
11 1 the British could not have changed American 
p; 
ilcy 
without the assistance of the Kremlin ... Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, Korea, Iran and the 
eastern Mediterranean offended Americans and 
frustrated first Roosevelt and then Truman ... as doubts increased about Russian designs, the two 
presidents and their advisers began to look for 
alternatives. At that point British proposals became 
attractive. " (64) 
The US's monopoly of nuclear weapons played an important role in 
shaping its policies during this period. In 1945 and early 1946, it faced 
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considerable domestic pressure for rapid demobilisation of US forces. In 
response Army numbers plummeted from 12 million to 1.5 million, and by 
mid 1947 the US Army was only the sixth largest in the world. (65) 
Nuclear weapons enabled political leaders to continue with this popular 
policy while simultaneously adopting an increasingly tough line towards 
the Soviet Union. 
As a result, US leaders and the US military placed increasing 
importance on the role of nuclear weapons in both peace and war. Truman 
believed that the US nuclear monopoly would, and did, influence Soviet 
actions (e. g. in the Iran crisis in 1946). (66) He firmly believed in 
maintaining the US monopoly of the new weapons. As early as autumn 1945, 
General Groves argued that the US should consider a nuclear strike against 
foreign atomic-research facilities to guarantee a continued US monopoly. 
(67) 
This support for a policy of nuclear monopoly was reflected in 
proposals made by the US to the UN Atomic Energy Commission negotiations 
on A-bomb control. In a partial response to the ideas floated by Bohr, 
Einstein and others, the US put forward a plan of its own for 
international control of atomic energy. The hawkish US delegate, Bernard 
Baruch, however, made crucial changes to the original draft proposed by 
Acheson and Lilenthial. Given growing Soviet suspicion at the US policy 
of atomic secrecy, it is unlikely that even this plan would have been 
acceptable. (68) 
Rejection was made inevitable by Baruch's proposals that the UN 
Security Council would be able to punish - presumably with nuclear weapons 
- alleged transgressors, and that the Soviets would have no veto on that 
US-dominated body. To the Soviets-the Baruch Plan must have appeared as 
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an attempt to preserve a US atomic monopoly while giving the West access 
to knowledge, of the secret Soviet programme. The Soviet counter-proposal 
was, however, not much more realistic. The talks soon broke down. (69) 
While US leaders discussed the Acheson-Lilenthial plan, a parallel 
debate took place in Britain on the viability of international control. 
Churchill had vetoed such ideas in 1944 and 1945. Now members of the new 
Labour government, with the shock of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fresh in their 
minds, reconsidered the issues Bohr had raised. In August 1945 Prime 
Minister Attlee wrote: 
"The only course which seems to me to be feasible and 
to offer a reasonable hope of staving off imminent 
disaster for the world is joint action by the 
USA, UK and Russia based upon stark reality. 
We should declare that this invention has made 
it essential to end wars". (70) 
Ex-Premier Churchill was consulted and argued against the 'act of 
faith' proposed, though only in vayue terms, by Attlee. In line with his 
view during the war, he argued that such a proposal would arouse American 
suspicions. Instead he urged that Britain should build on its special 
relationship with the US and the nuclear agreements reached with 
Roosevelt, rather than subordinate these to a general international 
agreement. 
Churchill's view was eventually to prevail. At first, however, 
the Labour leaders pressed ahead with their attempts to find an 
alternative. Bevin himself, later to be a major architect of containment 
policy, told Cabinet colleagues in October 1945 that he beli(ved that many 
of the difficulties encountered with the Russians were a result of 
resentment at Western atomic secrecy. He argued that there was little to 
lose, and everything to gain, by giving Russia information on the bomb 
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project as a first step towards an international agreement. "We should 
take the risk of giving this information to the Russians in the interests 
of our foreign policy". (71) 
Attlee's anguish, but failure to find a solution, was expressed in 
his September 25 letter to Truman : 
If the responsible statesmen of the great powers 
aýWfaced with decisions vital not merely to the 
increase of human happiness but to the very survival 
of civilisation ... We have, it seems to me, if we 
are to rid ourselves of this menace, to make very 
far-reaching changes in the relationship between 
States .... (and) a new valuation of what are called 
national interests". 
In a rebuttal of the suggestion that the mutual possession of nuclear 
weapons would deter their use, Attlee drew on the experience of the 
recently concluded war: 
"In many discussions on bombing in the days before 
the war it was demonstrated that the only answer to 
the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to be 
correct. This obvious fact did not prevent bombing 
but resulted in the destruction of many great centres 
of civilisation. Similarly if mankind continues to 
make the atomic bomb without changing the political 
relationships of States sooner or later these bombs 
will be used for mutual annihilation. " (72) 
Within a few weeks, however, both Bevin and Attlee were to retreat 
from this position towards a more cautious policy. Suspicion of Russia 
amongst official-advisers led them to support Bevin's reassessment of 
policy on the atomic bomb. Attlee himself was forced to face the 
unpalatable reality that only the abandonment of nationalist ideas, the 
subordination of all states to international authority, and the abolition 
of war could allow the threat of nuclear war to be ended. Yet if a world 
organisation could not be built immediately, the pressures for a nuclear 
arms race were immense. As Gowing records, Attlee's thoughts "pointed the 
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paradoxes and dilemmas of a world power in the nuclear age: while waiting 
for mutual trust to be established and Utopia to arrive, each such power 
must look to its own interests and make itself as strong as possible in 
nuclear weapons, even if thereby mutual mistrust was engendered and the 
chances of ultimate international control diminished. " (73) 
3.3 The decision to build a British bomb 
As prospects for international control diminished, it also became 
clear that the US was taking an ambivalent position towards Britain's 
atomic project. The November 1945 meeting between Truman and Attlee 
discussed the question, but the outcome of their discussion was confused. 
Even in 1946, as Anglo-American relations in general improved, the supply 
of nuclear information remained scarcely a trickle. With the passing of 
the McMahon Act by Congress in the summer of 1946, the flow ended 
altogether. Gordon Arneson, a regular participant in the negotiations 
between the two governments, has argued that the McMahon Act was seen by 
the Truman administration as an easy way to end the awkward agreements 
reached by Roosevelt and Churchill in the 'aide memoirel without telling 
key US officials. (74) Certainly the McMahon Act only reinforced the 
view of the Administration that the nuclear secret should not be shared 
with any other power, including Britain. 
The attempt to 'freeze' the British out of the nuclear business, 
however, strengthened the determination of the latter to push on with 
their own project. As Attlee commented later. 
"That stupid McMahon Act ... They [the Americans] were rather apt to think they were the big boys and 
we were the small boys, we'd just got to show them 
they didn't know everything. " (75) 
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The freeze on nuclear interchanges increased British suspicions of 
US motives, together with fears of renewed US isolationism. These in turn 
added to pressures for Britain to continue its own bomb project. As 
Attlee explained later: 
"At that time we had to bear in mind that there was 
always the possibility of their withdrawing and 
becoming isolationist once again. The manufacture of 
a British atom bomb was therefore at that stage 
essential to our defence. 
You must remember this was all prior to NATO. NATO 
has altered things. But at that time, although we 
were doing our best to make the Americans understand 
the realities of the European situation - the world 
situation - we couldn't be sure we'd succeed. In the 
end we did. But we couldn't take risks with British 
security in the meantime. We had worked from the 
start for international control of the bomb. We 
wanted it completely under the United Nations. That 
was the best way. But it was obviously going to take 
a long time. Meanwhile we had to face the world as 
it was. We had to look to our defence - and to our industrial future. We could not agree that only 
America could have atomic energy. " (76) 
Indeed Andrew Pierre goes so far as to argue that "if America had 
not ruptured the special relationship, if the restrictive provisions of 
the McMahon Act had excluded Britain from their application, if British 
security had been guaranteed then as it came to be in the NATO treaty two 
years later, the decision of 1947 to start on an independent nuclear 
weapons capability may have been different". (77) 
Pierre's thesis is unproveable. However it may be that it 
underplays an important point - the elite's image of Britain as a Great 
Power and the close association of nuclear weapons with that position. 
Nuclear weapons had been - and were clearly perceived to be in future - 
central to the preservation of the 'special relationship' with the US. To 
opt out of nuclear weapons development, and accept a US-Soviet joint 
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monopoly, would have been to accept a reduction in international status 
unacceptable to most British leaders. 
Moreover Britain's independent project had developed considerable 
momentum by this stage. Since 1940 it had been assumed that Britain would 
build its own nuclear bombs after the war ended. It would have been a 
major decision not to proceed, and would have questioned the whole 
development of British policy over the previous seven years. 
The decision to proceed was formally taken by GEN163, a Cabinet 
sub-committee which met only once (for this purpose) in January 1947 and 
which excluded both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of 
the Board of Trade. (78) The decision was taken in conditions of extreme 
secrecy with the Cabinet as a whole left uninformed. The project's 
existence was only revealed to Parliament through an extremely vague 
written statement more than a year later. (79) 
There appears to have been, by this stage, little serious 
opposition to the project from within government. There were, however, 
some notable exceptions to this general rule. In a renewal of the themes 
pursued by Bohr, and echoing Attlee's concerns in late 1945, Professor 
Blackett, at the time a member of the government's Advisory Committee on 
Atomic Energy, argued that Britain should renounce nuclear weapons and 
unilaterally open its atomic facilities to international inspection. 
Unaware of the GEN163 decision taken several weeks before, Blackett 
concluded that: 
"it is probable that the decision to manufacture or 
to acquire atomic bombs now would tend to decrease 
rather than to increase our long-term security". 
Instead Blackett suggested that it was "highly probable" that 
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unilateral renunciation would lead to nearly all countries (except for the 
US and Soviet Union) following suit in permitting international 
inspection. Once such a system was established, he argued, there would be 
considerable pressure within the United States itself in favour of a 
policy of control and "the groups which wish to use the bomb for coercive 
purposes would be correspondingly weakened. " (80) 
The project also encountered some opposition on economic grounds. 
In an argument often to be repeated in coming years, it was argued that 
Britain no longer had the resources to remain a world power. Sir Henry 
Tizard wrote that: ' 
"We persist in regarding ourselves as a Great Power, 
capable of everything and only temporarily 
handicapped by economic difficulties. We are not a 
Great Power and never will be again. We are a great 
nation but if we continue to behave like a Great 
Power we shall soon cease to be a great nation. " 
(81) 
3.4 The Blocs Harden 
The decision, in early 1947, to continue with the British atomic 
project was taken at a time of considerable international uncertainty. 
The economies of western Europe were in severe difficulties, creating 
fears in Britain that radical political changes, and perhaps Communist 
takeovers, were still possible. Britain itself was gripped by a fuel 
shortage, a growing balance of payments deficit, and a rapid depletion of 
the loan from the US. Most worrying of all, although the US was now 
clearly aligned with Britain against the Soviet Union, it had still not 
committed itself to economic or military aid in maintaining capitalism in 
Western Europe -a task for which Britain by itself did not possess 
sufficient resources. 
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Within the next few months the situation changed dramatically. An 
unprecedently cold winter, combined with the after effects of negligible 
civilian investment during the war, brought a virtual breakdown of fuel 
supplies, communications, and industrial production. A major row erupted 
within the British government on the resources devoted to the military. 
Economic pressure now demanded a major effort to cut back imperial and 
'peacekeeping' commitments. Thus the decision to press ahead with the 
atomic bomb project was followed, only weeks later, by agreement to grant 
independence to Burma and India and to hand Palestine to the UN. (82) 
The pressure from the Treasury for cuts in defence spending 
also forced an end to Britain's expensive commitments in Greece and 
Turkey. On 21 February 1947, the British embassy in Washington told the 
US government that Britain would cease military aid to the two Aegean 
countries within six weeks. It was this British decision, by a 
combination of chance and design, that was to prompt the US to involve 
itself much more directly in the military defence of capitalist nations 
under threat -a major shift in policy announced in the Truman Doctrine. 
Shortly after, this increased military commitment was followed by the 
announcementýof the Marshall Aid Plan, which was to play a major role in 
restoring the economic fortunes of ailing European economies. Taken 
together, these two policies were to contribute to a marked strengthening 
of pro-American forces throughout Western Europe and a receeding of the 
'threat' of radical political changes. 
While the US became increasingly committed to the support of 
Western Europe, however, this commitment took the form mainly of economic 
and military aid, rather than increased levels of US troops in Europe. 
Indeed even in late 1948 the British occupation forces in Germany and 
Austria exceeded those of the United States. (83) 
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For some US policy-makers - such as George Kennan, then the State 
Department's Director of Policy Planning - the low level of US troops in 
Europe was justified by their assessment of the Soviet threat as primarily 
one of subversion and political instability, rather than of military 
invasion. For others, the Soviets were seen as a major military threat. 
The best response, however, was seen as increased reliance on the United 
States 'winning weapon' - the atomic bomb. As Secretary of Defence James 
Forrestal argued, the US atomic monopoly allowed the US to take risks 
internationally without major increases in the defence budget. (84) Even 
the 1948 crises over Berlin and Czechoslovakia, therefore, led only to 
increased tension between the two blocs, not to any major increase in 
defence spending fn the US or in Britain. 
The 1948 crises instead helped to accelerate the increasing 
emphasis being given to nuclear weapons in US war plans. Proposals for 
international control faded into oblivion. Infused with the idea that it 
possessed a long term atomic monopoly, and under pressure from the growing 
vested interests now attached to the A bomb programme, the US increasingly 
came to rely on immediate atomic attacks on Soviet cities as soon as a 
Soviet conventional invasion had been launched. The moral implications of 
such a genocidal policy were brushed into the background. 
The reports that the Soviet Union would soon acquire its own atomic 
bombs were ignored. And, as stocks Of nuclear weapons increased, the US 
adopted an emergency war plan (code-named Fleetwood) which envisioned that 
a sudden nuclear attack on Russia might be sufficient to win the war, 
avoid a protracted conventional conflict, and restrict any Soviet ground 
advances to east of the Rhine. (85) 
In its eagerness to exploit its temporary atomic monopoly in plans 
for West European 'defence', the US was laying the foundations for a NATO 
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policy which would outlast by decades the end of that monopoly. Yet 
recent studies of declassified documents from this period throw doubts on 
one of the key assumptions supposed by some to be key to the policy - that 
the Soviets possessed a massive superiority in conventional forces in 
Europe. Matthew Evangelista, for example, concludes that "Stalin's post- 
war army was not capable of a successful blitzkrieq invasion of Western 
Europe during the period preceding the formation of NATO". (86) 
British military leaders in the late 1940's appeared to concur with 
this assessment. In a memorandum written in late 1947, the Chiefs of 
Staff argued: 
"It is unlikely that before 1955-1960 the Soviet 
Union will be capable of supporting her armed forces 
entirely from natural resources now under her 
control, in any major war except one of very short 
duration ... The Soviet armed forces, despite certain deficiencies, could embark on a land war at 
any time and would at least in the early stages, have 
the advantage of numbers against any likely 
combination of opposing forces. In any major war, 
however, that started before 1955-1960 at any rate, 
this initial advantage would be increasingly 
counterbalanced, as hostilities continued, by 
Russia's economic insufficiency. Moreover the 
strategic air situation is, at least at present, 
unfavourable to the Soviet Union ... we consider it unlikely that the Soviet Union will possess, before 
1957 at the earliest, a sufficient stock of (atomic) 
bombs to produce a decisive result, by these means 
only, even against the United Kingdom alone ... Failing the early development of biological or 
surprise weapons to a point which she believed would 
ensure her rapid victory, the Soviet Union's economic 
difficulties are likely to be decisive in making her 
wish to avoid a protracted major war, at any rate 
until 1955-1960. " (87) 
Despite confidential analysis which suggested the contrary, 
however, the illusion of Soviet conventional superiority -together with 
the perception of the importance of the US nuclear umbrella - has 
continued to this day. -(88) These two concepts, mutually reinforcing, 
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have played a central role in determining the manner in which NATO policy 
has evolved in the intervening years. 
The central role of the A bomb in US strategic plans had 
important consequences for Britain. Firstly it led to renewed 
negotiations between the two governments on access to British- 
controlled uranium ores in the Congo, which resulted in the 'modus 
vivendil of January 1948. Secondly it led to the basing of US B29 bombers 
in Britain, the start of a commitment which would continue for the next 37 
years and would earn Britain the title of 'Airstrip One'. 
The renewed American interest in an agreement with the British 
which emerged in late 1947 was a direct result of the high priority the US 
attached to its atomic bomb programme. Britain had an option on half the 
uranium ore production from Belgian Congo (then producing 90% of available 
world production outside the Soviet bloc). The Americans needed to obtain 
access to these British-controlled reserves in order to keep their bomb 
production programme on schedule. In return for a reallocation of ore 
supplies in the US's favour the latter agreed, in the modus vivendi of 
January 1948, to a limited loosening of the McMahon Act's freeze on 
information exchange on atomic energy. - 
Finally, as part of the modus vivendi, Britain formally renounced 
the veto on American use of the bomb included in the 1944 Quebec 
Agreement. The Chiefs of Staff argued that the veto agreed in Quebec had 
little real value and, therefore, there was little point in advocating it 
given the strong opposition to such a clause in the US Congress. (89) 
Soon after the modus vivendi agreement was reached, another 
development took place with considerable long term importance for British 
defence policy. The Berlin crisis led to the stationing of 60 American 
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B29 bombers at British bases, the beginning of a US military presence 
which has lasted to the present day. The UK government saw this step as a 
further success in their efforts to bind the US to West European defence. 
Consequently there was no attempt made to obtain a right to consultation 
as to the use of the bombers, far less any attempt to revive the veto 
abandoned in the modus vivendi. As the commander of the USAF in Britain 
commented at the time: "Never before in history has one first-class power 
gone into another first-class power's country without any agreement. We 
were just told to come over and "we shall be pleased to have you". (90) 
3.5 The 1949 discussions 
In the space of the two years since the 1947 decision to press 
ahead with atomic weapon development, therefore, the situation facing 
Britain had changed radically. The US had now abandoned its previously 
ambivalent attitude towards overseas involvement, the economic and 
political situation in Europe had stabilised, and the NATO Treaty (signed 
in April 1949) would formalise the alliance between the US, the UK and 
Western Europe. In parallel with these developments, the role of nuclear 
weapons in international affairs had been confirmed and indeed visibly 
increased. Plans for 'defence' of Western Europe now rested clearly on 
immediate, and massive, US retaliation with its strategic nuclear 
bombers. 
As a result of the growing US commitment to Western Europe's 
defence, in 1949 the debate on the wisdom of the UK nuclear programme was 
reopened. Sir Henry Tizard questioned the need for diverting a high 
proportion of the country's most highly skilled scientific personnel to 
atomic work, and argued that it would be better to rely on the US's 
nuclear force for deterrence purposes. Unlike Blackett's 1947 proposals, 
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however, Tizard's ideas included continuing research and development of 
atomic weapons and long range aircraft. Only production would be 
concentrated in the US. (91) 
Proposals for an incorporation of the UK project into the US 
programme gained considerable support on both sides of the Atlantic. By 
late 1949, the British government team at the negotiations had developed 
proposals for a transfer of some of its key scientists and some raw 
materials to the US. Britain would gain considerably by its access to the 
experience built up by American projects. At the same time it was 
proposed that the British should be "free to start up in the United 
Kingdom any new processes connected with the manufacture of atomic 
weapons" and would require a stockpile of atomic weapons - 'about 20 
bombs' based in the UK. (92) 
The 1949 talks were unsuccessful. Many in the US saw them as a 
means of cutting Britain out of the nuclear weapons business altogether. 
Lack of knowledge regarding the British project made it difficult to 
convince congressional leaders that the 'secret' of the bomb should be 
shared. (93) 
As the talks floundered, two new developments shattered the 
relative calm which the Truman Doctrine and the formation of NATO had 
restored in Europe. In China, the Communist Party came to power, creating 
fears of a major threat to the United States' recently established 
hegemony in the rest of East Asia. In September 1949 a further shock was 
felt as news arrived of the event which Truman had predicted would "never" 
happen. The Soviets had tested an atomic bomb. (94) 
By now, however, it was too late to return to the plans for 
international control discussed in 1944 and 1945, and rejected by the 
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Western powers partly because of belief in the power an atomic monopoly 
would provide. Instead, as the next section of this chapter will show, 
the Soviet test simply added a new twist to the arms race, leading to 
increased reliance by the US and UK on new and more destructive weapons in 
their plans for deterrence and, if necessary, war. 
4. The Bomb Comes Of Aqe 1950-55 
4.1 NSC-68 and British Rearmament 
By the late 1940's, the British government had some reason to be 
pleased at its achievements since 1945. On the domestic front full 
employment had been maintained, the beginnings of the Welfare State had 
been established, and civilian industrial production had grown at an 
unprecedented rate. (95) Simultaneously, Britain had achieved the 
central objectives of its foreign policy - to both retain its status as a 
world power and to protect its security interests in Europe by enlisting 
the power of the US in the creation of the new Pax Anglo-Americana. The 
formation of NATO in 1949, and the establishment of permanent US Air Force 
bases in Britain, symbolised the success of the government's attempt to 
involve the Americans in Europe. The retention of Britain's world 
military role, with American support, together with its independent 
nuclear programme, still largely without American aid, were seen as 
evidence that Britain's status in the new structure of world power was not 
an entirely subordinate one. 
In 1949, two events occurred which were to lead directly to a major 
rethink of US containment policy, and prompt far-reaching consequences for 
Britain. First, the Administration's working assumption that its A-bomb 
monopoly would last many more years was shattered by the Soviets' nuclear 
test. Second, the US stood by powerless while Mao Tse Tung led the 
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Communist Party to power in China, prompting fears of a new phase of 
Soviet expansionism in Asia. 
Truman responded to these developments by ordering a go-ahead on 
the 'super' - the H bomb - and by ordering a high-level review of US 
security policy. (96) The result was National Security Council 
Memorandum 68 (NSC 68), prepared by a joint State Department-Defence 
Department working group under Paul Nitze and completed in April 1950. It 
argued that, as a result of the new developments, the policy of 
$containment' of the Soviet Union, as represented by the Truman Doctrine 
and Marshall Plan, now had to take on a more directly military meaning. 
It redefined containment to include seeking 
"by all means short of war to 1) block further 
expansion of Soviet power, 2) expose the falsities of 
Soviet pretensions, 3) induce a retraction of the 
Kremlin's control and influence and 4) in general, so 
foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet 
system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the 
point of modifying its behaviour to conform to 
generally accepted international standards. " (97) 
The authors of NSC-68, conscious of the declining bargaining power 
which the A bomb gave to the US, then argued that a military build up was 
required: 
"Without superior aggregate military strength, in 
being and readily mobilizable, a policy of 
"containment" - which is in effect a policy of 
calculated and gradual coercion -Iis no more than a 
policy of bluff. " 
The increase in military spending proposed was massive. NSC-68 
recommended that the budget be raised from $13 billion to $35-50 billion. 
The bulk of the increase would be on conventional forces, but a massive 
nuclear effort was also urged. 
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Finally, NSC-68 urged that Britain's military role in Europe and 
Asia should be strongly supported with US economic and military 
assistance: 
"a strengthening of the British position is needed if 
the stability of the Commonwealth is not to be 
impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to 
Communist expansionism in South and South East Asia. 
Improvement of the British position is also vital in 
building up the defensive capabilities of Western 
Europe. " (98) 
Initially the proponents of NSC-68, the foremost of whom was 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were uncertain of receiving a favourable 
Congressional response. Indeed Truman himself had severe reservations 
about the scale of expenditure suggested. (99) Before the outcome of the 
debate within the Administration could be decided, the issue was 
effectively forced by invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 and the 
subsequent rapid Communist advance. NSC-68 supporters were able to use 
events in Asia to build Congressional support for the massive military 
buildup in Europe which their proposals required. Following only months 
after the Communist victory in China, the Korean invasion was widely seen 
as a new and more dangerous phase in a worldwide Soviet offensive. As the 
expectation of a third World War increased, the remaining constraints on 
military spending quickly dissolved. 
As the US started its rearmament programme, pressure grew for 
similar military buildups on the part of its European allies, including a 
campaign for German rearmament. The transformation of NATO into an 
integrated military organisation began as the US appointed its leading 
World War Two commander - Dwight Eisenhower - as the first Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). Britain, as the leading US ally in NATO, was 
expected to make a particularly large contribution to the American efforts 
at a Western European arms buildup. 
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At first Britain responded to the pressure reluctantly. In July a 
British army brigade was sent to Korea and it was announced that an extra 
E100 million was to be spent on military equipment in 1950-51. (100) As 
US war fever grew, and its own rearmament programme was accelerated, 
however, Britain found itself forced into making larger increases in 
planned military spending which were to have major costs for its economy 
in the years to come. 
The British government's main concern during this period appears to 
have been fear that the US would be drawn into a major war with China in 
Asia, leaving Europe undefended against Soviet expansion. It therefore 
responded rapidly to reports of a press conference on November 30 at which 
President Truman appeared to suggest that the US might escalate the Korean 
War by using atomic weapons. On December 4th 1950 Attlee flew to 
Washington and obtained an undertaking that Britain would be informed 
before the bomb was used. (101) (The possibility of a British veto, it 
will be recalled, had been dropped during the modus vivendi, talks in 
1948). In return, Attlee had to pay a heavy price in agreeing to US 
demands for even larger increases in British military spending. (102) The 
full price of Britain's 'special relationship' was now becoming apparent. 
It is still unclear how important British pressures were in 
influencing US policy during this critical period. From recently 
declassified US documents, it appears that Truman and his Chiefs of 
Staff were, in any case, most reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Korea. 
General Omar Bradley, chairman of the joint chiefs, stated that "I've 
never heard anything so preposterous in my life" (103) Moreover, although 
there was considerable domestic pressure for a shift in priorities towards 
Asia, and for a widening of the conflict to include 'liberation' of China, 
such a shift would have been a major setback for the advocates of NSC-68. 
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Like the British, the leading US policy makers -Acheson, - Nitze and 
Marshall - had their sights firmly on Europe. Britain by its actions may 
thus have reinforced the American government in its determination not to 
yield to the "Asia first" lobby. There is no evidence however that, at 
this time, Britain by itself effected any major change in US strategy or 
policy on employment of nuclear weapons. 
If the benefits from Britain's 'special relationship' were unclear, 
the costs were not. The 56% increase in defence spending between 1950-1 
,. and 1952-3 had a crippling effect on the British economy. Production 
stagnated, civilian investment fell and the balance of payments went into 
severe deficit. The long term economic effects were particularly serious 
because of the rearmament programme's emphasis on increased equipment 
spending. Scarce skilled manpower and the resources of the capital goods 
sector were diverted into military production just as several of Britain's 
main international competitors, such as Germany and Japan, were re- 
entering world civilian goods markets. The subsequent decline in 
Britain's competitive position would be one from which it would never 
recover. (104) 
A notable feature of the British rearmament programme was the 
emphasis given to conventional weapons. Faced with the need to plan for 
the possibility of a war within two years, the government gave top 
priority to areas 'such as the fighter programme and defensive guided 
missiles. The programme for the production of a strategic nuclear bomber 
force - the V bombers - continued to be given a relatively low priority, 
as indeed it had been through much of the late 19401s. (105) 
4.2 The Global Strategy Paper 
The Labour government's E4700 million defence programme had led to 
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the first major crack in the consensus built up in the war years. Nye 
Bevan and Harold Wilson had resigned in protest from the Cabinet in 
response to the re-imposition of health service charges. Their 
resignation had also been prompted, however, by their opposition to the 
scale of the rearmament programme itself. They argued that, given the 
severe shortages of raw materials and skilled manpower that existed, the 
programme was simply not attainable. (106) 
The Conservative administration under Winston Churchill which took 
over in October 1951 accepted this argument. Concerned at the damage 
which was being done to Britain's economy, and conscious that the acute 
fear of imminent war that had swept the United States-the previous winter 
had now abated, the government ordered an immediate slow down in the arms 
programme. (107) As a result, defence spending 'only' rose as a 
proportion of national income from 5.8 per cent in 1950-51 to 8.7 per cent 
in 1952-3. If the E4700 million programme had been fully implemented 
the 1952-3 figure would have been 10 per'cent and would have risen further 
to 11 per cent in 1953-4. (108) 
Faced with'the conflicting demands of economic growth and 
rearmament, Churchill ordered the Chiefs of Staff to conduct a major 
review of Britain's military policy, taking particular account of the 
economic constraints involved. The result was the Global Strategy Paper, 
adopted by the Cabinet without significant amendment. (109) It argued 
that henceforth the West should base its defences on the threat of use of 
nuclear weapons at the onset of war. Tactical nuclear weapons should be 
deployed both to counter Soviet conventional forces in Europe and to deter 
limited conflicts in Asia. In this way, the level of conventional forces 
in Europe and in the Empire could be substantially reduced. Britain could 
remain a Great Power by reliance on its independent nuclear force, while 
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significantly reducing the burden its military commitments placed on its 
economy. 
The independent nuclear force, therefore, was given a much more 
central role in British military thinking than it had enjoyed before the 
Global Strategy Paper. The government now finally agreed to Royal Air 
Force demands for top priority to be given to a British-made strategic 
nuclear bomber force after years in which its progress had been a 
secondary priority. Shortly after the approval for the V bomber project, 
Britain tested its first atomic device at Monte Bello in the Indian Ocean. 
(110) Although Britain's first operational nuclear bomb would not be 
available until 1956, it was clearly firmly 'on the road' to becoming a 
fully-fledged atomic weapon power. (111) 
Indeed such was the priority now given to the V bomber programme 
that it was agreed to go ahead with the development of three separate 
models - the Vulcan, the Victor and the Valiant. As a result the 
programme cost soared, making the search for economies in defence spending 
as a whole still more difficult. Ministers, it appeared, were still 
convinced by the aerospace companies' argument that a largescale peacetime 
manufacturing capacity would be useful in war. The impact of nuclear 
weapons on the nature of war had yet to affect this aspect of procurement 
policy. (122) 
The basic rationale for Britain's bomber force was given by Sir 
John Slessor, the main architect of the Global Strategy Paper and recently 
the Chief of Air Staff: 
"For a century before 1914 the Pax Britannica rested 
squarely on the British fleet. Then came thirty-five 
years of grey twilight when there was nothing to take 
the place of our sea power. Today I believe the Pax 
Atlantica depends as surely, and probably more 
permanently, on Anglo American air power, of which 
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the decisive expression is the long range atomic 
bomber. " (113) 
It was essential, argued Slessor, that Britain make a contribution 
to the Western 'deterrent' force. He could not conceive of circumstances 
in which Britain would use it independently of the Americans. Its 
existence, however, increased Britain's influence in Washington and 
provided a means by which to maintain the special relationship between the 
two countries. As he argued in 1954: 
"If we were to leave to any ally, however staunch or 
loyal, the monopoly of an instrument of such decisive 
importance in the stupendous issues of war and peace, 
we should sink to the level of a fourth-rate power'. 
(114) 
Britain's progress in its nuclear programme, and its successful 
1952 test in particular, had the desired results on US government opinion. 
After the virtual freeze in information exchange since 1946, only very 
partially lifted by the modus vivendi, the Americans now saw very real 
advantages in a revival of the close nuclear collaboration between the two 
countries. Technically they found that British scientists were ahead of 
the US in some areas and their discoveries could benefit their own 
programme. Militarily, the Americans were interested, as part of their 
own New Look, (see next section) in training NATO allies in the use of 
nuclear weapons. (115) Politically, renewed cooperation would recognize 
the inevitable -the British determination to produce their own weapons - 
but ensure that they remained a close ally. Their new President, Dwight 
Eisenhower, thus agreed at Bermuda in December 1953 to request 
modifications in the McMahon Act; and these were duly passed the next 
year. 
4.3 The Americans follow the British lead: the 'New Look' 
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As the British considered the Global Strategy Paper, the US 
government faced pressures of a similar type. The Korean War continued, 
but the point of maximum danger had passed. The chances of general war 
had, it was thought, receded. At theýsame time the US stockpile of 
nuclear weapons was rapidly increasing, and military planners were 
beginning to consider the implication of the H bomb (to be successfully 
tested in 1954). ý 
At first the Americans were reluctant to follow the British 
example. The 1952 attempt by Sir John Slessor to explain the Global 
Strategy Paper to the Joint Chiefs was met by suspicion, and viewed by 
them as a means of rationalising the UK's failure to meet its conventional 
force commitments. With the election of a new Admi"Stration later that 
year, pledged to economy in government spending as a whole, the situation 
changed. 1953 and 1954 saw a major shift in US strategy towards 'massive 
retaliation. ' As one historian has commented: 
"Changes in American policy often come two or three 
years after changes in British military policy. The 
New Look originated with Churchill and the British 
Chiefs of Staff in 1951 and 1952; it became American 
policy in 1953 and 1954. While the wealthier country 
was able to develop new weapons earlier than the 
poorer one, nonetheless the poorer one, largely 
because of its more limited resources often was first 
in adjusting its military policy to týe new 
technological requirements. " (116) 
The new US policy was given its most dramatic presentation in 
January 1954, when the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced: 
"The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a 
great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and 
at places of our choosing... As a result it is now 
possible to get, and share, more basic security at 
less cost. " (117) 
It would be wrong to exaggerate the shift in policy which the New 
Look represented. Since the late 1940s US strategic thinking had been 
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dominated by the assumption that-massive use of nuclear weapons against 
the Soviet Union would take place within days of the start of a major war. 
It did, however, appear to give greater credence to the idea that in 
less-than-total wars (such as Korea) the US might be willing to use 
nuclear weapons at an early stage. Even for limited wars such ideas were 
not entirely new. The possibility of escalating the Korean War by using 
nuclear weapons against China and Russia had been actively considered by 
Truman and his advisers. (118) What was most clearly new about the 'New 
Look' was the way in which the increasing stockpile of nuclear weapons was 
now used to justify a cutback - as in Britain - in the conventional 
military forces built up as a result of NSC-68. Demobilisation from the 
Korean War enabled total military manpower to fall from 3.45 million to 
2.84 million, while the manpower of the Air Force - the custodian of the 
strategic nuclear force - rose by 20,000. (119) 
It is important, therefore, to emphasise that though the 
declaratory nuclear policy under the New Look differed from that under the 
Truman Administration, there is a less clear change in action policy. 
(120) As long as the Soviets' nuclear arsenal remained insignificant, the 
US government was willing to consider use of its own strategic arsenal as 
retaliation against events in Europe or Asia. To the extent that reliance 
on nuclear weapons increased in the early 1950s, it was a result primarily 
of the development of tactical atomic weapons and their deployment 
throughout the US armed forces, rather than because of clear shifts in US 
plans for the conduct of war. 
'Massive retaliation', therefore, was, on the one hand, an option 
which both Truman and Eisenhower believed should not be used in any 
circumstances as if it was simply an extension of conventional warfare. 
On the other hand, it was an option whicý neither would forego. While it 
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would not be used to win a pre-emptive victory, the threat of its use was 
considered in order to avert potentially humiliating defeat. On at least 
a 4Af,. f of two occasions the Eisenhower Administration authorisedýuse of nuclear 
weapons: once to persuade China and North Korea to sign the armistice 
agreement in 1953, and once in the offer to France to help its beleaguired 
forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. (121) 
4.4 Britain. the US and NATO's New Look 
The immediate consequence for NATO of the shifts in British and 
American policy was abandonment of the over ambitious conventional force 
goals adopted in Lisbon in 1952, already widely seen as unrealistic. Such 
a development was widely welcomed in Europe where the drive to build 96 
divisions for NATO was beyond their economic capabilities to reach. 
As part of the New Look, and in order to rationalise the failure to 
meet the Lisbon goals, the next few years also saw the rapid introduction 
of tactical nuclear weapons into Western Europe. Presented as an 
alternative means of combat. ing the Soviets' supposed conventional 
superiority, reliance on the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield 
rapidly increased. In November 1954 Field Marshal Montgomery, the Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander, said: 
"I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE 
are basing all our operational planning on using 
atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. 
With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be 
used. ' It is very definitely: 'They will be used, 
if we are attackeýý'. (122) 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the reliance on nuclear weapons to counter 
Soviet conventional forces appeared to increase even as the threat 
decreased. After the death of Stalin in 1953, and the ceasefire in Korea, 
fears of war had diminished. With the 1956 announcement by Khruschev of 
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reductions in their armed forces by 1,300,000 men, the thaw gathered 
momentum. In response Western reliance on nuclear weapons appeared to 
increase further. 
Such a development had a certain logic to it. For as long as it 
was believed that war was most unlikely and that, therefore, nuclear 
deterrence 'worked', it was unnecessary (for shortsighted political 
leaders at least) to consider the consequences should war break out. Only 
when the threat of war was thought to be growing, as in 1950-2, did 
serious consideration have to be given to the best means of defence in 
such a war. As the NSC-68 plans made clear, strong conventional forces 
were still believed essential for actual. 'conflict. 
The increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe may 
have had some doctrinal logic, therefore, particularly while the Soviets 
remained well behind in this area. Probably more importantly, however, 
such reliance reflected increasing technological and service pressures. 
The US Army and Navy, assisted by particular weapons laboratories, pushed 
for a doctrine which would give them a share of the nuclear weapons role 
previously the monopoly of the Air Force. Doctrine was developed to 
reflect those institutional requirements, as much as vice versa. And 
despite growing Soviet nuclear arsenals through the 1950's, the reliance 
on battlefield nuclear weapons increased steadily. (123) 
4.5 Contradictions 
By 1955 events seemed to have vindicated the efforts of successive 
governments, Labour and Conservative, to fulfil Churchill's wartime vision 
of 
+ax Anglo-Americana, backed by atomic air power. American nuclear 
weapons - atomic and thermonuclear - were now in large scale production; 
and after a long delay Britain itself was about to acquire its own nuclear 
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stockpile. Britain had forged a strong anti-Soviet alliance in Europe 
which had contained the Soviets within the Eastern half. The recent thaw, 
symbolised by the Austrian State Treaty and resumed summit meetings, 
suggested that Soviet expansion had run its course. Britain retained a 
Great Power's seat at the conference table on topics as diverse as the 
future of Indo-China and the organisation of NATO. After the loss of 
India, its Empire had, in large part, been preserved and indeed encouraged 
by the US. (124) Britain, in short, had, it seemed, retained its status 
as a Great Power. 
Such confidence proved to be remarkably shortsighted. For weak- 
nesses in Britain's policies already inherent in the trends of the early 
1950's would intensify and become more obvious in the second half of the 
decade. The Suez debacle in 1956 would be the greatest single shock, but 
the root of the crises to come would lie in longer term, and more 
fundamental, factors. 
The primary contradiction in British policy lay in the reliance on 
the threat of first use of nuclear weapons to deter or coerce a potential 
opponent, both in general war and in more limited conflicts. Yet in 
successive crises, and one medium scale war, the US had never used its 
nuclear weapons, even during a period during which the Soviet Union had no 
nuclear arsenal of its own. With the growth of the Soviet Union's 
arsenal, and its development of missiles capable of reaching US cities, 
the credibility of 'massive retaliation' was called even more into doubt. 
The search for 'limited nuclear options' would begin, and the requirements 
for conventional forces would grow. 
In practice, British actions in the early 1950's indicated that 
they were never convinced by the extreme formulation of the New Look 
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favoured by Foster Dulles and some other Americans. As Eisenhower records 
in his memoirs, when use of nuclear weapons in Korea was considered in 
1953: 
"In this respect American views hive always differed 
somewhat from those of some of our allies. For the 
British, for example, the use of atomic weapons in 
war at that time would have been a decision of the 
gravest kind. " (125) 
Increased reliance on nuclear weapons, therefore, was unable to 
provide a solution to the economic problems created by high military 
spending. The nuclear force itself proved to be expensive, consuming up 
to 20 per cent of the total defence budget in the 1950's. (126) The 
commitment to colonies and bases throughout Africa and Asia had to be 
maintained through large, and expensive, conventional forces. Nuclear 
weapons could not be used against guerilla warfare even if at times the 
government believed, as its 1955 White Paper stated, that "the existence 
of the nuclear weapon may discourage overt armed intervention by the 
Communist powers such as occurred in Korea. " (127) In Europe the 
government had felt obliged to commit four divisions to the British Army 
on the Rhine indefinitely in order to prevent a revival of Franco-German 
rivalry and provide a stable framework for German rearmament. (128) Such 
a pledge undoubtedly enhanced Britain's prestige in NATO. Combined with 
the UK's other commitments, however, it ensured that the defence budget 
remained a considerably greater burden on its economy than in its main 
competitors, despite an official review, prepared by both civilian and 
military officials, that concluded that "since the war the United Kingdom 
had attempted too much in too many spheres of defence, which had 
contributed to the economic crisis which ever administration had suffered 
since 1945". (129) 
In addition to the strains involved in Britain's nuclear doctrine 
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and in the costs of its military effort as a whole, the policies pursued 
since 1945 had already had serious consequences for relations with the 
rest of Western Europe. Britain's emphasis on its special relationship 
with the United States, and on its role as a world power, prevented the 
development of closer links with Europe, where its long term economic and 
security interests lay. As a result, while Britain was forced to pay 
heavily for its military commitments to NATO, it remained outside the 
European Economic Community when it was formed in 1957, and lost many of 
the economic advantages which it could, at this time, have obtained. 
Britain's commitment to a role as a world power, together with its 
special relationship with the US, was the primary explanation of its 
ambivalent attitude towards Europe in the first postwar decade. Over and 
above this fundamental tendency, however, the commitment to an independent 
nuclear force - itself clearly linked to Great Power aspirations - also 
created long term difficulties in relations with other European nations. 
Britain's insistence on its own nuclear force, and on an exclusive 
relationship with the US in nuclear affairs, was certain to create 
pressures for nuclear proliferation in Edrope. Britain clearly believed 
that it derived considerable status, and some influence, from possession 
of the atomic bomb. Lord Cherwell, one of Churchill's leading advisors on 
nuclear matters, spoke for most of his government colleagues, and indeed 
for many Labour politicians too, when he expressed his disapproval of any 
prospect that Britain might "rank with other European nations who have to 
make do with conventional weapons". (130) 
Once other major European states had tackled the immediate concerns 
of postwar reconstruction, they would face pressures to match the British 
I 
effort. The "New Look" for NATO, enthusiastically espoused by the US and 
UK, encouraged the nuclear aspirations of non-nuclear members further. 
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The British nuclear programme had its most immediate proliferation 
effect on France. French scientists had been involved in the initial 
spate of discoveries in nuclear physics in the late 1930's, and had been 
involved, albeit peripherally, in the wartime Manhattan Project. Yet both 
the US and UK were determined to exclude, the French from any participation 
in the nuclear programme after the war ended. This determination was 
strengthened by the presence of Juliot Curie, a committed. Communist, in 
the French nuclear project. (131) The result, however, was to fuel 
French suspicions that they were to remain subordinate in an alliance 
dominated by the two English speaking nations, and help lead through the 
1950's to France's determination to build a nuclear force of its own. As 
Andrew Pierre concludes: 
"By their rhetoric and by their actions, British 
statesmen encouraged the French to follow suit. 
British atomic developments and justifications for 
the strategic force were seized upon by those in 
France who argued for a French nuclear force. The 
British and French nuclear forces had an unsettling 
effect in Germany and in the rest of Europe - and 
perhaps much further, for nuclearism is a contagious 
disease. " (132) 
5. Conclusions 
During the period covered by this chapter, British foreign and 
and defence policy was decisively shaped by the determination of 
successive governments to retain Britain's international status as a 
Great Power. The outcome of World War Two - Britain's participation in 
victory as one of the 'Big Three' - greaily strengthened this commitment. 
Indeed so strong was the assumption that Britain would remain a world 
power that it was'not seriously questioned by leaders of either main 
political party. 
Yet World War Two also starkly highlighted Britain's economic 
weakness. Only US economic aid prevented national bankruptcy. It became 
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increasingly clear during the early war years that Britain's aspirations 
for continued international influence woud depend on its ability to form a 
permanent alliance with the United States which would outlas the war 
against Hitler. Only a United States willing to take a leading role in the 
postwar system could provide the economic and political stability 
necessary to protect perceived British interests in Asia, Africa and 
Europe. By taking on a role as junior partner in a Pax Anglo-Americana, 
Britain could recreate the international stability which, it was believed, 
the 19th century Pax Britannia had brought; and simultaneously ensure 
protection of Britain's particular interests. 
Involvement in the early stages of development of nuclear weapons 
in 1940 and 1941, and the involvement in the Manhattan Project throughout 
the rest of the war, undoubtedly reinforced Britain's determination to 
retain a major world role after the war had ended. "Would Britain have 
come to terms sooner with her status in the post-war world", the official 
history of Britain's atomic project has asked, "if her own and her refugee 
atomic scientists had been less clear sighted in 1940 and 1941, if the 
Maud Report had never been written and if she had played no part in a 
wartime atomic project? " (133) 
While early involvement in nuclear weapons development reinforced 
British leaders' commitment to a Great Power role, the converse also 
followed. Against the wishes of the US administration, Britain insisted 
on an independent nuclear weapons programme fearing that, if it did not, 
it would become a "third rate power". Instead it used its nuclear 
programme to retain its status as a privileged partner of the US and 
Number Two in the Western Alliance. 
Throughout the period it was recognised that Britain's Great Power 
status ultimately depended on its relationship with the US. The 
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independent nuclear, programme was used to encourage an Anglo-American 
condominium as the preferred form of world order. In the war years this 
conception led to the Quebec Agreement and the Roosevelt-Churchill aide 
memoire, which sought to cement nuclear cooperation between the two 
nations while excluding other major powers. After the war it was seen in 
the periodic attempts to renew cooperation after the set back of the 1946 
McMahon Act and in the serious consideration given in 1949 by Britain to 
proposals for complete integration of nuclear programmes. The success of 
the policy of using independence to achieve interdependence bore partial 
fruit in the relaxation of information exchanges in 1954, and would lay 
ground for further intimacy in nuclear affairs in the years that 
followed. 
In its own terms, British foreign policy achieved in large part the 
objectives which its leaders had set themselves during the war. Britain 
had persuaded the US to play an active part in the political and economic 
leadership of the postwar (non Communist) world. In Europe, it had been 
persuaded, after some hesitation, to cooperate with Britain's primary aim 
- the containment of Soviet influence and the reconstruction of stable 
capitalist regimes in France, Italy and Germany. Economic aid -notably 
the 1946 loan - had enabled Britain to retain a considerable part of its 
Empire intact. The growing importance given to the Cold War in its 
foreign policy ensured that the US's anti-colonialism gave way to support 
for Britain's world military role as a contribution to its own policy 
objectives. By the mid 19501s, under US, leadership, the expansion of 
communist influence had ceased and the capitalist world economy was 
beginning a period of unprecedented expansion. British leaders had some 
reason to feel, therefore, that their policies had not been entirely 
unsuccessful. 
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Yet in seeking to assess the success of British policies during I 
this period, one must also recognise the, serious costs that were involved. 
Taken together they throw into question whether the ambitious objectives 
of the wartime consensus were attainable, and they lead one to doubt 
whether the policies followed were, in retrospect, in the long run 
interests of the British people. 
Firstlv it is at least arguable that, had Britain taken a more 
conciliatory line towards the Soviets in the 1940's, a less tense, and 
more secure, postwar relationship between the great powers could have been 
achieved. Only if one assumes that the Soviet Union at this time was 
irredeemably committed to European conquest did the policies followed make 
complete sense. If one takes a more balanced view, and recognises that 
Soviet intentions and actions were conditioned mainly by their own 
security requirements, then it is possible that a real opportunity was 
missed for a less militarised settlement, and a freer Eastern Europe, at a 
time when relative Western strength could have led to substantial Soviet 
concessions. 
Yet Britain's central objectives throughout these years - retention 
of Great Power status and involvement of the US in an active world role - 
were in'practice incompatible with a long termlapprochement between the 
two emerging superpowers. Britain's project for a 'special relationship, 
with the US and for a Pax Anglo-Americana depended for its existence on 
the exclusion, and indeed opposition, of the Soviet Union. It is clear 
that powerful factors within Soviet and American society, and deep 
underlying conflicts between the two systems they represented, always made 
the development of some form of postwar confrontation a probability. Yet 
there were also signs of flexibility in the policies of both countries in 
the mid 1940's which suggested that this confrontation could have taken a 
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less militarised, and more managed, form. It was the third of the three 
wartime Allies, Great Britain, which consistently argued for the adoption 
of an anti-Soviet position by the Western powers, taking the initiative in 
1944 and 1945, 'holding the line' in 1945 and 1946, and launching a series 
of campaigns through these years to persuade the US to adopt a 
'containment' policy. Britain did not create the Cold War by itself. It 
did play an important role in encouraging its development, and ensuring 
that alternative solutions to the problems of the postwar world were not 
attempted. 
Secondly, an important component of Britain's plans for an Anglo- 
American dominated world order was the two countries' joint monopoly of 
nuclear weapons. The 'secrets' of the Manhattan Project were thought to 
give their owners considerable power. This illusion, for such it would 
turn out to be, encouraged the US into believing that its proposed world 
role could be discharged relatively cheaply. It thus enabled domestic 
opposition to containment policy in the late 1940's to be minimised. 
Yet this approach was based on the mistaken beliefs that (i) the 
Soviets would take many years to acquire their own nuclear weapons and 
(ii) the Soviet regime would probably collapse before it could do so. 
(134) Both ideas proved totally mistaken. The Soviet Union recovered 
rapidly from the devastation of war, and ruthlessly curbed dissent within 
its borders and in Eastern Europe: more ruthlessly, in all probability, 
because of the Western attempts to undermine their system from outside. 
In 1949, many years before Truman had expected, the Soviet state exploded 
its first nuclear device. The short age, of nuclear monopoly had ended. 
The special nuclear relationship between the US and UK, together 
with the belief that the monopoly of nuclear weapons would last for many 
years, played an important role in the processes leading to Cold War. 
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During the war years the Soviets, at that time supposed allies, had been 
excluded from knowledge even of the existence of the Manhattan Project. 
Churchill and Roosevelt repeatedly rejected advice from their most senior 
advisers which warned of the consequences of secrecy and argued for 
limited disclosure to the Soviets as a trust-building measure. Niels 
Bohr's plan for international control had been given a sympathetic 
reception on both sides of the, Atlantic by many of those most closely 
involved in the nuclear programme. The two political leaders, however, 
rejected such ideas as being incompatible with their plans for an atomic 
armed Anglo-American dominated postwar world, in which the Soviets would 
have to take a subordinate place. As the war drew to a close, the atomic 
bomb was used as an instrument of coercive diplomacy - first at Potsdam, 
and then at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The suspicions these actions aroused 
in the Soviet Union in turn helped reduce any future prospects for 
international control. 
Such prospects may in any case have been slender, given the 
intrusive inspection that such a regime would have required and the closed 
nature of Soviet society under Stalin. The policy followed by the UK and 
US ensured, however, that the world would never find out whether or not 
the Soviets could have made the necessary concessions. The chance to use 
the West's nuclear monopoly was squandered in favour of what turned out to 
be a short-lived military advantage. Anstead the policies formulated by 
Churchill and Roosevelt propelled the world inevitably on the dangerous 
path of an unrestrained arms race, the end of which is not yet in sight. 
Thirdly the emphasis placed on the role of nuclear weapons in 
'defence' had a profound effect on the West's strategy long after its 
nuclear monopoly had ended. In the late 1940's it took the form of a 
build up of strategic atomic bombers as a counter to perceived Soviet 
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conventional superiority. Instead of stepping back from the moral 
depravity of World War Two - as seen in Dresden, Auschwitz and Hiroshima - 
the leaders of the 'free world' descended yet further with plans to kill 
millions of civilians and destroy whole cities in the name of 'defending 
liberty'. When their own citizens became subject to such threats, after 
the Soviet test in 1949, the response of the West seemed to be to rely yet 
more heavily on massive retaliation, such was the addiction to nuclear 
weapons that had been created. The British Global Strategy Paper, and the 
American New Look, now envisaged nuclear retaliation in response to 
perceived Soviet, non-nuclear, aggression in Europe and Asia. Britain 
may, in the early 1950's, have been more cautious than its ally about use 
of the Bomb in Asia. Yet the adoption of the Global Strategy Paper, and 
support for the rapid nuclearisation of NATO in the 1950's, suggests that 
the morality of nuclear weapons was at best a minor element in British 
policy. 
In parallel with the growing emphasis on nuclear weapons in NATO's 
military preparations-, and largely as a result of it, the postwar decade 
saw a persistent and damaging underestimation of the West's relative 
strength in non-nuclear defences compared with the Soviets. This 
disparity between public presentation and reality 'on the ground' was 
recognised by some senior intelligence and military experts. It was also, 
however, an idea that took on a life of its own, leading Winston 
Churchill, for example, to argue in 1949: 
"I must not conceal from you the truth as I see it. 
It is certain that Europe would have been communised 
and London under bombardment some time ago but for 
the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the 
United States. " (135) 
The myth of conventional weakness-'meant that, even after the Soviet 
bomb test, and even after the rearmament of the early 19501s, the NATO 
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powers continued to rely for their 'defence' on the early first-use of 
nuclear weapons. Britain must bear a major responsibility for this 
development. 
Fourthly, Britain's foreign policy during these fifteen years, and 
its nuclear policies in particular, gave top priority to maintenance of a 
world role and to the development of a permanent special relationship with 
the United States. As a consequence relations with its West European 
neighbours, weakened by the war, were given a relatively low priority. 
During the first postwar decade Britain excluded itself from plans for 
European union. In the crucial discussions in the early 1950's on the 
European Defence Community, Britain refused to take part because of its 
world role, its relationship with the US and its nuclear Great Power 
status. In doing so it not only excluded itself from European co- 
operation, it also ensured the demise of the scheme as a whole. Once it 
was clear that the UK had excluded itself, France's fears of German 
dominance, combined with its own yearning for a continued imperial role, 
led that country to oppose military union too. Thus Britain's foreign 
policy excluded participation in a West European federal state, and indeed 
prevented such a development taking place. With the benefit of hindsight, 
it can be argued that this policy may not have been entirely in line with 
the country's long term economic and political interests. 
Britain's nuclear policy also had important consequences in Europe, 
most directly in France. The emphasis given to an Anglo-American world 
police force excluded France - as Churchill had made clear in 1945 in 
discussions with Roosevelt. Yet France's leaders still saw their nation 
as a Great Power entitled to equal status with their traditional rival 
Britain. The increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in NATO planning, 
therefore, encouraged the idea that possession of the Bomb was a 
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prerequisite for national status and indeed for national security. By 
refusing to share nuclear information wit'h France, developing its own 
nuclear weapons, and keeping its distance from discussions of European 
union, Britain encouraged those forces pressing for a force de frappe for 
France. The best opportunity for limiting nuclear club 'membership' to 
the two super`powers occurred during this period: before France's 
programme had developed a momentum of its own, and while there was still a 
possibility of Britain merging its efforts with the US. (136) An 
important consequence of the failure of attempts at such a merger, 
therefore, was encouragement of nuclear proliferation in Europe and, 
indirectly, elsewhere. As the first medium-scale power to acquire nuclear 
weapons, Britain was an example for others to follow. Most directly it 
encouraged those in France and West Germany who argued for national 
nuclear forces. Indirectly it started the long, and tangled process of 
proliferation worldwide. It is questionable whether such consequences 
have been, or will be, beneficial to British security. 
FinallY, there is considerable evidence that the long run economic 
costs of the foreign policies of this period have been severe. 
Immediately after the war, Britain's ambitious objectives required the 
maintenance of substantial overseas military commitments: firstly to 'hold 
the fort' while the US was persuaded to take an active world role, and 
then to maintain a'British role as a world power. Only after 1950, 
however, did the full costs of these commitments become apparent. The 
rearmament programme of the early 1950's, in particular its demands on 
scarce resources in the industrial sector of the economy, imposed severe 
costs on the British economy. Britain's growth rate fell, and its levels 
of investment and exports stagnated, while its recently defeated, and 
therefore disarmed, rivals - Germany, Japan, Italy - experienced a 
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remarkable economic 'miracle'. A precipitate relative economic decline, 
which was to continue for the next three decades, had begun. It was clear 
evidence that British governments, whether Labour or Conservative, 
consistently put the requirements of international status above those of 
domestic economic development. 
The direct contribution of the British nuclear programme to this 
process was not insignificant. Throughout this period some of the most 
inventive British scientists and engineers were used in the nuclear and 
aerospace industries in the effort to develop Britain's 'independent 
deterrent. ' Not only were scarce resources therefore not available for 
civilian purposes. The structure of civilian investment was itself 
distorted, with, for example, excess investment in civil nuclear power. 
More crucially, however, Britain's possession of nuclear weapons 
encouraged its illusions of Great Power status and its commitment to a 
special relationship with the United States, both of which necessitated a 
high level of defence spending compared with other advanced capitalist 
states. This high defence burden, in turn, made a significant 
contribution to the decline of the domestic economy. 
The first fifteen years of Britain's nuclear weapons programme, 
therefore, saw the success of many of the objectives of the wartime 
political consensus on foreign policy. The US had committed itself to a 
world r-ale, the perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe had been 
contained, and Britain had preserved its Great Power Staus through its 
special relationship with the US. These achievements did, however, involve 
serious long term costs. The opportunities for rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union had not been sufficiently explored. The possibility of 
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international control of nuclear energy had been excluded by the nature of 
the arrangement between Britain and the US. Britain had ensured that 
plans for European union were unsuccessful and had encouraged 
proliferation of national nuclear forces. And the commitment to Great 
Power status had entailed substantial costs for the British economy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RETREAT AND REAPPRAISAL : 1955-1968 
1. The Shock of Suez 
In 1955, Britain's leaders appeared to have achieved considerable 
success in their foreign and defence policies. Although the nation's 
poor economic performance was a growing source of concern, governments 
could take comfort from the belief that Britain remained one of the 'Big 
Three'. In Asia, the efforts of Foreign Secretary Eden were thought to 
have been instrumental in preventing American military involvement in 
Indo-China by supporting a compromise with the Vietnamese. In Europe, 
Britain's permanent commitment of four, army divisions to NATO's Central 
Front had been crucial in avoiding rifts within the Western alliance, 
permitting German rearmament, and tyingýthe United States closely to 
European defence. Finally, Britain's costly investment in its 
independent nuclear programme was now producing direct and indirect 
results. Directly it had led to the atom bomb test in 1952, and gave 
Britain the knowledge necessary to decide, in 1954, to proceed with 
development of an H-bomb. Indirectly British 'progress' in its nuclear 
weapons development had led to renewed American interest in collaboration 
between their two programmes, reflected in the 1954 amendments to the 
McMahon Act. Both reinforced the belief that Britain retained an 
important role as a Great Power, together with the belief that the 
independent nuclear force contributed to the maintenance of that role. 
The failure of the Suez invasion in November 1956 therefore came as 
a considerable shock to the British establisment, dramatically showing 
the underlying weakness of Britain's economic and military position. 
Britain was forced to cease fighting, when the invasion was underway, by 
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intense pressure from the US. The Federal Reserve Bank in New York began 
selling sterling at a discount, forcing the British government to face 
the possibility of devaluation. The US Sixth Fleet continually harassed 
and obstructed the Anglo-French invasion fleet en route for Egypt. The 
British Cabinet felt it had no alternative available but to back down. 
(1) j 
The Suez debacle clearly showed the ultimate dependence of the UK's 
international position on US support. Britain no longer had the economic 
resources to withstand American pressure on the pound. Despite the 
rearmament programme of the early 19501s, the Suez expedition had shown 
that Britain lacked the conventional forces for effective and timely 
intervention outside Europe. It confirmed the lesson of the period since 
the war - that Britain's Great Power status depended on the 'special 
relationship'. At the same time, by showing that Britain's partner in 
that relationship - the US - could not be relied upon in time of crisis, 
it created widespread unease as to the viability of the policies followed 
since the 19401s. 
In the trauma that followed Suez, politicians of all parties began 
a search for new ideas. Significant figures began to question the 
continuing commitment to Great Power status, or at least some important 
aspects of it. While Labour and Conservative had remained, more or less, 
united in their commitment to a world role and an independent nuclear 
force up to the mid 1950's, the divergence in views between and within 
the parties now increased dramatically. 
2. Still Yearninq for Grandeur 
As a result of the Suez episode, Anthony Eden resigned as Prime 
Minister, and his successor, Harold MacMillan, ordered a major review of 
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defence policy. The result was announced, in April 1957, by Duncan 
Sandys, the Minister of Defence. The Sandys White Paper, as it became 
known, reflected the growing belief that the burden of defence on the 
economy was too high. It noted that: 
"Over the last five years, defence has on average, absorbed 
10 percent of Britain's gross national product ... it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Britain has been 
bearing a disproportionately large share of the total burden 
of Western defence. " (2) 
In an attempt to make economies in defence spending, the White 
Paper announced that conscription was to be phased out by 1962, and the 
size of the armed forces cut from 690,000 to 375,000. Increased 
emphasis was placed on the role of Britain's independent nuclear force, 
and it was argued that this would allow substantial economies in 
conventional forces, both in Europe and Asia. As a consequence, the 
White Paper argued: 
I 
"it can safely be assumed that the new plan, when it is 
fully implemented, will further appreciably reduce the 
burden on the economy. Above all, it will release 
skilled men, including many badly needed scientists 
and engineers, for employment in civilian industry. 
Both exports and capital investment will gain. " (3) 
The Sandys Review expressed its conclusions in stark language, 
which suggested to some that it represented a radical response to the 
Suez crisis in the previous year. In fact, what proved more remarkable 
was how little policy had changed. In reality, the policies set out in 
1957, and reaffirmed in 1958, simply represented an implementation of the 
principles enunciated in the 1952 Global Strategy Paper. Now that 
British nuclear weapons were becoming available, the plans in that paper 
could be transformed from declaratory policy into deployments on the 
ground. The successful development of British H-bombs, and a long-range 
bomber force to deliver them, would enable Britain to retain its Great 
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Power role at a lower cost. The emphasis'on the independence of the 
nuclear force would restore, it was argued, national prestige and 
military power, both seriously brought into question by Suez. 
We now examine the main elements of nuclear defence policy during 
this period in turn. firstly, the development of the independent nuclear 
force itself. Secondly, the role of the 'special relationship' in that 
development. Third, the moves towards nuclearisation of NATO, and 
Britain's role in these moves. -Fourth, we 
look at evolving British 
defence policy outside Europe, and the role of nuclear weapons 'East of 
Suez'. Finally, we summarise why, as a consequence of the defence 
policies followed, the British government in the late 1950's and early 
1960's proved unable to achieve the reduction in the economic burden of 
defence which the Sandys paper had promised. 
2.1 The British bomb 
The Global Strategy Paper, in 1952, had already foreseen an 
increased role for nuclear weapons in British military plans. Top 
priority had been given to the V-bombers in order to have a means of 
'delivering' the weapon as soon as possible. Shortly afterwards, the 
government had agreed to construction of new atomic reactors, which would 
triple plutonium production and thus enable the target of 200 bombs by 
1960 to be met. (4) 
When the Global Strategy Paper was written, however, Britain was 
not yet a nuclear power. The first operational, and nationally owned, 
nuclear weapon -a 20 kiloton fission weapon -would not be in service 
until late 1953; and even in 1956 the stockpile would only be 14. (5) 
The first V-bombers only became operational in 1955, though their number 
grew rapidly thereafter. The Sandys review, therefore, took place just as 
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the capabilities necessary to put the Global Strategy Paper into practice 
were becoming available. 
The most important new development in the British nuclear programme 
during the mid 1950's, however, had been the decision to build a hydrogen 
bomb. In 1952 and 1953 British efforts had been concentrated on 
producing a useable fission weapon, and little research had been done on 
the possibilities for a fusion bomb. In 1954, in the aftermath of the 
American test of a workable H-bomb at Bikini Atoll, it was decided that 
Britain could not remain in the 'atomic bow and arrow era. " (6) A 
British crash programme to build its own H-bomb would now be given top 
priority. 
Central to the 1954 decision appears to have been a belief that, 
unless Britain acted quickly, it would be left behind the two superpowers 
in the atomic arms race. Stalin's death the previous year had begun a 
thaw in East West relations. Increasing public awareness of the effects 
of the hydrogen bomb was generating demands for arms talks between the 
nuclear weapons states. In particular the government was worried by 
growing domestic demands for an international moratorium on tests. As 
one recent history of this period has recorded: 
"it was felt to be imperative that the United Kingdom 
should develop a thermonuclear weapon but it was also 
realised that it might soon be faced with a US-USSR 
agreement to halt thermonuclear testing and irresistible 
domestic and international pressures upon them to accept 
it. Thus it became politically vital ... to develop a thermonuclear weapon design concept in the shortest 
possible time ... 11 (7). 
In the event, Britain's intensive research effort between 1954 and 
1958 paid off. The first H-bomb test took place on 15 May 1957 and by 
September 1958 a further eight tests had been conducted, enough to give 
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the government confidence in their ability to explode bombs with a yield 
of up to ten megatons. The effort proved to be well-timed. Only one 
month after the last test, on 31 October 1958, a US-USSR-UK moratorium on 
nuclear testing began. 
The successful development of an H-bomb by these three countries 
led to a growing realisation that mutually assured destruction (M. A. D. 
for short) would soon be the inevitable outcome of full-scale war between 
East and West. The British bombs tested at Christmas Island in 1958 had 
yields of approximately ten megatons, and made the fission weapons used 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki appear small by comparison. As the 1957 White 
Paper made clear: 
"It must be frankly recognised that there is at present 
no means of providing adequate protection for the people 
of this country against the consequences of an attack 
with nuclear weapons. Though, in the event of war, the 
fighter aircraft of the Royal Air Force would unquestion- 
ably be able to take a heavy toll of enemy bombers, a 
proportion would inevitably get through. Even if it were 
only a dozen, they could with megaton bombs inflict wide- 
spread devastation. " (8) 
As a Soviet General put it more bluntly: 
"There are optimists and pessimists in Britain. The 
pessimists think five H-bombs will wipe out everyone 
in Britain, the optimists think it will take eight. ' We 
have 200.11 (9) 
With the humiliation of Suez the ýrevious year, and the 
widespread belief in the futility of non-nuclear defences in the face of 
the H-bomb, British development of its own H-bomb could not have come at 
a more opportune moment for the governing elite. The prospect of an 
independent strategic nuclear force enabled Britain's rulers to regain 
their pride in their country's international status, and encouraged the 
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illusion that it could retain a world role. As Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan claimed: 
"The independent (nuclear force) ... gives us a better 
position in the world, it gives us a better position 
with respect to the United States. It puts us where 
we ought to be, in the position of a Great Power. " (10) 
Indeed for some the immense power of the H-bomb had at 
least one advantage: it would have a 'levelling' effect between all 
those who possessed it, thus allowing Britain to exist on equal terms 
with the two military giants. As Julian Amery, M. P. argued: 
"It would seem that the hydrogen bomb, when we have it, 
will make us a world power again. The atom bomb rather 
put us out of the race because only big territorial 
expanses like the United States or the Soviet Union could 
stand up to atom-bombing and hope to survive. We should 
have been obliterated very quickly. But the hydrogen bomb 
is a great leveller. It cancels out the disparity between 
population and the big areas of territory and smaller ones. 
It would be Just as dangerous for the Soviet Union or the 
United States to incur thermonuclear bombardment as it would 
be for us. " (11) 
It appears paradoxical, with the benefit of hindsight, that 
emphasis on nuclear weapons in Britain's military plans increased just as 
the suicidal nature of that policy became ever more apparent. It is 
partly explained by the trends in US policy, to which British thinking 
was closely attuned. More importantly, it demonstrates the extent to 
which Britain's nuclear force was designed to fulfil political rather 
than military objectives. In particular it was hoped that full 
membership of the nuclear 'club' would restore British prestige and put 
its relations with the US on a sound footing. As Denis Healey put it, 
the government had needed a "virility symbol" to compensate for "the 
shock of having their military impotence exposed at Suez". (12) 
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2.2 The nuclear relationship 
Although 1957 saw increasing emphasis on the independence of the 
British nuclear 'deterrent', the government made it clear that the 
special relationship with the US remained central to British policy. 
Britain's nuclear force was not justified, in public at least, on the 
basis of lack of trust of the US - as French nuclear weapons would be 
under de Gaulle. Rather it was necessary, it was argued, to gain a 
privileged position of influence with US leaders, enabling the special 
nuclear relationship envisaged by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1943 to be 
revived and refreshed. 
Because of his commitment to such a policy, Prime Minister 
Macmillan quickly moved to restore Anglo-American relations after Suez. 
In Bermuda in March 1957 and in Washington in October 1957, he and 
President Eisenhower reached a series of agreements which brought closer 
nuclear collaboration than at any time since 1945. First, in what 
Eisenhower described as "by far the most_ successful international 
conference that I had attended since the close of World War Two, " the two 
leaders agreed at Bermuda to install sixty Thor intermediate range 
ballistic missile in Britain under a 'dual key' system. (13) Second, 
the RAF was given detailed information on weapon designs and weights to 
enable it, if necessary, to carry USAF bombs. Thirdly, at the October 
meeting, the two leaders agreed to seek amendments to the 1954 Atomic 
Energy Act which would give Britain accýss to information about Soviet 
nuclear capabilities. Transfer of enriched uranium and a nuclear 
submarine propuls. ion plant we! fcalso included in the Agreements eventually 
passed by Congress in July 1958 and May 1959. (14) 
Both Macmillan and Eisenhower, who had worked closely together 
during the war, wished to improve nuclear cooperation between their two 
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countries as part of a 'healing' process after Suez. The crucial factor 
in the US acquiescence, however, appears to have been the realisation 
that Britain could, in critical areas, have something to offer. As a 
result of the latter's long years of independent research and 
development, Britain possessed information which the American scientists 
were anxious to acquire. (15) The exchange was assymetrical, but not 
entirely one-way. 
The exclusive nature of the agreements made in 1957 and 1958 
demonstrated, once again, the priority given by the British government to 
Atlantic links over European links. While Macmillan restored the 
$special relationship', its continental neighbours - France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg - were establishing the 
European Economic Community without UK participation (16). The 
resentment amongst European countries - particularly in France - at the 
preferential terms given to the UK in nuclear matters would continue to 
sour relations between Britain and Europe in the years to come. 
Despite the agreements reached in 1957 and 1958, however, Britain 
found it increasingly difficult to keep up with the arms race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. New developments in technology 
threatened the long term viability of Britain's V-bomber force even 
before it had fully come into service. The Soviet Union was now 
beginning to deploy medium-range ballistic missiles in large numbers, 
which might give Bomber Command as little as four minutes warning of a 
pre-emptive attack; and improved Soviet air defence, designed to counter 
the US Strategic Air Command, also threatened to render Britain's V- 
bombers much less effective. As early as 1955 research and development 
began to take place on possible successors to the V-bomber as Britain's 
strategic nuclear force. (17) 
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Central to Britain's difficulty in maintaining an independent 
nuclear force in the years that followed was the growing cost of the 
delivery systems required. The V-bomber force itself had proved to be a 
severe burden on the defence budget, consuming 10% of defence spending in 
1958-9. If one also included spending on the fighter force and the 
control and warning system, necessary to protect bomber bases, the cost 
added up to between 15 and 20 percent of total defence spending. (18) 
With Britain's defence spending already higher as a proportion of 
national income than any other major Western country except the US 
itself,, the government could not afford to allow the costs of the nuclear 
force to rise further. While the H bomb tests had, it was thought, 
allowed Britain to keep up with the superpowers in the development of 
nuclear weapons themselves, the beginning of the missile age now 
threatened to leave it behind in the systems necessary to deliver those 
weapons. 
At first, two systems were considered as replacements for the V- 
bombers. The first, the Avro-730 supersonic bomber, soon came up against 
the same difficulties as the V bombers were beginning to face. As a 
result, it was cancelled at an early stage of development as part of the 
economies announced in the 1957 White Paper. (19) The second 
alternative was the Blue Streak intermediate-range ballistic missile. At 
the time this was thought to be a purely British development. After its 
cancellation as a military project, however, it was revealed that its 
rocket engine and internal guidance system were based on the US's Atlas 
rocket, and were being manufactured in Britain under licence. (20) 
Blue Streak did not survive for long. By 1960 it was estimated 
that it would have cost between E500 and E600 million to complete. (21) 
This was equivalent to E3600-4300 million at 1983-4 prices, around twice 
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as much as the Polaris system eventually chosen. Even more damaging, it 
was clear that Blue Streak would be extremely vulnerable to pre-emptive 
strike. A liquid-fuelled missile, it required fifteen minutes warning 
before launching. Yet the newly installed early warning system (at 
Fylingdales, Yorkshire) could only guarantee four minutes. At first this 
problem was tackled by a decision to deploy the missile in hardened 
underground silos, thus forcing costs up. It was feared, however, that 
even this would not suffice in protecting Britain's strategic force 
against surprise attack by the megaton yield SS4 and SS5 weapons now 
being deployed by the Soviets. 
As a result of these factors, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet 
1 decided, in February 1960, that Blue Streak must be cancelled. (22) 
Before making a public announcement, Macmillan discussed possible 
replacements with Eisenhower at their Washington meeting in March 1960. 
The British were given two options - the Skybolt air-launched ballistic 
missile or the Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile. Each was being 
developed for the United States' own nuclear forces. Britain would, 
Eisenhower agreed, be allowed to purchase the system 'off the shelf', 
minus warhead, for its own use. Macmillan chose Skybolt in preference to 
Polaris, and the decision was announced to the House of Commons on 13 
April 1960. Both the RAF and Royal Navy supported this decision, the 
former because it would prolong the role of the V-bomber force until 
around 1970, the Navy because it was more interested, at this time, in 
gaining the resources for its new aircraft carrier programme. The 
decision to remain with an air-based system was strongly influenced by 
this unanimity of military advice. 
Simultaneously, and "more or less in return for Skybolt" according 
to Macmillan, (23) Britain agreed to allow the US to base its own Polaris 
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missile submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland. Combined with the decision 
to rely on a US-manufactured missile for Britain's own nuclear force, 
this sparked off widespread controversy over the wisdom of government 
policy. In a debate which would be echoed again in the early 19801s, 
opponents of the proposals were concerned at the lack of British control 
of US missiles based in the Holy Loch. The clear contrast with the 
landbased Thor missiles, which were operated by a 'dual key', increased 
the fears aroused. Yet it is clear that the US would not have allowed 
those weapons, or indeed its bombers based in Britain, to be subject to 
British veto. (24) If the UK wanted continued US assistance in 
maintaining an 'independent' nuclear force of its own, it would have to 
accept the risks involved in basing the US's own forces on its 
territory. 
With these developments it now appeared to many that the careful 
tightrope between independence and interdependence which Britain's 
nuclear programme had walked since the 1940's was threatening to become 
dependence of a most unwelcome nature. As the policies of the US 
Administration that was to succeed to power in 1960 would soon make 
clear, it proved to be a vulnerable position for Britain to be in. 
2.3 The nuclearisation of NATO 
Since the Global Strategy Paper, British defence policy had sought 
to use nuclear weapons as a means by which to reduce the economic burden 
imposed by multiple military commitments without reducing the commitments 
themselves. As part of this policy, the biggest reductions announced in 
the 1957 White Paper were in forces for defence of Europe. The British 
Army of the Rhine was reduced from 77000 to 64000 in 1957-8 and further 
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cut to 55000 in 1958-9. The Second Tactical Air Force in Germany was to 
be reduced in size by half within one year, with a similar reduction in 
the light bomber force in England, which was assigned to NATO. Finally, 
the government abandoned plans for more advanced fighter aircraft and 
made deep cuts in Fighter Command, whose role was to be confined to 
defence of British and American nuclear bomber bases. Even in this 
limited function manned aircraft would, in due course, be replaced by 
missiles. 
In order to justify these cuts the government argued that, in line 
with NATO's policy of 'massive retaliation', nuclear weapons would be 
used at an early stage of any major conflict. Soviet conventional 
superiority in any case made large armed forces redundant. It was better 
to concentrate efforts on arming NATO with tactical nuclear weapons in 
order to counter this superiority. Accordingly, the White Paper 
announced, "atomic rocket artillery will be introduced which will greatly 
augment the fire-power" of the British Army of the-Rhine; and the 
reduction in the Second Tactical Air Force would be "off set by the fact 
that some of the squadrons will be provided by atomic bombs. " (25) 
The nuclearisation of British policy took place as part of, and 
encouraged, parallel developments in NATO as a whole. In the same way 
that the Sandys White Paper of 1957 can be seen as putting the Global 
Strategy Paper into practice, so NATO's-decisions in 1957 and 1958 can be 
seen as reflecting the New Look decided upon in 1954. As battlefield 
nuclear weapons became available in large numbers, NATO came increasingly 
to assume that they would be used at the outset of any war in Europe. In 
1956, Field Marshal Montgomery, speaking as NATO's Deputy Supreme 
Commander, reasserted that all plans were based on using nuclear weapons 
- 143 - 
with the sole proviso that "the politicians have to be asked first. " 
"That might be a bit awkward, of course, " he added, "and personally I 
would use the nuclear weapons first and ask afterwards. " (26) 
The British government's official justification for NATO's 
'tripwirel policy rested on the supposedly massive Eastern superiority in 
conventional forces. The 1958 White Paper explained this point in plain 
terms: 
"(Russials) basic strength lies in her overwhelming 
superiority in conventional armaments and military 
manpower... The West, on the other hand, relies for 
its defence primarily upon the deterrent effect of its 
vast stockpile of nuclear weapons and its capacity to 
deliver them... the strategy of NATO is based on the frank 
recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be 
repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment 
of the sources of power in Russia. " 
The White Paper went on to argue that the assymetry between Eastern 
conventional superiority and Western nuclear superiority meant that 
multilateral nuclear disarmament was not possible "without fully 
compensating reductions in (the) conventional forces" of the Soviets. 
"Otherwise", it argued, "Russia would be left in a position to dominate 
the world. " (27) 
Although the perception of overwhelming Soviet conventional 
superiority played an important part in justifying NATO policy, however, 
other factors were probably of greater importance. Central was the 
belief that a war in Europe with the Soviet Union was most unlikely. 
Since Stalin's death in 1953, there had been a marked thaw in the 'Cold 
War'. The first summit meetings since the 1940's had been held and in 
May 1956 the Soviets had announced reductions in their armed forces by 
1,300,000 men. (28) British leaders believed that war was sufficiently 
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unlikely for it to be an acceptable risk to rely on nuclear weapons. As 
the government explained in 1958, 
"There is thus no military reason why a world conflagration 
should not be prevented for another generation or more 
through the balancing fears of mutual annihilation. In 
fact, there is no reason why all this should not go on 
almost indefinitely. " (29) 
A reliance on nuclear weapons not only capitalised on what remained 
a Western 'advantage'. It also helped the British government reduce 
defence costs in Europe, releasing resources for other, military and 
civilian, uses. Finally, since the West's nuclear superiority was based 
entirely on American and British forces, the policy of massive 
retaliation emphasised the continuing leadership of the wartime 
diumvirate within NATO. By contrast, a reduction in reliance on nuclear 
weapons could have reopened debate about the structure of power within 
NATO, and on Germany's role in particular. As long as Soviet attack 
remained extremely unlikely, Western leaders saw no reason to Jeopardise 
the considerable achievements of postwar economic and political 
reconstruction in Europe. 
Nuclear weapons, therefore, increasingly came to dominate NATO 
planning as a means of offsetting Soviet conventional forces and enabling 
the costs of defence to be reduced. The corollary of this policy was, 
however, that all NATO forces - not only those of the US and UK - should 
be equipped with American-supplied battlefield nuclear weapons. 
Otherwise, it was argued, their armies And air forces would become 
ineffective and irrelevant pr, more likely, pressure would grow for the 
production of costly national nuclear forces. The effect of the latter, 
particularly in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, might well 
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destabilise the delicate political balance within NATO and exacerbate 
tensions with the Soviets. ,j 
In response to such considerations, American military planners gave 
serious consideration to providing European allies with both the delivery 
vehicles and the warheads necessary for tactical nuclear warfare. As a 
result of Congressional misgivings, however, a compromise was reached, in 
which nuclear delivery vehicles - aircraft, Honest John missiles, atomic 
artillery - would be supplied to the European allies. The warheads 
themselves would be held under US custody until "in time of emergency" 
authorisation to 'release' them to the allies would be given. (30) The 
first example of this 'dual key' control agreed was the 60 Thor missiles 
which Macmillan agreed, in March 1957, should be deployed in Britain. 
The December 1957 NATO Council meeting then cleared the way for a series 
of agreements with other member states, as a result of which, only 3 
years later, there were 2500 American land-based tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe. (31) By January 1961 Honest John missiles were deployed with 
the forces of Greece, Netherlands, West Germany, the UK and the US; and 
by 1965 US nuclear warheads were mounted on quick alert aircraft of nine 
NATO allies. (32) In such circumstances, war in Europe would almost 
inevitably go nuclear at an early stage. The United States had thus 
effectively devolved control of its nuclear weapons to NATO's military 
command and indeed to the constituent armies of the Alliance. Massive 
retaliation was now embodied in the very structure of NATO armed forces. 
(33) 
As the next section of this thesis shows, these policies were 
implemented despite the reservations of both France and West Germany - 
still relatively weak members of the Alliance. But between 1957 and 
1960, doubts as to the wisdom of total reliance on nuclear weapons also 
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grew in both Britain and the United States, the countries mainly 
responsible for the New Look. The fundamental reason for this unease was 
the evidence of growing Soviet nuclear capabilities. In particular the 
launch of the first artificial satellite - Sputnik - by the Soviets in 
1957 indicated that the US itself would soon be vulnerable to attack with 
nuclear missiles. When that vulnerability became a reality, would the 
Soviets believe that the United States would contemplate national suicide 
in defence of Western Europe? It was an argument which had a profound 
effect in the US, which for the first time for over a century found 
itself faced with war affecting, not only US troops overseas, but the US 
homeland itself. At first Britain attempted to reaffirm that Sputnik had 
not upset the balance of power and that "it will take her several years 
to complete the development of an accurate inter-continental rocket. " 
(34) Soon after, both governments began to recognise the arguments of 
those critics - political and military - who argued for a policy of 
'graduated deterrence' and conventional, forces able to force a pause in a 
European war before escalating to an all-out nuclear holocaust. This 
conversion was assisted by the realisation, that, if NATO were to follow 
the logic of total reliance on nuclear weapons, even larger cuts in the 
size of armed forces could be made. Such a prospect was unacceptable to 
powerful elements in the armed forces, both because they were unwilling 
to rely entirely on a nuclear response and for reasons of self- 
preservation. 
As a consequence of these factors, the retreat from the extremes of 
tmassive retaliation' began. When the British government attempted to 
cut the British Army on the Rhine by a further 10,000 to 45,000 in 1959, 
it met strong opposition from other NATO members who reminded it of its 
1954 Treaty obligations. Despite a report of three independent experts 
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appointed by NATO's Secretary General which concluded that the cost of 
BAOR represented a heavy additional cost on the UK balance of payments, 
the government was forced to withdraw the proposal. (35) The British 
Army's strength in Germany has remained at 55,000 ever since. 
Reflecting this shift in declaratory policy away from exclusive 
reliance on nuclear retaliation, the 1960 White Paper emphasised that 
Western nuclear power "is only one component of the deterrent. Because 
of the need to meet local emergencies which could develop into a major 
conflict, conventionally armed forces are a necessary complement to 
nuclear armaments. " (36) It is a message that would become stronger as 
the pressure from the US increased. 
Yet this shift in declaratory policy was not matched by a 
comparable shift in Army doctrine or in the deployment of battlefield 
nuclear weapons. 'In Exercise Spearpoint, held in 1960, the BAOR 
exhibited "virtually complete reliance on nuclear weapons", and observers 
were told that "nuclear weapons would have been used from the 
commencement of any conflict if war had replaced war games. " (37) As 
the attempt to introduce 'flexible response' into NATO planning in the 
next few years would show, it was much more difficult to reduce reliance 
on nuclear weapons than it had been to increase it. The close 
integration of nuclear weapons into NATO's ground and air forces, 
designed for a policy of massive retaliation in a situation of Western 
nuclear superiority, would continue even after neither of these 
conditions applied. 
2.4 The nuclear contagion spreads 
In 1954, during the discussions on the development of a British 
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H-bomb, a confidential paper was written by Nigel Birch, Parliamentary 
Secretary to Minister of Defence Harold Macmillan. Birch argued against 
the development of thermonuclear weapons by Britain on the grounds that 
it would complicate disarmament efforts and encourage other nations to 
develop their own nuclear weapons. His proposal did not, however, find 
other supporters in government. (38) Instead Britain, as we have 
already discussed, accelerated its own nuclear programme and supported 
moves by NATO to increase the reliance on nuclear weapons in European 
defence. 
As a result of these two factors, irresistible pressures built up 
on other medium powers also to acquire nuclear weapons, pressures that 
might have been avoided had Birch's proposals been accepted. 
The initial impact of this pressure was felt on the two other 
medium scale military powers in NATO - France and West Germany. The 
indirect effects were, however, more widespread as nations such as China 
and India felt that nuclear weapons and status were linked and responded 
accordingly. If Britain had renounced its commitment to an independent 
force before 1954, and if the super powers had restricted nuclear weapons 
to a second strike 'minimum deterrent' role after the Soviet test in 
1949, proliferation may still have taken place. It would, however, it is 
suggested, have been both slower and easier to control. As events 
occurred, a dangerous process began which has not yet ended. 
2.4.1 France and nuclear weapons 
The French debate on whether or not to acquire a national nuclear 
force was not resolved until some time between 1954 and 1958. A number of 
factors contributed to the eventual decision to acquire an independent 
'force de frappe'. As in Britain, the experience of Suez in 1956 
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strengthened the desire not to be entirely dependent on the US for 
nuclear protection, and also led to a desire for a symbol of continuing 
national grandeur. If Britain, the other major European colonial power, 
was developing its own nuclear weapons, then it was argued that France 
must do so in order to maintain its international status. If the French 
did not have a 'special relationship' which enabled it to do so, it would 
have to develop its force without American help. NATO's adoption of a 
$massive retaliation' policy only strengthened French leaders' 
association of nuclear weapons with status. 
Thus, when de Gaulle came to power in 1958, the clearly 
discriminatory nature of Britain's exclusive nuclear relationship with 
the US, as expressed in the amendment to the McMahon Act being passed by 
Congress, was seen as a clear incitement. One of de Gaulle's first 
decisions was to "open up the throttle on the French nuclear programme. " 
(39) Henceforth there would be no turning back on a French bomb - and as 
a consequence, th6 task of any future British government wishing to 
renounce independent nuclear weapons would be considerably more 
difficult. 
If the US would not provide assistance to the French nuclear 
programme, however, de Gaulle rapidly decided that there was no benefit 
to be gained from accepting the risks involved in allowing US nuclear 
weapons on French soil. In June 1959 he forced the removal of more than 
200 NATO fighter bombers from France because they carried nuclear weapons 
outside French control. (40) Henceforth France would argue strongly 
against US efforts to reduce the reliance on early first use in NATO 
doctrine. Yet it would make it just as clear that it was unwilling to 
share the risks that such a policy involved by refusing any foreign 
nuclear bases on its own territory. 
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2.4.2 Germanv and nuclear weapons 
The West German political elite has always had a more ambivalent 
attitude towards nuclear weapons. The issue came dramatically into the 
public debate in 1955 when the result of Operation Carte Blanche -a NATO 
war game showed that the use of 355 nuclear weapons in 'defence' of 
Germany resulted in 1.7 million deaths and 3.5 million wounded. (41) 
With their country clearly the potential battleground for a nuclear war, 
over which their government would have little control, fierce debates 
raged throughout the late 19501s. In August 1956 the German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer wrote in the Bonn government's official Bulletin: 
"As to the debate which was started by Americans about 
the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, 
I would like to stress that I regard shifting the principal 
emphasis to atomic weapons at the present time as a mistake 
... I am of the opinion that it is of special importance to localise small conflicts that may occur, and for this we need 
divisions with conventional weapons. " (42) 
At this time, however, the German government's influence over NATO 
policy - even when it concerned its own territory - was severely 
circumscribed. The Federal Republic's existence had been extremely 
short, with the revised German Treaty si gned in Paris in October 1954. 
The treaty itself limited the new state's sovereignty by giving the three 
Western powers - the US, UK and France - the right to station armed 
forces in West Germany, and committing all its own armed forces to NATO, 
and therefore American, command. (43) The German government, faced with 
the joint determination of Britain and the United States to implement the 
'New Look', felt that it had no alternative but to fall into line. As a 
consequence, Adenauer altered his position in 1956, appointed Franz 
Joseph Strauss, strong advocate of nuclearisation, as Defence Minister, 
and agreed to a request for access to US weapons on a 'dual key' basis. 
(44) And, in the following year, secret negotiations began with France 
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on a joint effort to develop and produce nuclear weapons which would be 
available to Germany in a crisis. Such an arrangement, the French 
argued, would either force American aid to European nuclear programmes or 
end what was perceived as Anglo-American domination of the alliance. 
(45) The discussions were not halted until de Gaulle, a convinced anti- 
German, came to power in June 1958. ? 
The British development of an independent nuclear force, together 
with its support for the New Look, exerted strong pressures on the new 
German state to press for access to, and perhaps control over, its own 
nuclear arsenal. Developments in France strengthened this trend. 
Although the German signature of the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1970 
effectively resolved the problem for the time being, the inequality of 
nuclear status between the three major European powers, and the potential 
for a German change of heart, would continue to be a danger in the minds 
of policymakers in West and East. 
2.5 Nuclear weapons and Britain's world role 
In the late 1950's the British government believed that the 
greatest'threat to Western interests came from communist-inspired 
revolution and small-scale wars in the Third World. In Europe the 
nuclear stand-off and political stability made the likelihood of 
conflict small. Together with the US, however, the UK government was 
concerned that the decolonisation process in Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, together with the stresses created by dependency relationships in 
Latin America, would allow the Soviet Union to make further advances at 
the expense of the West. 
Such an argument reinforced Britain's commitment to a continuing 
world policing role, which itself was closely related to its imperial 
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status. In the years that followed Suez, the relative emphasis on extra- 
European military commitments actually increased. Britain was encouraged 
to play a world role by American leaders anxious to maintain a loyal ally 
in their global policy of containment. The British were pleased that, in 
this role, their special relationship with the US was reaffirmed, and the 
legitimacy of their remaining colonial possessions accepted. 
By allowing cuts in the costs of the UK's NATO commitments, 
therefore, it was hoped that the policy of 'massive retaliation' would 
fulfil one of its primary functions: to release resources for Britain's 
'East of Suez' role. As we have seen, such hopes proved to be 
shortlived. As Soviet nuclear power grew, the reluctance to rely 
entirely on nuclear weapons for defence of Western Europe also increased, 
and the savings made proved to be relatively limited. In addition to 
savings in NATO related military costs, the 1957 policy also sought to 
make savings in 'East of Suez' costs by increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons. Together with an increased capability for airlift of a 
ýstrategic reserve' of troops, tactical nuclear weapons could, it was 
thought, substitute for expensive conventional forces in much the same 
way as they did in Europe. In particular, nuclear weapons would enable 
Britain to end conscription, which imposed a substantial burden on an 
economy critically short of manpower. As Macmillan argued in 1957: "the 
end of conscription must depend on the acceptance of nuclear weapons. " 
(46) 
The possible use of nuclear weapons in conflicts outside Europe was 
part of US policy throughout the 19501s. On several occasions, their use 
had been actively considered, notably in Korea (1953), Indochina (1954) 
and the Quemoy/Matsu crises (1954-5 and 1958). As John Lewis Gaddis 
argued in his study of containment strategies "the Eisenhower 
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administration's restraint-in this regard (not using nuclear weapons - 
MC) had clearly been a function of circumstance, not any principled 
opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars" (47) 
British thinking paralleled that in the United States on this 
point, just as the Global Strategy Paper paralleled the New Look. The 
1955 White Paper had argued that "the existence of nuclear weapons may 
discourage overt armed intervention by the communist powers such as 
occurred in Korea. " (48) Sandys himself, in defence of his White 
Paper, envisaged the possibility of limited nuclear war in the Third 
World: 
"Limited and localized acts of aggression, for example, 
by a satellite Communist state, could, no doubt, be 
resisted with conventional arms, or at worst, with 
tactical atomic weapons, the use of, which could be 
confined to the battle area. " (49) 
Lord Mancroft, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, 
expanded on the possible use of nuclear 
. 
Yeapons by arguing that Britain 
contributed to the security of its CENTO and South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) partners "by the very fact of our possession of 
nuclear deterrent forces which could intervene with great effect in those 
areas. " The White Paper confirmed that bomber squadrons based in Cyprus, 
and capable of carrying nuclear weapons, would be available for CENTO 
purposes in the event of a Middle East emergency. Later that year, in 
Australia, Sandys confirmed that nuclear weapons would be available for 
defence of the SEATO area, and went on to say that Canberra bombers 
equipped to carry atomic weapons would be going to Malaya. Although he 
declined to say whether the nuclear bombs themselves would be based in 
Asia, he said that "when they are brought here, to the SEATO area, I 
don't think anything will be said about it. " (50) 
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Fortunately no circumstances arose which were Judged serious enough 
to warrant use of tactical nuclear weapons in those years - probably the 
height of British reliance on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless as late as 
July 1961, V-bombers were placed on readiness in Malta during the Kuwait 
crisis. (51) If another conflict on the scale of Korea had taken place 
in those years, the use of nuclear weapons by Britain and/or the US would 
have been a strong possibility. 
Despite the emphasis on nuclear weapons in East of Suez roles, 
however, the economies achieved in the late 1950's proved to be less than 
the ambitious 1957 White Paper had envisaged. The costs of reliance on a 
strategic reserve such as large equipment stockpiles and long-range 
transport aircraft turned out to be considerable. The end of 
conscription meant that pay and conditions had to be considerably 
improved in order to attract volunteers. Service pressure for more 
sophisticated weapons systems for East of Suez operations had a firm 
basis in military reality; and capabilities thought to 
+necessary in 
1957 - such as manned aircraft - had to be reintroduced into the 
equipment programme'. Nuclear weapons may have been envisaged for 
small-scale 'conventional' wars - such as Korea - but in the counter- 
insurgency and guerilla warfare in which Britain was involved they had no 
relevance. By 1960, therefore, the savings from the Sandys'reforms had 
been exhausted. The cuts in the British Army and RAF units in Germany 
had been halted. The costs of maintaining an independent nuclear force 
were rising sharply. Reliance on nuclear weapons, together with an end 
to conscription, had produced only limited savings in East of Suez costs. 
The policy of the Global Strategy Paper using nuclear weapons to 
retain Great Power status at reduced cost had proven to have definite 
limitations. Indeed, rather then helping to cut the level of military 
- 155 - 
F 
spending, the independent nuclear force itself involved substantial 
direct costs. As importantly, perhaps, its existence reinforced 
illusions of world status that ensured that the savings made would remain 
severely limited. The failure to reduce the burden of military spending 
would, as a result, continue to contribute to the economic malaise which 
was to become a growing object of concern by the early 1960's. 
3. The McNamara Strateqv and the Nassau Aqreement 
By the late 1950's, the policies outlined in the New Look and 
Global Strategy Paper were coming under increasing criticism. It was 
increasingly believed that 'massive retaliationt was no longer a credible 
option, now that the Soviets were developing a capability for destroying 
American, as well as European, cities. It would be irrational, and indeed 
suicidal, to respond to Soviet military advances only by escalation to 
all-out war. Knowing this, the Soviets would no longer be deterred by a 
threat to do so. An alternative strategy, involving more limited 
military options, was therefore needed. 
These criticisms were reinforced by the rapidly growing public 
awareness of the effects of nuclear war. The H-bomb atmospheric tests in 
particular alerted large numbers of people to their possible fate in a 
future conflict. With the intensity of the Cold War reduced after 
Stalin's death, greater political space was becoming available for 
critiques of defence policy that could not be labelled as pro-communist. 
The most radical manifestation of this change was the establishment of 
CND in 1957. It was also reflected, however, in growing criticism of 
NATO strategy from the leaders of the Labour and Liberal parties. In the 
armed forces, on the Conservative back benches, and amongst the new breed 
of 'strategic analysts', the support for new strategies was growing. 
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Common themes emerged in these criticisms. First, it was argued 
that NATO strategy was likely to become increasingly less able to deter 
Soviet attempts to make local gains. As one of the most influential 
articles of this period argued. 
"Increasingly, therefore, our present policy is in danger of being 
interpreted as bluff - if indeed it does not prove to be one - for 
any aggression between an all-out war and a very minor one; and it 
leaves much room for misunderstanding and Communist exploitation. " 
(52) 
Secondly, many commentators doubted whether there was any 
Justification for an independent British nuclear force, and argued that 
Britain should make its commitment to NATO in conventional, and possibly 
tactical nuclear, forces only. This became the official policy of the 
Labour Party, and was supported by many who did not agree with the 
completely non-nuclear policy proposed by CND. (53) These criticisms 
began to affect official policy as early as 1957; and by 1959 and 1960 
had brought about a noticeable retreat from the extremes of 'massive 
retaliation' in both the US and the UK. Official statements now put more 
emphasis on the possibilities for limited wars and the cuts in the level 
of NATO conventional forces came to a halt. 
3.1 The McNamara Strategy 
The major impact of the discussions of the late 1950's was not 
seen, however, until the election of a new President, John F. Kennedy, in 
January 1961. Kennedy had become convinced that massive retaliation 
policy had been driving the United States "into a corner where the only 
choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission -a 
choice that necessarily causes us to hesitate on the brink and leaves the 
initiative in the hands of our enemies. " (54) On taking office, he 
appointed a series of senior advisors with a mandate to undertake a major 
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review of US security policy. Robert McNamara became Secretary for 
Defence, and set about introducing central planning and systems analysis 
into a budget dominated by interservice rivalry. The leading figures in 
the 1950 review of policy, NSC-68, re-entered government convinced that 
policy must now accommodate to emerging Soviet nuclear strength. Paul 
Nitze became Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security 
Affairs, and was directed to draft a revised version of the 'basic 
national security policy' of the Eisenhower adminstration. Former 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was asked to undertake a study of NATO 
defence policy, which he completed in March 1961. (55) 
A 
A central theme in the new US policy developed through 1961 and 
1962 was a critique of the implicit assumption in previous policy that a 
major war was extremely unlikely. Instead it was believed that, while 
not likely, war was possible. The government, therefore, must plan to 
fight these wars in a rational way if US national objectives were to be 
achieved. It was a belief reinforced by the 1961 Berlin crisis, which 
began to build up just as Kennedy was taking office. The 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis further increased the desire for a military strategy that 
depended less on all-out nuclear war as', a deterrent to limited, non- 
nuclear threats to US interests. (56) At the same time, a strong 
presumption became established that there must be a rational, but 
limited, way to use military force in crises. This, in turn, created a 
strong tendency to focus solely on military solutions to the exclusion of 
political factors. It was an error which proved dangerous in Berlin and 
Cuba. It was to lead to failure and humiliation in the jungles of Indo- 
China in the years that followed. 
Central to the US 'strategy' which Kennedy and McNamara inherited 
was the Single Integrated Operational Pian (SIOP) - the detailed plan for 
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conduct of a nuclear war. When briefed on SIOP two weeks after taking 
office, McNamara found that SIOP-62, then the current version, called 
for: 
"an all-out pre-emptive first-strike against the USSR, 
Eastern Europe and Red China, in response to an actual 
or merely impending Soviet invasion of Western Europe that 
involved no nuclear weapons at all. " (57) 
1 
McNamara was horrified. SIOP was so organised that there was no 
possibility for excluding Communist states - such as China or Albania - 
which were not closely allied to the Soviet Union. There was no planning 
for less-than-total nuclear options. SIOP-62 involved launching the 
entire US nuclear force of 3423 nuclear weapons, totalling 7847 megatons. 
Even on extremely optimistic assumptions on the effects of these 
explosions, 285 million Russians and Chinese would be killed, and many 
more would die, in East and West, as fallout spread worldwide. (58) 
In reaction to this policy, whichembodied massive retaliation in 
its most extreme form, the new rulers in the Pentagon introduced a series 
of radical changes. Flexibility was to be introduced into nuclear 
targetting, allowing a choice between military and civilian targets, 
between strategic and other military targets, and between targets in the 
Soviet Union and those in other communist countries. The possibility of 
limited use of nuclear weapons to 'signal' determination to escalate, 
rather than initiating large-scale nuclear war, was envisaged. The need 
for an option which allowed enemy leaders to be spared from nuclear 
attack, so as to make intra-war bargaining possible, was emphasised. 
Studies were set in motion on the feasibility of large-scale civil 
defence preparations which would make US use of nuclear weapons more 
'credible'. The funds for command, communications and control were 
greatly increased, in an effort to improve central Presidential control 
of the progress of nuclear war. 
- 159 - 
In addition to these steps-to introduce more flexibility into US 
plans for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the new Administration 
also began to re-examine the commitment to the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons to offset Soviet conventional forces in Europe. With the 
nuclearisation of Allies' forces through the supply of 'dual-key' 
delivery systems, American control of nuclear weapons had become 
extremely tenuous. In 1960, members of Congress's Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy had visited Europe and found fighter aircraft loaded with 
US nuclear bombs sitting on the edge of runways with German pilots inside 
the cockpits and starter plugs inserted. The only US control apparent 
was an American officer nearby with a revolver. (59) It was clear that 
the European allies, the Supreme Allied'Commander Europe (SACEUR), and 
indeed relatively low level military commanders, could initiate the use 
of US nuclear weapons without Presidential authority. Indeed once a 
major conflict had started it would be extremely difficult to stop 
nuclear weapons being used in large numbers. 
As a result of such fears, the new Administration decided in 1961 
to install Permissive Action Links (PAL) on nuclear weapons in Europe. 
It was hoped that these would prevent their being used without 
authorisation, though recent studies suggest that such a hope may have 
been misplaced. (60) Nevertheless it did indicate, as did the new 
strategic nuclear policy, that the Kennedy team was serious in its desire 
to have military options other than automatic nuclear retaliation. 
Thirdly, McNamara and his colleagues put much greater emphasis on 
the role of conventional forces than had been apparent under Eisenhower. 
Close examination of the conventional forces of both NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact revealed that, far from Soviet superiority being overwhelming, there 
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was rough parity in the two alliances' ground forces. In both sea and 
air forces, furthermore, NATO had a considerable, and perhaps decisive, 
lead. The argument of the 1950's - that NATO had to rely on first use of 
nuclear weapons because of the relative weakness of its non-nuclear 
forces - did not stand up to scrutiny. As McNamara, Nitze and other top 
Pentagon officials confirmed publicly in 1963, the assumption which had 
governed NATO policy since the 1940's was now believed by the US 
government to be wrong. (61) 
In a rather ironical twist, the higher estimate of Western 
conventional forces' strength led to greatly increased support for 
improvements in those forces. Now that eventual escalation to use of 
nuclear weapons, as an alternative to defeat, was no longer perceived as 
inevitable, the government was more inclined to devote resources to 
making such a choice less likely. 
Within a short period, spurred on by the Berlin crisis in 1961, the 
US made considerable additions to its conventional forces. The active 
strength of the army rose from 11 to 16 divisions, and tactical fighter 
strength from 16 to 21 wings. Mobilisation, airlift and pre-positioning 
capability were enhanced. Between early 1961 and January 1962, SACEUR's 
ready division equivalents on the Central Front increased from about 16 
to 25. The US urged further increases on its NATO allies to bring the 
division count up to 30 ready divisions plus 30 in reserve, a goal set by 
SACEUR General Norstad. (62) 
3.2 The Athens speech 
In May 1962, McNamara gave a major speech to the North Atlantic 
Council meeting in Athens. In unprecedented detail he described the new 
policy of 'flexible response' which the US wished NATO to adopt. He 
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argued cogently for a reduction in reliance on nuclear weapons, and 
sought the Allies' support for a build-up of conventional forces. The 
speech started the process which resulted in the formal NATO adoption of 
a 'flexible response' strategy in 1967, though not in a form entirely in 
line with McNamara's 1962 thinking. 
In his speech, declassified in August 1979, McNamara began by 
presenting the case for flexibility in US strategic nuclear plans: 
"the US has come to the conclusion that to the extent 
feasible military strategy in general nuclear war should 
be approached in much the same way that more conventional 
military operations have been regarded in the past. That 
is to say, our principal military objectives, in the event 
of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, 
should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces while 
attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of 
allied society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a 
strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or 
a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations 
for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general 
nuclear war. " 
The possibility of first use of tactical nuclear weapons was not 
dismissed. However, its prospects were not rated highly. McNamara argued 
that even a very limited use of such weapons, intended to demonstrate 
Western resolve, "could rapidly lead to general nuclear war. " In a 
rejection of the previous policy of relying on nuclear weapons for 
battlefield use, he contended that "local nuclear war would be a 
transient but highly destructive phenomenon ... Any substantial nuclear 
operation in Europe inevitably would involve both forces and targets in 
the US and USSR". 
Finally, McNamara drew the conclusion that NATO had to concentrate 
its efforts on improved conventional forces. "With improvements in 
ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air 
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capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces", he argued, 
"the Soviet Union can be assured that no gap exists in the NATO defence 
of this vital region, and that no aggression small or large can 
succeed. " 
What did all this mean for the independent nuclear forces of 
Britain and France, not under American Presidential control? On this 
point, McNamara was blunt: 
"There must not be competing and conflicting strategies 
in the conduct of nuclear war ... 'if nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally 
controlled campaign against all the enemy's vital nuclear 
capabilities. ... it is essential that we centralize the decision to use our nuclear weapons to the greatest 
extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to 
contemplate having only a part of the strategic force 
launched in isolation from our main striking power... 
We would find it equally intolerable to have one segment 
of the Alliance force attacking urban-industrial areas 
while, with the bulk of our forces, we were succeeding in 
destroying most of the enemies' nuclear capabilities. 
Such a failure in co-ordination might lead to the 
destruction of our hostages - the Soviet cities - just 
at a time at which our strategy in coercing the Soviets 
into stopping their aggression was on the verge of success. 
Failure to achieve central control of NATO nuclear forces 
would mean running the risk of bringing down on us the 
catastrophe which we most urgently wish to avoid. 
In this connection our analyses suggest rather strongly 
that relatively weak nuclear forces with enemy cities 
as their targets are not likely to be adequate to 
perform the function of deterrence. In a world of 
threats, crises, and possibly even accidents, such a 
posture appears more likely to deter its owner from 
standing firm under pressure than to inhibit a potential 
aggressor.... 
In the event of war, the use of such a force against 
the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount 
to suicide, whereas its employment against significant 
military targets would have a negligible effect on the 
outcome of the conflict. In short, then, weak nuclear 
capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, 
prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a 
deterrent. " (63) 
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The European reaction to the new policy promulgated at 
Athens was not a sympathetic one. They had been convinced over the 
previous decade that nuclear weapons made European war extremely 
unlikely, and were concerned at US eagerness to consider how such a war 
should be fought. Given their much more, painful experience of World War 
t 
Two, European leaders were reluctant to consider the possiSlity of World 
War Three, be it conventional or nuclear. The addiction to nuclear 
defence had of course been reinforced by the US policy of 'massive 
retaliation', which had encouraged most NATO countries to acquire 'dual 
key' battlefield nuclear weapons. 
The new US emphasis on conventional forces was viewed as both 
expensive and wasteful, given the continuing perception of overwhelming 
Soviet conventional superiority. It was feared that US talk of 
centralising control of nuclear weapons'ýwould mean a withdrawal of the 
nuclear 'guarantee' to Europe. If the tactical nuclear Itripwirel was 
removed, and conventional forces improved, what was there to ensure that, 
if NATO was losing a non-nuclear war, the US would initiate nuclear 
hostilities? Or that the Soviets would believe that the US would do so? 
There was widespread opposition to the central thrust of US policy for 
NATO -a reduction in reliance on early first use. Indeed Kai-Uwe von 
Hassel, West Germany's defence minister, went so far as to argue that: 
"as concerns the defence of Europe, in contrast to other 
parts of the world, ... the atomic threshold must 
be 
very low ... atomic demolition mines, nuclear air defence 
weapons and, if need be, nuclear battlefield weapons must 
be made ready for employment in an early phase of recognizable 
attack on Europe. " (64) 
The French were particularly critical. The US strategy threatened 
the very existence of their independent force, in which they had by this 
stage invested considerable finance and prestige. De Gaulle was in the 
process of cutting conventional forces in order to release resources for 
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economic growth -between 1962 and 1967 conventional defence spending was 
to fall by 43%. The French nuclear force was the crucial element in the 
Gaullist project to recover national prestige after the blows suffered in 
Indo-China, Suez and Algeria while, simultaneously, restoring the 
economy's international competitiveness. (65) These objectives, based 
on economic and political considerations rather than military ones, were 
incompatible with the McNamara strategy. The US's insistence on flexible 
response in the early 1960's was to be a key factor in France's decision 
in 1966 to withdraw from the military structure of NATO; and it 
reinforced the determination of French leaders to construct a nuclear 
force of their own. 
In an attempt to address at least some of the concerns raised by 
its European allies, the US came up with its ill-fated Multilateral Force 
(MLF) proposals. (66) These sought, by offering shared control and 
'mixed manning' of strategic nuclear systems, to tackle the problem that 
European leaders wanted independent forces for status reasons. In 
reality, however, far from discouraging proliferation, the MLF debate 
served only to accentuate it. The nuclear appetite of certain German 
politicians was whetted. While the US sought to have a veto over all 
European nuclear forces, most of their own strategic force would remain 
under sole US control. After a debate stretching over more than four 
years, it died an unlamented death. It had been all along, in Kennedy's 
own view, a fake. 
3.3 Britain and the McNamara Strateqv 
As a result of the new policy, the US Administration's attitude to 
the British nuclear force changed dramatically. Under Eisenhower, 
particularly after the 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, the 
I 
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independent force had been aided and encouraged as a contribution to the 
overall Western 'massive retaliation' force. Britain was a loyal ally, 
supporting the US world role and making a major contribution to NATO 
defences. It was also capable of, and apparently determined to, build 
its nuclear force by itself if necessary. Eisenhower clearly felt that 
the need to maintain sound political relations with the UK overrode any 
consideration of possible divergences between the two countries in a 
hypothetical future major war. The Kennedy administration, by contrast, 
was much more concerned that it retain escalation control. The more it 
emphasised conventional and limited nuclear options, the more it found it 
necessary to question whether the British force could be reconciled with 
such concepts. On 21 April 1961, Kennedy approved a National Security - 
Council Policy which stated that "it would be desirable for the British, 
in the long run, to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business, since 
their activity in this field is a standing goad to the French. " (67) 
In addition to US concerns at the possible 'trigger' role of 
British nuclear forces, and the way in which it contributed to 
proliferation, a number of influential figures in the new Administration 
argued that there were wider, political, reasons why Britain should be 
urged to abandon its nuclear force. George Ball, one of Kennedy's most 
influential advisors in European matters, argued that US support for the 
independent nuclear force "encouraged Britain in the belief that she 
could by her own efforts - so long as she maintained a specially favoured 
postion with the United States - play an independent great power role, 
and thus it deflected her from coming to terms with her European 
destiny. " (68) That 'destiny', Ball argued, lay in membership of the 
EEC, where she could contribute to Western Unity and reduce the tensions 
being created by Gaullism. 
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The most widely noted exponent of this view of Britain was 
Dean Acheson, who in a speech in late 1962 warned that: 
"Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found 
a role. The attempt to play a separate power role - that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a "special 
relationship" with the United Staes, a role based on being 
the head of a "commonwealth" with has no political 
structure, or unity, or strength and enjoys a fragile and 
precarious economic relationship by means of the Sterling 
area and preferences in the British market -this role is 
about to be played out. " (69) 
The British responded angrily to such suggestions. Prime 
Minister Macmillan was willing to recognise the need for gradual 
adjustment in policy towards the Commonwealth and Europe - as his 'Winds 
of Change' speech in 1960 and the EEC application demonstrated. Retreat 
on these fronts, however, only strengthened his government's 
determination to retain the independent nuclear force, a symbol of 
I 
Britain's historic role and of its 'special relationship' with the US. 
The experience of Test Ban negotiations in these years reinforced the 
belief that nuclear weapons gave Britain a seat at the 'top table', and 
with it international status. As F. S. Northedge has argued: 
"It was perhaps unfortunate ... that Britain played a leading part in the nuclear test ban negotiations of 
1958 to 1963 ... [it] had the effect of fostering in Britain hallucinations of world power no longer-justified 
by realities ... it entrenched the British illusion that, however much the country's physical strength had fallen, 
its moral influence remained pre-eminent. " (70) 
Britain's commitment to maintaining its own nuclear force 
was reinforced by the change in US strategy that the Kennedy 
administration appeared to be introducing. With 'massive retaliation' 
the US was committed to early first use of nuclear weapons in a major 
European war. Under the new policy, however, it was unlikely that the US 
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President would, after perhaps weeks of intense conventional war, be 
willing to 'risk flew York to save London'. Defence Minister Peter 
Thorneycroft voiced these doubts, which paralleled, though more 
discreetly, criticisms heard from France: 
"As an increasing number of more and more powerful missiles 
will be aimed at Washington and flew York, can we be certain 
that a threat directed against our country would always be 
answered by an American counter threat? And should we 
admit this certitude, would the Russians be equally 
persuaded? Is a deterrent under the exclusive control 
of America absolutely reliable? " (71) 
The divergence of views between Britain and the United 
States , and to some extent within the US Administration, came to a head 
in November 1962, only weeks after the Cuban missile crisis. US Defence 
Secretary McNamara decided that, as part of his drive for efficiency in 
the Pentagon, the Skybolt project was to be scrapped. Progress on 
Minuteman and Polaris had been so successful, he argued, that Skybolt was 
unnecessary. Moreover it had failed four successive tests, and was 
proving to be both expensive and unreliable. 
This decision clearly created major problems for Britain 
which now had no system with which to replace the V-bombers in a 
strategic nuclear role. British leaders feared, with some Justification, 
that some of Kennedy's officials would use the opportunity in an atter-pt 
to ease the UK out of an arms race which it could no longer afford. 
Macmillan's government was determined that this attempt should not 
succeed. 
Matters came to a head at the sum. It meeting in Nassau on 
18 December. By now, Skybolt's effectiveness had been *co: -promised* in 
public by both McNamara and Kennedy. Macmillan therefore turned down 
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an offer from Kennedy to continue Skybolt development, with costs shared 
50-50, solely for British needs. (72) An offer of the Hound-Dog air-to- 
ground missile, less advanced than Skybolt, was rejected as providing no 
more than a temporary solution to Britain's replacement problem. 
Macmillan made it clear that only a renewal of Eisenhower's 1960 offer of 
Polaris would now be acceptable to his government and party. 
1, 
Macmillan set the problem in historical context, referring to the 
close wartime collaboration, the break between 1946 and 1958, and the re- 
establishment of full co-operation by President Eisenhower. Now, he 
feared, the US might be returning to its policies after the War in which 
it had been perceived to be depriving the UK of a nuclear role. If it 
did so, Macmillan warned, there would be a wave of anti-Americanism in 
Britain. He had Just received a telegram signed by 137 Tory backbenchers 
urging him to insist on an tindependent deterrent'. If he failed to 
bring a satisfactory agreement back, his government could collapse and 
might be replaced by a leadership forced to exploit anti-Americanism to 
keep the Conservatives in power. (73) 
Moreover, Macmillan made clear that US refusal to supply Polaris 
could force his government to co-operate with other nations, presumably 
France, on nuclear matters. Britain would allow the Holy Loch and other 
US nuclear bases to remain, but it would not permit previous information 
received from the US to stand in the waý of a fresh attempt to stay in 
the nuclear business. 
Faced with Macmillan's tough stance, Kennedy relented. He was 
unwilling to risk a major breach in the Alliance over the hypothetical 
possibility that there were circumstances in which Britain would wish, or 
be able, to use its nuclear missile without American approval. To 
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further reduce such a possibility, however, he insisted that Britain 
agree that its Polaris missiles would "be used for the purposes of 
international defence of the Western Alliance in all circumstances". 
Macmillan accepted this, but with the addition of the crucial, and 
contradictory, caveat "except where Her Majesty's Government may decide 
that supreme national interests are at stake". (74) Since it is 
impossible to imagine any circumstances in which the government would 
consider the use of Polaris when these interests are not at stake, this 
amounted to an American admission that the UK could retain its 
operational independence. 
There would of course be doubts expressed as to the value of such 
an 'independent' force, given its dependence on US communication links, 
spares and technology. These doubts will be closely examined in Chapter 
6. Nevertheless it is important to emphasise that Nassau represented a 
major political success for the supporters of a British nuclear force. 
Their major concern throughout the debate in 1957-62 had been with the 
international status, and special links with the US, which it was 
believed the nuclear force gave to Britain. The military scenarios that 
so excited McNamara's "whiz kids" were of little interest in Britain. 
What was important was that Britain's membership of an exclusive club had 
been renewed for many years to come at a remarkably low cost (compared, 
at least, with its predecessor the V-bomber force). Yet again Britain 
had been able to combine nuclear interdependence and independence, proved 
the correctness of the policies followed since 1940, and refuted the 
arguments of those - such as Dean Acheson - who believed that it needed 
to find a new role in the world. 
An immediate consequence of Nassa6 was a strengthening of 
continental European views, especially in France, that a Britain in the 
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EEC could prove to be an American 'Trojan Horse', as committed to the 
special relationship and its Commonwealth links as to European co- 
operation. The perception that Britain had divided loyalties, and would 
seek to tie Europe too closely to American priorities, played a central 
part in de Gaulle's veto of UK membership on January 14,1963. Although 
not the only factor in the decision, the Nassau agreement probably 
strengthened de Gaulle's determination to oppose what he perceived was 
Anglo-American domination of the Alliance. (75) Britain would find that 
its nuclear force may have been an 'admission ticket' to the test ban 
talks. It was met with closed doors when the much more vital European 
club was approached. (76) 
The Nassau agreement, together with the McNamara strategy, also 
reinforced de Gaulle's determination to establish France's independence 
of action. Kennedy had made a belated offer of Polaris missiles to 
France in order to 'balance' the deal with Britain. He feared that 
acceptance would involve undue dependence on the US, particularly if the 
proposals for a multilateral force went ahead. And, though it would have 
recognised France's equality with Britain within NATO, it would have 
required a very different nuclear doctrine and position on Britain's EEC 
application. With some reluctance, de Gaullerejected the offer. (77) 
3.5 After Nassau 
By 1963 it had become clear that the US was failing in crucial 
respects to fulfil the ambitions and objectives set by McNamara in 1961. 
The independent nuclear forces of Britain and France now looked less 
vulnerable to obsolescence than a year before and likely to be built up 
in the years to come. Despite the downgrading of tactical nuclear 
weapons in US declaratory policy, their deployment in Europe still 
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accorded with the requirements for 'massive retaliation'. Indeed between 
1960, the end of the Eisenhower administration, and August 1963, the 
number of such weapons in Europe (excluding Strategic Air Command and 
sea-based warheads) rose from 2500 to 4000. By October 1968, there would 
be 7200 land-based tactical nuclear warheads in Europe -several times the 
number which flexible response would have required. (78) 
By 1963, however, the urgency began to go out of the proposals 
energetically put forward in the Athens speech. The US and its allies 
had survived the Berlin and Cuba crises without war. The nuclear powers 
were about to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty. There was a perception 
that the risks of global war were now diminishing. And, after Kennedy's 
death in November 1963, the focus of the strategists of 'flexible 
response' shifted to Vietnam, where the US was to commit 500,000 men to a 
limited war fought with conventional weapons. In Europe, the US was 
forced to accept a policy that was contradictory in military terms. The 
'flexible response' strategy adopted in 1967 would be much less of a 
departure from massive retaliation than its supporters had intended. For 
the time being, however, it was all the US was going to get. 
Labour and the bomb 
By the early 1960's it was clear that the government had failed to 
achieve the major reduction in the economic burden of defence which had 
been one of the central aims of the 1957 White Paper. Between 1957/8 and 
1963/4, defence spending in real terms had risen by almost 8 percent and, 
as a proportion of national income, fallen by only 0.7 percent. (79) 
The continuing priority given to Britain's world role, and the consequent 
spending on nuclear weapons and forces for East of Suez policing roles, 
ensured that Britain's defence burden remained well above those of its 
main European allies, and economic competitors. 
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By the time the Labour Party came to power, in October 1964, the 
economic costs of this defence effort were again becoming a source of 
widespread concern. France and Germany had both overtaken the UK in 
national income per head for the first time in more than a century. In 
contrast to the continuing 'economic miracle' in continental Europe and 
Japan, Britain seemed caught in a 'Stop Go' cycle and the low levels of 
investment and growth which this entailed. (80) 
The Labour government was elected on a promise to end this decline, 
introduce the 'white heat' of new technology and new ideas into industry, 
and lift the economy on to a long term growth rate of 4 percent per 
annum. The 1965 National Plan set out how the government hoped to 
achieve these ambitious targets. It argued that some of the resources 
necessary for industrial growth would have to be found from cuts in 
defence: 
"The defence effort pre-empts a large part of the 
productive potential of some of the most important and 
technologically advanced industrial resources and is 
a large user of skilled and unskilled manpower ... As 
a nation we spend as much on defence as we do on 
investment in industrial plant and machinery ... The defence programme now uses some 35-40 percent of 
national research and development expenditure and 
about one-fifth of the qualified scientists and 
technologists engaged in it ... externally, the defence effort presses hard on our balance of payments. 
In 1964-5 E262 million of the defence provision was 
direct overseas expenditure; this is more than we can 
afford. " (81) 
As the years that followed would show, however, the Labour Party 
was to be only partially successful in reducing the considerable burden 
on the economy that military spending represented. Its leadership was 
still firmly attached to the world role to which Attlee and Bevin had 
committed Britain, including strong Commonwealth links, the special 
relationship with the United States, and the East of Suez military role. 
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When these commitments clashed with the requirements of domestic economic 
growth, the latter took second place. Wilson's personal decision in 1964 
not to devalue the pound, despite an international consensus that it was 
10-15 percent overvalued, was one of the most obvious, and damaging, 
consequences of this policy. (82) The eventual result would be the 
abandonment of Labour's ambitious social and economic goals, widespread 
public disillusionment, and an electoral defeat from which the Labour 
Party would never fully recover. 
4.1 Renegotiating Nassau 
As a result of the fierce debates of the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the Labour Party leadership's commitment to maintaining Britain's 
independent nuclear force was by no means clear. The 1961 Party 
Conference had reversed the short-lived commitment to unilateralism, and 
by 1964 the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament had lost much of its 
previous influence. In order to unify the Party after Gaitskill's 
abrasive leadership, however, his successor Harold Wilson had sought to 
finesse the issue by emphasising his belief that an 'independent' nuclear 
force was absurd. (83) Denis Healey, Labour's defence spokesperson, 
emphasised that they would: 
"certainly not continue the progr 
* 
amme in its capacity 
as an independent British force '.. We do not believe 
that it is a necessary or sensiblý use of our resources 
to spend more money on retaining an independent nuclear 
capability. We have repeatedly said that we have no 
interest in the Polaris programme as a contribution to 
an independent British deterrent. Whether it is of any 
value as part of an Alliance effort we cannot make up our 
minds until we negotiate the question with the United 
States. " (84) 
In the years leading up to the election, Labour's key politicians - 
Wilson, Healey and Gordon Walker - took a line in public that was 
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complementary to the McNamara strategy. The problem of overcommitment in 
the defence budget could be tackled by an application of the management 
techniques which, it was argued, McNamara had been introducing with 
considerable success in the Pentagon. The 'independent' nuclear force 
was seen as a status symbol which had no military credibility. The main 
requirement in NATO was for modern conventional defences and a strategy 
of 'flexible response'. As Labour's 1964 manifesto stated, with 
masterful ambiguity: 
The Nassau agreement to buy Polaris know-how and 
Polaris missiles from the USA will add nothing to the 
deterrent strength of the Western Alliance ... We are 
not prepared any longer to waste the country's 
resources on endless duplication of strategic nuclear 
weapons. We shall propose the re-negotiation of the 
Nassau agreement. Our stress will be on the strengthening 
of our conventional regular forces so that we can contribute 
our share to NATOdefence and also fulfil our peace-keeping 
commitments to the Commonwealth and the United Nations. " (85) 
The Labour Party's policy in 1964 seemed, therefore, to represent a 
continuation of the 1949 policy proposed by Tizard, and not unlike the 
ideas of many centrists in the politics"of the 1980s. The attempt to 
maintain a fully independent strategic nuclear force would be abandoned. 
Instead Britain would rely on the US to provide the strategic nuclear 
component of NATOs military effort. Although the V-bombers and tactical 
nuclear weapons might be continued in service, they would do so as part 
of Britain's 'contribution to NATO', not as a force able to be used 
independently. 
There was a widespread view in Britain, and elsewhere, that 
Labour's policy did indeed mean that Polaris would be cancelled. The 
Times predicted that a Labour government would "not maintain an 
independent nuclear striking force after the V-bomber force ceased to be 
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effective". (86) The Conservatives fought, and lost, the General 
Election on a platform that put the retention of the "independent 
deterrent" at its centre. In Gaullist tones, Alec Douglas Home argued 
that: 
"the Socialists would propose to discard all control 
by a British government over Britain's nuclear arms 
... I must be sure that each of you recognises the consequences of such a Socialist decision. It would 
mean that we should surrender all our authority in 
world affairs and hand over the decision about the 
life and future of Britain to another country. This I 
am quite sure you cannot allow. " (87) 
Despite Sir Alec's warnings, the British people elected the Labour 
Party to power in October 1964. On taking office, however, it soon 
became clear that the differences between the two parties on this issue 
were considerably less than their leaders, each for his own reasons, had 
tried to argue. Wilson publicly emphasised that the new government would 
)renegotiate' Nassau, and, in an attempt to do so, offered to assign 
Britain's Polaris submarines and most of its V-bombers to an Atlantic 
Nuclear Force (A. N. F. ). These would be "irrevocably committed to NATO as 
long as NATO lasted as an effective organisation. Only in the event of a 
break-up of NATO would they revert to British control". (88) It was, 
and still is, hard to see how this commitment differed in substance from 
the Nassau wording agreed between Kennedy and Macmillan. As events would 
transpire even this limited change was not made. Nassau remained 
operative, with no amendments, through the life of the Labour 
government. 
The decision to proceed with the Polaris project was taken by 
Wilson, after discussions with Patrick Gordon Walker and Denis Healey, 
only days after Labour took office. This was endorsed by the Cabinet 
Defence Committee and later by Cabinet. According to Wilson's account, 
it was believed that the project was beyond the "point of no return; 
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there could be no question of cancelling them, except at inordinate 
cost. " (89) The new Ministers did agree, however, to reduce the number 
of Polaris submarines on order from 5 to 4 as a contribution to the 
general economies being made in defence expenditure plans. 
Several accounts of these years have suggested that the Polaris 
project was not irreversible in financial terms. Lawrence Freedman 
contends that the Treasury had held back on authorising new expenditure 
on Polaris until the election was over. He estimates that the net cost 
of foreclosing on the contract would only have been E35-40 million - 
around ten per cent of the total capital cost. (90) Indeed construction 
work on the Polaris project was virtually suspended for six months during 
1964/65 pending a political decision. (91) Unless he was deliberately 
misled by officials, Wilson's later contention that "we kept the Polaris 
submarine programme because production was beyond the point of no return" 
cannot be the main reason why he decided on completion of the project. 
(92) 
However, there are also clear signs that the new Labour government 
did envisage circumstances in which British nuclear forces might be used 
independently. The proviso that Britain's nuclear force would revert to 
British control should NATO break up suggested that, in this 
circumstance, it was believed that the force still had some value. 
Healey himself argued that, even within NATO, the force was of some use: 
"if you are inside an alliance you increase the deterrent to the other 
side enormously if there is more than one centre of decision for first 
use of nuclear weapons. " (93) The decision to reduce the number of 
boats ordered from five to four, rather than the three suggested by some 
in the Treasury, itself reflected the desire to maintain a "credible" 
independent force, rather than simply a contribution to NATO's overall 
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nuclear strength. For four was the minimum total force size which 
enabled the Navy to maintain one boat on station at all times. A 
reduction to three boats would have meant that, for part of the year, 
Britain would have had no assured independent second-strike capability. 
(94) 
Moreover the policy decisions taken at this time suggest that the 
new Labour government took the view, shared by previous Conservative 
administrations, that British nuclear weapons had a useful role in 
conflicts outside Europe. Its proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, 
outlined to the House of Commons on 16 December 1964, pointedly excluded 
part of the V-bomber force earmarked for possible deployment outside the 
NATO area. (95) V-bombers and nuclear-equipped carrier forces continued 
to be deployed in support of the Anglo-Malaysian 'confrontation' with 
Indonesia. (96) Perhaps most remarkably, within two months of entering 
office, the government offered a nuclear $guarantee' to India. 
This offer was made in direct response to China's first nuclear 
explosion, which took place the same day as the General Election in 
Britain. The Labour government believed that British nuclear weapons 
could be used to deter either a Chinese nuclear attack on India or a 
large-scale Chinese conventional attack. Not only the V-bomber force 
would be made available for such a role. Consideration was also given to 
the stationing of Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean. The policy was 
set out in the 1965 White Paper: 
"The Chinese explosion must remind us that the 
stability so far achieved in relations between Soviet 
and Western alliances might rapidly be jeopardised by 
the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do 
not now possess them ... our nuclear policy must help to provide some reassurance to non-nuclear powers. " 
(97) 
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These extra-European nuclear commitments reflected the Wilson 
government's strong commitment to the East of Suez role, which was, 
initially at least, perhaps even stronger than that of the Conservatives. 
There was a belief that Britain's nuclear force could be used to 
buttress the world role to which Wilson attached so much importance. It 
demonstrated the deep commitment of the Labour leaders to inherited 
imperial values, including a paternalistic view toward former colonial 
possessions (such as India). 
Britain's offer of a nuclear guarantee was, however, quickly 
rejected by India, who had never, it appears, given any indication that 
they would be interested in such an idea. If they had thought the 
Chinese explosion required a nuclear countermove, it is probable that 
they would either have turned to one of the two superpowers for 
protection or accelerated their own nuclear weapons programme. The 
British offer, therefore, met with little enthusiasm in Delhi and was 
quickly rejected. (98) 
4.2 Labour and the turn to Europe 
Between 1964 and 1968 British defence policy was dominated by a 
series of cost-cutting defence reviews.. In toto, they were intended to 
impose zero growth (in real terms) on the defence budget between 1964 and 
1970. To achieve this, apparently modest, goal the government was forced 
to make major cuts in military commitments and capabilities. 
At first, savings were focused in Europe. 'Offset' agreements were 
sought with the Federal Republic of Germany in an effort to reduce the 
balance of payments burden of the British Army on the Rhine. Wilson 
announced that: 
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"whatever we may do in the field of cost 
effectiveness, value for money and a stringent review 
of expenditure, we cannot afford to relinquish our 
world role - our role which, for shorthand purposes, 
is sometimes called our 'East of Suez' role. " (99) 
By 1966, however, the difficulties in making cuts in forces for 
NATO were becoming increasingly apparent. The government had decided to 
review Britain's application for EEC membership, and all political 
parties were becoming more sceptical of the rationale for East of Suez 
deployments. With the end of 'confrontation' in South East Asia, the 
focus of cuts shifted to commitments outside Europe. As economic 
difficulties grew further economies were made, culminating in the 1968 
decision to withdraw all permanent forces from East of Suez by 1971. 
(100) 
Despite this cost cutting Britain's nuclear weapons programme 
remained unscathed through these years. Rumours that the government 
would either cancel Polaris or withdraw from tactical nuclear roles 
proved to be incorrect. (101) Indeed it became clear that the new 
government's nuclear policy did not differ substantially from that of the 
Conservatives save in one major respect, that of public presentation. 
Rather than focus on the military rationale for Polaris, government 
ministers emphasised its low running costs and the importance of 
maintaining equivalence between French and British nuclear efforts. 
The inconsistency between public pronouncement and actual policy 
affected not only the decision to continue with Polaris itself. It was 
also reflected in the government attitude to a possible replacement 
system for Polaris. In 1967, the government announced that it had 
rejected the Poisedon missile as a successor to Polaris, and a week later 
Wilson had given an assurance that the government was not interested in 
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the development of new generations of strategic nuclear weapons. 
According to John Simpson, this committed the government to "terminating 
British warhead and re-entry vehicle development". (102) If this were 
the intent, it was soon reversed for, in 1968, the Cabinet decided that 
nuclear weapons R&D should continue, subject to the proviso that no 
tests should be undertaken. (103) As a result, paper studies on 
possible improvements to Polaris commenced, which were eventually to 
crystallise in the Chevaline project. (104) 
Nor did the Labour government make substantial efforts to reduce 
its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Production of a new tactical 
bomb for the RAF and Royal Navy began in 1964. Despite some reports to 
the contrary, the government decided not to 'conventionalisel the V- 
bomber force when Polaris began to enter service in 1968. Instead they 
were reallocated to a theatre nuclear role under Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR). Canberras and Buccaneers continued to carry British 
nuclear weapons, and Phantoms were equipped with US bombs as they came 
into service. (105) As for the Army, the decision was taken in 1966 to 
buy a Lance missile system dedicated to a battlefield nuclear role. 
(106) 
This continuing process of improvement in Britain's tactical 
nuclear arsenal was in some part a reflection of the British view that 
the US had gone too far in its proposals for reducing reliance on nuclear 
weapons. In particular, Healey argued that it would be "days not weeks" 
after a major conventional attack that NATO would be forced to initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons or surrender. He believed that US officials, 
such as Alain Einthoven, had substantially exaggerated the West's ability 
to counter a Soviet offensive with conventional forces. (107) Like 
other Europeans, Healey feared that the US might withdraw its nuclear 
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guarantee. He warned that, were the US to reduce their nuclear 
commitment to Europe, the European reaction would be to start producing 
more nuclear weapons, not to build up the conventional forces which the 
Americans wanted them to do. (108) The British nuclear force would, it 
is clear, have been a major element in such a build up. 
5. Conclusions 
The successful development of its own atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons in the late 1950's played an important part in confirming the 
British state's commitment to a Great Power role at that time. It was 
believed, even after the humiliation of Suez, that nuclear weapons would 
enable Britain to retain the commitments of a world power at a reduced 
cost. This had been the basis of the proposals in the 1952 Global 
Strategy Paper. With the actual production of British nuclear weapons in 
the late 19501s, these proposals were put into practice by the 1957 White 
Paper. 
The attempt to remain a Great Power 'on the cheap' proved to be a 
failure. In Europe significant cuts in land and air forces were made as 
NATO's defences came to rely increasingly on tactical nuclear weapons. 
The growing concern at Soviet nuclear capabilities, however, soon halted 
the move towards total reliance on these weapons, and Britain was obliged 
to retain a British Army of the Rhine of around 55,000 men. Outside 
Europe too, nuclear weapons proved to be less useful in deterring 
perceived threats than some had hoped. With the end of conscription, the 
costs of maintaining an East of Suez role grew. By 1960 the savings in 
defence spending had been exhausted, and the budget once more began to 
rise. 
The independent nuclear force, therefore, had failed to solve the 
gap between Britain's military commitments and the limited resources 
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available to meet them. On the contrary, it encouraged politicians in 
their belief in the special relationship with the United States, and 
postponed the day when they would have to adjust to the realities of 
ecnomic decline. Indeed this period was remarkable for its continuity 
with the aims pursued ever since the 1943 Quebec Agreement. Only with 
the defence cuts in 1966-8, and the consequent withdrawal from East of 
Suez, did the framework of British policy established at that time show a 
marked shift away from traditional concerns. 
Given the economic constraints on defence spending, the nuclear 
force had always been vulnerable on cost grounds. The V-bomber programme 
had proved very expensive, and the Blue Streak had to rocket be cancelled 
when its cost threatened to get out of control. -'Sy 
44 end of the 
1950's, Britain was already well behind the US and 4h, Soviets in, size of 
its strategic nuclear arsenal. By 1962 there were also serious doubts as 
to whether Britain could maintain a strategic nuclear force which was 
qualitatively equal with the two superpowers. Only the Nassau agreement 
between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy ensured that the 
UK would remain in the nuclear arms race at a reasonable financial cost. 
The price, however, was a degree of dependence on US weapon systems which 
would continue to call into question the degree of 'independence' Britain 
in fact enjoyed. 
Britain's support for increased reliance on nuclear weapons in 
defence policy also had important effects on NATO strategy. In the late 
1950's it had allied with the Eisenhower Administration in pressing for 
the implementation of massive retaliationt despite doubts from both 
France and Germany. As a result, a rapid build up of tactical nuclear 
weapons was initiated, which encouraged proliferation in Europe and made 
- 183 - 
NATO very dependent on a doctrine that was believed by many to be 
potentially suicidal. 
When, under the Kennedy administration, the US proposed a reduction 
in reliance on nuclear first use, Britain was distrustful. It had 
supported a nuclear emphasis - both because it enabled Britain to remain 
number two in NATO at a reduced cost and because of the assumption that 
deterrence would not fail. The US argument for war fighting capabilities 
(both conventional and nuclear) and for centralised control of nuclear 
weapons (and thus no independent British force) made Britain very 
uncomfortable. It threatened Britain's'position in the alliance by 
emphasising that there should only be one centre of nuclear decision. 
Even more dangerously, it was based precisely on the belief that, despite 
the existence of nuclear weapons, war could take place. 
By the 1960's the long term economic costs of Britain's defence 
policies were becoming even more apparent. Indeed, after a period of 
indecision, those costs would force the Labour government to decide in 
1968 to abandon permanent bases East of Suez: a belated acceptance that 
Britain could no longer remain a world power. 
This acceptance, however, was not complete. The retention of 
nuclear weapons and the continued belief in a special relationship 
demonstrated this. As East of Suez forces were transferred to NATO 
roles, rather than scrapped, defence spending as a proportion of national 
income remained considerably above European levels. The cuts, when they 
had come, were too little and too late. 
Britain's commitment to policies developed in the 1940's had 
considerable costs. It contributed to economic decline by pre-empting 
scarce resources for military spending. It delayed entry into the EEC 
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because the UK was unwilling to subordinate its Atlantic and Commonwealth 
links to European obligations. Most of all, perhaps, British policy in 
this crucial decade helped ensure that the confrontation with the Soviet 
Union in Europe continued to be based an a theology of nuclear deterrence 
with no rationale as a defence. It would be a creed whose tenets 
would prove remarkably difficult to disavow. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
YEARNING FOR REDEMPTION: 1968 - 85 
1. Introduction 
By the late 1960's a period of relative stability in British and 
NATO defence policy had begun. The fierce controversy over the 
independent British nuclear force had been ended after it became clear 
that the Labour Party was committed to its retention; and the 1968 
decision to withdraw permanent forces from East of Suez ended the other 
major area of debate. 
At the same time, the fervent of controversy about NATO nuclear 
doctrine, begun in the late 1950s and intensified by the Kennedy 
Administration's policies, also receded in intensity. The Americans 
came to accept, albeit reluctantly in some cases, that European 
governments were unwilling either to abandon their own independent 
nuclear forces or'accept a major reduction in reliance on the US nuclear 
'umbrella'. There was relief that the development of a German atomic 
bomb now appeared much less likely than it had a decade before, and that 
this was now enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As their 
attention turned increasingly to the conduct of the Vietnam war, top US 
officials accepted an interpretation of flexible response which was 
extremely ambiguous and had little influence on NATO nuclear force 
deployment or procurement. 
In Europe, including the UK, there was some satisfaction that the 
US's original concept of flexible response, which was seen as a plan for 
fighting a limited war in Europe, had been abandoned. The continuing 
reliance on early first use of nuclear weapons was welcomed because of 
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the belief that such a posture would effectively prevent war from ever 
taking place. The disastrous results of the application of flexible 
response in South-East Asia, both in the 'theatre' of operations and in 
the USA, strengthened the conviction that Europe should not be 
'Vietnamized'. 
On both a national (UK) and alliance (NATO) level, however, the 
relative stability of the early 1970s proved to be only temporary. 
The process of detente failed to develop into a more fundamental 
resolution of the differences between the blocs in Europe. Britain's 
withdrawal from East of Suez did not lead to a full adjustment to a new 
role as a medium-sized European power, or to lower levels of defence 
spending. By the late 1970s it became clear that the stability of this 
period had been temporary, and that it contained within it elements which 
would undermine that stability. Europe as a whole would be plunged into 
a new period of Cold War; and Britain seemed to be reverting to 
policies and priorities in defence which the settlement of the late 
1960s, it had been thought, had overcome. 
This chapter will outline relevant developments in US and NATO 
policy in this period. It will look in particular at the rise and 
decline of detente in both its political and military dimensions. 
British nuclear weapons policy will then be examined within this general 
context, first for the 1970s and then for the 1980s. The chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of the decision to replace Polaris with 
Trident. Detailed discussion of some of the issues raised by this 
decision will, however, be reserved for later chapters. 
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2. Detente and the Arms Race 
The late 1960s saw hopeful signs that the Cold War was coming to an 
end. Richard Nixon's assumption of office in January 1969 had brought a 
sustained effort to reach agreements on limiting nuclear arsenals. This 
change in US policy was, in large part, a consequence of the rapid Soviet 
buildup in nuclear arms in the years following their humiliation over the 
1962 Cuban crisis. (1) This buildup in turn reduced the nuclear 
superiority which the US had enjoyed during that crisis, and meant that, 
in the event of all-out nuclear war, the US itself would suffer damage as 
great as the countries of Europe and the Soviet Union. In recognition 
of these new circumstances, American incentives for nuclear arms 
agreement increased. In 1972 the first SALT treaty was signed, together 
with an agreement limiting the development of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(A. B. M. ) defences. In Europe, West Germany at last recognised the 
German Democratic Republic and the postwar frontiers of Europe. Trade 
between the Soviet Union and West Germany quadrupled between 1970 abd 
1975, (2) Hopes were aroused that security could be based increasingly 
on economic and political, rather than military, means. In time, it was 
believed, peaceful evolution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could 
further ease the fears that fuelled the Cold War. 
Detente did not live up to its promise. On a political level, 
the two superpowers continued to pursue objectives that were antagonistic 
and incompatible. On a military level the limited arms control 
agreements reached at the height of detente failed to halt, or even 
significantly slow, the arms race. The continuing development of 
military potential on both sides exacerbated friction on a political 
level, while incompatible political objectives prevented effective 
measures being taken to halt that development. 
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On a broad political level, instability in the superpower 
relationship was a con--kquence of the continuing divergence in the 
strategic objectives of Soviet and American leaders. While the Soviets 
wanted a recognition of parity between the two states, the United States 
insisted that detente required recognition of the, US-dominated, status 
quo in the Third World. Throughout the period of detente, US leaders 
continued to seek to impose linkage between Soviet 'restraint' in the 
Third World and the relationship between the US and Soviet Union. Most 
conflicts, however marginal to US national interests, continued to be 
seen as tests of the 'credibility' of the Pax Americana. (3) As a 
result of this perception, the series of revolutionary changes in the mid 
1970s were seen by many American policy-makers as breachesýdetente. The 
victory of North Vietnam, the anti-colonial revolts in Angola and 
Mozambique, and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Grenada and 
Nicaragua: all these threatened US global hegemony. With the 'fall' of 
Iran, and direct Soviet military intervention in Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan, the view grew that the Soviets were taking unfair advantage 
of detente. Simultaneous Soviet 'losses', such as closer US-China links 
and their expul. sion from Egypt, were not sufficiently weighe4 in the 
balance. As the trauma of Vietnam faded from public consciousness, 
opposition to detente within the US grew, and a powerful lobby began to 
press for a re-assertion of global military superiority. The 
consequence was Carter's shift to a hard-line posture from 1978 onwards, 
the Senate's refusal to ratify the SALT II agreement and the election of 
Ronald Reagan on a militantly anti-Soviet platform in 1980. The 'Evil 
Empire' rhetoric of the new President, together with a massive arms 
buildup, would soon return the world to levels of tension not seen since 
the early 1960s. 
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Continuing developments in the military field largely reflected 
these political trends. The Soviets were determined to achieve military 
parity with the United States, despite their much smaller level of 
economic resources. The 'lesson' of the Khruschev period had been that 
only military strength could safeguard Soviet security, and the desertion 
of China from their alliance with Moscow reinforced fears of encircle- 
ment. From the mid 1960s until the late 1970s, a sustained arms buildup 
was mounted in pursuit of these goals, with apparently little relation to 
the easing of tension in the late 1960s. The strategic nuclear arsenal 
was expanded in an effort to gain 'parity' with the United States, a 
goal that required forces considerably in excess of those needed for 
Khruschev's 'minimum deterrent' policy. The quality of conventional 
armed forces in Europe was increased, and after the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslavakia, their forward deployment was increased. The Soviet Navy 
began a transformation from a purely coastal defence force to an 
instrument for intervention worldwide. In 1975, this increasing global 
role helped underpin Cuban support for the MPLAs resistance to South 
Africa's invasion of Angola. In 1977, the Soviets mounted a massive 
airlift of heavy weapons to support the Ethiopian regime in its conflict 
with Somalia. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan further increased 
Western fears that Soviet leaders were now becoming more expansionist in 
their military objectives. 
The US's response to these developments reflected a growing 
reluctance to accept the implications of superpower parity. Despite the 
recognition that neither country could win a nuclear war, new systems 
continued to be developed in order to give the US flexibility in 
conducting such a conflict. The 'improvements' in US nuclear arms were 
justified by the Soviets' own nuclear buildup, and by the latter's 
percieved 'gains' in the Third World. With the failure of arms talks to 
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limit effectively new developmnents in technology, these pressures were 
further fuelled by the considerable institutional momentum behind new, 
and potentially destabilising, technologies. Together these elements 
led, by the late 1970s, to a renewed US military buildup and a more 
assertive foreign policy. The US took a tough line in insisting on the 
deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Prominent 
Administration advisers talked seriously about the possibilities for 
'decapitation' nuclear attacks against Soviet leaders. (4) The 
Republican Party's 1980 election manifesto committed itself to 
restoring US military superiority. (5) In pursuit of this objective, 
new strategic nuclear programmes - Trident D5, MX, the stealth' boinbtr, 
improved command and control - were accelerated. Massive efforts were 
devoted to making limited nuclear options - and/or a disarming first 
strike -a feasible option. As with the similar policy in the early 
1960s, however, the Soviet reaction was predictable: a further build-up 
in their own forces in order to deny the US any possibility of exercising 
such options. 
3. British nuclear weapons policy in the 1970s: the special 
relationshig 
Despite the 1968 decision to end a permanent East of Suez presence, 
British defence policy in the 1970s continued to be influenced by factors 
which had proved central in the 1950s and 1960s. The retreat from an 
extra-European military role proved to be incomplete and reluctant. 
The 'special relationship' with the US continued to exert a decisive 
counter-influence to closer links with Europe. And governments of 
both political parties continued to be committed to the maintenance of 
an independent strategic nuclear force. 
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Neither the shift of defence efforts from Asia to Europe, nor 
Britain's long-awaited admission to the EEC in 1973, led to an end to 
the special relationship with the United States in military matters. 
In political and diplomatic matters, there was a noticeable shift in 
policy away from the US and towards Europe, particularly under the 
premiership of Edward Heath. This shift was not, however)significantly 
reflected in new patterns of military co-operation, where the key 
relationship remained that with the United States. As had been the case 
since World War Two, this relationship was particularly close in the 
intelligence field, where it still constituted an effective Anglo- 
American diumvirate. (6) The primacy of the American connection is 
further illustrated by the fact that there are seventy-five'front-line' 
staff attached to the British Defence Staff in Washington, compared with 
only seven in Bonn and ten in Paris, the capitals of Britain's two most 
powerful European NATO allies. (7) 
As in the past, however, Britain's unique ties to the US have also 
bound its leaders closely to American policies and priorities, as events 
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated dramatically. In that 
conflict, Britain and other EEC members were unsympathetic to the Israeli 
offensive against Egypt, and the Heath government refused to allow the 
use of British bases in Cyprus and Britain for American spy flights over 
the combat zone. In retaliation, Kissinger charged that the Europeans 
were acting "as if the alliance does not exist", and the US cut off the 
secure communications line linking CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia 
with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) centre in London. (8) 
It was made very clear that Britain would have to 'stay in linet in 
future if it wished to retain its special relationship. Given the 
dependence of Britain's strategic nuclear forces on access to American 
intelligence sources, such a demonstration of the fragility of these 
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links must have been most unwelcome in London. For, as we shall 
explore further in Chapter 6, this dependence inevitably casts some doubt 
on the 'independence' of Britain's own nuclear force. (9) 
The events of the late 1960s and early 1970s suggest, however, that 
the success of Britain's application for entry to the EEC actually 
revitalised the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. (10) In the late 
1960s, when Britain's application had not yet been accepted, its leaders 
were careful to avoid a repetition of the events of late 1962 when, it 
was argued, the Nassau agreement had helped to convince de Gaulle that 
he should veto Britain's entry. Thus, in 1967, Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson had taken great pains to reassure de Gaulle that Britain was 
becoming less dependent on the US for military supplies, and that the 
decision not to ask for Poseidon was a "Nassau in reverse", as part of 
his campaign for EEC entry. (11) As leader of the Opposition, Edward 
Heath suggested that, at least in the long run, Britain and France should 
consider pooling their nuclear forces "in trusteeship for Europe as a 
whole". (12) These movements in British political concerns were 
serious enough to provoke considerable American concern that the UK would 
supply France with nuclear information, obtained from the US, as part of 
its 'admission fee' to the European Community. 
Yet, despite these worries, the eventual success of Britain's EEC 
entry campaign actually made nuclear collaboration with France less, 
rather than more, likely. For Britain's priority in military policy had 
always been to preserve the close relationship with the US. That 
priority might, at times, be temporarily modified in order to achieve 
political or economic objectives in Europe. Such changes did not, 
however, change the basic commitment to the primacy of the Atlantic tie. 
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A further indication of the continued vitality of the 'special 
relationship' was the willingness of both countries to renew Britain's 
role as the US's "Airstrip One" in Europe. From the beginning of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s, Britain had been used'as the main forward 
base for US nuclear bombers with strategic capability - i. e. designed 
to attack targets deep inside the Soviet Union itself. Other European 
NATO countries had, for the most part, only allowed shorter range 
aircraft on their soil, regarding the prescence of strategic bombers as 
too provocative. In addition, while most other European nations 
rejected similar American proposals, Britain was one of the three 
countries - together with Italy and Turkey - to agree to the stationing 
of ballistic missiles on its territory in the late 1950s. (13) Finally, 
the US 'triad' of land, sea and air-based nuclear weapons in Britain had 
been completed with the 1960 agreement permitting Polaris missile 
submarines to be based at the Holy Loch in Scotland in return for the 
supply to Britain of Skybolt missiles. 
By the mid 1960s, however, partly as a result of the rethink in US 
policy, the importance of Britain as a forward base appeared to be in 
decline. The increased range of the US's new strategic nuclear systems, 
in particular its Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
meant that increasing emphasis was being placed on systems based in the 
continental United States. The role of more vulnerable forward bases was 
consequently reduced, as they were held to be less easy to control 
effectively and more prone to pre-emptive attack. As a consequence of 
such factors, the Thor missiles were withdrawn from Britain in 1963 (14); 
and, in 1965, Strategic Air Command withdrew its remaining bombers, some 
B-471s, from Britain. (15) Even the submarine bases at the Holy Loch 
appeared to many to have only a short life ahead. The first Polaris 
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missiles had needed forward bases because their short range - about 1,400 
I 
miles - required them to patrol in areas relatively near to Soviet 
targets. The range of Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), however, increased to 2,500 miles with the A3 missile, deployed 
from 1964 onwards. (16) And the Poseidon SLBM, which became operational 
in 1971, had a range of 2,900 miles, even when carrying 10 warheads. 
(17) These rapid increments in capability suggested that, in the 1970s, 
the US would decide that forward bases for its ballistic missile 
submarines were no longer necessary. If such a decision were made, 
Britain would then be left with no American strategic nuclear bases on 
its soil. 
Such a prognosis, however, would have been decidedly premature. 
The continuing political requirement for US nuclear bases in Britain 
overrode the lack of any military rationale. Between 1970 and 1979, a 
series of decisions was_ taken which reversed the trend towards US 
withdrawal, and re-established the UK as a major nuclear base. 
In the first of these developments, US strategic bombers returned 
to Britain in Spring 1970 in the shape of 72 F-III aircraft based at 
Upper Heyford. (18) In 1976, the Labour government approved the 
deployment of a further 80 F-III's at Lakenheath. (19) As of 1984, there 
were still between 144 and 160 F-III nuclear bombers based at these two 
airfields, together with 12 EF-III electronic jamming aircraft to ensure 
the bombers' continued penetrability to Soviet targets. (20) 
Although formally assigned to NATO, it was clear from the time of 
their initial deployment that the F-III's role was virtually indistin- 
guable from that of the F-III's based in the United States - ie, attack 
against the Soviet Union as part of central US targetting plans. (21) 
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Throughout the 1970s, these F-III bombers, together with Britain's V- 
bombers, were the only US strategic nuclear forces based on land in 
Europe. As such, their retention was increasingly perceived as a symbol 
of the US's willingness to use these forces in 'defence' of Western 
Europe: a political role which seemed to increase even as their propor- 
tionate contribution to the US's total strategic forces becameincreas- 
ingly marginal. 
Second, predictions of Holy Loch's impending redundancy also proved 
to be premature. Between 1971 and 1977, the US did withdraw Polaris 
missiles from the Holy Loch. They were replaced, however, by the more 
modern and longer-range Poseidon missiles, each of which carried between 
6 and 14 independently targetable warheads. An announcement to the 
House of Commons was not thought to be necessary despite this very 
considerable increase in US firepower based in Britain. (22) 
During this same period, the US enlarged its submarine base at 
Charleston, South Carolina and announced that some Poseidon submarines 
would be withdrawn from overseas bases. The two other forward submarine 
bases - Guam in the Pacific and Rota in Spain - both closed, the latter 
as a result of Spanish government pressure in 1979. According to Duncan 
Campbell, the withdrawal of Poseidon from Scotland was considered in the 
US Navy at this time. (23) The political symbolism of the base, however, 
ensured its survival. 
Indeed left-wing opposition to the US base served to strengthen the 
determination to retain it. In February, 1974 the Labour Party had been 
elected on a Manifesto that promised: 
"We shall participate in the multilateral 
disarmament negotiations and as a first step will 
seek the removal of American Polaris bases from 
Great Britain. " (24) 
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Shortly after that election, however, NATO's Supreme Commander 
Atlantic had attacked the government position, arguing that it would 
create "real dangers" leading to a "serious weakening of our deterrent 
position". The Holy Loch base was now "absolutely vital" since there 
were "no credible alternatives". (25) 
Such assertions were demonstrably incorrect. The value of the 
US bases in Britain was now clearly political; and it was as a result 
of political, rather than 'deterrent', considerations that the new 
Labour government moved swiftly to reverse its Manifesto commitment. 
By the time the Labour Party's manifesto for the October 1974 
election was drawn up, the pledge had been reformulated, so that the 
removal of the Holy Loch base was postponed indefinitely: 
"Starting from the basis of the multilateral 
disarmament negotiations we will seek the removal 
of American Polaris bases from Britain. " (26) 
By the late 1970s, however, the presence of US air and sea- 
based strategic forces in Britain was no longer believed by NATO 
leaders to be enough to ensure the credibility of the US's nuclear 
'umbrella' over Europe. As a result of this, and other factors, the 
UK decided in 1979, together with other European countries, to accept 
the stationing of US controlled ground-launched missiles from 1983 
onwards. (27) 
This decision would mean that, for the first time since NATO was 
formed, US nuclear forces capable of destroying targets deep inside 
Soviet territory would be deployed in West Germany. It also meant 
that Britain would, once again, have a: ýcomplete 'triad' of US 
strategic nuclear forces on its territory - the F-III bombers, the 
Poseidon submarines, and, from December 1983, the ground launched 
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cruise missiles (GLCMs) at Greenham Common. Britain's firm support 
of the 1979 decision, and its willingness to share in the deployments 
planned in that decision, despite the already large US nuclear 
presence, undoubtedly helped to further cement the ties between the UK 
and US. It, thus helped foster a climate conducive to continuing 
to continuing US support for Britain's efforts to develop and maintain 
its own nuclear force. The UK's agreement to deploy F-III bombers and 
Poseidon missiles in the 1970s was accompanied by US assistance to 
Britain's Chevaline programme. The 1979 agreement to accept GLCM's 
would soon be followed by the 1980 request by the UK for the supply of 
Trident I missiles. There is no evidence that the two decisions were 
formally linked, as the Skybolt and Holy Loch decisions in 1960 
undoubtedly were. What is clear is that a British decision to refuse 
participation in the deployment of US missiles would have made 
subsequent negotiations on its own requirements more difficult. It is 
symptomatic of the stability achieved in the nuclear special relationship 
between the two countries that such considerations could be understood 
without being stated publicly. 
4. Britain's nuclear force in the 1970s 
Throughout the 1970s, Britain's nuclear force had a relatively low 
profile in political debate. The nuclear disarmament movement was only a 
shadow of the campaign in the early 1960s. Those on the left who were 
critical of defence policy focused their concern on the high level of 
military expenditure rather than on nuclear issues. (28) Indeed, while 
Labour's 1974 manifesto committed the Party to "progressively reduce the 
burden of Britain's defence spending to bring our costs into line with 
those carried by our main European allies", it made no mention to all of 
the Party's policy on Britain's independent nuclear force. (29) 
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The lack of political controversy over the independent nuclear force 
was considerably helped by the practice of emphasising its role as a 
"contribution to NATO. " This ambiguous formulation was used between 1964 
and 1979 under both Labour and Conservative administrations. It was not 
until the Thatcher Government, which faced the need to make a decision 
on Polaris replacement, that the independent role of the force became 
increasingly emphasized. 
The ambiguity surrounding the role of the nuclear force proved 
useful in securing broad acceptance for. its continuing existence. Those 
who saw the force as a necessary attribute of an independent world power 
were satisfied thatýforce with operational independence was being 
maintained. Those whose main concern was the preservation of the close 
links with the US, but were suspicious, of 'top table' rhetoric, were 
satisfied with the declaratory emphasis on alliance, rather than national, 
purposes. Even those who were opposed to any British involvement with 
nuclear weapons took some confort from the Labour Party's public 
commitment, reaffirmed in 1975 while in power, that: - 
"We do not intend to move to a new generation of 
strategic nuclear weapons". (30) 
As long as the level of world tension was relatively low, and there 
was little active public concern on nuclear issues, the independent 
nuclear force seemed safe from any serious threat of cancellation. Like 
NATOs 'flexible response' doctrine, the government's declaratory policy on 
the independent nuclear force both facilitated wide political support and 
hid the contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in the doctrine. 
This inconsistency was made, possib)e 'through the 1970s both by the degree 
of secrecy surrounding governnntn+, nuclear weapons policy and by the 
relatively low, though still significant, costs of maintaining the force 
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in the 1970s. Even the considerable concern within government over the 
escalating costs of the Chevaline programme was effectively shielded 
from public debate through04f- the crucial decision-making period. 
Secrecy, therefore, proved invaluable in protecting the commitment to 
nuclear weapons from attack on cost grounds. As sections 5 and 6 of 
this chapter will show, however, secrecy and low cost would only 
protect the independent nuclear force temporarily. In 1980, as the 
government moved towards a decision to replace Polaris with Trident, 
nuclear weapons policy once again became a central political issue. 
Against the background of heightened international tension, and concern 
at the basic premises of 'deterrence' doctrine, it was no longer possible 
to keep the issue "under wraps". The dramatic cost escalation which 
Trident represented over its predecessor further helped to ensure that it 
could not escape political controversy as easily as Chevaline had done. 
Such controversy was for the 1980s. Meanwhile, whatever public 
protestations were made, governments of both major parties in the 1970s 
were anxious to maintain Andefinitely an effective independent nuclear 
force. Through these years substantial programmes were undertaken in 
order to keep Britain's arsenals of both strategic and tactical nuclear 
systems 'up to date'. 
4.1 The Cheyaline programme 
The most important development in, Britain's strategic nuclear force 
during this period was the Chevaline project. Its existence was one of 
the best kept secrets in government, and was only formally intimated to 
Parliament in January 1980 when Defence Secretary Francis Pym announced 
that it was nearing completion. (31) Until then, the only official 
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reference to the project had been in the 1975 Defence Review: 
"The Polaris force... provides a 
contribution to NATO's strategic 
capability out of all proportion 
fraction of our defence budget wl 
maintain. We shall maintain its 
(32) 
unique European 
nuclear , to the small 
hich it costs to 
effectiveness" 
The development of the Chevaline programme can be traced back to 
1968, shortly after work at Aldermaston on Polaris A3 warheads had been 
completed. (33) The purpose of early research was to identify missile 
design concepts which would enable the UK nuclear force to overcome the 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems which, it was thought, the Soviets 
might develop in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1968 and 1973 there were 
two main alternatives considered for such a system. Firstly, there was 
the US-developed Poseidon SLBM, which carried up to 14 MIRVed warheads, 
and which was to first enter service in the US Navy in 1971. By 
saturating Soviet defences with large numbers of independently targeted 
warheads, it was believed, such a system would make effective, and 
simultaneous, interception impossible. For the US, Poseidon had the 
additional advantage that it allowed greater accuracy and could threaten 
many more targets than the Polaris missile it replaced. 
The second alternative, which Britain eventually decided to follow, 
was based on US ideas developed in the early 1960s. Known as Antelope, 
this approach concentrated on improving penetration of ABM defences by 
means other than increasing warhead numbers. Firstly, light penetration 
aids - ie decoy warheads - would be added in order to confuse enemy 
radar while the missile's re-entry systemns remained outside the earth's 
atmosphere. Secondly, an ability to manoeuvre the missiles and/or the 
re-entry systems in space in order to complicate defences would be added. 
(34) 
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This initial US concept was considerably developed by work in 
Britain. An ability to adjust the trajectories of individual missiles, 
so that sequentially fired missiles could arrive simultaneously, was 
added; and the internal electronics were hardened to protect the missiles 
from the effects of ABM nuclear explosions nearby. 
Unlike Poseidon, the Chevaline system, which was based on 
Antelope, did not involve genuinely independently targetable warheads. 
According to most reports, it has three warheads which, like the Polaris 
A3 system deployed in the 1970s, are spread over a single target. (35) 
There is some ability to determine the targeting of individual warheads, 
but only within an area of up to 50 miles in diameter. (36) The 
generally accepted view is, however, that this does not amount to a MIRV 
capability. (37) 
Through the early part of the 1970s, the government retained the 
option of buying the Poseidon system. It was not until January 1974 that 
the Heath government finally decided to reject this alternative and 
commit itself to full-scale development of Chevaline. (38) The decision 
was based on several factors, of which the most important appear to have 
been cost, the possible US-reaction, and the domestic political 
situation. 
Poseidon was opposed on cost grounds because it was believed to be 
unnecessarily sophisticated for Britain's needs. Soviet ABM defences had 
developed at a slower rate than had been predicted in the late 1960s. 
(39) The ABM Treaty of 1972, as amended in 1974, had severely restricted 
the deployment of ABM defences by both superpowers. The Soviets retained 
only 64 Galosh ABM launchers round Moscow, and these were widely regarded 
as relatively primitive. In the light of this diminished threat, 
Poseidon was believed to be superfluous to Britaints requirement for an 
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assured capability for destroying Moscow. Since Poseidon would require 
not only the purchase of new missiles, but also substantial spending on 
refitting submarines and new support facilities, it was believed that it 
would be considerably cheaper to opt for Chevaline. 
In retrospect such an assessment must be open to doubt. 
Nevertheless it helped lead, it appears, to a fierce bureaucratic battle 
between the nuclear weapons establishment at Aldermaston and the Royal 
Navy. Eager to obtain funds for the surface fleet, the latter opposed 
Poseidon and argued that Aldermaston's arguments for a 'hedge' against 
Soviet developments were unconvincing. This concern at the costs of 
Britain's strategic nuclear force was a continuation of the Navy's 
opposition to Polaris in 1960, and its support for cancellation of the 
fifth Polaris submarine in 1964. (40) It would resurface yet again in 
the 1980s, when the plans for the Trident programme coincided with major 
cuts in the surface fleet. 
A second factor in the government decision to reject Poseidon was 
uncertainty over the US response to a request from Britain to enter into 
a new missile sales agreement. It appears that Prime Minister Edward 
Heath was told that Britain would be supplied with Poseidon if it decided 
to make a request. At the same time, however, both President Nixon and 
his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger expressed their wish that 
such a request should not be made. (41) They warned that congressional 
support for such an agreement might be difficult to obtain, given 
concerns about technology transfer. It was also thought that the 
possibility of a ban, or severe limit, on MIRVed missiles in the SALT 
talks between the US and the Soviet Union could affect Britain's hopes 
of obtaining Poseidon. The Soviets would be certain to insist on 
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counting a British Poseidon force of 64 missiles (up to 896 warheads) on 
the US side of any 'balance'. There would then, it was thought, be 
strong pressures in the US to abrogate the agreement with Britain if this 
was felt to be the only way to achieve a SALT treaty that allowed parity 
between the superpowers. 
This case against Poseidon was strengthened because it did not 
apply to Chevaline. Since the latter would not be MIRVed, it would not 
present as much difficulty in the arms control talks as did Poseidon. 
Since Chevaline would not require a formal Sales Agreement, and could be 
developed in secret, it would be less vulnerable to criticism in the US 
Congress. (The same argument applied, of course, in the UK House of 
Commons). 
Finally, the US Administration appears to have actively 
encouraged the Chevaline programme as a reaffirmation of the nuclear 
special relationship between the two countries. It provided substantial 
help in the development of the technology necessary. Seven underground 
nuclear tests were conducted in Nevada between 1976 and 1980 in order to 
provide Britain with information necessary to build the more compact 
warheads which Chevaline required. (42) Between 1977 and 1983, a large 
number of missile tests were performed using US facilities on land and 
off the Florida coast. (43) A large number of subcontracts on the 
Chevaline programme were placed in the US. In total, one third of 
Chevaline spending was in the United States. (44) 
The US welcomed, and supported, Chevaline partly because it allowed 
the continued development of an area of, technology which they had 
abandoned in favour of MIRVIs, but which could be a useful source of 
ideas in future. More importantly, perhaps, Chevaline was seen as an 
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indication of the continued vitality of the special relationship which 
went a considerable way to altering the growing perception in the US, 
aroused especially in the late 1960s, that the British might allow their 
nuclear force to be gradually run down. 
The third, and crucial, factor in the Heath government's rejection 
of Poseidon was the domestic political situation at the time. Purchase 
of Poseidon would inevitably involve considerable publicity around the 
sales agreement. Given the Labour leadership's public opposition to a 
$new generation' of strategic nuclear weapons, it would be forced into an 
open rejection of the deal; and, if the Labour Party should come to 
power before the project were complete, it would then be likely to cancel 
Poseidon without reviving Chevaline. (45) For this reason, as well as 
on grounds of cost and the possible US reaction, the Heath government 
decided that the maintenance of Britain; s independent nuclear force would 
be better served by choosing Chevaline. 
This decision proved to be a prudent one. Only weeks after the 
government's decision, a General Election was held in which the Labour 
Party was returned to power, albeit without a parliamentary majority. 
The Ministers directly involved with defence matters, while committed to 
maintaining Britain's nuclear force, would have found it difficult not to 
cancel Poseidon. The Chevaline programme, on the other hand, could be 
concealed from the Cabinet and the Party as a whole. Even if it were 
revealed, it could plausibly be represented as only an 'improvement' to 
Polaris, not a 'new generation'. 
At first the decision to proceed with Chevaline under the new 
government was a provisional one. The government had announced a major 
review into defence spending as a whole in order to fulfil its manifesto 
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pledge to reduce Britain's defence burden to that of its main European 
allies. (46) Pending the results of the Review, a subcommittee of the 
Cabinet, consisting of Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, Roy Jenkins, James 
Callaghan and Roy Mason, decided in April 1974 to authorise a further 
year's expenditure on the project. This amounted to E46.5 million. (47) 
At this stage, approval of the project was still provisional, and it was 
effectively put on "trickle-feed" until a decision to go ahead to 
completion had been taken. (48) 
Growing knowledge of the technical, requirements for the project led 
to the estimated cost of the programme rising significantly. 'In 1973, 
the total cost had been estimated at E195 million at Autumn 1972 prices. 
By Autumn 1974, this had risen to E235 million at the same prices. (49) 
Nevertheless, in September 1975, it was agreed that the project should 
be taken to completion. At the same time a major re-organisation of the 
project's management was ordered in an effort to establish better 
financial control. (50) 
Under the new management team, it soon became apparent that 
Chevaline costs had been grossly underestimated. More funds than had 
been foreseen would be necessary for missile tests. Warhead costs had 
been reasonably estimated. The costs of re-entry vehicle design, which 
was a field in which Britain had not been involved since Blue Streak's 
abandonment in 1960, had, however, been badly understated. Scacely six 
months after the Ministerial decision to proceed, the estimated cost 
increased from E235 million to E388 million (at Autumn 1972 prices). 
(51) Nor would this be the end to cost escalation. On the latest 
available estimate, Chevaline will cost E530 million at Autumn 1972 
prices - equivalent to E2,200 million at Autumn 1984 prices. (52) 
1 
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This is roughly equivalent to the capital cost of the original Polaris 
programme as a whole. (53) 
Labour's decision in 1974 and 1975 to keep Chevaline going, despite 
its diminishing military rationale and rising costs, appears to have been 
motivated primarily by the desire to keep the momentum of the independent 
nuclear force going, and in particular to retain the option of a full 
scale Polaris replacement programme in the 1980s. There was concern that 
Chevaline cancellation would have led to the dispersal of weapons design 
teams and given the impression, both in the US and inside the MOD, that 
Polaris would not be replaced. (54) When_Ministers reconsidered the 
project in 1977 both David Owen, the Foreign Secretary and Fred Mulley, 
the Defence Secretary, appear to have been less than enthusiastic about 
the project. According to Lawrence Freedman's account: 
"Chevaline did not survive on its. strategic 
merits .. Nor was it felt that it represented value for money -Nevertheless, large sums of money had already been spent and future savings could 
only be made by scrapping the programme altogether. 
(and) perhaps most importantly, it was felt by 
the few ministers considering the matter that it 
would be politically dangerous for a Labour 
Government to cancel Chevaline .. Cancellation 
would be taken as a major turning point in British 
nuclear weapons policy, as an indication of being 
prepared to wind down the whole force. " (55) 
The decision to continue Chevaline was a clear sign that the Labour 
leadership, despite their public protestations, wanted to continue the 
independent nuclear force indefinitely, and were willing to pay a 
substantial price to do so. It is an interpretation that would be 
confirmed in 1978 and 1979 as the Labour government moved towards a 
decision to request Trident I SLBMs from the US as a replacement for 
Polaris in the 1990s. 
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In addition to investing large sums in Chevaline, the 1974-9 Labour 
government agreed to a number of other developments which underlined its 
commitment to continued independence in nuclear weapons, and reduced 
Britain's reliance on the US for the maintenance of that independence. 
Firstly, in April 1976, the government decided to set up, at a cost 
of EIO million, a national production plant at Chapelcross for the 
production of tritium. Since 1961, tritium, a radioactive substance 
used in fusion weapons, had been supplied from the United States on the 
assumption that, were the US to refuse further supplies, the UK could set 
up production facilities before the decay of the material had seriously 
affected the weapons' capabilities. By the 1970s, however, new studies of 
the tritium ageing problem suggested that it could be retained in weapons 
for a much shorter period than had previously been assumed. In May 1974, 
the first British nuclear test for 9 years was performed, apparently in 
order to assess the effects of tritium aging on a weapon near the end of 
its shelf life. As a result of this test, and related studies, it was 
now thought that the effectiveness of Britain's nuclear force was 
dependent on continuing US tritum supplies. The decision to build the 
Chapel Cross plant was thus a clear indication that the government was 
determined to retain an independent nuclear capability, if necessary 
against US wishes. (56) 
Secondly, the Carter Administration, which took office in the US 
in 1977, had taken a strong stance on nuclear non-proliferation. It 
decided that long-term agreements with the UK on the barter of nuclear 
materials were not compatible with this policy. As a result, the 
Callaghan government decided to build a plant at Capenhurst to produce 
the highly enriched uranium necessary for the fuel of both Polaris and 
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nuclear attack submarines. (57) In 1981, however, the Reagan adminis- 
tration agreed to renew the long-term barter contracts; and, as a 
result, the Capenhurst programme was slowed down and a policy of 
interdependence in fuel supplies readopted. (58) The episode had 
illustrated yet again the continued commitment to an independent nuclear 
weapons capability. 
Thirdly, the 1970s saw a marked reduction in Britain's reliance 
on 'dual-key' American nuclear weapons for its tactical delivery systems. 
Substantial numbers of British advanced tactical warheads were produced 
once the requirements for Polaris had been fully met in 1972. Between 
1972 and 1978, according to John Simpson's account, the number of 
tactical warheads held by the RAF and Royal Navy rose from 45 to 250. 
(59) This enabled Jaguar and Buccaneer aircraft to be equipped with the 
new British bombs; and it also allowed the deployment of UK-controlled 
nuclear depth charges on Navy ships, for use by nuclear-capable 
helicopters. (60) There were also reports that Britain was considering 
the construction of its own warheads for its nuclear artillery and Lance 
missiles, the main remaining area of dependence on US warheads. (61) 
Although such ideas were not implemented, perhaps because of the 
considerable load already imposed on Aldermaston by other programmes, it 
seems possible that such ideas may be revived in future, possibly giving 
Britain a neutron warhead capability. (62) 
4.2 The RAF and nuclear weapons 
The development of an enhanced independent capability in nuclear 
weapons themselves was accompanied, during the 1970s, by a number of 
programmes for maintaining, and updating, nuclear delivery systems. In 
particular, there was a wide ranging, and largely successful, attempt to 
retain for the RAF a major nuclear role, despite the formal hand-over of 
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the 'strategic deterrent' to the Navy in 1969. Suggestions that the V- 
bombers should be converted to a purely conventional role, as part of 
NATOs flexible response strategy, were rejected. (63) V-bombers were 
retained in a primarily nuclear role through the 1970s, armed with 
megaton-yield weapons. (64) They continued to be drilled in tactics for 
low-level strikes against targets in the Soviet Union, and were main- 
tained on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) status. The RAF believed that 
perhaps a third of the bombers would be able to penetrate Soviet defences 
and reach'their targets even without American support. (65) This 
'strategic' role, the RAF argued, gave Britain flexibility in its nuclear 
forces which Polaris alone could not provide. It also allowed a 
continuing British contribution to NATO's European-based strategic forces 
to complement the US F-IIIs that were being deployed in England: thus 
helping to cement the close co-operation between the RAF and USAF that 
had existed since the 1940s. 
The RAF's biggest success in retaining a nuclear role, however, was 
the Tornado GR1 programme. In 1960s, it had experienced severe problems 
in getting government agreement for a major new bomber programme. The 
TSR2 project was cancelled on cost grounds in 1965. And in 1968 it was 
decided not to purchase the US-built F-III, which was to have been given 
the long-range nuclear strike role after the V-bombers had retired. 
Instead, after the failure of negotiati6ns with the French, an 
agreement was reached, in early 1969, to produce the Multi-Role Combat 
Aircraft (MRCA) in collaboration with Italy and West Germany. (66) The 
total capital cost of the project - later renamed Tornado - for Britain 
would be at least E13,200 million at 1984/5 prices - more than 40% higher 
than total estimated Trident costs. (67) Of the 385 aircraft ordered by 
the RAF, 220 would be the GRI strike variant. The 220 GRI's would 
contribute to a marked increase in Britain's inventory of nuclear-capable 
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. aircraft 
in the 1980s, when they eventually came into service. 
5. British Defence policy 1977-85 
By the late 1970s, British defence policy faced another of its 
periodic costs/commitments crisis. Continuing relative economic decline 
had limited the resources available for defence. Labour's 1975 Review, 
together with further cuts in 1975 and 1976, had meant that, in real 
terms, defence spending had grown by only 1.1% between 1973-4 and 1977-8 
(68) Given the continued escalation in the costs of military equipment, 
this was not sufficient to adequately finance all of Britain's defence 
commitments. The Tornado programme, in particular, put a 
growing strain on the resources available during this period. (69) In 
addition, the government was committed, despite East of Suez withdrawal, 
to an expensive equipment programme for the surface fleet, involving new 
aircraft carriers and the sophisticated Type 22 frigate and Type 42 
destroyer. (70) The size of the British Army on the Rhine was to be 
maintained at 55,000, the level set in the early 1960s. Finally, 
substantial amounts were to be spent, as we have already seen, on 
Britain's nuclear capabilities. All these commitments simply could not 
be met within a static overall defence budget. 
At first the crisis was met by short-term economies in maintenance, 
training, stocks and the armed forces' pay levels. While equipment 
spending in real terms rose by 29.5% between 1974-75 and 1978-9, 
personnel spending fell by 8.0%, and that on other items -repairs, 
buildings, etc. - by 20.0%. (71) Such a policy could not last. The 
operational effectiveness of the services was being severely handicapped, 
and discontent amongst service personnel was increasing. By late 1976, 
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the Labour government had recognized that a major increase in total 
defence spending would be needed in order to retain all Britain's planned 
military capabilities. 
As a consequence of this assessment, the government agreed to 
increases in real defence spending which marked its final abandonment 
of its manifesto pledge to reduce Britain's defence burden to the level 
of its European NATO allies. In May 1977, the government agreed to 
implement NATOs target of 3 percent annual real increases in its 
defence budget. (72) With rising government revenues forecast as a 
result of North Sea oil discoveries, and optimistic forecasts of economic 
growth, it was believed that these increases could be financed without 
undue additional strain on the economy. The decline in national income 
in the early 1980s, and the consequent pressure for reduced public 
spending, was not foreseen at this time. 
Labour's decision to agree to implement the 3% target was 
influenced to some extent by the general worsening of the international 
climate In the late 1970s. Tension between the superpowers was 
increasing, and the US was putting increased pressure on its allies to 
make a greater contribution to its confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
Having failed to cut its defence budget in the early 1970s, when East 
of Suez withdrawal was in process and detente was at its height, 
Britain now found itself being urged to increase its military effort. 
It would be misleading, however, to see this changed 
international situation as the main determinant of the decision to 
increase defence spending. Other European NATO members, notably West 
Germany, Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian nations, were to increase 
defence spending by far less than Britain. Yet all these countries 
- 216 - 
already had defence burdens considerably less heavy than that of the UK. 
Rather, the British 3% decision should be understood as related more to 
the government's concern at its place within the Western Alliance, and 
its commitment to Britain's perceived status as NATO's leading European 
military power. Indeed the increasing economic predominance of West 
Germany in Western Europe only served to strengthen the determination 
of British leaders to retain the UK's advantage in an area - military 
capability - in which it was still relatively strong. As a result, 
Labour politicians proved unwilling to cut any of the main components of 
the nation's 'balanced' defence effort. It was then inevitable, given 
the underfunding of existing commitments, that defence spending would 
have to be increased. 
The Labour government in the late 1970s had attempted to retain 
Britain's international status, and preserve longstanding military 
commitments. The Conservative government that succeeded to office in 
May 1979 was also committed to these goals. For possibly the first time 
since the early 1950s, however, the new government also appeared to 
wish to use increased military effort to restore Britain to its past 
'greatness'. In pursuit of this objective, the NATO 3% objective was 
extended to 1985-6. Despite a severe economic slump, and rapidly rising 
unemployment, the government has overachieved this goal. Between 1978-9 
and 1985-6, defence spending in real terms rose by 29 percent, or 3.7% 
per annum. It is an increase that is even more remarkable given the 
cuts in other areas of public spending. While the defence budget rose by 
29%, education spending fell by 2%. housing by 59%, and trade and 
industry by 56%. Of the major areas of expenditure, only social 
security spending, which had to hear the strain of over two million 
more unemployed, was given a comparable, increase. (73) 
i 
- 217 - 
Some of this high priority attached to defence spending was a 
consequence of the general pressures on NATO countries to increase 
military efforts as part of the developing New Cold War. (74) The 
greater part of an explanation must be sought, however, in domestic 
factors. In the first two years of the government, substantial sums 
were needed to restore temporary economies made in the late 1970s, given 
the continued unwillingness to review existing commitments. In addition 
and of increasing importance, the Thatcher administration presided over a 
series of shifts in foreign and defence policy, which together marked a 
reassertion of the principles on which Britain's international role had 
been based in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Firstl_y, an increased emphasis was placed on Britain's capability 
for intervention outside the NATO area. The Royal Navy was deployed in 
the Carribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans in order to reassert Britain's 
continuing military interest in those areas. An Army brigade of 5,000 
men was earmarked specifically as a small-scale Rapid Deployment Force 
for out-of-area operations. The 1982 Falklands War further increased the 
resources available for capabilities - such as long-range transport 
aircraft - which had been run down in the 1970s as part of withdrawal 
from East of Suez. 
Secondly, an increased importance has been placed on Britain's 
'special relationship' with the United States. Mrs. Thatcher has made 
it clear that she values her warm relations with Mr. Reagan. The 
government is willing, where necessary, 'to subordinate concerns about the 
direction of US defence policy to the interests of Allied unity - as the 
recent 'Star Wars' debate has illustrated. And Mrs. Thatcher has seemed 
ideologically sympathetic to the Reagan Administration's attempt to 
reassert the US's global superiority over the Soviet Union, even when 
other West European governments have urged a more conciliatory line. 
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Thirdly, as the next section of this chapter will discuss, the 
Conservative government has placed increased importance in its 
declaratory policy on the role of Britain's independent nuclear force. 
From being described simply as a "contribution to NATO" since 1964, the 
nuclear 'deterrent' has become one of the "main pillars" of the defence 
programme. (75) The government has placed top priority on gaining 
agreement to its plans for acquiring the Trident II system to replace 
Polaris, if necessary at the expense of its conventional contribution 
to NATO. Indeed the decision to acquire Trident, rather than less 
sophisticated alternatives, itself reflected this high priority. 
In all three of these areas, the Thatcher government's policies, 
therefore, reflected its belief that it was possible, and desirable, to 
base Britain's defence policies on the same principles and priorities as 
in the 1950s, despite the decline in its economic fortunes in the 
intervening years. 
It was a sentiment nowhere better expressed than in Mrs. Thatcher's 
Cheltenham speech shortly after the victory of the Falklands campaign: 
"When we started out there were the waverers and 
the fainthearts .... Those who believed that our decline was irreversible ... that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and 
ruled a quarter of the world. Well they were 
wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain 
has not changed and that this nationsiill has those 
sterling qualities which shine through our history". (76) 
6. The Polaris replacement debate: 1977-82 
By the late 1970s, increasing attention was being given, by those 
involved in long-term military planning, )the problem of Polaris 
replacement. The four Polaris submarines had only commenced their 
service between 1968 and 1970. (77) The Chevaline programme for 
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updating the missile re-entry vehicles was still in a development stage, 
and would not be fully in service until the mid 1980s. Nevertheless it 
was believed that a decision on Polaris replacement would be needed in 
the early 1980s, preferably in 1980, given the extensive timelag that 
would exist between a decision and the actual deployment of new systems. 
In the case of Polaris, this time-lag had been relatively short - less 
than 8 years. It was generally believed, however, that to allow such a 
short period would be extremely imprudent, particularly since the co- 
operation of the US in the replacement programme could not be assumed. 
Furthermore there was only one shipyard available for SSBN construction, 
(Barrow), compared with the two available for Polaris. It was argued, 
therefore, that as long as thirteen years would be needed between 
decision and deployment. (78) Given the subsequent planned eighteen 
year lifetime of the Trident programme, even this apparently generous 
assumption appears to have been overoptimistic. 
Several factors contributed to the assessment that Polaris would 
need to be replaced in the early or mid 1990s, and therefore that a 
decision would need to be made in 1980 or shortly after. First, it was 
believed that submarines had a lifetime of twenty, or at most twenty- 
five, years. As they approached this age, they would become more 
expensive to maintain, perhaps noisier, and probably less reliable. 
This fixed a deadline for replacing some, and preferably all, Polaris 
submarines by 1993. It has been argued by some naval sources that 
Polaris refits now being carried out are so extensive as to effectively 
solve this problem. By fitting expensive new sonar equipment and 
'stealth' technology, Polaris will continue to have undiminished 
survivability against Soviet ASW- (79) However, while this argument may 
have considerable merit, it understates the problem that faces a 
government committed to maintaining the strategic force. 
- 220 - 
Given Polaris's extensive refit schedules, it 
would only need one submarine to be lost for it to be impossible to 
maintain a continuous patrol, and then several years might be needed for 
a replacement. It is not the inevitabi-lity of Polaris obsolescence, 
therefore, that is at stake, but its growing possibility. 
Secondly, the Polaris missiles themselves would, by the mid 1990s, 
be amongst the oldest ballistic missiles in existence. The US Navy was 
due to, and indeed did, phase out its last Polaris missiles in the early 
1980s. Thereafter Britain would have to finance maintenance facilities 
in the US for its own missiles completely by itself. In addition, even 
with Chevaline modernisation, there were some doubts as to whether 
Britain could rely on Polaris against thhe ballistic missile defences 
that might be deployed in the late 1990s I. 
Indeed problems with the performance of Polaris missiles have 
already been reveýled with a series of test firings in 1980, which led to 
a decision to spend E400 million (at 1984/5 prices) on new motors for the 
missiles. (80) Production lines were re-opened, and Lockheed brought 
some of its experts out of retirement for, the programme -a possibility 
that will clearly diminish as time passes. (81) Although it is the 
submarines, rather than the missiles, that seem to be the driving 
constraint in the replacement timetable, it is clear that, without major 
new investment, the missiles can also not be expected to last much beyond 
the turn of the century. 
6.1 The choice of-Trident 
In 1977, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (R. I. I. A. ) 
published a major study, written by Ian Smart, on the alternatives 
available for replacing Polaris, given the need to reach a decision in 
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the early 1980s. The study concluded that two main possibilities 
existed - submarine-based ballistic missiles and submarine-based cruise 
missiles. It further expressed the view that, between these two 
alternatives, a fleet of five ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would 
appear to be the optimum choice. (82) (The relative merits of 
alternative Polaris replacement systems are discussed in section 6.4) 
At about the same time as the R. I. I. A. study was being undertaken, 
the Ministry of Defence itself came to the view that the issue required 
discussion at a political level. Accordingly, Prime Minister Callaghan 
convened a small ad hoc group of senior Ministers to examine the matter. 
In order to maintain secrecy, it did not even carry a Cabinet Office 
number in the 'Gen' series, and its existence was not reported to the 
Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, which included some who 
might have questioned whether such discussions were compatible with 
Manifesto commitments. The committee consisted of Prime Minister James 
Callaghan, Chancellor Denis Healey, Foreign Secretary David Owen, and 
Defence Secretary Fred Mulley. (83) As a first step towards a decision 
it ordered civil servants to prepare two studies, one on military and 
political implications of Polaris replacement, and a second on possible 
replacement systems. The second study, undertaken under the 
chairmanship of Chief Scientific Adviser RonaldMason, was the more 
important of the two. It quickly came to the same conclusion as the 
R. I. I. A. study: that a submarine-based force was needed. and that, 
therefore, neither aircraft nor ground-based missiles were suitable. 
At this stage, however, the choice between cruise and ballistic missiles 
remained open. (84) 
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By commissioning these studies, the Ministers concerned appeared toý, 
be acting in clear breach of their pledge, in October 1974, that: 
"We have renounced 
'any intention of moving towards 
a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons". (85) 
Even so, no consensus existed amongst the four Ministers concerned 
as to the best course of action. Mulley remained ambivalent on the 
need for replacement, and was under strong pressure from senior officers 
anxious that the costs would fall on conventional forces. (86) Owen 
had for some time argued that, while he supported a British 
'contribution' to NATO's strategic force, it need not be capable of being 
used independently, nor of destroying Moscow without American assistance. 
In 1971, shortly after leaving his office as Navy Minister, he had 
written that the Labour government in 1964 could have cancelled the 
fourth Polaris submarine at minimal cost. "This would have left three 
submarines -a suitable number to ensure that the deterrent was never 
seen as independent but only as a contribution to NATO". By not doing 
so, Owen wrote, the Wilson government had "lost a unique opportunity to 
kill once and for all the whole concept of a separate British national 
deterrent". (87) In the late 1970s, Owen continued to hold these 
views, and argued that, while some Polaris replacement was required, it 
need not be designed to meet the 'Moscow criteriont. According to his 
own account, he "challenged Trident in government consistently from 1977 
to 1979". (88) 
Callaghan was clearly committed, however, to the concept of an 
independent British force, and it has been reported that he favoured 
Trident as the most appropriate Polaris replacement. (89) At the 
Guadeloupe summit meeting in January 1979, Callaghan raised the issue of 
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possible American help with President Carter. (90) One of the purposes 
of this meeting was to obtain the agreement of the UK, France and West 
Germany to deploy the new US medium-range missiles (codenamed LRTNF -Long 
Range Theatre Nuclear Forces) in Europe. (91) The coincidence of these 
two discussions may have been fortuitous. It is clear, however, that a 
parellel exists with the Skybolt-Holy Loch deal in 1960; and that the US 
might have been markedly less keen to help Britain with Trident had it 
refused to accept its share of Cruise missiles. President Carter's 
advisers must also have been aware that failure to help the UK's Polaris 
replacement programme could jeopardize British support for LRTNF 
modernisation, on which there was already some European disquiet. (92) 
In early 1979, Callaghan moved to dilute his Party's commitment 
against Polaris replacement. As a consequence, in the General Election 
of May 1979, the Labour Party's manifesto was decidedly ambiguous: 
In 1974, we renounced any intentions of moving toward 
the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons 
or a successor to the Polaris nuclear force; we reiterate 
our belief that this is the best course for Britain. But 
many great issues affecting our allies and the world are 
involved, and a new round of strategic arms limitation 
negotiations will soon begin. We think it essential that 
there be full and informed debate, about these issues in the 
country before any decision is taken". (93) 
While the Labour government had not made a decision before the 1979 
General Election, therefore, it appears likely that, had it been re- 
elected, it would have decided to replace Polaris. In all probability, 
that replacement would have been Trident. 
Once the Conservatives came to power under Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher any remaining uncertainty on whether Polaris would be replaced 
soon ended. A formal Cabinet subcommittee (MISC 7) was set up, 
consisting of Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Geoffrey Howe, 
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Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Defence Secretary Francis Pym, and 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. It considered the results of the 
official studies carried out under the previous government; and by the 
end of the year, the cruise option appears to have been ruled out. (94) 
In December 1979, Mrs. Thatcher obtained President Carter's general 
agreement to helping the UK programme, and the next six months were taken 
up with detailed negotiations on the acquisition of American Trident C4 
missiles and associated services. In July 1980, the government 
announced to the House of Commons that it had decided to buy C4 missiles 
for four, or possibly five, SSBNs. The total cost of the programme was 
estimated at between E4,500 million and E5,000 million at September 1980 
prices. (95) 
As the British decision was being made, however, significant 
changes were being made in US strategic nuclear doctrine. Increasing 
emphasis was being placed on the need for counterforce capabilities, 
first in PD-59 under President Carter and then, after his November 1980 
election, by President Reagan's administration. As part of this new 
emphasis, in October 1981, President Reagan announced his approval for 
the development of a completely new submarine- launched ballistic missile 
- Trident D5. (96) By the end of the century, it is planned, the US 
could have 5,000 D5 warheads. making it the largest single component of 
its strategic arsenal. Because of its pin-point accuracy, this force 
will give the US the theoretical capability of destroying all Soviet 
ICBMs in a 'disarming first strike', leading one US Congressman to 
describe it as "the most destabilising (to superpower relations) 'first 
strike' weapon ever built, far more than the MX". (97) 
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In response to the US decision, the UK government reconsidered its 
own position and, in March 1982, announced that it too would purchase the 
D5 missile. Because the new missile was considerably larger than the C4 
missile, the size of Britain's planned submarines would also have to be 
increased, thus increasing the cost of Polaris replacement further. In 
addition, the government took the opportunity to announce that the force 
would be fitted with a new, and expensive, nuclear reactor (PWR-2), and 
advanced tactical weapon systems still under development. As a result 
of these changes in the programme, together with adverse exchange rate 
and price movements, the cost rose from E4,500-5,000 million (at 
September 1980 prices) to E7,500 million (at September 1981 prices). 
(98) As of the time of writing, largely as a result of further changes 
in prices and exchange rates, the government's estimate of cost had risen 
to E9,265 million (at 1986/7 prices). (99) 
The decision to extend nuclear weapons co-operation with the United 
States was the natural one for the British government to take. As we 
have seen in the last three chapters, the 'special relationship' has been 
a key component of Britain's foreign and defence policies since the 
1940s. The British government had bargained toughly to secure the 1962 
Nassau agreement, on which the Trident deal would be modelled. It had 
provided the US with a unique overseas base for its strategic nuclear 
forces, and valuable access to its intelligence facilities, in order to 
maintain the close links between the two countries. The preference of 
the British government, under both Callaghan and Thatcher, was that 
Polaris's replacement should also be developed within this framework. 
This preference was reinforced by the problems that possible 
alternatives would create. The Chevaline experience, and a fortiori the 
costs of France's independent nuclear programme, had demonstrated the 
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substantial costs. involved in national development efforts. On the other 
hand, co-operation with France in nuclear weapons development would have 
required a major shift in a policy followed since the War, which neither 
Labour and Conservatives leaders saw any gooJreason to consider. These 
two alternatives would certainly have been seriously considered if the 
US had been unwilling to help Britain further, as indeed its hesitancy 
over Poseidon in the early 1970s had suggested might be possible. They 
were, however, only fallback solutions.,, The priority was the 
continuation of the Anglo-American nuclear entente which had been central 
to British policy since the days of Churchill and Roosevelt. 
By the time of the January 1979 Guadeloupe discussions between 
Carter and Callaghan, it was clear that the US would be willing to help 
Britain. The opposition to independent nuclear forces, particularly 
strong under President Kennedy, had subsided. Familiarity with the UK's 
Polaris force, and the special relationship with its intelligence 
services, meant that the necessity for maintaining Britain as a staunch, 
and loyal, ally overrode remaining doctrinal reservations. Britain was 
one of the strongest supporters of both the 1977 3% spending growth 
decision and of LRTNF modernisation. After the embarrassment over the 
neutron bomb episode, Carter and his aides were not about to risk 
offending a key ally for theoretical arguments which, with the passage of 
time, seemed less than central. 
The clinching argument for the US, however, was probably its 
perception that a refusal to help Britain would not lead it to abandon 
its commitment to an independent nuclear force. Instead, it would force 
Britain, in all probability, either on'a path of independent development 
or towards collaboration with France. Not only would such policies 
reduce American influence on British nuclear planning and, perhaps, 
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operations. It could also lead to a drastic cooling in the bilateral 
political relationship. Most of all, these-alternatives would probably 
cost a lot more than a deal with the US. As the French experience in 
the 1950s had illustrated, increased spe. nding on independent strategic 
nuclear forces would probably be at the expense of conventional forces 
assigned to NATO forces which the US was, at this time, determined to 
build up. Rober t Komer, who designed the US proposals for a NATO 
conventional buildup, endorsed in 1977, and was Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy in 1979-80, justified his support for Britain's 
Trident programme in these terms: 
"Nor was the United States ever enthusiastic about the 
buildup of British and French nuclear forces. We 
regarded them as superfluous, potentially destabilising, 
(could we rely on de Gaulle not to pull the nuclear 
trigger? ), and almost inevitably funded at the expense of 
UK and French conventional forces. Although we aided UK 
force modernisation - most recently in promising to provide Trident II missiles - this was essentially because we saw 
the British as determined to modernise anyway, hence 
calculated that we might as well help them do so less 
expensively in order to minimise the impact on their 
conventional NATO contribution". (100) 
As a result of the US's concern to reduce the costs to Britain of 
its attempt to remain a nuclear power, it granted a number of significant 
concessions which lowered the final cost of the UK Trident programme. 
Firstly, apparently after some State Department opposition, it was agreed 
to sell Britain the complete MIRV systems for the Trident missiles. (101) 
This was actually an improvement on the Nassau agreement, under which 
Britain had to develop its own re-entry vehicles, albeit with American 
help. (102) 
Secondly, the US agreed that Britain should pay only a small 
contribution to Trident R&D costs -a flat rate of $160 million at 
fiscal 1982 prices - thus avoiding any possible escalation in the R&D 
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costs of the US programme (though not escalation in missile production 
costs). (103) In return for these concessions, Britain agreed to 
provide RAF personnel to man US-owned Rapier air defence missiles 
guarding US bases in Britain. In 1985-6 the cost of this deal was an 
estimated E4.5 million in pay and allowances, though it is likely to rise 
in later years. (104) 
6.2 Arguments for Trident 
While the deal reached on Trident with the US was reasonably 
generous, given the weapon system on offer, it has been less clear, even 
to supporters of an independent nuclear force, whether the system chosen 
was not too sophisticated - and therefore expensive - for Britain's 
requirements. Such a perception has encouraged the advocacy of cheaper, 
and less sophisticated, Polaris replacements - as Section 6.4 will 
discuss. Supporters of the government decision, for their part, put 
forward at least three main arguments in favour of the Trident II 
programme. 
Firstly, it is argued that there are considerable advantages for 
Britain in using the same weapons systems as the US. The use of 
American missiles, and provision of information for submarine and warhead 
design, will enable savings to be made in capital costs. The French 
experience, it is argued, demonstrates the considerable costs involved in 
independent development and production. 
Similarly, the maintenance costs of the force will be reduced by 
the sharing of facilities with the US. The September, 1982 decision to 
service Britain's D5 missiles at the US facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia 
is a good example of this. This decision will save an estimated E500 
million on the provision of capital facilities in the UK, in addition to 
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long term savings in running costs of around E700 million. (105) If 
Britain had opted for a system other than Trident D5, the use of such a 
shared facility would not have been possible, and more national 
facilities would have been needed. Even if Trident C4 had been chosen, 
maintenance costs would have been increa sed as a consequence of US Navy 
plans to phase out their own C4 missiles in the late 1990s - just as 
Britain's new SSBNs are due to enter service. (106) 
In operational terms it is held by some advocates of Trident that 
there are advantages in possessing the same strategic system as the US. 
This 'commonality' will encourage the exchange of knowledge on 
operational improvements, such as methods of combating enemy ASW. In 
addition, it is argued, the use of a common system ensures that the 
Soviets will be unable to distinguish a British missile in flight from an 
American one. It will thus be more likely to respond to a British 
attack as if it were launched by the United States - thus enhancing its 
ability to 'trigger' an American nuclear strike. (107) 
All these arguments have some merit. The converse of 
WUk 'commonality', however, is dependencejis examined in more detail. i1L 
Chapter Six. To the extent to which it exists, it clearly throws into 
question the contention that Trident will be an independent nuclear 
force. Only if commonality does not also bring undue dependence can it 
plausibly be an advantage for those who favour an independent strategic 
nuclear force. 
Even if operational independence were to exist, however, 
commonality imposes, other costs for Britain. It requires that Britain 
buys a force geared, not to perceived national requirements for nuclear 
deterrence, but to the requirements on which the US bases its own nuclear 
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forces. In the case of Trident D5, this means that Britain has had to 
purchase a system which even some of its strongest supporters would argue 
is much more sophisticated than is required. The large D5 missile is 
both bigger and considerably more expensive than the C4 it replaces. It 
therefore requires larger, and much more expensive, submarines than 
would have been needed with Polaris or Trident I. The additional costs 
of buying a weapon system in excess of Britain's perceived deterrence 
requirements thus has to be balanced against the savings in production 
and maintenance costs which may be incurred by having the same system as 
the US. 
The second main argument of Trident proponents is that Polaris 
needs to be replaced by a much more sophisticated system in order to 
preserve Britain's capability to 14unch a second strike despite improved 
enemy counter-measures. To assure a credible strategic nuclear 
deterrent, it is argued, Britain's force must be able to both survive any 
possible Soviet pre-emptive strike and, after doing so, be capable of 
penetrating any Soviet defences, including those round Moscow itself. 
These two criteria - penetrability and survivabiity - are then used to 
explain why Polaris must be replaced by a much more sophisticated weapon 
system such as Trident. Even if it is assumed that Polaris/Chevaline 
will remain fully effective until the mid 1990s, it is argued, its 
replacement must anticipate possible improvements to Soviet defences 
after that time, based on the supposedly prudent assumption that no 
significant arms control measures are introduced. Indeed if Polaris's 
successor is to last as long as Polaris itself - 25 years - it must 
anticipate developments in military technology between now and the year 
2020. Technological developments in two areas in particular are of 
concern: anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
defences. 
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In the first area, ASW, Soviet capabilities do not at present pose 
a significant threat to Britain's SSBN forces. Indeed, according to 
goverment evidence, no British Polaris submarine has ever been found on 
patrol by the Soviet Navy. (108) Nevertheless it is argued that Soviet 
ASW capabilities are certain to increase considerably in the next 40 
years, and it would therefore be prudent to make provision to counter 
them. The Trident system will do this in a number of ways. The 
increased range of the missiles will enable the submarines to patrol much 
further away from their potential targets in the Soviet Union than at 
present, thus greatly incce4sing the area over which Soviet ASW forces 
must search. In addition, the improved PWR2 reactors to be installed 
will allow more submarines to be on patrol at any one time. Of the four 
Polaris boats, it has been estimated, only two are on patrol for 73% of 
the time, whilst for 20% of the time only one boat is available. (109) 
Trident, by contrast, should be able to keep three submarines available 
for over 80 percent of the time. (110) This will mean that Soviet ASW 
forces will need to destroy more submarines at sea in a disarming first 
strike, and leave fewer boats as easy targets in port or in refit. 
In the second area, ABM defences, current Soviet capabilities are 
also relatively primitive and, as we have already noted, could be 
overcome by Polaris even without the Chevaline up-date. However, the 
United States is now devoting large resources to research and development 
on Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) systems which, if deployed, would 
breach the ABM Treaty. There is little doubt that, if the US continued 
this programme, the Soviets will attempt to follow suit. If these 
developments are then projected to the year 2020, on reasonable 
assumptions, the current Polaris re-entry vehicles are unlikely to be 
able to continue to guarantee the destruction of Moscow. The Soviets by 
that time are likely to be able to destroy a high proportion of incoming 
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British missiles. If only 16, or at most 32, single-target missiles 
have been launched, the UK forces' destructive power could be reduced 
below the level necessary to effectively destroy several Soviet cities. 
Trident, it is argued, guards against such developments. By 
obtaining a MIRVed system, Britain will be presenting Soviet defences 
with a much larger number of targets which -,. must simultaneously be 
destroye-J. It therefore increases the chances that at least some will get 
through. The greater number of Trident submarines at sea, compared with 
Polaris, will also increase the number of warheads that can be launched 
simultaneously, posing further difficulties for possible 21st century ABM 
defences. 
Given the premises that it must take into account possible 
developments in ABM and ASW defences in the next 35 years, and that these 
developments may not be restrained by arms control agreements, there is a 
plausible technical case for Trident. Unfortunately, however, such 
'worst caset assumptions inevitably fuel the arms race in both East and 
West. As section 6.3 will show, it is precisely the escalation which 
the attempt to meet these worst case criteria necessitates which 
constitutes one of the main arguments against Trident. 
Arguments of 'communality' and of the need to maintain a credible 
second strike capability are the two most commonly heard public 
justifications of the Trident decision. There is, however, a third 
argument for Trident which, although not often publicly aired, 
nevertheless appears to be important within military and specialist 
circles. It is the need for a Polaris replacement which provides 
additional 'flexibility' in the use of nuclear weapons, increasing the 
range of targets that can be hit and allowing the strategic force to be 
used in a limited nuclear conflict. Trident, it is argued, will help to 
provide this flexibility in a number of different ways. Firstly, its 
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increased range will allow more targets to be covered, for example east 
of the Urals, and will also enhance its 'post-launch survivability'. 
(111) The latter is particularly necessary if the SSBN may be needed 
again for future strikes. 
Secondly, by increasing boat availability and warhead numbers, 
Trident will also increase the capability to use a portion of the 
strategic arsenal in a limited nuclear war while still holding enough in 
reserve for destruction of MoscoW and other major cities. Third, the 
greater accuracy of the D5 missile will allow Britain to threaten a 
greater range of Soviet targets, perhaps including Soviet silos and 
command bunkers. This flexibility, it is argued, will increase the 
ability to deter, and if necessary respond to, limited Soviet 
conventional or nuclear attack. 
The UK government has been extremely reluctant to discuss the 
nature of its independent targeting policy. The 1980 Open Government 
Document stated only that: 
"Successive UK Governments have always declined to 
make public their nuclear targeting policy and 
plans, or to define precisely what minimum level of 
destructive capability they judged necessary for 
deterrence. The Government however thinks it right 
now to make clear that their concept of deterrence 
is concerned essentially with posing a potential 
threat to key aspects of Soviet state power. There 
might with changing conditionsbe more than one way 
of doing this and some flexibility in contingency 
planning is appropriate". (112) 
It is clear from semi-official sources that the ability to destroy 
Moscow is considered to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, part of 
these plans. What is unspecified is whether 'key aspects of state 
power' might, at some future date, also include military targets such as 
missile silos. This possibility was discussed in 1980 by Michael 
Quinlan, then the senior civil servant in charge of Britain's strategic 
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nuclear programmes, in evidence to the Commons Defence Committee: 
Patrick Wall (Conservative MP) 
"Is Trident going to be sufficiently accurate to 
switch from the softer to the harder targets? I 
am asking about Trident I. I will come on to 
Trident II afterwards". 
Mr. Quinlan 
"I hesitate to get deeply into the question of 
targeting ... Polaris, in its various forms, will 
not have the kind of accuracy that will make it 
any good at taking on silos at any reasonable 
rate of exchange, but there is a range of targets 
between hitting a large city and hitting a silo 
which may be of some relevance. The Trident 
memorandum ... does use a general term - Soviet state power - which may embrace a range of 
targets lying between these two". (113) 
Unfortunately Mr. Quinlan was noVpressed further on Trident II 
targeting. Nevertheless it is clear that even the present force is 
already targeted on a range of military and non-military targets in order 
to provide British leaders with a number of so-called 'limited nuclear 
options'. Once Trident II gives Britain a better 'rate of exchange' 
against missile silos and command bunkers there is little reason to 
suppose that these too will not be included in the government's options. 
Nuclear strategists have argued for some years that greater 
'flexibility' in targeting of British (and French) nuclear forces would 
increase their deterrent value. , 
Graemý Auton has argued'this point in 
some detail: 
"Medium powers must escape the kind of logic asserting 
that the only effective targets for smaller deterrents 
are cities and civilian populations; ie: they must 
reject the contradictory notion that medium nuclear 
powers have a deterrent value but no war-fighting 
utility. Required is a range of options allowing for 
the measured and selective employment of nuclear 
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weapons against a wide array of targets, in order to 
avoid immediate escalation to a level of destruction 
that could not credibly be pursued". 
In the event of a Warsaw Pact conventional assault on Western Europe, or some other limited provocation, the 
British and French governments would have an initial 
option ... of striking at vulnerable counterforce targets in the Soviet Union". 
These targets would include : 
"Non-military, industrial targets outside urban 
centres that would require only one or two nuclear 
warheads each. Air-defence sites .... military airfields, major army bases and submarine bases (in 
which perhaps half of all Soviet SSBNs would be docked 
or undergoing refit) .... hard targets such as missile silos, nuclear weapons storage facilities and command 
posts". 
Reassuringly, Mr. Auton tells us that: 
"Of course the USSR might launch limited counterforce 
or otherwise 'selective' retaliatory strikes of its 
own .... to demoralise 
turopean populations without 
inviting condign destruction of Soviet cities. The 
assumption is, however, that at this point there would 
be powerful incentives on both sides for controlling 
conflict and preventing its escalation to mutual city 
targeting". 
"Since the initial use of nuclear weapons (by the UK) 
would not have apocalyptic consequences, the threat to 
resort to it in the event of dire provocation would be 
more credible - much more credible, certainly, than the threat of massive countercity strikes". (114) 
An influential study of the targeting requirements for Britain's 
nuclear forces, written by Geoffrey Kemp and published by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, gives some insight into 
this trend in thinking. It starts with a lengthy discussion on the most 
cost-effective way for Britain to destroy major Soviet cities which 
includes the chilling argument that: 
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"It can be argued that more chaos would result from a 
nuclear attack that only partially destroyed a city 
and left many injured to be cared for than from an 
attack that totally obliterated it, leaving few, if 
any, survivors". 
Kemp concludes his study by contending that: 
"Any decision by medium powers to develop forces 
capable of fairly sophisticated targeting options ... (would be expensive). However it can be argued that 
such an option would give a medium-power nuclear force 
greater political flexibility in event of a major 
conflict with the Soviet Union or (perhaps more 
important) in a pre-war crisis situation". (115) 
More recently David Hobbs at Aberdeen University, in a study 
designed to investigate less expensive alternatives to Trident, discusses 
the minimum requirements for such an alternative. 
11 ... the United Kingdom might be well advised to seek a more flexible retaliatory capability, allowing some 
scope for controlled or graduated escalation (for 
intra-war deterrence). That would imply a wider 
range of target options, taking advantage of the 
enhanced accuracy of new delivery vehicles; and, if 
practicable, a less discrete system than the existing 
one, so that use of a portion of it would not 
automatically jeopardise the remainder". (116) 
As a result of this logic, Hobbs then argues that an alternative to 
Trident must be able to destroy both the 'area' targets for which Polaris 
is intended and, in addition, a number of counterforce targets. He 
concludes by defining the 'criterion fora4equacy' for such an alternative 
as 1100 assuredly arriving warheads' - more than three times the targeting 
capability of the current Polaris force,, even with two boats on patrol. 
An additional pressure for Polaris's replacement to have greater 
flexibility built'into it appears to have come from the imminent 
obsolescence of Britain's V-bomber force which, as we have seen, provided 
Britain with a 'dyad' of strategic forces in the 1970s. According to one 
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account, a number of those most closely involved in the Trident decision 
- including Chief of the Defence Staff Air Marshall Sir Neil Cameron and 
Deputy Under-Secretary Michael Quinlan - believed that "retention of a sub- 
strategic capability to strike Soviet targets was important for the 
national deterrent mission". (117) The Tornado GRI aircraft due to 
replace the Vulcan bombers could not reach much of Soviet territory due to 
its restricted range, and the cost of developing air-launched cruise 
missiles in addition to a submarine-based strategic force was then thought 
to be prohibitive. As a result at least one possible system - Poseidon - 
was rejected as not giving sufficient capability for limited nuclear 
options. As Malone reports: 
"Poseidon's prospects dimmed when account was taken 
of the distinct operational advantages of increased 
SLBM range. They declined even further when, in 
late 1979, the government concluded that it would 
not be possible to replace the Vulcan squadrons with 
a weapons system capable of engaging targets in the 
Soviet Union. Polaris's successor would, therefore, 
be the only element of the British force structure 
capable of undertaking selective strikes against the 
Soviet Union properly. It would, in this sense, be 
successor to both the Polaris and Vulcan forces. 
This development placed an even greater premium 
upon post-launch survivability and argued for an 
excess warhead capacity in third-generation 
strategic forces. " (118) 
It is difficult to assess the relative importance of these three 
arguments - communality, the need to ensure a credible second strike 
capability, and the desire for limited nuclear options. All appeared 
to have played some part in the decision to choose Trident D5. 
Overarching all three arguments, however, and therefore perhaps crucially 
important, appears to have been a concern to obtain the best system 
available. This concern was motivated partly by the reluctance to have 
a national force clearly 'inferior' in quality to that of France, or one 
several generations behind that of the superpowers. For such a perceived 
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inferiority might have damaged Britain's international standing. In 
addition there was an appreciation that the British nuclear force has, 
historically, been vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that it is 
ineffective. The experiences with Blue Streak and Skybolt in the late 
1950s and early 1960s illustrated this clearly. By attempting to rely 
on systems which might become obsolescent within a few years, the 
government had allowed opponents of the independent nuclear force - in 
the US and UK - to attack it on ground of practicality rather than 
principle. Once Polaris had been chosen in 1962, such criticisms 
appeared less effective and the force's future was secured for two 
decades. By going again for the best system available, and perhaps 
overinsuring quite considerably in the process, the government sought 
to insulate the planned force from the charge that it would not be 
effective. A review of alternative Polaris replacements, and the 
problems involved with them (section 6.4), will demonstrate that this 
consideration in the choice of Trident may be well-founded. 
6.3 Arguments against Trident 
By emphasising the need for a Polaris replacement that is the most 
sophisticated available, capable of operating to the year 2020 and 
providing a range of limited nuclear options, the government has created 
a number of other problems. These have led to a series of arguments 
against Trident over and above those generally applicable to the concept 
of an independent nuclear force. Firstly, the massive escalation in 
warhead numbers is a subject of serious concern. Secondly, the increased 
accuracy of the D5 missile is seen as contributing to crisis instability 
and thus undermining mutual deterrence. Thirdly, and politically most 
damaging1the decision to buy a very advanced weapon system to replace 
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Polaris has meant that the financial costs incurred will be difficult to 
meet within overall constraints on defence spending. 
Firstly, as a result of its MIRVed front-end, Trident will be able 
to destroy many more targets than the Polaris/Chevaline system it 
replaces. Polaris can at present hit a theoretical maximum of 64 targets 
with its 64 missiles. In practice, given the number of boats on patrol 
at any one time, only 32 or possibly even 16 targets could be destroyed 
at short notice. Each Trident D5 missile, however, is theoretically 
able to carry up to 17 warheads. The provisions of the unratified SALT II 
agreement provide, however, for a maximum of 14 warheads on each MIRVed 
SLBM, and the US is complying with this provision. Assuming that Britain 
follows the US lead, the maximum number of targets which Britain's four 
submarines could destroy is 896. (equal to four submarines, sixteen 
missiles, fourteen warheads. ) After allowing for refits and submarines 
in port, the maximum number of targets that could be destroyed at short 
notice would be either 448 or 672, depending on whether two or three 
boats were on patrol. Trident, on these calculations, will represent 
between 21 and 28 times the targeting capability of Polaris. 
In explaining the decision to switch from C4 to D5, however, the 
government stated that: 
"We feel it right to make clear that the move to 
Trident P5 will not involve any significant change 
in the planned total number of warheads associated 
with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with 
the original intentions for a force based on the C4 
missile system". (119) 
Since the C4 missile has only 8 warheads on each missile, this 
implies that the government's plans for Trident D5 do not envisage more 
than 512 warheads in total. Given the low financial cost of deploying 
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additional warheads, however, it is possible that military planners 
will not adhere rigidly to the artificial ceiling of 512. As 
Secretary of State John Nott conceded in 1982: 
"The system will not come into service until the 
mid-1990s but my successors and the Prime Minister 
at the time would have complete choice as to how 
many missiles were placed in the submarine, and 
similarly the Prime Minister at the time would 
have a choice as to the number of warheads that 
were placed on that missile'. (120) 
Even if the government plans at present to have only 512 warheads 
on Trident, therefore, it could change its mind in the 1990s. Indeed, 
if Soviet ABM defences improve significantly in the next decade, or are 
perceived as likely to do so in the decade after that, the government 
has already made it clear that warhead numbers could be increased. In 
justifying the decision to build 16 missile tubes on each submarine, 
rather than the 12 that would be necessary for a 512-warhead force, the 
government argued that: 
"the large number of tubes would provide flexibility 
to cope with any possible improvements in Soviet 
anti-ballistic missile defences throughout the life 
of the force ... this should not necessarily be taken to imply that we are currently planning to 
deploy the maximum number of missiles and warheads 
that will theoretically be possible as a result 
of this decision. " (121) 
As Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin has explained, "since we will 
not initially require the full capability represented by the Trident 
system - as the Government has repeatedly made clear - there is a margin 
for insurance should Soviet defensive systems be enhanced" (122) Given 
the worst-case planning used in nuclear policy, clearly illustrated with 
Chevaline development, together with the likelihood of a superpower 'Star 
Wars' arms race, it therefore seems probable that Britain's Trident force 
will eventually have as many as 896 warheads. Whether it has 512 or 
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896, however, it will clearly represent a massive quantitative escalation 
that it is difficult for the government to present as a "minimum 
deterrent" force. 
One of the most serious consequences of this increase in warhead 
numbers may be its effects on the chances for arms control agreements 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. On SALT counting rules, 
a MIRVed missile is assumed to have the maximum number of warheads with 
which it has been tested. In Trident D51s case this will be 14. If 
these rules remain unchanged, therefore, the UK Trident D5 force will be 
considered to have 896 warheads even if the government sticks to its 
intention only to deploy the number previously planned for the C4. 
Together with the French nuclear force, there will then be as many as 
2,000 strategic nuclear warheads in the possession of countries not 
included in the bilateral US-Soviet arms talks. These will constitute a 
significant proportion of the current Soviet strategic arsenal now 
around 11,000 warheads. If 'deep cuts' in superpower arsenals were 
agreed, the difficulty would be further increased. 
In practical terms, it is difficult to believe that future arms 
control agreements can be reached between the superpowers except on the 
basis of the principle of rough parity. Given the vast overkill that 
exists in current arsenals, the attachment to this principle may have 
little rational foundation. Nevertheless it exists. The Soviet Union 
appears to be unwilling to accept a situation where its nuclear forces 
are numerically clearly 'inferior' to those of its NATO rivals. In turn 
no US President could hope to win political support for an agreement that 
allowed the Soviets more strategic weapons than the US. These two, 
rather different, requirements proved to be compatible in the 
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negotiations for SALT I and SALT II, largely because of the relatively 
small British and French arsenals at the time. When 'third parties' 
have 2,000 warheads between them, however, it would make strategic 'deep 
cuts' agreement impossible unless one of the superpowers effectively 
abandoned the concept of 'parity'. 
The second area of criticism of the acquisition of Trident D5 is 
its greatly increased accuracy. Highly accurate weapons enable one side 
to destroy the other's missile silos and command bunkers before they can 
be used in retaliation. Were one side then to believe that it had the 
capability to destroy all, or almost all', the opponent's nuclear forces 
in a 'disarming first strike', the incentives to use nuclear weapons as 
an instrument of political coercion would increase. Were it to be 
perceived that both sides had first strike capability, the incentives to 
use nuclear weapons first in a crisis could be overwhelming. 
At present few, if any, of the missiles of the two superpowers have 
the 'hard target capability' necessary for an effective disarming first 
strike. With the planned development of MX, Trident D5 and Pershing II 
missiles, however, the US is likely to remedy this 'gap' in the next few 
years. There is every likelihood that the Soviet Union will follow the 
American lead with missiles such as the SS-X-24. 
Trident D5 is the largest single programme in the US plans for 
acquiring a large-scale counter-silo, and therefore potentially first 
strike, capability. Using inertial guidance, stellar guidance, and 
inflight updating with Navstar satellites, the warheads are likely to 
attain a CEP of 300 feet. (123) This will give each Trident D5 warhead 
at least a 95% probability of destroying a hardened Soviet silo. Using 
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two Trident warheads per Soviet silo, it has been estimated that only a 
handful of the 1398 Soviet land-based missiles would survive an initial 
attack by the US. 
In addition, it is possible that, in the early 1990s, the Trident 
D5 missile will be fitted with a terminal guidance capability, enabling 
its warheads to home in even more precisely onto their targets. Such a 
capability is already fitte4 to the Pershing II missiles now being 
deployed in West Germany. If used on Trident, it could reduce its CEP 
to as low as 150 feet. 
According to the Sunday Times, Trident's counterforce capability 
has led one-government minister to argue that : 
"We've been lumbered with something that's 
totally inappropriate. Trident is a first 
strike weapon and totally unsuitable as a 
deterrent fron our point of view". (124) 
However, the government has officially denied that Trident's 
accuracy was considered in the decision to acquire it. In an 'Open 
Government Document' in 1982, it stated that : 
"The Government wishes to make it absolutely clear 
that the increased accuracy of the Trident D5 
system played no part in its decision to adopt the 
more modern system". 
It points out that : 
"even if a UK Government had any thoughts of a 
first strike capability, simple arithmetic 
demonstrates that it is totally beyond its grasp. 
The firepower of the British force with maximum 
D5 payloads, would be sufficient to target only a 
very small proportion of the Soviet ICBM silos". 
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To forestall the observant reader who may be asking himself himself 
or herself whether this implies that the US is seeking a first strike 
capability by acquiring 5,000 D5 warheads, it continues: 
"the reasons behind the UK and US decisions to deploy 
D5 are very different ... The purpose of the US ... is to make it clear that it has the ability to use 
its nuclear weapons ... against different numbers and types of targets including specifically military 
targets. This is made possible by the increased 
accuracy of the more modern missile. Their policy 
is not in any way to provide a 'first strike' 
capability or to make 'limited nuclear war' easier 
or more likely; neither the US, the UK nor NATO as 
a whole subscribes to either concept". (125) 
The contention that Trident's increased accuracy is unrelated to 
US plans for a limited nuclear war and for a first strike capability, 
yet is designed for use against hardened military targets, will not 
convince many of its critics. The entire basis of recent American 
nuclear planning has been precisely to provide the President with a range 
of 'limited nuclear options' for the conduct of a 'protracted nuclear 
wart. The statement that British decision makers were entirely 
uninterested in Trident's increased accuracy has been greeted with some 
scepticism in Britain, and is clearly inconsistent with its integration 
into US strategic nuclear targeting plans. 
- Such scepticism is likely to be reinforced by the contention that 
the maximum payload on the British Trident force could target 'only a 
very small proportion of the Soviet ICBM silos'. The maximum payload 
which Britain could deploy in four 16-tube submarines will be 896 highly 
accurate D5 warheads. At present the Soviet Union has 1398 ICBMs 
(Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) of which only 818 are MIRVed. (126) 
Were 50% cuts in these forces to be agreed by the superpowers, the Soviets 
could be left with as few as 410 MIRVed ICBMs. (127) 
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''If Trident is as accurate as its manufacturers claim, therefore, 
a British first strike could hope to destroy a very substantial 
proportion'of existing Soviet ICBMs, including most of its most powerful 
ones. (the MIRVed ICBMs). Were the Soviets to agree to 50% cutý., in those 
forces, Britain would be able to target independently two Trident 
warheads on most, if not all, silos of MIRVed ICBMs: virtually ensuring 
their destruction. 
It is likely that, even if 50% cuts were implemented, Britain could 
I 
not destroy each and every Soviet ICBM silo. In any event, there would 
still be other substantial nuclear forces available to retaliate against 
the UK, including medium range SS20 missiles, submarines, and bombers. 
But it is difficult to see how 896 Trident warheads can credibly be 
described as 'sufficient to target only a very small proportion of' 1398 
ICBM silos. 
The third criticism to which Trident is vulnerable, even from those 
who traditionally support nuclear programmes, is that it is simple too 
expensive. On government figures its estimated capital cost is now 
E9,300 million at 1986/7 prices. (128) 
Moreover even this figure may be an underestimate. There are a 
number of items excluded from the cost estimate on the grounds that they 
are not solely attributed to the Trident programme. (129) It is this 
crippling cost, as much as any other factor, that has broken the previous 
consensus, within the armed forces and on the Centre and Right of the 
political spectrum, in favour of an independent nuclear force. 
6.4 Alternatives to Trident 
i 
As the estimated cost of Trident has increased, and worries about 
the escalation it represents have grown, there has been some discussion 
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on alternative Polaris replacement systems. The options rejected by the 
government between 1978 and 1982 are being re-examined. While the Labour 
Party is clearly opposed to any Polaris replacement, many Trident 
opponents, in the SDP/Liberal Alliance, ind some in the Conservative Party, 
are anxious to find a cheap alternative. In this quest there is a strong 
element of desperation. Many of those opposed to Trident because of its 
cost, but committed to retaining an independent strategic force, do not 
appear to have understood fully the difficulties of reconciling these 
two views. (130) This section aims to outline these difficulties. 
Proposals for alternatives to Trident may be divided into those 
suggesting alternative 'launch platforms' and those proposing different 
'delivery vehicles'. The former refers to the system on which the 
nuclear weapon is normally kept, and from which it would be launched. 
The latter is the system responsible for transporting the weapon to 
the target, either by a gravity bomb or by some form of missile. 
Since around half of the cost of Trident is incurred by the need 
for expensive submarines, there have been a number of proposals for 
alternative launch platforms. Amongst these have been ground-based 
missile launchers, aircraft, and dual-capable attack submarines. We 
consider these three alternatives in turn. 
For an alternative launch platform to provide a credible 
strategic force, it must not only be cheaper than Trident. It must also 
be perceived to be capable of surviving a pre-emptive nuclear strike and 
then retaliating in sufficient strength. For this reason, the first 
alternative, ground-launched missiles, is not popular as a British 
strategic system. As long ago as 1960, Britain abandoned the Blue 
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Streak missile mainly because of its vulnerability to attack. In the 
1980s and 1990s, with much more accurate Soviet missiles available, a 
land-based force would provide a strong incentive for pre-emption and 
thus, in turn, encourage British leaders to use the force earlier than 
otherwise might be thought necessary. 
There has been some discussion within government on the possibility 
of Britain acquiring its own force of ground-launched cruise missiles 
(GLCMs), able to move around the countryside to improve their chances of 
survival. (131) Such a mobile force, however, could not ensure its 
survival in a large scale nuclear attack and would, in any case, require 
considerable traffic of cruise missiles on the roads. The latter 
prospect would present political problems even for a Conservative 
government. (132) When mobile cruise missiles for Britain are 
proposed, therefore, they are generally seen as a complement to a last 
resort strategic system, and not as a substitute. In such a 'theatre 
nuclear' role, perhaps as a replacement for the V-bombers, GLCMs might be 
thought useful. Indeed in 1979 a strong lobby within the Ministry of 
Defence pressed for precisely this proposal as part of the NATO decision 
to introduce new US medium-range missiles into Western Europe. (133) 
As Britain's only, strategic force, however, land-based missiles are a 
non-starter. 
The second alternative - aircraft-based systems - has more support, 
particularly in the Royal Air Force. It was such a system, after all, 
that provided Britain's strategic force in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Institutionally, the RAF has always been more committed to a nuclear role 
for itself than the Navy. Indeed, in the debates leading up to the 
Trident decision, the RAF appears to haýe lobbied vigorously for a 
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reinstatement of its role using air-launched cruise missiles. (134) The 
problems involved in using cruise missiles will be discussed shortly. 
There are also difficulties with an aircraft-based strategic force, 
however, which were instrumental in the shift to submarines in the 1960s 
and are no less important today. 
The central problem is that it is difficult, and very expensive, to 
maintain a credible strategic air force that can survive a surprise 
attack 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Much of such a force would have 
to be kept on 'strip alert', ready to take off with bombs loaded within 
three or four minutes, and an adequate number of aircraft would probably 
have to be constantly airborne. For, without assured survivability, the 
force would appear incredible to the general public, and probably to 
potential enemies. The need for airborne alerts, however, would make 
nuclear accidents more likely and create public apprehension, as the 
government pointed out in its rejection of this option: 
"Maintaining launch aircraft permanently airborne 
might seem to solve the problem of airfield 
vulnerability. But this is very expensive. 
Moreover, no British Government would want to have 
numerous nuclear-weapon carriers constantly 
airborne, year in and year out, in crowded 
airspace over and around our small country" (135) 
Moreover, even if such an option could ensure that the strategic I 
force was protected from pre-emptive attack, it would still face enormous 
problems of survival during a prolonged conventional war. In such a war, 
communications facilities and airfields would be prime targets and the 
aircraft themselves would be bound to suffer heavy losses. To continue 
to keep one hundred or more strategic aircraft operational through a non- 
nuclear conflict would be extremely difficult. There would therefore be 
considerable pressure to use the force at an early stage of a conflict 
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before its effectiveness had been diminished by aircraft losses and the 
destruction of communications networks. A national nuclear force that 
cannot be withheld from use in a prolonged conventional conflict is 
not likely to be a politically acceptable one, given NATOs declared 
policy of 'flexible response. ' 
Some of these problems could be alleviated by appropriate 
measures, in particular more aircraft and better protected airfields. 
The more that such extra investment is felt to be necessary, however, 
the greater the capital cost of an aircraft-based Polaris replacement 
becomes, and therefore the less its attraction as an alternative to 
Trident. Even if the capital cost of such a force could be kept lower 
than a submarine-based force, moreover, the need for large numbers of 
personnel and aircraft to be on constant alert is certain to mean that 
running costs will be several times higher. It therefore appears clear 
that aircraft cannot offer a credible alternative to Trident at a lower 
cost unless the government is willing to accept severe dilution of its 
requirement that its strategic force should be able to survive 
conventional or nuclear attack. 
The third possible alternative launch platform is currently the 
most popular amongst pro-nuclear Trident critics. It is the deployment 
of strategic nuclear weapons - probably cruise missiles - abroad a large 
number of British weapon platforms which are already used, or planned to 
be used, for conventional roles. Such an arrangement -1dual- capable' 
weapon systems - is already used for Britain's theatre nuclear arsenal. 
Tornado GRI, Buccaneer, Jaguar aircraft, Royal Navy helicopters, and 
- Army howitzers are all armed with both conventional and nuclear weapons. 
The system could also be used, it is argued, for the strategic nuclear 
rol e. 
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Some commentators have suggested that aircraft, and even surface 
ships, could be used as dual-capable strategic systems, but these would 
suffer from problems of survivability in a conventional conflict even 
greater than those of the dedicated strategic aircraft that we have 
already ruled out. Instead, the favourite candidate for the role of 
dual-capable strategic launch platform is undoubtedly the Royal Navy's 
fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines. Britain, it is argued, could 
follow the US Navy's example by equipping all its attack submarines with 
twelve (or more) cruise missiles in addition to At normal conventional 
weapons. Britain currently has eighteen such submarines in service or 
on order. It is argued that, dispersed throughout this relatively 
large fleet, a nuclear capability would be less vulnerable to Soviet ASW 
than the small fleet of 4 missile submarines currently planned. It 
would also mean that the considerable expense involved in building a 
dedicated missile submarine fleet would be avoided. The cost of the 
cruise missiles needed would, by comparison, be relatively small. 
The idea of a dual-capable SUM force has clear attractions for 
politicians, such as the SDP leader Dr. David Owen, who on the one hand 
do not support an "independent deterrent" in principle but, on the other 
hand, believe that Britain should not be seen to be opposed to making 
some contribution to the US's strategic nuclear force. As he argued 
recently: 
"If we take the Minister's view of a minimum 
deterrent having to have a super-sophisticated 
ballistic missile system capable of penetrating 
the Galosh defences around Moscowý, I have no doubt 
that we come out with Trident. " 
Dr. Owen continued by emphasising his view that "Britain's nuclear 
force should be seen as part of NATO's overall deterrent, not as an 
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'independent' force. " For such a 'minimum deterrent' force, he argued, 
there was a case for considering sea-launched cruise missiles. (136) 
For those who believe that Britain does require a survivable second 
strike force for independent use, however, the attack submarine plan is 
not a satisfactory alternative to Trident. For it will detract 
considerably from the Royal Navy's capability for fighting a conventional 
war. While the war-time role of strategic nuclear submarines is to 
remain hidden and secure until 'needed', that of attack submarines is to 
destroy enemy forces, if necessary at considerable risk to themselves. 
These roles are directly contradictory. To the extent that some 
dual-capable submarines were to behave as strategic forces, their 
contribution to the conventional battle would be zero, and therefore 
Britain's conventional capability would effectively be cut. If this is 
the plan for their deployment that advocates have in mind, then this is 
not a cheap alternative to Trident after all, and the capital costs of 
the attack submarines involved should be included in any cost 
comparison made. If this was done, however, any cost advantage over 
Trident would be small or non-existent. 
On the other hand, if it is intended that none of the cruise 
missile-carrying attack submarines are to be withheld from battle, then 
there would be a danger that the nuclear arsenal could be depleted, 
during a non-nuclear war, below the level that would constitute a 
credible deterrent. At some stage, as the eighteen submarines were 
reduced in numbers - perhaps to 10, or 8, operational boats - the 
pressure would grow inexorably to withdraw the survivors from the battle 
in order to safeguard Britain's last-resort nuclear deterrent. Again 
this would suggest that the real costs to the UK's conventional military 
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strength of a strategic nuclear force would be as great as if a specially 
dedicated fleet of Trident submarines had been built. 
If there appears to be no clearly adequate, yet cheaper, 
alternative to a dedicated submarine fleet as a launch platform, might 
there nevertheless be an acceptable alternative to the expensive Trident 
D5 missile as a delivery system? Two possibilities have been widely 
discussed. First, cruise missiles. Second, ballistic missiles other 
than Trident D5. 
The main reason for favouring cruise missiles is their low cost: as 
low as E1.25 million each. (137) This advantage must, however, be 
balanced against a number of considerations which suggest that it is 
clearly inferior to ballistic missiles for the purpose in question. 
Most obviously, cruise missiles will be subject to considerable attrition 
from enemy air defences. Indeed, as the US is now expanding its 
capability in this area to several thousand missiles, on sea, land, and 
in the air, the Soviets are likely to devote considerable resources to 
defensive counter-measures. For a British cruise missile force of, at 
most, a few hundred weapons, the proportion able to penetrate Soviet 
defences in an independent, British only, attack is likely to decline. 
The exact percentage of missiles that could get through by the year 2000 
is now a matter of considerable debate. No cautious planner would want 
to assume, however, that more than 50% would get through to their targets 
once launched, and some would argue for a more conservative figure. 
In addition, if a fair comparison is to be made with Trident D5, ;4 
Mwil be. ", 4C 
for many years after 2000 since Trident'itself is planned to last until 
2020. If this is done, penetrability is likely to decline even more 
dramatically if current technology is used. If, as is more likely, more 
sophisticated cruise missiles are developed in the 1990s, Britain could 
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find herself having to invest large amounts in attempting to keep pace 
with superpower technologies, with no guarantee that it would succeed. 
Because of the lower penetrability of cruise missiles, together 
with the fact that they have only one warhead per missile, Britain would 
require far more cruise missiles than ballistic missiles to achieve the 
same effect. In his influential 1977 study, Ian Smart argues that 17 
cruise missile carrying submarines (SSGNs), each carrying at least 24 
SLCMs, would be equivalent to five ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 
each carrying 16 missiles with three warheads. (138) The government, in 
announcing the C4 decision in 1980, calculated that eleven SSGNs, each 
with 80 cruise missiles on board, would "give less assured deterrent 
capability than a force of five boats each with 16 Trident ballistic 
missiles. " It would, moreover, cost a third as much again in capital 
costs and about twice as much to run. (139) Savings on buying cheaper 
missiles would thus be, at least in part, offset by the expense of 
building more submarines. Indeed even one sympathetic account of the 
SUM option, which concedes that a fleet of 7 SSGNs would be needed as 
a minimum deterrent force, estimates its capital cost at E5,000 million 
at 1983 prices, and it is likely that the running costs (of such a force) 
would be higher than four Trident submarines. (140) 
Because cruise missiles are both cheap and small, and the main cost 
of a SUM capability would be in the boýts themselves, most of those 
still advocating such an alternative suggest that the missiles should be 
deployed on dual capable attack submarines. As we have suggested already 
this proposal involves large hidden costs and operational difficulties. 
At least for those who believe that Britain requires a credible last 
resort nuclear force, cruise missiles do not appear to be a cheaper 
alternative to Trident. 
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Perhaps the most telling point against cruise missiles, however, is 
is the extent to which they would make Britain much more operationally 
dependent on the United States than it is at present with ballistic 
missiles. Cruise missiles depend on terrain contour mapping (Tercom) 
to keep on the correct course for their targets and avoid enemy air 
defences. Britain has no such capability, and could only develop it at 
substantial cost. Yet the justification for an independent strategic 
nuclear force depends on the assumption that Britain may, in some 
circumstances, wish to use nuclear weapons when the US does not. In such 
circumstances, it is virtually inconceivable that the US would assist the 
UK. As a consequence, British cruise missiles would have to rely 
entirely on inertial guidance which, on one calculation, would produce a 
navigational error of around one mile in every hour of a three hour 
flight. (141) This would be an unacceptably high error even for counter- 
city missions, and would probably make the force more vulnerable to 
Soviet air defences. Even if a cruise missile force were thought to be 
significantly cheaper than Trident D5, therefore, a government committed 
to an independent nuclear force would be likely to reject it as effective 
only with American aid. 
Were cruise missiles ruled out, we are still left with a number of 
ballistic missile systems which could, in theory, be chosen instead of 
Trident D5. The existing Polaris, Poseidon or Trident C4 missiles could 
be revamped or purchased. Britain might even risk an independent 
missile production programme of its own. Substantial savings in capital 
costs might thereby be made. 
Such alternatives, too, would not be easy options. The 
acquisition of the cheapest of the missiles - updated Polaris or 
Poseidon - could produce severe problems of penetrability and 
survivability by the late 1990s. With the development of space-based 
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ballistic missile defences now under way at a pace faster than 
anticipated in 1980, the pressures are for more, rather than less, 
sophisticated missiles to counter these defences. (142) The adoption of 
a cheaper missile, such as Poseidon, would still incur considerable 
expense, and might only postpone further large expenditure on a further 
new system for a few years. 
The main savings on alternative ballistic missile systems result 
from being able to use smaller submarines. This in turn, however, means 
that if developments in ABM technology then require an upgrading to a 
bigger missile - such as Trident D5 - it would be impossible to fit them 
into the small submarine. If, on the other hand, older missiles (such as 
the C4) were put in a large submarine capable of taking D5 later, then 
the savings would be negligible. Indeed, such a solution, because of the 
'communalitYl argument already examined, might actually increase lifetime 
force costs. A cheaper ballistic missile force chosen today might lead 
to greater costs in the 1990s, and early 21st century, in a repetition of 
the Chevaline experience. 
From the foregoing examination of alternatives to Trident, 
therefore, it appears that none of the possible options provides a 
cheaper and politically acceptable solution to the budgetary dilemmas 
which Trident has created. If options were chosen which appear to save 
large sums, the most popular of which is SLCMs on attack submarines, 
there would be substantial hidden costs, and both the capability and 
operational independence of the force would be severely impaired. If 
options were chosen with a greater capability but less savings, the most 
discussed of which is Trident C4, reduced capital costs would be offset 
by higher running costs and an increased possibility of obsolescence in 
the first decade of its operational life. It is therefore understand- 
able that the government believes that Trident II cancellation could be 
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the first step towards the abandonment of an independent strategic force 
altogether. 
7. 
- 
Conclusions 
The period covered by this chapter has encompassed remarkable 
shifts in the debate on British defence policy. In 1968, British policy 
appeared to have stabilised round a series of agreed principles, Lnter 
alia a residual extra-European role, the primacy attached to the special 
relationship with the US, a continuing commitment to an independent 
strategic nuclear force, and a major role in NATO conventional and 
theatre nuclear plans. Through the 1970s this consensus lasted, helped 
both by the low level of public concern at superpower relations and by 
the secrecy with which successive governments treated nuclear weapons 
decision-making. 
Only in the late 1970s did this consensus begin to crumble. As 
detente faltered and then failed, and the US adopted an increasingly 
belligerent posture internationally, fears of war increased in Europe. 
In Britain, this changing political climate coincided with the decision 
to replace Polaris with the much more expensive, and sophisticated, 
Trident D5 missile system. As a consequence of both the general climate 
and its high cost, Trident has proved very unpopular. Yet an examination 
of the decision to procure it suggests that, were a government to cancel 
it, it is unlikely to find a credible alternative strategic weapons 
system at a lower price. The choice is likely to be increasingly 
perceived to be between Trident and no independent nuclear force at all. 
It remains to be seen whether, as in the early 1960s, a political 
consensus around the retention of an independent nuclear force can be 
recreated. 
II 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BRITISH NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the military 
rationales which have been proposed for Britain's national nuclear 
force. Those who believe that Britain's nuclear weapons are needed 
for, or at least contribute to, its security must logically believe 
that situations exist in which the use, or threat of us'e, of the nuclear 
force could protect the country's "interests", however defined. 
Section 2 of the chapter therefore looks at possible scenarios in 
which, it has been suggested, Britain's nuclear weapons might have a 
justifiable role. Firstly, their possible role as a contribution to 
US/NATO nuclear strikes is discussed. Second the possibility of a major 
European war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in which the UK had an 
interest in using its own nuclear weapons even though the US declined to 
use its own forces, is considered. Third, the possibility of the 
national nuclear force being of use in a confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and a Britain 'standing alone' is examined. Finally, the 
possible role of the force in a conflict with other powers outside Europe 
is considered. 
Section 3 of the chapter then analyses British nuclear doctrine and 
force requirements. The circumstances in which the national nuclear 
force might be used, outlined in Section 2, should, and to an extent do, 
determine the technical requirements for that force. This section 
therefore discusses what these requirements are, and how far current and 
proposed forces meet them. To the extent that these requirements cannot 
be met, the military justification for maintaining the force itself is 
thrown into question. 
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Rationales 
2.1 A Contribution to NATO 
As previous chapters have discussed, British governments have 
always maintained that the national nuclear force is a 'contribution' to 
NATOs nuclear deterrent, to be deployed in conjunction with, rather than 
independently of, the US force. This view of the role of the nuclear 
force was particularly popular with the Labour governments in 1964-70 
and 1970-79, which contained a number of individuals opposed to the 
concept of an 'independent deterrent. ' 
To justify the maintenance of Britain's nuclear force as a 
'contribution to NATO' may have had some logic in the early years of the 
nuclear age. During this period, and up to 1960 or so, the US possessed 
overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. As a 
consequence, NATO felt it could safely base its defence policy on a 
massive nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union in the early stages of 
a war -a policy of 'massive retaliation. ' Until the late 1950s, and 
Soviet acquisition of strategic nuclear systems, it appeared unlikely 
that the US would refrain from using its own nuclear force if Western 
Europe were attacked. 
During this early period, Britain played an important role in 
American nuclear plans. It provided a crucial forward base for the 
bombers which would launch the nuclear assault on the Soviet Union. 
Without the use of British bases, the effectiveness of this assault would 
have been considerably diminished. In addition, in the years before H- 
bombs were produced in quantity, Britain's own nuclear force provided 
useful additional firepower for the West. Both these commitments served 
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to increase British influence on US policy, and strengthen the Anglo- 
American alliance as the leading force in NATO. 
In the period when the US did not yet have a massive overkill in 
nuclear capability, moreover, there could be important differences in the 
targeting priorities of the two allies. While the US would be most 
interested in destroying Soviet war potential in general, the UK's 
survival might depend on destroying Soviet medium-range bomber sites. As 
Winston Churchill argued in 1954: 
"Unless we can make a contribution of our own. 
we cannot be sure that in an emergency the 
resources of other powers would be planned exactly 
as we would wish, or that the targets which would 
threaten us most would be given what we consider 
the necessary priority in the first few hours. 
These targets might be of such cardinal importance 
that it could really be a matter of life and death 
for us. " (1) 
By the mid-1960s, however, the increase in the size and 
sophistication of the US's nuclear force had given it a massive 
'overkill' capability. The development of Minuteman and Polaris missiles 
reduced the military need for forward bases, and indeed the US nuclear 
presence in Britain was considerably reduced in those years. Whatever 
extra increment Britain's nuclear force still provided for the US's 
strategic force was now of negligible military importance. 
Since the mid-1960s, the US strategic arsenal has continued to grow 
in size. In the mid 1960s it consisted of around 2,300 nuclear warheads. 
(2) By 1972, it had increased to 5,700. Today the US is estimated to 
have over 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads. (3) Britain's Polaris 
submarines, capable of attacking at most 64 targets, may be thought to 
have political significance. In terms of destructive power, however, 
they are now irrelevant to the US's total arsenal. There is, as a 
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consequence, no military justification for spending more than a minimal 
sum on such a capability if it is only designed to supplement the US's 
own forces. 
The 'contribution to NATO' argument has continued to have 
important political and symbolic significance. Since the late 1950s, 
when the British nuclear force was first deployed, however, it has been 
its independent roles which have been the focus of the controversies on 
whether it has a military rationale. These independent roles have been 
given renewed emphasis in the 1980s as a major effort is made to sustain 
political support for the Trident programme. 
In particular it is argued that the national nuclear force has 
a military value to Britain because an opponent might believe it could 
be used in circumstances in which, or on targets against which, the US 
itself was not prepared to use its own weapons. It is to the 
possibility of such circumstances that we now turn. 
2.2 The 'second centrel argument 
Since the late 1950s European governments, including that of the 
UK, have held two fears about the US's nuclear commitment. They have 
been concerned that the US government, in the event of a major war, 
might be unwilling to use its nuclear forces in the defence of Western 
Europe because, with the growth in the Soviets' arsenal, such a step 
might expose the US itself to destruction. Simultaneously, however, 
they have been concerned that the US might be too willinq to use 
nuclear weapons in Europe if it believed that such a war could be so 
limited as to exclude its own cities from the holocaust. The 'second 
centrel argument for Britain's nuclear force addresses the first of 
these concerns. 
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The 'second centrel argument is based on the proposition that the 
Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred from aggression against 
Western Europe if there are two centres of nuclear decision-making 
within NATO than if there were only one. As Defence Secretary Francis 
Pym argued in Justifying the decision to purchase Trident C4: 
"In a crisis, Soviet leaders - perhaps beset by 
some pressures of turmoil in the Soviet empire, 
perhaps looking out upon a NATO Alliance passing 
through some temporary phase of internal 
difficulty - might conceivably misread American 
resolution... they might be tempted to gamble on United States hesitation. 
The nuclear decisiong whether as a matter of 
retaliatory response or in any other 
circumstance, would, of course, be no less 
agonising for the United Kingdom than for the 
United States. But it would be a decision of a 
separate and independent power and a power whose 
survival in freedom might be more directly and 
closely threatened by agression in Europe than 
that of the United States. This is where the 
fact of having to face two decision-makers 
instead of one is of such significance% (4) 
The fear that motivates supporters of the 'second centre' argument 
is that, when faced with the possibility of conventional defeat in 
Europe, the US might decide it was in its own interest not to escalate 
the conflict by using nuclear weapons. Since the McNamara Doctrine in 
the early 1960s, US leaders have repeated their desire to retain central 
control over when, and if, to use nuclear weapons. If it were thought 
that such a decision would quickly lead to the destruction of US cities, 
as indeed would be likely, the US's rational stance would be to hold 
back. To initiate a process of nuclear escalation would, in these 
circumstances, be totally contrary to its own national interests. As 
Henry Kissinger bluntly stated in 1979: 
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"The European allies should not keep asking us to 
multiply strategic assurances that we cannot 
possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not 
want to execute because if we execute, we risk the 
destruction of civilization. " (5) 
Given the European fear that the US might be unwilling to risk 
global nuclear war in defence of Europe, and might have an effective 
policy of 'No First Use', the 'second centrel argument for British 
nuclear forces can also be seen as a 'recoupling' device. For the use 
of British, or French, nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union would be 
liable to precipitate an intercontinental nuclear exchange. The 
existence of such a possibility would be likely not only to increase 
Soviet caution. It would also, it is argued, increase US willingness to 
use its own nuclear forces if it believed that its European allies were 
ready to do so. 
The 'second centrel argument is used to present the British nuclear 
force as a contribution to Western defence, rather than a diversion from 
it. Yet it is a justification that has few supporters outside government 
circles. For it requires the assumption that the UK might be willing - 
in some circumstances - to use its own nuclear weapons, when the US had 
refused to use its own, in defence of other European countries. In 
these, undefined, circumstances Britain's nuclear 'umbrella' over West 
Germany would deter the Soviet Union while that of the US did not. (6) 
In justification of the 'second centrel role, it is argued that, 
should NATO's forces - including most of the UK's Army and Air Force - be 
losing in conventional war in Central Europe, Britain should - or at 
least could - use its own nuclear weapons to avert defeat. It might 
start with a 'demonstration shot' to indicate British willingness to 
raise the conflict to a nuclear level. If this proved unsuccessful, 
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the UK would then escalate to use of theatre nuclear weapons (such as 
Tornado) or to a limited counterforce attack on Soviet targets (with 
Trident). Finally, if all else failed, a selective attack on Soviet 
cities might persuade the Kremlin leaders to see the error of their ways 
and withdraw. 
Such a ladder of nuclear escalation, it is argued, is credible 
because Britain has a more direct national interest in Europe than the 
US, whose territorial security would not be so immediately threatened. 
This interest, in turn, means that Britain might be more willing to risk 
nuclear destruction in defence of Europe than the US. This possibility, 
it is argued, will deter the Soviet Union from a conventional invasion 
more than the US nuclear 'deterrent' by itself. Indeed, the government 
argues, Trident would add more to deterrence of such an invasion than 
would a 50% increase in the British Army's conventional forces in 
Germany: 
"The presence of an independent deterrent under the 
absolute control of the British Prime Minister 
greatly multiplies the risk to any potential 
aggressor of starting a war in Europe. Those who 
argue that the expenditure on Trident would be 
better devoted to strengthening our conventional 
forces must consider whether a future Soviet 
leadership are more likely to be deterred by an 
invulnerable second strike submarine-launched 
ballistic missile force or, for example, by two 
extra armoured divisions with 300 additional 
tanks. " (7) 
The 'second centrel argument may appeal to officials and 
politicians anxious to demonstrate Britain's loyalty to NATO. But is it 
really credible to suppose that a British government would order the 
first use of nuclear weapons, when the US had not done so, and in defence 
of other European countries? Or that the Soviets would believe that it 
would do so? Such a decision would have to be made in the knowledge that 
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a previously unscathed Britain would then, in all likelihood, face swift 
and appalling casualties in a Soviet counter-attack. As Lord Carver 
argued in 1980: 
"Can you find a realistic scenario -I never have - in which a responsible British Prime Minister would 
say: "Well I do not care what these chaps are going 
to do over there? " I mean, this is a major 
decision. The result of using ours would 
inevitably mean the end of this country. It only 
needs about 20 megaton weapons. I cannot conceive 
of any responsible Prime Minister taking that 
decision. So I totally reject the second centre 
decision. I can find no scenario, and I never have, 
in which it is realistic that we should employ our 
nuclear weapons in circumstances in which the United 
States has decided not to deploy theirs. " (8) 
2.3 The 'sanctuary' argument 
The 'second centrel argument is designed to allay European concern 
that the US may be unwilling to use its-nuclear force to 'defend' its 
allies. The sanctuary argument, in contrast, is motivated by the fear 
that the US will use its nuclear force, but will do so in a manner that 
gives priority to its own national concerns. It is feared that the US, 
far from being unwillingto use its nuclear weapons in a European war, 
might believe that it was able to fight a limitednuclear conflict in 
Europe from which its own homeland, and that of the Soviet Union, were 
excluded. Such a belief might increase the credibility of any threat to 
use nuclear weapons. It would, however, mean massive destruction in 
European countries, including Britain. 
British fears of such a development are understandable given deve- 
lopments in US doctrine over the last three decades. Once the Soviets 
had acquired an assured second strike capability in the 1960s, US leaders 
were unwilling to pledge their readiness to "sacrifice New York to save 
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London. " In order to protect their own national survival, they therefore 
sought means of limiting the scale of nuclear conflict through policies 
of 'flexible response' and 'limited nuclear options'. These policies 
were based on the assumption that a controllable 'ladder of escalation' 
existed in conflicts from local conventional war right up to full-scale 
nuclear war. American policy, it was argued, should involve the ability 
to escalate to whatever level was deemed necessary. (9) But it should 
also provide for the possibility of restricting conflict to a particular 
level of intensity through the mutual agreement, on a tacit basis, of the 
participants. 
In the event of a war between the blocs in Europe, it was, and is, 
suggested that a series of 'thresholds' exist which would serve as 
mutually understood limits on escalation. The most commonly discussed, 
and clearly delineated, threshold is that between conventional war, of 
whatever intensity, and a war involving nuclear weapons. Because this 
threshold has such a powerful psychological significance, strengthened by 
the abstinence from use of nuclear weapons for 40 years, both sides would 
be under enormous pressure not to be the first to break this mutually 
self-imposed constraint during war. Indeed it is the European fear that 
US threats to be the first to use nuclear weapons are incredible that is 
the basis of the 'second centrel argument. 
US attempts to make first use credible have created other fears. 
For these are bound to involve an assumption that nuclear weapons can be 
used in Europe's 'defence' without leading inevitably to global nuclear 
war. A further threshold in the escalation ladder must therefore be 
created, involving the use of nuclear weapons but not the wholesale 
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destruction of American cities. For, given the continued existence of a 
Soviet second strike capability, the latter would be the inevitable 
result of unrestrained warfare. 
A large number of possibilities for such a threshold have been 
discussed. The most clearly defined, and the possibility most likely to 
accord with national objectives, would be abstinence by both superpowers 
from using nuclear weapons against each other's territory. Were such a 
mutually advantageous limit to be observed, nuclear war would not be 
rational. It would nevertheless have the advantage that it would be less 
self-evidently suicidal from the point of view of the two superpowers. 
A nuclear war limited only by the exclusion of the territories of 
the US and the Soviet Union would be an unparalleled disaster for other 
combatant nations. But their governments recognize that such a 
possibility would be a strong factor in the minds of the leaders of the 
two superpowers in times of crisis or w: ir. Supporters of the 'sanctuary' 
argument contend that, in such a situation, the possession of an 
independent nuclear force would help to exclude Britain from nuclear 
attack in a limited nuclear war. It would ensure immunity for its own 
territory in much the same way as the nuclear forces of the superpowers 
ensured the safety of their respective homelands. Although it could not 
deter conventional attacks on military targets, it would prevent a Soviet 
nuclear strike on the US nuclear bases in the UK. Without an 
independent nuclear force, it is argued, US bases in Britain would be 
high priority targets in a limited nuclear war in Europe. Possession of 
such a force, on the other hand, would both protect these bases from 
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nuclear attack in war and reduce the risk to the British people of 
allowing the bases on its territory. (10) As John Simpson has 
commented: r 
"A national nuclear weapon capability is seen as 
an indispensable adjunct to the existence of 
United States nuclear weapons bases in Britain. " 
(11) 
The 'sanctuary' argument is particularly favoured by those 
(including a powerful lobby in the Conservative Party) who seek a more 
nationalist approach to defence policy. They resent Britain's dependence 
on the US, and are envious of France, with its independent nuclear force 
clearly devoted to national, rather than NATO, 'defence'. Some of its 
proponents would, in principle at least,: prefer a 'Fortress Britain' 
policy, in which Britain withdrew its troops from Germany, expelled US 
bases,, and concentrated its resources on a truly independent nuclear 
force and on a strong Navy. (12) Even if these steps are not possible, 
they support the possession of Polaris/Trident in British control in the 
belief that it will give the government in Whitehall increased influence 
in a crisis and will deter the Soviet Union - and the US - from including 
the British Isles in the nuclear battlefield. 
It is an unconvincing argument for a number of reasons. Most 
fundamentally, it rests on the untenable assumption that a nuclear war 
could be geographically limited to Europe. Yet the weight of considered 
evidence suggests that, once such a war had started, and hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of nuclear weapons had been detonated, it would be 
impossible to control. Politicians would rapidly lose communications 
with, and thus control over, the thousands of theatre nuclear weapons in 
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Europe. (13) Enormous incentives would be created, on both sides, to 
launch a disarming first strike against the other's strategic nuclear 
forces in order to minimise damage in an all-out holocaust. 
Even if it were conceivably possible that a nuclear war could be 
limited to Europe the presence of US nuclear forces would probably 
ensure that Britain was not excluded from the battlefield. The British 
Isles contain a large number of bases whose main role in war would be to 
enable the US to fight a limited nuclear war: the cruise missiles being 
deployed at Greenham Common, the F-111 bombers at Upper Heyford and 
Lakenheath, the Poseidon submarines at Holy Loch, etc. It is 
implausible to suggest that the Soviet Union will not attack US bases in 
Britain were the US to attempt to fight a limited nuclear war in which 
these bases would play a key role. If it did launch selective nuclear 
strikes against these bases, it is difficult to see what advantage 
Britain would achieve from retaliation against the Soviet homeland. 
For this would be certain to provoke a further, more devastating, 
attack. 
2.4 Britain Standinq Alone 
The scenarios for use of Britain's nuclear force in a war 
involving NATO as a whole appear unconvincing. Might there neverthe- 
less be situations in which Britain could no longer rely on US forces to 
defend itself, and in which the national nuclear force might be of value 
in protecting the British Isles themselves? 
In such circumstances, where Britain stood alone as it did in 1940, 
it is argued that Polaris/Trident could indeed deter an enemy considering 
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invasion or bombardment. As the Ministry of Defence argues: 
"In the last resort, if the Alliance was to 
collapse, the possession of an independent 
strategic weapon provides the UK with the means of 
preserving national security by deterring large 
scale conventional or nuclear attack or of 
countering nuclear blackmail. " (14) 
Yet the threat to use nuclear weapons in such a 'scenario' would 
be neither desirable nor plausible. For it would be suicidal for the 
British government to carry out such a threat. As a result, a Soviet 
government would be unlikely to be deterred by it. For such a desperate 
situation to be reached in the first place, it must be assumed that the 
Red Army had successfully overrun Western Europe without the conflict 
escalating to nuclear war. 
If the Soviet Union had already taken considerable risks - 
including that of nuclear conflict - in conquering Western Europe, an 
implausible British nuclear threat would carry little weight. It would 
be unnecessary for the Soviets to use their nuclear weapons in order to 
defeat Britain. It could launch a conventional invasion with a high 
probability of success - particularly if most of the British Army and Air 
Force had been destroyed in the continental campaign. 
In these circumstances, would the British government be foolish 
enough to initiate a nuclear war with a superpower even with tactical 
weapons against an invasion fleet? And, more importantly if we are 
concerned with 'deterrence', would a Soviet leadership reckless enough 
to invade Germany and France believe a British threat to do so? British 
use of nuclear weapons would, in these circumstances, be certain to 
bring swift nuclear retaliation. If such retaliation was limited - 
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perhaps against nuclear submarine bases - Britain would be no better 
off than when it started in 'deterrence' terms, and with several hundred 
thousand casualties as a warning against further nuclear strikes. If, on 
the other hand, the Soviets responded with a comprehensive pre-emptive 
attack against Britain's command and communication centres and its 
military facilities then there would be little left to defend. 
Some supporters of Britain's nuclear force see its role as confined 
to deterring a nuclear attack on this country, and discount the 
possibility of using it to deter invasion. Thus John Nott, when 
Secretary of State for Defence, told the House of Commons Defence 
Committee: 
"(Trident) could not conceivably be a first strike 
weapon. It is there as an ultimate defence of this 
country against a nuclear strike, a pre-emptive 
strike by a nuclear power. " (15) 
It is implausible, in the first place, why the Soviets would need 
to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons against Britain were it left 
to defend itself. The Soviets' overwhelming superiority in conventional 
forces would be sufficient to ensure it'victory. Moreover, this 
tscenario' assumes that Britain would be 'standing alonet against a 
continent dominated by the Soviet army. In such circumstances the Soviet 
Union would already, it must be assumed, have conquered NATO's armies in 
Western Europe without triggering a nuclear holocaust. Would it then be 
likely to risk the latter by threatening the use of its nuclear weapons 
against Britain? A conventional invasion would appear to be a much more 
logical, and less risky, step to take. 
Moreover, advocates of an 'independent deterrent' often fail to 
take into account the considerable constraints that exist on the threat 
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to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers. Despite the large 
number of conflicts since 1945, there have been few such cases of 
'nuclear blackmail'. Those that have occurred - such as Nixon's threat 
against Vietnam - have failed when their bluff was called. (16) The 
reason such threats fail is that the first use of nuclear weapons since 
1945 - and against a non-nuclear nation- would have incalculable 
political costs for the aggressor. It would lead to a massive shift in 
world opinion against it, and would cause tremendous revulsion amongst 
its own people. Any government contemplating such action would have to 
consider the likely reaction - massive rearmament by non-occupied 
countries, rebellions in satellite states, and mounting dissatisfaction 
at home. 
It is perhaps plausible that a superpower would be willing to bear 
these costs if the gain to be achieved by nuclear blackmail were the 
defeat of the other superpower and/or effective world domination. If it 
were designed simply, however, to defeat a minor power - such as Britain 
- the balance of-advantage is likely to be quite different, 
particularly if non-nuclear military alternatives (such as invasion) 
existed. Calling a nuclear blackmailer's bluff might therefore actually 
work - as the Vietnamese found in 1969. At the same time, if the 
aggressor was believed to be ready to use nuclear weapons, there would 
be no alternative whether or not Britain possessed its own. It would be 
more rational to accede to the demands of the enemy, and continue the 
struggle once Britain is occupied, than, to allow the total annihilation 
of the British people to take place. 
Indeed in some respects immunity to nuclear blackmail is likely to 
be greater for a non-nuclear power. For the use of nuclear weapons 
against a nuclear power could be 'justified' - at least domestically - 
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as a pre-emptive and 'defensive' action to protect the laggressor's' own 
population against retaliation. Indeed this argument is still employed 
by some US officials as a rationale for a disarming first strike on the 
Soviet Union. With Britain retaining hundreds of weapons on its soil - 
British and American - the Soviet Union can justify an attack with 
nuclear weapons more easily than against, say, non-nuclear Sweden. 
2.5 Using Britain's nuclear force outside Europe 
There are strong grounds, therefore, for doubting the credibi- 
lity of Britain's nuclear force in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, 
whether in a European war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or if Britain 
were 'standing alone. ' Such a confrontation, however, is not the only 
type of armed conflict which has, or could in future, face the British 
state. Since 1945 British troops have been involved in a large number of 
conflicts in the Third World, both as a contribution to the Anglo- 
American policy of 'containment', and in an effort to manage the slow 
process of decolonisation. 
Many of these conflicts have been primarily between regular British 
and colonial troops, on the one hand, and guerilla movements on the 
other. In these cases nuclear weapons 6learly had no role. In other 
cases, however, where confrontations were possible between Britain and 
hostile non-nuclear states, the use of nuclear weapons was considered 
to be an option. Since such a threat would not directly endanger the 
existence of the British Isles, it was considered, in military terms, to 
be credible. As earlier chapters have noted, British governments in the 
1950s and 1960s announced their belief in the value of nuclear weapons 
in a series of conflicts, and potential conflicts, in Asia. 
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British planning for possible use, of nuclear weapons in Asia 
parallelled similar thinking in the United States. Inter alia, the US 
Administration gave serious consideration to the threat to use nuclear 
weapons in Korea, Quemoy/Matsu, and Vietnam on several occasions in the 
1950s and 1960s. (17) , With the development of a large Soviet nuclear 
force by the late 1960s, and the consequent awareness of the dangers of 
escalation, however, US readiness to consider nuclear options against 
non-nuclear powers declined. Nevertheless it is probably still the case 
that the first deliberate decision to use nuclear weapons since 1945 is 
more likely to be made in a conflict in the Third World than in a 
European war. 
Indeed, in the Falklands War of 1982, the British government 
appears to have decided that nuclear options could not be ruled out in 
the event of serious setbacks in its campaign to recapture the Islands. 
According to leaked government documents, tactical nuclear weapons were 
carried by the Task Force and a Polaris'submarine was sent to the South 
Atlantic. The former would have been available for use against Argentine 
submarines. The latter, it was concluded, afforded the only reliable 
means of launching a nuclear attack on Argentina. A senior government 
source is reported to have said: 
"Certainly, the nuclear option was one of the 
options studied on 2 April ... part of the work done that day involved examining the possibility 
of retargetting Polaris against Argentina. " (18) 
Fortunately the British government was not obliged to face the 
choice between a nuclear ultimatum to Argentina and an admission of 
military defeat. The fact that the nuclear option was considered in a 
conflict with a non-nuclear power, however, confirms that the use of 
Britain's nuclear force outside Europe cannot be ruled out as a 
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possibility. It would be quite disproportionate to any national economic 
or political advantage gained. It would generate enormous pressures for 
rapid acquisition of nuclear forces by non-nuclear states. It could lead 
to a considerable increase in international tension. And it might draw 
one, or both, superpowers into a wider conflict that could spread to the 
British Isles themselves. Neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union could easily afford to allow the UK to undertake such a move 
unpunished without severe implications for their own interests. Although 
use of Britain's nuclear force in such circumstances might appear to be 
militarily credible, therefore, it would be both immoral and extremely 
damaging to its national interests. It cannot serve, therefore, as a 
reasonable justification for the nuclear force's existence. 
3. Nuclear doctrine and force reguirements 
The circumstances in which the nuclear force might justifiably be 
used, or in which a threat to do so might deter a potential opponent, 
have now been outlined. As we have seen, there are considerable grounds 
for arguing that in none of the 'scenarios' discussed would it be 
rational, or credible, to threaten to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, 
such a view is not undisputed. Most proponents of Britain's nuclear 
force would argue that, in at least some of the 'scenarios', a threat to 
use nuclear weapons would be credible and justifiable. Indeed, if they 
are to sustain an argument in favour of maintaining the force as a 
contribution to Britain's defences, they must do so. 
Logically, having defined in broad terms the circumstances in which 
Britain's nuclear force might be used, its supporters should then develop 
a doctrine for how it is to be used together with technical requirements 
for the force so that it is capable of being used in the particular 
scenarios favoured. 
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In practice it is doubtful how far the shape of nuclear forces is 
determined by a prior definition of their required military functions. 
Perhaps of equal importance, the technical possibilities available are 
crucial in determining the justifications developed for the weapons. In 
addition, considerations of prestige and political status have more 
importance in explaining the existence and shape of the force than the 
complexities of deterrence theory. The role of nuclear doctrine, though 
not insignificant, is nevertheless subordinate to these factors. 
In the United States a relationship between scenarios for possible 
use of nuclear forces and the technical requirements for those forces can 
be more clearly discerned. The extensive modernisation of offensive 
strategic forces, together with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), 
is clearly seen by some Administration officials as a means of restoring 
the nuclear superiority which the US enjoyed in the 1950s and early 
1960s. The development of highly accurate counterforce systems and 
improved command and control mechanisms, together with an open espousal 
of decapitation doctrine, can be seen in this light. According to one 
recent estimate, assuming all missile submarines at sea survived, 3,600 
Soviet strategic warheads would survive a US surprise attack given 
present forces. By 1995, as a result of the MX and Trident D5 
programmes, this number could drop to 700. (19) With the US also likely 
to enjoy substantial capabilities for destroying Soviet submarines in 
their patrol areas, and with the beginnings of improved ABM defences, US 
leaders may then believe that they possess a superiority that can be 
used to achieve crisis dominance. As Caspar Weinberger is reported to 
have said in justifying the Strategic Defense Initiative: 
"If we can get a system which is effective and which 
we know can render their weapons impotent, we could 
be back in a situation we were in, for example, when we 
were the only nation with a nuclear weapon". (20) 
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For Britain, there is clearly no economic possibility, or apparent 
desire, to achieve a national nuclear capability which is equivalent, 
far less superior, to that of either superpower. The scenarios on 
which its nuclear forces are based are less ambitious than those 
underlying US and Soviet deployments. Nevertheless, there still exists 
a relationship between the scenarios in which, it is believed, the 
nuclear force could be used and the technical requirements for that 
force. Four requirements have formed the main focus of this 
discussion: firstly, the ability to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on 
the Soviet Union in a second strike; secondly, the ability to use the 
nuclear force in a variety of 'limited nuclear options'; thirdly, the 
ability to 'trigger' the forces of the US into action; fourthly, the 
ability to be used without the agreement of the US. We now consider 
these four requirements in turn, relating them where appropriate to the 
scenarios in which, it is argued, Britain's nuclear force could be 
used. 
3.1 Unacceptable damage 
In three of the five scenarios discussed so far - the 'second 
centrel, the 'sanctuary', and the 'last resort' - Britain would require a 
capability, even after a Soviet attack, of inflicting 'unacceptable 
damage' on the Soviet Union itself. Such a capability, it is argued, 
would deter Soviet leaders from actions which they might otherwise have 
taken. 
Such an 'all out' nuclear capability may not be judged to be 
sufficient by itself. A 'second centrel capability for retaliation 
against Soviet conventional invasion of Germany, for example, may also 
require a capability for limited nuclear options. This possibility is 
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further discussed in Section 3.4. Nevertheless there is general 
agreement that no independent limited nuclear option would be credible 
if it were not complemented by the capability of inflicting 
unacceptable damage, however defined, on the Soviet Union itself. For 
the Soviets would not be deterred by the possibility of British nuclear 
use if Britain itself were under nuclear threat but the Soviet 
territory was not. As Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron 
has argued: 
"The Russians simply would not be deterred by a 
threat of using British theatre nuclear weapons, 
for example on their second echelon forces, in 
circumstances where ex hypothesi the United States 
was holding off and Britain had no further option 
if the Russians raised the stakes. They would 
know in advance that such use would be simply an 
invitation to be over-trumped. The cold fact is 
that you can, at a stretch, make a case of sorts 
for an independent strategic capability without 
an independent non-strategic capability; but the 
converse is just not on. " (21) ý 
It should be noted that not all the scenarios examined in the 
previous section require that the British nuclear force be capable of 
inflicting unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. If it were only 
required as a contribution to NATO, its'function would be primarily 
political given the massive overkill capacity of the US arsenal. There 
would be no overriding requirement either for survivability or for an 
ability to destroy targets inside the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, if the only independent role of Britain's nuclear force 
is in a possible conflict with a less powerful state, probably in the 
Third World, the technical requirements would clearly be much less than 
at present. It would not be required either to survive a Soviet attack 
or to penetrate sophisticated defences. Such a capability could be much 
t 
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more modest, and less expensive, than the force currently planned. Even 
if it were believed that nuclear weapons were needed to deter the use of 
such weapons by expansionist powers such as Libya, only a minimum 
capability would be required for such a function in the foreseeable 
future. 
Such justifications for Britain's nuclear force are held to be 
important by some very senior military and political figures. They are, 
however, essentially marginal to the basic case for the independent 
nuclear force as currently constituted. For that case rests squarely on 
the need to be able to impose unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in 
an attack by a British nuclear force acting on its own, and possibly 
doing so after a pre-emptive strike on bases in the UK by the Soviets. 
As the 1981 Defence White Paper argued: 
"To be a credible deterrent our strategic nuclear 
force must meet certain standards. It must 
clearly be under ultimate United Kingdom control. 
It must be capable of posing a convincing threat - 
of inflicting, on key aspects of Soviet state 
power, damage which any Soviet leadership would 
regard as out of all proportion to any likely 
gains from aggression against us. " (22) 
The British government has always been very reticent, however, in 
defining its interpretation of 'key aspects of Soviet state power', and 
thus elaborating the principles underlying its targetting policies. 
Instead, we must work on the assumption that the informal discussions of, 
and papers written by, those close to the politico-military elite give us 
a good idea of trends within government. (23) 
It is fairly clear that the British government does not define the 
required level of unacceptable damage to Soviet state power mainly in 
terms of numbers killed. It is felt that human life per se would have 
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a relatively low value for Soviet leaders in wartime. This view is 
reinforced by the knowledge that the Soviet Union suffered over twenty 
million casualties in World War Two, yet emerged with a greatly enhanced 
international position. This historical experience, it is argued, 
together with the nature of the Soviet regime, shows that it would not 
necessarily be deterred from aggression by the threat of massive civilian 
casualties if, at the same time, the Soviet state were to emerge intact 
and victorious. 
Instead of seeking to maximise the number of deaths amongst Soviet 
citizens, therefore, British nuclear targeting seeks to degrade, to an 
unacceptable extent, the power of the Soviet state. Indeed this central 
aim is implicit in the use of the term 'key aspects of Soviet state 
power' to describe the main target of Britain's forces. 
In a nuclear conflict, the distinction between attacking the Soviet 
state and the Soviet population may appear to be a marginal one. The 
'collateral damage' suffered from attacks on industrial, military and 
political targets in cities will often approximate that caused by a 
strike designed, to maximise civilian deaths. As in the strategic bombing 
campaigns of World War Two, there is, a thin dividing line between attacks 
designed to demoralise civilian populat'lons and those intended to destroy 
an opponent's war machine. 
Moreover, as in both World War Two and the Vietnam war, 
policymakers usually feel more morally comfortable with a policy not 
designed directly for genocide, even if that is the ultimate effect. (24) 
This is demonstrated by a remarkable article, entitled 'Trident's 
Potential Targets', by Julian Critchley, MP, Vice-chairman of the 
Conservative Party Defence Committee. After a discussion of US 
targetting policy, he contends that: 
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"There is a more serious undercurrent of opinion of 
which democratic governments must take account. 
It is the anxiety of a great number, maybe a 
majority of thoughtful people, about the rational 
limits to the use of force and regard for the 
sanctity of human life, if nuclear weapons are 
employed. It is this which makes the targetting 
of nuclear missiles so important; for morally 
there is all the difference in the world, and 
one far deeper than the terms "counterforce" or 
"counter value" imply, between indiscriminate 
massacre of men, women and children and the aiming 
of a weapon at a particular military objective 
whatever collateral damage it may cause. " (25) 
In common with many other aspects of defence policy, British 
thinking in this field is clearly heavily influenced by the extensive US 
literature on strategic studies. It is clear from recently released 
documents that the US has never had a nuclear retaliatory policy designed 
simply for mutual assured destruction, as has been assumed by some 
people. Ever since the 1940s, the US strategic nuclear force has been 
targeted against military installations and against those facilities 
thought crucial for the Soviet state's industrial recovery. (26) This 
policy grew initially out of the perceived need, in the event of war, to 
cripple the Soviet Union's ability to sustain an invasion of Europe. It 
developed into a requirement to prevent Soviet retaliation with its own 
nuclear forces. Today, targetting policy is determined by the US 
official doctrine of seeking to 'prevail', if war becomes necessary, by 
attacks on leadership centres and military targets. Urban centres are 
not targetted per se in the 1980 war plan - codenamed SlOP-5D - although 
it contains 40,000 potential targets. Indeed, since 1980, there has been 
a further shift away from industrial targets in favour of more directly 
military installations. (27) 1 
The nearest the US came to a 'counter-city' doctrine was in the 
late 1960s, when Defence Secretary Robert McNamara used a declaratory 
policy of 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD) to curb the budgetary 
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appetites of the armed forces. Pentagon studies had demonstrated that 400 
megaton-equivalent of nuclear weapons were sufficient to destroy over 70% 
of Soviet industry and over 25% of its population. (28) McNamara used 
this 'assured destruction' criterion as a means of fixing the required 
capability for each 'leg' of the USs strategic nuclear triad - its 
Polaris submarines, its Minuteman land-based missiles, and its B-52 
bombers. 
Britain has neither the resources, nor any apparent wish, to 
acquire a strategic force capable of fulfilling, the same criteria of 
'assured destruction' as had been applied to US forces. Indeed current 
nuclear policy is based on the assumption that only one missile submarine 
may be available for retaliation against Soviet aggression. As the 1985 
Defence White Paper confirms: 
"the United Kingdom's deterrent force rests and 
will continue to rest on the ability to maintain 
only one submarine on patrol at all times. " (29) 
If this is so, one Polaris submarine with sixteen ballistic 
missiles must be considered the total strategic force immediately 
available. Each missile has multiple (MRV) warheads, and some limited 
flexibility is probably available in attacking more than one target 
within each city. In total, the force theoretically has the capability 
to deliver one megaton-equivalent of destructive power on each of 16 
target areas. (30) Given reasonable assumptions on the reliability of 
both missiles and re-entry vehicles, however, planners would need to 
assume that only 13 or so would reach their designated targets. (31) 
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The capability to deliver one megaton-equivalent on each of 
thirteen separate, targets might be thought sufficient to inflict 
unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even if Moscow itself were 
excluded. As McGeorge Bundy has argued: 
"In the real world of real political thinkers - 
whether here or in the Soviet Union -a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one 
city of one's own country would be recognized in 
advance as a catastrophic blunder: ten bombs on 
ten cities would be a disaster beyond history: 
and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are 
unthinkable. " (32) 
In circumstances where World War Three were already under way, 
however, things may be viewed rather differently. A small nuclear force 
may not be a credible deterrent if it is unable to cripple Soviet 
warfighting potential, even if it can inflict several million casualties. 
Those who believe that Soviet leaders are bent on world domination, and 
place a low value on individual human lives, may assume that they would 
be willing to undergo casualties comparable to those in World War Two in 
pursuit of their own goals. They could not rule out a Soviet communist 
leader who echoed Mao's boast: "let 400 million Chinese die; 300 million 
will be left. " (33) If the Soviets were to gain control of Europe, then 
the destruction which Polaris could inflict might be seen as an 
acceptable price. 
Indeed a perception of the relative impotence of Britain's force, 
as a consequence of its small size, is common amongst US politicians. 
Partly it is due to a 'numbers illusion' -a failure to understand that 
numbers of nuclear weapons are less important in an age of massive 
destructive power. Partly it is due to the incredibility and 
irrationality of the scenarios for British nuclear use, though it must be 
said that scenarios for US nuclear use are scarcely more credible. 
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To the extent that British nuclear targeting reflects these fears 
of Soviet ruthlessness, and responds to American perceptions of its 
weakness, therefore, it is likely that it will not simply be concerned 
with maximisation of civilian casualties. Indeed the small size of the 
force, in contrast to popular perception, makes a pure countercity 
strategy less likely. For it requires greater attention to the means by 
which a small number of weapons can be used most effectively. It is 
reasoning of this nature that explains the official requirement for a 
force that "must be capable of posing a convincing threat - of 
inflicting, on key aspects of Soviet state power, damage which any Soviet 
leadership would regard as out of all proportion to any likely gains from 
aggression against us. " (33) 
Three main types of targets have been discussed as suitable for 
British nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union -industrial, military 
and political. The locationsof targets in each of these categories often 
coincide, and in many cases are located in or near population centres. 
Nevertheless targetting based on these criteria, particularly for a small 
nuclear force, could have a significantly different result than a 'pure, 
counter population policy. It is therefore useful to outline the 
rationale for each category of targeting in turn. 
Industrial targets would be judged important as providing a means 
of effectively crippling Soviet potential for fighting a conventional 
war, or indeed of continuing as a modern industrial society. Such a 
nuclear strike need not be designed to cripple the operation of the 
Soviet economy permanently. What is seen as an important deterrent is 
the effect on short run production levels, particularly in war industries. 
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For such damage might weaken Soviet ability to pursue its objectives in 
its larger struggle with the United States, even if the UK was, by this 
stage, too devastated to be involved. As the government's discussion of 
the Trident decision argues: 
11 ... one practical approach to judging how much deterrent power Britain needs is to consider what 
type and scale of damage Soviet leaders might think 
likely to leave them critically handicapped 
afterwards in continuing confrontation with a 
relatively unscathed United States. " (34) 
Major targets might therefore include, as in the bombing offensives 
against Germany in World War Two, power-plants, gas and oil refineries, 
chemical factories, munition works, and so on. One recent discussion of 
British and French nuclear forces contended that: 
"The real danger to the Soviet Union, however, is 
the vulnerability of its industries. The 
destruction of Just 34 refineries would halt all 
gas production in the Soviet Union. Eight 
well-placed warheads would curtail Soviet copper 
production ... and the destruction of the city of Pavlodar would deny Moscow 65 per cent of its 
aluminium output. In the eyes of the Kremlin 
leaders, each British and French SLBM firing 
submarine will have, at a very minimum, the ability 
to destroy the Soviet copper, chemical, and 
gas-refining industries, as well as almost 70 
per cent of Soviet aluminium and oil production, 
while having several warheads each left over to 
attack Moscow, Murmansk, Leningrad, Stalingrad, 
and the missile-testing centre at Tyuratam. " (35) 
Attacks on military targets would be likely to give high priority 
to destruction of facilities crucial to the Soviet Union's war fighting 
capability. These might include ABM radars and early warning systems, 
submarine bases and ports (particularly Murmansk where the Soviet 
Northern Fleet is based), army barracks and communications facilities. 
Each of these could be destroyed with a Polaris warhead with a CEP of 
1,500 feet. As Ian Smart argues: 
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"even a relatively small British force could, in 
fact, launch a highly effective attack not only on 
'soft' civilian targets (as is often assumed) but 
also on 'soft' military and 'semi-hard' military 
or civilian targets ... a particularly serious threat would be presented if it seemed that even a 
single SSBN would have a high probability of 
crippling the Soviet air and ABM defence systems by 
destroying most of the critical radar 
installations. " (36) 
Thirdly, the possibility of political targetting of Britain's 
nuclear force has been discussed. It is argued that the Soviet Union is 
a potentially unstable society held together by the coercive power of the 
Communist Party and secret police, and subject to growing tensions 
between Russians and the non-Slavic minorities. John Nott, while 
Britain's defence secretary, even warned: 
"Can we disregard totally even the possibility in 
years to come of a disintegrating Soviet empire 
with, as an act of desperation, the dying giant 
lashing out across the central front? " (39) 
Given the fragility of the Soviet political structure, it is 
argued, selective nuclear targetting could be used to precipitate its 
collapse without, necessarily, leading to all-out nuclear war. Such a 
line of thought gained ground in the US in the late 1970s during the 
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review ordered by President Carter. Emphasis 
was placed on targets believed to be of psychological importance to the 
Soviets. The possibility of regional insurrection during the war would 
be encouraged by selective targetting. National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski insisted on plans to attack specifically Russian, as opposed 
to Soviet, targets, arguing that only the Russians were the enemy. (40) 
Even Paul Warnke, a leading American 'dove', commented that: 
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"their political system is infinitely more fragile 
than ours. If Moscow disappeared, there'd be 
dancing in the streets in the Ukraine, in Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania. " (41) 
Malone argues that industrial and political targeting could be used 
in combination by the UK: 
"British doctrine (need not be confined) to a 
pre-programmed, and ultimately purposeless, 
slaughter .. It was possible to inflict significant urban - industrial damage in a targetting plan designed to threaten the political 
order of the Soviet Union ... a breakdown of 
central economic direction would paralyse economic 
life while disruption of government, party and 
military control might well threaten national 
unity. 
... the British could not inflict enduring damage but, given the shadow of American power, 
they need not be concerned with the duration of 
damage. A critical period - weeks, perhaps months 
- would ensure when the very foundations of the Soviet state might be in jeopardy. " (42) 
3.2 The Moscow Criterion 
The central problem of British nuclear targeting policy, there- 
fore, is to decide, given the forces available, what combination of 
targets - industrial, political, military, etc. - would be most likely 
to constitute 'unacceptable damage' for the Soviet Union, and thus, it 
is argued, an effective deterrent against that country. 
In Britain's discussions of targetting policy, it is clear that 
one of the main conclusions has been that the independent nuclear force 
must remain capable of destroying targets in the Moscow area - the so 
called 'Moscow criterion'. Because of the centralized nature of the 
Soviet military and political system, and the concentration of industrial 
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and administrative resources there, destruction of Moscow could in 
itself constitute unacceptable damage to the Soviet system, perhaps 
precipitating its collapse. By contrast, a nuclear attack that did not 
include Moscow would, it is widely believed, be less clearly unacceptable 
to the Soviets. 
Paradoxically, however, the acquisition of Trident may make the 
destruction of Moscow a less essential component of British targeting. 
One Polaris submarine could destroy 'only' five or six major Soviet 
metropolitan areas outside Moscow, allowing for technical failures. (43) 
While this would be a substantial blow to the Soviet Union, involving the 
immediate deaths of more than ten million of its citizens, it might not 
be sufficient to precipitate systemic breakdown. In a period of intense 
crisis or conventional war, Soviet leaders might be more willing to risk 
the possibility of such an attack, it is argued, than one also involving 
the nation's capital. 
With Trident, however, one submarine would be able to destroy many 
more times the number of targets outside Moscow that Polaris can. Even 
if Moscow is not targeted, therefore, a British attack with Trident would 
cause, compared with Polaris, several times the number of casualties, and 
a more devastating setback to Soviet hopes for survival of their 
political system. Only if the Soviets develop extensive ABM defences for 
their cities in the 1990s and the first decade of the next century would 
the 'advantages' of Trident in a Moscow-avoidance strike begin to 
diminish. 
At present, it is the existence, and possible improvement of, ABM 
defences that constitutes the main reason for British leaders to consider 
- 295 - 
excluding Moscow from an all-out retaliatory strike. The capital is, 
under the ABM Treaty, the only place where the Soviet Union is allowed to 
construct ballistic missile defences. Currently it has 64 Galosh 
interceptors available, and could increase this to 100 under the Treaty, 
and to a much higher number if the Treaty is abandoned. Chevaline should 
ensure that Polaris will continue to be able to destroy Moscow up to the 
mid 1990s. After that time, however, the prospect of more powerful 
defences for Moscow and other Soviet cities will create increasing 
problems for British 'worst-case' planners. (44) 
Their problem would be increased by the knowledge that, in ord6r 
to destroy most of the important targets in Moscow - industrial, -military 
and political - several warheads would need to be used on the various 
parts of a city which is about as large"as London. (45) According to 
Geoffrey Kemp's calculations, 8 one-megaton bombs would be needed to 
produce at least 5 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure throughout 
the Moscow area. It has been estimated by the US Office of Technology 
Assessment that many brick houses would be demolished at this minimum 
overpressure, and that around half of those in an area with such a level 
would die. With most overpressures a great deal higher than 5 psi, 
however, the number of survivors from a8 Megaton attack on Moscow 
would be relatively small. (46) 
A one megaton weapons is equivalent, almost exactly, to three 200 
kiloton MRVed Polaris A3 warheads. Polaris/Chevaline is likely to have 
a rather less destructive payload than this system, which it replaces, 
however, because of the space used to carry penetration aids. To destroy 
all the major 'soft' targets'in the Moscow area, therefore, would require 
at least eight Polaris missiles. In addition, some of the most important 
military and industrial targets - radar installations, specialised 
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factories, etc. - are hardened to withstand at least 25 psi (the 'semi- 
hard' targets). Polaris missiles are probably accurate enough to 
destroy such targets if aimed directly at them. (47) If a large number 
of such targets were to be included, however, considerably more than 8 
missile strikes might be required. On the other hand, if a large 
proportion of the important 'semi-hard' and 'hard' facilities in Moscow 
were to survive a British attack, the damage to the Soviet state's 
recovery capability might be reduced to the extent that it was no 
longer considered a credible deterrent. 
If only one Polaris submarine is available, therefore, and it is 
assumed that two or three of the missiles fail to work, it can afford to 
lose only 5 or 6 missiles to Soviet ABM defences before its destructive 
capability falls below that necessary to cover all 'soft' (5 psi) 
targets. It does not therefore require an extreme 'worst case' analysis 
to realise that it might require only a modest upgrading of Soviet ABM 
defences to render one Polaris submarine incapable of destroying all the 
soft targets in Moscow, even if all its missiles were aimed at that 
city. 
If nuclear war were preceded by a period of crisis or 
conventional conflict, it is likely that Britain could have two Polaris 
boats, and possibly three, available for use. Even in these 
circumstances, however, improvements in ABM defences might mean that most 
of the thirty-two missiles available would need to be used against Moscow 
to ensure the destruction of the capital's most important 'soft' and 
'semi-hard' targets. Only if the effectiveness of ABM systems was 
assumed to be low-certainly less than 50% - would it be possible to 
reserve some missiles for limited nuclear warfare (see Section 3.3) or 
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for important targets outside Moscow. By the year 2,000, given the 
developing arms race between the superpowers in ballistic missile 
defences, it is possible that even two UK Polaris boats will be incapable 
of delivering as many as eight MRVed missiles on Moscow targets. In such 
circumstances it might then be thought that a 'Moscow only' option, 
especially one in which leadership bunkers would survive because of 
Polaris's lack of hard-target accuracy, would no longer be adequate. In 
a period of world war or intense crisis, such a force might no longer be 
judged to be a credible deterrent against, or satisfactory revenge for, a 
major nuclear attack on the British Isles. 
These difficulties with the 'Moscow criterion' created by the small 
size of Britain's force and possible ABM developments, have led both 
strategic analysts and government ministers to consider the option of 
excluding Moscow from targetting plans, 'concentrating instead on the 
destruction of key regional cities. (48) According to one estimate, 14 
or 15 missiles could destroy Leningrad and four other major industrial 
concentrations outside Moscow, with a combined population of thirteen 
million. (49) With the added effects of fallout, firestorms and so on, 
such an attack could inflict more casualtiesIhan an attack on Moscow. 
Although the symbolic and political value of destroying the capital would 
be lost, perhaps as much damage would be done to Soviet military and 
industrial potential. 
Even this possibility would be severely curtailed, however, if the 
US and Soviet Union's missile defences begin to be developed in earnest 
and, as is widely thought possible, the ABM Treaty is abrogated by the 
early 1990's. By the year 2000 such developments would allow the Soviets 
to deploy Galosh-type ABM interceptors to protect several of its major 
military and industrial centres. (50) Such deployments, with a 
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potential 'kill rate' of 50-80% against attacks with small numbers of 
missiles, could reduce British capability very markedly. 
The possibility that ABM developments could render Polaris less 
powerful is, as Chapter 5 discussed, one of the main arguments for 
Trident D5. The current Chevaline system is designed to penetrate Soviet 
exoatmospheric defences by the use of penetration aids. To counter the 
endoatmospheric systems which the Soviets are likely to deploy in future, 
however, such systems will not be sufficient. The acquisition of a MIRV 
system such as Trident D5 will allow many more warheads to be thrown 
simultaneously against Soviet defences, and should thus ensure that the 
required level of destruction is still caused. Moreover, the Trident D5 
systems will be capable of incorporating, at a cost, a series of further 
counter-measuresto Soviet defences: increases in warhead numbers, 
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, a depressed -trajectory firing mode, and 
anti-radar devices. (51) 
3.3 DecaDitation 
Trident D5 is not only designed to ensure Britain's continued 
ability to penetrate the Soviet Union's defences and inflict 
'unacceptable damage' on that country. It will also add a capability to 
destroy hardened targets against which the current Polaris force would be 
ineffective. Before the introduction of Chevaline, a 200 kiloton Polaris 
warhead had only an estimated 34% chance of destroying a 300 psi missile 
silo. (52) Chevaline may have improved accuracy to some extent. At the 
same time, however, the protection for missiles and command bunkers 
available is now as high as 5,000 psi (53) 
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The degree of accuracy which Britain's Trident D5 warheads will be 
capable of attaining is not yet known. The US has only just begun to 
conduct flight tests of the missile, and accuracy predictions must be 
therefore to some extent speculative. And the extent to which withdrawal 
of US assistance would reduce the accuracy of British weapons is even 
more uncertain. It is fairly clear, however, that Britain's DS warheads 
will be considerably more accurate than Polaris. Recent estimates 
suggest that the US D5 warheads will have a CEP of 300 feet, using 
stellar/inertial guidance and NAVSTAR inflight updating. (54) And a 1985 
newspaper report has quoted 400 feet as the planned CEP for Britain's 
independent force. (55) If such figures are then taken as reasonable 
indications of the assumptions which will form the basis of targetting 
policies, the acquisition of Trident will allow British planners to 
greatly expand their options for attacking hardened targets. 
Of particular significance is the implication that Trident will 
give Britain a so-called 'decapitation' capability: the ability to 
destroy the hardened Soviet command and control bunkers in which, in the 
event of crisis, Soviet military and political leaders will seek 
protection. Such a form of targeting has been given an increased 
emphasis by the current US administration, and would form a key component 
of plans for a first strike attack on the Soviet Union. As General 
Holloway, former commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), 
wrote in 1980: 
"Degradation of the over-all political and 
military control apparatus must be the primary 
targetting objective. Irrespective of whether we 
strike first or respond to a Soviet strike 
(presumably counterforce), it assumes the 
importance of absolute priority planning. 
Striking first would offer a tremendous advantage, 
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and would emphasise degrading the highest 
political and military control to, the greatest 
possible degree ... there is such centralised control that it would be possible to degrade very 
seriously their military effectiveness for nuclear 
or any other kind of war if the command control 
system were severely disrupted ... there is no other targetting strategy that can achieve the war 
aims that underwrite survival" (56) 
Britain has no possibility of attaining an independent first strike 
capability. Even with Trident it will have far too few nuclear weapons 
to threaten all Soviet nuclear forces and their command centres. For 
Britain, a decapitation capability might be seen, instead, as a means of 
inflicting a more clearly unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet 
Union than an attack which was unable to destroy the political 
leadership. As Adam Ulam has argued: 
"As to the possibility of a 'small' nuclear war, 
the USSR has to think in political terms: against 
a small nuclear power she would undoubtedly emerge 
victorious; but could a Communist regime survive 
such a war? What would be the consequences of 
even one nuclear missile falling on Moscow and 
destroying the top leadership of the Party and 
State? " (57) 
According to some recent reports, decapitation is indeed one of the 
targeting options discussed for Trident. Farooq Hussain, Director of 
studies at the Royal United Services Institute, goes so far as to contend 
that: "The independent credibility of the nuclear force of medium powers 
depends on what has become known in strategic jargon as a "de-capitation 
strike. " (58) And, in early 1985, unnamed Ministry of Defence officials 
were quoted as commending "the politburo option" which Trident would give 
them: 
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"This option is known as the "frighten the enemy the 
most" strategy, the theory being that Soviet leaders 
will think hard before launching an attack on Britain 
when they know that 30 or so minutes later, they them- 
selves, will all be wiped out. As one senior official 
puts it: "We will be able to send the whole bloody lot 
down Gorbachev's throat". (59) 
A decapitation attack would be an effective means of fulfilling the 
'Moscow criterion' to the full, and destroying the important political 
and military targets that make Moscow of unique importance to the Soviet 
leaders. In addition, such an attack would be consistent with the 
government's own published requirement that a British deterrent should, 
in Soviet eyes, be "likely to leave them critically handicapped 
afterwards in continuing confrontation with a relatively unscathed United 
States. " (60) Indeed, on the assumption that the Soviets did not launch 
their weapons upon warning of attack, a decapitation strike might 
prevent, or at least delay, a retaliatory strike. In such circumstances, 
as Section 3.5 will discuss, Britain's capability for precipitating US 
use of its nuclear force might be increased. 
Perhaps the most crucial advantage for Britain in possessing 
decapitation options, however, is that they provide a means of inflicting 
a very crippling'degree of damage on the Soviet state using a relatively 
modest number of warheads. According to Paul Bracken, about one hundred 
highly accurate weapons would allow four or five warheads to be exploded 
on major command posts and would further destroy telephone switching 
centres, satellite ground stations, radars, and early warning stations. 
In addition, as few as "ten high altitude high-yield nuclear bursts might 
be launched in conjunction with attacks on the national capital in order 
to generate strong EMP waves that could knock out communication and 
electrical power systems. " Finally, for extra assurance: "Ground 
bursting of weapons would throw up radioactive dust, which could foul up 
airplane engines and disrupt reconstitution of the bombers" (61) 
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Such an attack with one hundred warheads would be well within the 
capability of only two British Trident submarines carrying a full payload 
of 400 or more warheads. Only when ballistic missile defences attain a 
capability to destroy over 75% of incoming warheads would Trident be 
unable to carry out a strike of this nature. Even then, it is likely to 
be argued, the threat of a limited decapitation attack might constitute a 
more effective sanction than a strike limited to an equivalent number of 
'soft' targets. 
3.4 Britain and limited nuclear war 
Whatever array of targets Polaris or Trident were to attack in a 
bid to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, however, the end 
result for the UK would be likely to be the same : total destruction. A 
recent detailed computer prediction has calculated the effects of a small 
scale Soviet retaliatory strike on Britain, consisting of only 117 
warheads with a total yield of 38 megatons, and aimed at industrial and 
urban targets. Such an attack would result in 23.3 million immediate 
casualties, of which 18.3 million would be killed. Millions more would 
die in the months that followed. 
Such a small attack, moreover, would only be likely if the vast 
majority of Soviet forces had already been destroyed by a US, or joint 
UK-US, first strike. Were Soviet forces to be used against Britain 
before, or launched on warning of, such a strike, the destruction would 
be even greater. An attack on military and industrial targets, using 342 
warheads with a total yield of 219 megatons, would result in 42.5 million 
casualties, almost 80% of the total population. Subsequent deaths from 
radiation sickness, starvation and the possible effects of the nuclear 
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winter would then reduce the island's population even further. Only 
those in the most outlying areas - such as the Scottish Highlands - would 
have a significant chance of survival. (62) 
It is difficult to envisage a British leader contemplating a 
nuclear attack on the Soviet Union when it was known that these would be 
the consequences of retaliation. In an attempt to increase the 
credibility of Britain's nuclear force, therefore, its advocates have 
searched for ways of fighting a nuclear war that did not necessarily lead 
to large scale slaughter of civilian populations. As in the United 
States, these discussions often appear to owe more to wishful thinking 
than to a sober analysis of the technical problems involved in nuclear 
war-fighting. 
In particular a number of 'limited nuclear options' for Britain 
have been discussed as alternatives to the 'unacceptable damage' option 
which constitutes the central criterion for the strategic force. Such 
options, it has been argued, could be useful in all the main scenarios 
for independent use of Britain's nuclear weapons outlined in Section 2. 
Firstly, it is argued that the capability for using nuclear weapons 
in a limited way would be of use in the 'second centrel scenario. This 
scenario implies that Britain should retain the possibility of using its 
nuclear weapons first in the event of a Soviet conventional invasion of 
Western Europe, even when the US is not willing to use its own. It is 
argued that, in the event of such an invasion, perhaps accompanied by 
guarantees on the limited nature of Soviet war aims, the US might not be 
willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to avert a major 
conventional defeat. Given its global military power and geographical 
position, the US would not be under immediate military threat from a 
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Soviet-controlled Germany. And, although such a development would 
clearly in itself be very damaging to its interests, the leaders of the 
United States would also take account of other factors - such as 
developments in Asia - when deciding whether to risk using nuclear 
weapons. In a situation where the US was perceived to be reluctant to 
use its nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attack, it is argued, a 
British threat to do so might be more credible, for the reasons outlined 
in Section 2. Since Britain itself was not under direct threat, 
however, some 'limited' nuclear option might be more appropriate than an 
all out strike against 'key aspects of Soviet state power'. 
For a limited nuclear war role, Britain's submarine-based strategic 
force might be suitable, provided that it was able to withold the bulk of 
its weapons in case it were felt necessary to escalate to a more 
comprehensive holocaust. Indeed it is clear that Trident has been 
supported in part because it will have a much greater capability in such 
scenarios than Polaris has at present, as Chapter 5 discussed. 
Nevertheless even Trident may not be suitable for a limited use of 
nuclear weapons id Germany or in the North Atlantic. Such an action 
would reveal the position of one of the two or three submarine at sea, 
expose it to enemy attack, and thus substantially reduce strategic 
nuclear capability. The use of multiple warhead missiles might be 
perceived as too escalatory if the object is simply a demonstration of 
resolve. And the government might wish to retain the option of using the 
SSBN force in an intermediate stage between a localised nuclear war at 
sea or in Central Europe and an all out conflict, in order to deter 
Soviet escalation to a limited nuclear attack on the British Isles - the 
'sanctuary' scenario we discuss shortly. 
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While the use of Polaris/Trident cannot be ruled out in a 'second 
centrel scenario, therefore, other independent nuclear forces, it is 
argued, are required. Indeed this provides one of the main military 
justifications for the tactical nuclear weapons currently owned by 
Britain - freefall nuclear bombs carried by Jaguar and Tornado aircraft 
on the Central Front and maritime strike Buccaneer aircraft, and nuclear 
depth charges carried by Royal Navy helicopters. The Army's nuclear 
systems, however, rely on nuclear weapons held by US forces on a 'dual 
key' basis. These could not be relied upon to be available for 
independent use. 
The second scenario for which Britain's limited nuclear options 
might be appropriate would be the situation envisaged in the 'sanctuary' 
argument. In this situation, Britain's nuclear force, it is argued, 
would preserve the British Isles from nuclear attack in the event of a 
limited nuclear war in Europe between the US and the Soviets. Britain 
could preserve its own homeland as a 'sanctuary' in a theatre nuclear war 
by the threat to spread the war to'the Soviet homeland. 
Were the Soviet Union to extend a limited nuclear conflict to 
Britain, however, some analysts argue that it is unlikely that a 
fullscale attack on industrial and city targets will immediately 
follow. By hypothesis, the attack will be part of an attempt to 
prevail in a limited nuclear conflict, and therefore be confined to 
key British and American nuclear bases. (63) Targets in a 
counterforce attack on Britain would be likely to include US bases for 
cruise missiles, F-111 bombers, Poseidon submarines and naval nuclear 
weapons. They would include British nuclear forces - the Faslane and 
Coulport facilities, the re-fit yard at Rosyth, stores for theatre 
nuclear forces. In addition, command and control facilities -e. g. at 
Northwood and High Wycombe - might be attacked. (64) 
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It is argued that, in the past, such a counterforce attack would 
have used groundbursts from inaccurate, high-yield weapons - such as the 
one megaton SS4 and SS5 missiles. Fallout and blast damage would-have 
been so great as to be virtually indistinguable from the consequences of 
a counter-city attack. A British government would, therefore, feel 
justified in responding with an equivalent level of unacceptable damage 
on Soviet cities. 
Recent developments in Soviet nuclear forces, paralleling those in 
the US, make such a scenario, it is argued, less probable. The more 
modern SS20 missiles that are now replacing the SS4 and SS5 missiles are 
more accurate and, with warheads rated at 150 kilotons, are less likely 
to cause massive 'collateral damage'. Increasingly, as the Soviets 
follow the US lead in the development of low-yield, high accuracy 
weapons, the likely casualties in a counterforce attack could fall even 
further. The SS20 missile, with an estimated CEP of 1,300 feet when 
launched from fixed sites, is not much more accurate than Britain's 
Polaris/Chevaline force. (65) By the mid 1990s, the Soviets will 
probably be able to match the accuracies of the US's Pershing II or 
Tomahawk cruise missiles, 150 feet CEP and 200 feet CEP respectively. 
If they are able to do so, they may also feel able to make substantial 
reductions in yield, while improving the capability to destroy hardened 
targets. If Soviet 'theatre' nuclear forces in the late 1990s have 
yields as low as the 5-50 kilotons reported for Pershing II and the 
Tomahawk cruise missile, the collateral damage arising from a limited 
nuclear attack on Britain would then be very substantially reduced. (66) 
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There is considerable controversy as to the effects of a Soviet 
counterforce attack on Britain. One proponent of Trident and of 'limited 
nuclear options', Peter Malone, recently estimated that such an attack 
with SS-4s and SS-5s might have resulted in between 5 and 7 million 
casualties. The SS-20, however, could, he argues, be used more 
effectively against the same set of targets and result in 'only' 600,000 
casualties. Even if, as would be likely, "British and American forces 
had dispersed upon receipt of political warning, an SS-20 attack on long- 
range nuclear strike forces might result in less than 2 million 
casualties'. On the basis of these relatively optimistic calculations, 
Malone then argues that: 
"The discriminatory attack capability represented 
by the SS-20 ... placed a premium on retention of a flexible nuclear posture, capable of responding 
proportionately to Soviet counterforce attacks" 
(67) 
By contrast, the 'Doomsday' study, written by a group that included 
prominent opponents of Britain's nuclear force, estimated that a 
counterforce attack on nuclear bases and associated facilities in 
Britain, using the current Soviet arsenal, would-result in 9 million 
casualties - more than the number which Malone has argued would be 
indistinguable in its effects from a counter-city attack. (68) 
The difference between calculations such as these rests mainly on 
the assumptions made. Many of the casualties in the 'Doomsday' scenario 
are a result of the assumption that a counterforce attack on Britain 
would include a5 megaton groundburst on Northwood, 500 kilotons on 
Whitehall, and 500 kilotons on Grosvenor Square, the HQ of the US Navy's 
Sixth Fleet. (69) Those who argue that a more limited attack is possible 
would point to the incentives that the Soviet Union would have to exclude 
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the capital city and communication centres from a nuclear attack. For to 
include these targets might be perceived as increasing the probability of 
retaliatory attacks on Soviet cities, both because of the scale of damage 
and because 'decapitation' of British nuclear forces might lead missile 
submarine commanders to execute their orders on their own inititative. 
On the other hand, a counterforce strike which attacked only front 
line nuclear bases, which Malone appears to have assumed, would involve 
far fewer casualties. Phil Steadman, one of the 'Doomsday' team, has 
calculated that such an attack, which excluded London and other command 
facilities, would result in 1,400,000 casualties. (70) Such a 'limited' 
attack, it is argued, would give the Soviets a major advantage in a 
European nuclear conflict, while still giving British leaders an 
incentive to limit the scale of their retaliation. For it would be 
incredible, according to this line of reasoning, for Britain to inflict 
unacceptable damage on Moscow in retaliation for the loss of one or two 
million Britons. For the result would be rapid destruction of most of 
its remaining 55 million citizens. 
The development of more sophisticated Soviet nuclear systems, in 
the context of the 'sanctuary' argument, is thus used as a justification 
for the development of British limited nuclear options. In the case of a 
limited Soviet attack on bases in Britain, it is argued that the most 
appropriate British retaliation might be directed against targets in the 
Soviet Union, but excluding Moscow and major cities-, holding the latter 
in 'reserve' to deter the destruction of British cities. (71) Trident's 
capability for more boats on patrol and for counterforce options, would, 
it is argued, enable such contingencies, to be covered more adequately 
than Polaris does at present, as Chapter 5 has discussed. 
- 309 - 
The 'sanctuary' justification for limited nuclear options, however, 
like the 'second centrel justification, rests on a questionable 
assumption - that it is possible to envisage a limited nuclear war in 
Europe taking place without rapid escalation to a strategic nuclear 
exchange. Yet the incentives, in a limited conflict, for pre-emption 
and escalation would be overwhelming. Such would be the situation even 
in a major conventional war. In a limited nuclear conflict, the 
military advantages from striking first, combined with difficulty of 
reaching a common delineation of agreeable 'limits', would make 
limitation more unlikely. 
Moreover the nature of nuclear weapons is such that even a limited 
nuclear conflict would create an unprecedented disruption of command and 
control arrangements. Political and military leaders would find 
themselves unable to determine what targets had been attacked, and with 
what results. Control over remaining nuclear weapons would rapidly 
devolve to low level commanders, some of whom would assume that they were 
authorised to retaliate. The possibility of excluding particular 
categories of targets, such as cities, would be neglibible. As Des Ball 
concludes, in his study 'Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? ': 
"The 'fog of war' makes it extremely unlikely that 
the situation to which NCA (the US leadership - MC) 
believe themselves to be reacting will in fact 
correspond very closely to the true situation, or 
that there will be a high degree of shared 
perception between the respective adversary 
leaderships. In these circumstances it would be 
most difficult to terminate a nuclear exchange 
through mutual agreement at some point short of 
all-out urban-industrial attacks. " (72) 
Because of such considerations, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that limited nuclear options, for the US or UK, are in part 
a rationalisation of a 'deterrence' policy that rests firmly on the 
- 310 - 
irrational threat to totally destroy an enemy, and consequently oneself, 
given the probable retaliation in the event of aggression. The 
deterrent value of limited nuclear options, if any exists, rests on 
their ability to convince an opponent that one is crazy enough to 
believe such options do exist, and therefore more willing to initiate a 
nuclear war. 
To the limited extent that counterforce weaponry can be seen as 
having a meaningful military role, it is not to be found in fanciful 
scenarios for limited nuclear wars played by Marquis of Queensbury rules. 
Rather, their role would be in a fullscale disarming first strike 
against an opponent's military and political system. Such an option has 
been central to US strategic targetting since the 1950s, and remains so 
today. (73) Even Britain's development of counterforce capabilties, to 
the extent that it has military significance, must be viewed primarily in 
the light of current US programmes for the development of a first strike 
capability, as Section 3.5 will discuss. 
The third, and final, scenario in which limited nuclear options 
might be relevant for Britain would be in conflict with Third World 
countries. In such circumstances the use of the strategic nuclear force 
might be thought too drastic, or liable to weaken Britain's position if 
the conflict were to escalate to involve one or both superpowers. 
Particularly against a non-nuclear power, a threat to use tactical 
nuclear weapons might be enough to coerce an opponent, and might be 
thought likely to incur less international opprobrium. This possibility 
has been given some credence by the reports of deployment of low-yield 
tactical nuclear weapons on the Falklands Task Force, over and above the 
redirection of a Polaris submarine to the South Atlantic. (74) 
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Although limited nuclear options may be of relevance to conflicts 
in the Third World, however, it is unlikely that force requirements for 
the UK have been influenced by such scenarios. The capabilifie4- required 
for a war in Central Europe and the North Atlantic are more than enough 
than is needed in conflicts elsewhere. 
3.5 Whose finger on the trigger? 
The possibilities for independent use of British nuclear weapons 
discussed so far all assume that the US is unwilling to use its own 
nuclear force on Britain's behalf, at least against the targets which the 
UK government believes it is in its own interests to threaten. Yet if 
the US does not want to escalate the conflict, it will be profoundly, and 
adversely, affected if Britain decides to do so independently. Only in 
the case of a British conflict with a non-aligned Third World country is 
it possible that the US would adopt a policy of non-intervention in such 
a situation. Even here, the political impact of nuclear conflict, 
together with the danger of escalation and the threat to US prestige if 
it failed to restrain Britain, would provide strong incentives for 
American action. 
In the event of independent use of Britain's nuclear weapons 
against the Soviet Union, American interests would be immediately at 
risk. Such a move would be certain to change the whole nature of a 
conflict, whether it entailed an escalation to nuclear use in the Central 
European battlefield, or the extension 6f such a war to include Soviet 
territory. The Soviets would be extremely likely to respond to these 
moves by nuclear strikes against the UK. But it is also probable, given 
the perceived closeness of US-UK links, that the Soviets would also 
attack the US itself. Not only would the Soviets find it difficult to 
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distinguish a British attack from an American one, especially if it 
involved US-made Trident D5 missiles. Even if the Soviets were certain 
that US-owned weapons had not been used, they might suspect that American 
sanction had been given to an attack. It seems improbable that the 
Soviets would be willing to suffer massive damage to their homeland while 
the US was left unscathed. 
Such an analysis, moreover, is likely to be shared by US leaders. 
In the event of a major war in Europe, US strategic nuclear forces would 
probably go on high alert - or 'hair trigger' - status at once. There 
would be considerable military pressure for pre-emptive action, 
particularly if the Soviets' nuclear forces were also being readied for 
action. A major conventional war could therefore become nuclear within 
days. A theatre nuclear war would be almost certain to escalate to an 
all-out strategic exchange. (75) 
In such an unstable situation, any perceived possibility of 
independent British use would increase further the incentives for the US 
to strike first. US decision-makers would reason that, were Britain to 
attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, it would be likely to 
precipitate Soviet attack on both the UK and the US. In these 
circumstances, the US might believe it could minimise its own losses by 
pre-empting such a British move. 
US incentives for pre-emption are likely to increase as new 
programmes for the development of its own strategic forces come to 
fruition. New counterforce weaponry - such as MX, Trident D5 and cruise 
missiles - should provide a greatly increased capability to destroy 
Soviet command centres and military targets. Strategic Anti Submarine 
Warfare - directed against Soviet SSBN sanctuaries - is being given a 
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high priority by the US Navy. (76) The development of ballistic missile 
defences, if successful, will help reduce still further the size of any- 
Soviet second strike. These technological moves towards a potential 
first strike doctrine will make the 'trigger' capability of Britain's 
force more, rather than less, important. 
This 'trigger' role for Britain's nuclear force is not only the 
probable consequence of independent use. It may also be an'important 
element of policy, though the government is anxious to avoid publicly 
stating this in so many words. To the extent that Trident will have 
a 'decapitation' capability, moreover, it is more likely that it can be 
used to precipitate US action. For such an attack, aimed at Soviet 
command structures, would not only inflict a level of damage that may be 
judged more unacceptable than a limited countercity strike. It might also 
lead to the disintegration of the command structures which control Soviet 
nuclear forces. The possibility of delay and/or uncoordinated action in 
a Soviet response would increase US incentives to destroy remaining 
forces, particularly since command would have become decentralized. 
The French government has been more explicit than that in the UK as 
to the value of a capability for 'triggering' the US force. In 1983, 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing stated that one of de Gaulle's motives in 
building up French nuclear forces in the 1960s was "to be able ourselves 
to decide on a nuclear action that would constrain the United States, if 
they hesitated, to bring into play the superiority they had at the time 
vis-a-vis the USSR in nuclear matters. " (77) 
In Britain, however, the nature of the 'special relationship' 
requires that leaders can never openly avow a trigger rationale for the 
nuclear force. I. na curious paradox, the possibility of a trigger 
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mechanism acts to 'couple' the US to providing a nuclear umbrella for 
Britain, on the one hand; but public debate of such a mechanism would be 
likely to call into question the wisdom of US aid for Britain's force on 
the other. 
Provided that Britain's force is seen to be able to inflict 
'unacceptable damage' on the Soviet Union, the only situation where a 
trigger policy might not work is where the US had made it clear that it 
was opposed to the British action, and that it would actively collaborate 
with the Soviets to punish the culprit. There is unlikely to be a middle 
way, in which the US professes a lack of knowledge or interest in British 
nuclear preparations. Particularly if the US is already at war,, 
_'_ 
the Soviet Union is 
unlikely to take such protestations seriously. 
By the same reasoning, therefore, a situation in which Britain 
wanted to use its nuclear force when the US was unwilling to use its own 
would almost certainly involve the withdrawal of any support for 
Britain's force. Indeed active obstruction by the US of British 
preparations would be extremely likely. 
Most discussions of the independent capability of Britain's nuclear 
force have focussed exclusively on possible Soviet countermeasures. To 
judge the technical viability of independent use, however, it is also 
necessary to take account of possible US countermeasures. For a force 
that could overcome Soviet ABM and ASW defences, but would succumb to US 
resistance, could not reasonably be described as-'independent'. If US 
disruption of this sort were potentially effective, it would undermine 
the technical foundation of all the scenarios and doctrine for 
independent use, including the possibility of 'triggering' a US strike. 
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The rest of this section, therefore, examines whether the US might in 
fact possess a counter-UK capability of this nature. 
As we have already discussed, Britain is heavily dependent on the 
US in the long run for the supply of nuclear systems and facilities. 
This long run dependence imposes severe constraints on independent action 
in peacetime defence and foreign policy as a whole, making a 'Gaullist' 
policy of expelling US nuclear bases inconceivable. Of greatest concern 
to the discussion in this chapter, however, is not this long run 
dependence. It is whether Britain retainsoperational independence - 
whether it could use its nuclear force, in the face of US opposition, in 
scenarios where, its proponents argue, it would be of deterrent value. 
In normal peacetime conditions, it is unlikely that, without prior 
warning, the US could physically prevent British use of its nuclear 
weapons. Despite some suggestions to the contrary at the time of the 
Nassau agreement, it seems highly improbable that the US has any 'safety 
catch' on the UK's Polaris missiles. With the agreement of at least one 
member of the Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister could order the launch 
of those missiles; and within 15 minutes the submarine commander would be 
ready to fire. (78). 
Such an event, however, is really only'of marginal interest. For 
it is virtually inconceivable that a British Prime Minister would 
consider firing nuclear weapons at a time of peace and without 
t; '. t-5 
provocation. Only during wartime, or perhapsýof intense crisis, is it 
possible that nuclear weapons might be used deliberately. 
In circumstances of intense crisis or war, however, if the US 
government believed that Britain might consider using its nuclear force 
on its own, it would have a number of capabilities at its disposal to 
frustrate such action. 
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The US's ability to deny British use of its nuclear force would be 
greatly facilitated by the interpenetration of the intelligence and 
communications networks of the two countries, an element of the 'special 
relationship' at least as important as nuclear weapons collaboration. 
Facilities in Britain, or in British overseas bases such as Cyprus, Diego 
Garcia and Hong Kong, would be of considerable importance in US war 
plans. It is highly probable that the British secret services, and 
perhaps other parts of the British state machinery, would have some 
members also involved with US intelligence. It might prove difficult for 
a British government to discuss the possible use of nuclear weapons 
without US knowledge. Once the US government had gained such 
information, it might then feel it had a strong incentive to intervene 
forcibly to prevent its ally taking such action. 
One possibility would be for the US to launch a pre-emptive attack 
on British nuclear bases and communication centres, using sabotage, 
conventional weapons and, possibly, nuclear weapons. Such a step would 
be a difficult one for the US to take, particularly since it would risk 
the loss of a vital base for prosecution of the conventional battle in 
Europe. The large American troop prescence in the UK might also reduce 
the probability that a nuclear strike would be used. In a situation 
where the US perceived British use of nuclear weapons was imminent, 
however, a nuclear pre-emptive attack could not be ruled out. 
In isolation an attack on the land-based British nuclear forces 
would be extremely risky for the United States. For it is almost 
certain that Brit'ish missile submarines have pre-delegated authority to 
launch their nuclear weapons if they believe that their country is under 
nuclear attack and no-one is available to give the order for retaliation. 
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(79) A nuclear attack by the US on the UK command structure could 
therefore trigger precisely the event it would be designed to prevent. 
In such circumstances, therefore, the US would also have to 
consider means by which it could destroy the UK's strategic force using 
its ASW and ABM capabilities. Indeed, provided that British missile 
submarines in port could also be disarmed, such means might even be a 
possible substitute for a large scale attack on the British mainland with 
all the dangerous consequences that this would entail. 
The main US threat to Britain's strategic nuclear force would be 
from its considerable ASW capabilities in the North Atlantic. It has 
been estimated that the US Navy usually knows the location of the Soviet 
Union's missile submarines to within 50 or 60 miles of their precise 
location. (80) Since the US co-operates with the UK on deployment of 
their submarines - to avoid inadvertent confrontations - it is likely to 
know the location of the two or three British submarines at sea as well, 
if not better, than this. If all other ASW methods failed, it would be 
technically feasible to 'take out' Britain's strategic force by barrages 
of nuclear missiles - from sea and land against the area in question. 
(81) 
In addition to this ASW threat to British submarines, which will 
grow with US Navy modernisation, the US Strategic Defense Initiative may 
also threaten the viability of the UK's force in the long run. The 
development of US boost-phase defences, iA particular, might be sufficient 
to allow the destruction of most of Britain's Trident missiles before 
their re-entry vehicles could, separate. The few warheads that did get 
through this stage might then be insufficient for the penetration of 
quantity of Soviet ground-based defences. 
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It is generally thought extremely improbable that either the US or 
the Soviet Union will ever be able to develop 'leakproof' defences 
against a fullscale first strike by the other. A combination of likely 
countermeasures - anti-satellite warfare, sophisticated decoys, jamming 
and increased warhead numbers - will ensure that some proportion of 
weapons is always likely to get through. 
In the case of smaller nuclear forces - such as those of Britain, 
France and China - the consequences of ABM developments may be more 
revolutionary. The first effect is likely to be to considerably reduce 
the potential of these forces to exercise limited nuclear options. In 
the long run, it may render the UK SSBN force technically obsolete eveA. 
in an all out attack. In this latter situation, the maximum number of 
missiles that could be fired simultaneously would be 32, or perhaps 48. 
A US boost boost phase ABM defence that was designed to achieve a success 
rate of, say, 50% against several hundred Soviet ICBMs might expect to 
achieve a success rate of as much as 90% against a much small0r. force. 
This in turn would leave only 3 or 4 British missiles to attempt to 
penetrate mid-phase and terminal phase defences. Such a minimum 
capability is unlikely to be a credible deterrent to a Soviet leadership 
already engaged in a major war. The possibility of such developments 
will, therefore, throw further into question the operational independence 
of Britain's strategic nuclear force. 
4. Conclusion 
The case for the current government's policy of retaining and 
modernising the UK nuclear force rests, inter alia, on two assumptions. 
First, it assumes that there are situations in which Britain's security 
will be enhanced by the use, or threat of use, of such a force. 
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Secondly, it assumes that the British nuclear force can, and will, 
be able to meet the technical requirements that these hypothetical 
situations impose. This chapter has sought to examine whether these 
assumptions are justified. 
The possible scenarios for independent use of Britain's nuclear 
weapons can be broadly divided into two categories -those in which the US 
is seen as too reluctant to use its nuclear weapons in a European 
conflict, and those in which the US is seen as too willing to fight a 
limited nuclear war which excludes its own territory but includes that of 
the UK. In the first situation, it is argued, the nuclear force could 
provide an additional deterrent to Soviet aggression, over and above that 
which the US provides. In the second situation, it is argued, it could 
help make its territory a 'sanctuary' in a limited conflict because of 
the ability to bestow on the UK the means of escalating the conflict to 
involve the homelands of the two superpowers. 
In order for British nuclear threats in these scenarios to be 
credible, it is a necessary condition that its nuclear force is 
independently capable, despite any likely countermeasures, of inflicting a 
level of damage on the Soviet Union that would deter it from hostile 
action that it might otherwise have taken. This requirement is the basis 
of UK nuclear targetting policy, which seeks to deter by threatening the 
destruction of 'key aspects of Soviet state power. ' It is also the basic 
technical criterion for the national nuclear force. 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that there are strong 
grounds for arguing that both the assumptions on which the case for the 
British nuclear force is based may be flawed. In none of the scenarios 
examined does it appear to be rational for Britain to use its nuclear 
I 
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weapons when the US is unwilling to use its own. Nor is it credible that 
Britain could remain a 'sanctuary' in a limited nuclear war, particularly 
while it is a major base for US nuclear forces. 
Even more damaging, there are doubts as to whether Britain's 
nuclear force is capable of fulfilling its technical requirements. The 
development of anti-missile defences in the future may considerably 
reduce its destruction potential. Its capability of being used against 
US wishes is in some doubt. Any possibility that its use might 'trigger' 
an intercontinental nuclear war is likely to strengthen the US's 
incentive to prevent independent action. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FUTURE NUCLEAR OPTIONS FOR BRITAIN 
1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at those policy options available to the British 
government which involve the retention of a national nuclear force. In 
Section 2 we examine the cost pressures now building up on the defence 
budget, and attempt to quantify how important Trident spending will be in 
intensifying these pressures. In Section 3 the difficulties involved in 
attempting to continue current plans into the 1990's, despite these 
pressures, are discussed. In Section 4 the feasibility of a 'Gaullist' 
option, in which increasing emphasis is given to national and nuclear 
commitments at the expense of contributions to NATO conventional defences, 
is examined. And, in Sections 5 and 6, we examine the implications of 
Trident being cancelled by an administration which was still committed to 
the possession of a British nuclear force. 
The Chapter concludes by arguing that all the options discussed are 
variants based on continuing acceptance of the fundamental tenets of UK 
and NATO defence policy. Which particular policy is adopted, therefore, 
will be a result mainly of economic pressure and the electoral fortune of 
the various parties. 
2. The Costs of Trident 
The political consensus in support of Britain's nuclear force has 
been less than absolute since the early 1960's. The lack of credible 
scenarios for its use has meant that, for many on the centre and left of 
the political spectrum, it has been regarded primarily as a contribution 
to NATO's nuclear force, rather than a fully independent 'deterrent'. 
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The continuing decline in Britain's economy, together with the partial 
withdrawal from Great Power pretensions, has further eroded the belief 
that the country requires the place at the 'top table' which, it had been 
believed, nuclear weapons secured. A significant, and growing, section of 
the political elite has regarded the nuclear force as a marginal 
commitment. It has supported the possession of a strategic force because 
of the way it has reinforced the 'special relationship' with the U. S., and 
because of straightforward inertia. But it has recognized that it must be 
balanced against other spending commitments - military and civilian. As 
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt recently made clear, support for an independent 
nuclear force, in his view, must be contingent upon its cost remaining 
relatively low: 
"The need for a British independent nuclear 
deterrent has never seemed to me to be self- 
evident. If it did not exist, I doubt if it would 
now be invented. However, I have slowly and 
reluctantly come to the conclusion that in this 
changing and imperfect world a force should be 
kept. The present cost is small and the insurance 
worth having. But what if the cost turns out not 
to be small? If the opportunity cost of Trident 
meant that the conventional forces were 
significantly weakened? Then I think alternative 
forces would have to be looked at ... No 
strategic system would be cheap and none would be 
as good as Trident, and in the climate of an 
agonizing re-appraisal there would obviously be 
the alternative course of giving up the strategic 
nuclear deterrent altogether". (1) 
Although the national nuclear force has survived past threats to its 
existence largely because of its low cost, these costs are, nevertheless, 
substantial. In 1983-84, according to the annual Defence White Paper, 
E382 million was budgeted for the strategic nuclear force. (2) In 
addition, according to independent estimates, a further E736 million was 
spent on related support costs -R&D, training, administration and 
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repairs. In total E1100 million, or 7% of the total defence budget, was 
devoted to the strategic nuclear force, f-1,000 million excluding 
Trident. (3) 
In addition to the direct cost of the strategic nuclear force, there 
are substantial resources devoted to the procurement and operation of 
tactical nuclear svstems. Nuclear strike is one of the main missions of 
the Tornado GR1 aircraft, which has taken up a large proportion of the 
RAF's procurement spending over the past decade. Other fixed wing 
aircraft also have a nuclear role, including Jaguars, Buccaneers, Nimrods, 
and, in the near future, Harrier GR51s. The Royal Navy's ASW helicopters 
are designed to carry nuclear depth charges, and its Sea Harriers are 
capable of delivering free-fall nuclear bombs. Finally, the British Army 
on the Rhine has one regiment of Lance missiles, which have a nuclear-only 
role, and five regiments of nuclear-capable artillery. (4) Because 
nearly all of these systems are 'dual-capable', i. e. they can deliver 
either nuclear or conventional explosives, it is impossible to allocate 
most of the expenditure on them into conventional and nuclear categories. 
In common with other areas of public spending, however, the rate of 
change in the cost of an item stimulates political comment or concern much 
more readily than its absolute level. Nuclear weapons spending, as a 
proportion of defence spending, is much lower than in the 1950's, when the 
V-bomber force took as much as 20% of the total. (5) The political 
controversy attached to nuclear weapons has also been restricted as a 
result of the exceptional secrecy surrounding some of the major projects 
involved, notably the Chevaline development in the 1970's. 
In contrast to that project, the costs of the Trident programme have 
been a focus of public controversy since the initial government decision 
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was announced in 1980. The marked rise in nuclear weapons spending which 
Trident will require is likely to create major problems for the defence 
budget as a whole. It will ensure that the existence of an independent 
nuclear force will be a matter of political controversy at least until the 
next General Election. 
2.1 Defence Commitments and Resources 1975-85 
Since the 19501s, successive governments have faced tensions between 
Britain's extensive military commitments and the limited resources 
available for defence. As a consequence of the aspiration to remain a 
Great Power, it has spent a greater proportion of its national income on 
the military than any of its major European NATO allies. At the same 
time, and partly as a result of this heavy military burden, it has had an 
economic growth rate that has been consistently poorer than that of most 
other advanced capitalist countries. Although Britain has continued to 
spend more on defence, proportionately compared with its allies, therefore, 
it has still had to curtail its military commitments to remain within the 
constraints imposed by a laggard economy. (6) 
In the 1960's and early 1970's, substantial reductions in defence 
commitments were made by the withdrawal from East of Suez. Between 1964-5 
and 1974-5, defence spending in real terms only rose from E12,412 million 
to f-13,327 million (at 1984/85 prices), an increase of 7.4%. (7) This 
enabled the proportion of G. D. P. used for the military to decline from 
5.9% to 4.9%. This remained, however, considerably higher than the 
military burdens in West Germany (3.6% of G. D. P. ), France (3.8%), the 
Netherlands (3.4%) and Italy (2.5%). (8) 
By the mid 1970's there were few additional savings that could be 
made by further East of Suez withdrawals. At the same time, pressures for 
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reductions, in Britain's defence budget were intensifying. The country's 
poor relative economic performance combined with an international economic 
crisis to produce a squeeze on government spending as a whole, and on 
defence spending in particular. Between 1974/5 and 1978/9, defence 
spending rose from f-13,327 million to f-13,370 million (at 1984/5 prices) - 
an increase of only 0.3%. (9) 
As a result of the intensifying technological contest between the 
superpowers, the 1970's also saw a rapid rise in the sophistication of 
conventional weapon systems, and consequently in their unit cost. 
Ministries of Defence found that in order to maintain the numerical 
strength of their arsenals of major weapons, they had to spend an 
increasing amount each year in real terms. British procurement was not 
exempt from these pressures. 
The Labour government in the late 1970s was not prepared, however, 
to respond to these trends by making reductions in those military 
commitments that remained after the completion of East of Suez withdrawal. 
It went ahead, in secret, with the Chevaline improvement programme for 
Polaris. It confirmed the programme for production of three 1A. S. W. 
carriers", thus effectively reversing the 1966 decision not to replace 
Britain's aircraft carriers. It went ahead with the order for 385 Tornado 
aircraft, in a multinational programme which would eventually cost Britain 
alone E13,400 million (at 1984/5 prices). (10) As a consequence of the 
determination to press ahead with all these projects, and others, total 
equipment spending rose from E4,167 million in 1974/5 to E5,352 million in 
1978/9 -a rise of 28%. (11) 
To pay for this increase in equipment spending, other components of 
the defence budget had to be squeezed. Numbers employed and relative pay 
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levels'were cut. Economies were made in fuel, maintenance and'stores. 
Between 1974/5 and 1978/9 non-equipment spending fell by 12.5% from E9,160 
million to E8,019 million. 
These cuts were, by their nature, temporary economies. They were a 
clear reflection of the inability of the Labour government to reconcile 
its desire to reduct the burden of military spending on the economy and 
its desire to maintain its existing military commitments to NATO. Even 
before Labour's 1979 election defeat, it was clear that a major spending 
increase was needed to restore these short-term cuts. For its first two 
years in office, the new Conservative government spent little more than 
had already been budgeted by its Labour predecessor. 
In addition to restoring the temporary cuts of the late 1970's, 
however, the Conservatives soon made clear that further increases in 
defence spending would take priority over social programmes. Against a 
background of rising international tension, the government agreed to meet 
the NATO target of 3% annual real growth until 1986-. (12) Between 1978/9 
and 1985/6 the total defence budget increased from E13,370 million to 
E17,354 million'(at 1984/5 prices) - an increase of 29.8%. (13) The 
proportion of national income-spent on the military rose to 5.3% in 1984/5 
its highest level since 1967, before falling to 5.1% in 1985/6. 
Moreover, the increase was particularly marked in the new equipment 
budget, which rose by 54% between 1978/9 and 1985/6. This remarkable 
increase was devoted to modernisation of existing forces, rather than 
increasing their size. The strength of the armed forces remained 
constant, while the number of civilian employees fell; and spending on 
armed forces personnel stayed relatively constant. (14) 
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The large increase in military spending in the early 19801s. took 
place against a background of a further deterioration in Britain's overall 
economic performance. This in turn led to reduced tax revenues, increased 
unemployment and a growing social security budget. The government's 
financial position was saved from being considerably worse only by an 
increase in state oil revenues from E0.6 billion in 1978/9 to E11.5 
billion in 1985/6. (15) This in turn allowed total government spending 
to be shielded from the full impact of recession, increasing from 43% of 
G. D. P. in 1978/9 to 44 1/2% in 1985/6. (16) 
Despite the overall growth in public spending, however, increases in 
expenditure on defence and social security had to be accompanied by cuts 
in other areas in order to keep within overall budgetary limits. In*a 
clear reflection of the new government's priorities, overseas aid spending 
fell 12% between 1978/9 and 1985/6, housing by 59%, education and science 
by 1% and trade and industry by 56%. (17) 
The pressures on government spending are likely to increase in the 
late 1980's. On current estimates, North Sea oil revenues could fall from 
E11.5 billion in 1985/6 to as little as E6 1/2 billion in 1986/7. If the 
world oil price falls further, or if sterling rises against the dollar, 
even these estimates may prove overoptimistic. (18) At the same time, 
the government is finding it increasingly difficult to find further 
savings in social and economic programmes. Indeed powerful demographic 
and political pressures are now working for increased spending in some of 
these areas, notably infrastructural investment and social spending. In 
these circumstances, the Treasury has clearly convinced the government as 
a whole that defence spending can no longer enjoy the exceptional priority 
it has enjoyed between 1979 and 1985. 
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The assumption that defence spending growth must be reduced, or 
ended, after 1985/6 is-a longstanding one. In 1980 Defence Secretary 
Francis Pym indicated that his Ministry was basing its long term planning 
on the working assumption of one percent real annual growth after 1985/6. 
(19) After his 1981 Defence review, Secretary of State John Nott informed 
the Commons Defence Committee: "I am assuming nil growth beyond (1985/6) 
for the purposes of planning. " (20) In 1983, the Ministry of Defence was 
forced to concede that no real growth could be allowed in 1986/7. (21) 
Since 1983, the squeeze on the Ministry of Defence's budget has 
increased. Public spending plans announced in late 1985 provide for a6 
1/2% real cut in defence spending between 1985/6 and 1988/9. (22) 
Further reductions in subsequent years are a distinct possibility. The 
high priority which the current government gives to reducing the overall 
level of taxation has now ensured that the defence budget can no longer be 
exempted from the drive for economies in public spending. 
2.2 Trident and the Defence Budget 
Because of the rapid growth in their sophistication and 
capabilities, most major weapons systems cost considerably more per unit 
than those systems they replace. It is this inexorable rise in unit cost, 
rather than increased numerical strength, that has been the driving force 
behind the 87% real increase in equipment spending between 1974/5 and 
1984/5. (23) 
The Trident programme is no exception to this general trend. The 
cost of the original Polaris programme was approximately E2,300 million at 
1984/5 prices. (24) The two major modernisation programmes for Polaris, 
the Chevaline programme and the re-motoring programme, are estimated to 
have cost E2,200 million and E339 million respectively. (25) On official 
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estimates, Trident will cost E9.3 billion at 1986/7 prices - more than 
four times the real cost of the original Polaris project. (26) 
Moreover, for a number of reasons, this estimate may itself be an 
underestimate of the total capital cost of Trident. Firstly, it excludes 
the costs of a number of programmes which are closely related to the 
project and would not be necessary if Trident were cancelled. The cost of 
developing new production and research facilities at Aldermaston Atomic 
Weapons Research Establishment will be E325 million. These facilities 
"are required for purposes other than Trident but on which Trident in- 
service dates depend. " (27) A further E200 million of public funds is 
being spent on improvements to construction facilities at Vickers 
shipyards in Barrow in Furness, which will be used used partly for 
Trident. (28) In return for favourable terms on the R&D component of 
Trident spending in the U. S., Britain has agreed to man Rapier air 
defences for U. S. bases in the UK -a further cost of around f-160 million. 
(29) 
Secondly, the implementation of the Trident programme is dependent 
upon the development- of a number of new facilities and equipments which 
will be used for both Trident and for Britain's attack submarines. These 
include the improvement of docking facilities at Faslane, the development 
of an entirely new sonar system, the development of the PWR2 power plant, 
and the development of new communications systems between submarines and 
shore-based command. (30) Yet none of the development cost of these 
programmes is included in Trident costings. Only the production cost of 
those units to be installed in the four Trident submarines is included. 
Thirdly, it must be unclear whetheý sufficient 'contingency' 
provision has been made for unforeseen escalation in costs. The D5 
missile has just begun test firings in 1987 and cost estimates must 
remain speculative. Both the PWR2 reactor and sonar programme are 
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still in the development stage, and their costs may escalate in the light 
of new threat assessments and/or unforeseen technical difficulties. The 
construction of the submarines themselves has only just started, and there 
remains widespread concern as to the efficiency of naval dockyards which 
may affect the cost of this component too. (31) 
The difficulties of accommodating Trident spending within the 
defence budget, even on official cost estimates, will be greatly increased 
by the reduction of total defence spending in real terms during the years 
in which annual spending on the project is due to rise most steeply. 
Between 1984/5 and 1989/90, we estimate that Trident spending will 
increase from E163 million (at 1984/5 prices) to E900 million. Yet over 
the same period total defence spending is likely to fall by, around 8% 
in real terms. In consequence, the resources available for conventional 
defence will fall by around 12% in real terms. (32) 
It seems clear that the MoD is relying on a series of measures to 
increase efficiency , to avoid or at least postpone the defence review 
that is likely to be the eventual result of these trends. The target set 
by the Chief of Defence Procurement, Peter Levene, of a saving on 
procurement costs of "in excess of ten per cent" is likely to be crucial 
in this process. (33) Such a saving, which would apply to both new 
equipment and spares, would release at least E800 million per annum. 
Together with continuing reductions in civil service numbers, it would, if 
achieved, go a long way towards preventing a major crisis. 
There must Ue severe doubts as to whether such large savings can be 
realised in the short term. The small number of domestic producers for 
many items of military equipment, together with the absence of effective 
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international competition, makes an increase in competitive tendering 
difficult to achieve. And the increased emphasis on collaborative 
projects is likely to reduce, not increase, the incentives for 
'goldplating' of weapon specifications. 
Few outside observers therefore believe that the government will be 
able to avoid making hard choices on defence spending priorities in the 
near future., In what ways the MoD would bring its commitments within the 
resources available cannot easily be predicted. What is clear is that the 
form that these economies take will have a major effect on the situation 
that will face whichever party forms the government in the late 1980's. 
To the extent that the government relies on short term expedients - pay 
restraint, stock rundowns, or simple financial juggling - it will be more 
difficult for a new government to avoid some compensatory increases. If, 
however, the government is able to avert a defence spending crisis by 
reductions in commitments and/or genuine improvements in efficiency, the 
pressure on its successor is lik -y 
to be reduced. 
3. Continuing Current Policy 
The most likely option in theimmediate future, at least until the 
next General Election, is a continuation of current policy. The 
government's commitment to the Trident programme is firm, and the 
proportion of expenditure incurred rises rapidly in 1987 and 1988. Only a 
very large increase in the total estimated cost of the programme would, at 
this stage, be likely to persuade a majority Conservative government that 
a review of the Trident decision were necessary. 
Yet, in contrast with many other major weapons programmes, the cost 
of Trident has remained remarkably stable in real terms since the 
decision, in March 1982, to buy the D5 system. In constant 1984-5 prices, 
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the cost estimate made in 1982 was equivalent to E8750 million. The 
latest cost estimate, made in 1987 was E9.28 million at 1986/7 prices, or 
E8,500 million at 1984/5 prices. (34) 
By the end of the financial year 1987/8, around E1650 million (at 
1984/5 prices) will have been spent on the Trident programme, according to 
current plans, and perhaps another E1000 million will have been 
contractually committed. ' Any government that emerges from the General 
Election in 1988, therefore, may find that the budgetary advantages of 
cancelling Trident, but purchasing an alternative Polaris replacement, are 
considerably less than they appeared in 1983. 
Moreover, as Chapter 5 discussed, many of the canvassed alternatives 
to Trident are much less attractive to proponents of a national nuclear 
force than they might at first appear. Some would be vulnerable to 
comparatively modest, and thus quite plausible, improvements in superpower 
ballistic missile defences or pre-emptive capabilities over the next 20 or 
25 years. Yet any system that could not be counted upon to survive and 
overcome such defences at least until around 2005-2010 could hardly be 
regarded as a cost effective replacement for Polaris, which is due to 
remain in service until the mid 1990's. 
In addition, by 1988 there might also be questions as to whether 
alternative systems could be brought into service without expensive 
extensions to the lifetime of Polaris. Current plans envisage the 
retirement of the Polaris boats between i994 and 1997. If this is 
delayed, extra spending will have to be incurred on further submarine 
refits. If a complete fourth refit is necessary, it is unlikely to be 
less expensive than the third refit, which is estimated to have cost 
around E500 million at 1984/5 prices for all four submarines. (35) 
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A new government which wished to retain Britain's nuclear force for 
domestic political and symbolic purposes, might still decide to replace 
Trident by a cheaper system even if it were not likely to fulfil the 
criteria of survivability and penetrability until now thought necessary. 
This possibility is discussed further in Section 5 of this chapter. 
Under a Conservative government at any rate, a continuation of the 
defence policies of the last decade appears the most likely possibility 
for the late 19801s. This would involve not only a continuation of the 
Trident programme. It would mean that the relationship with the U. S. 
would continue to be central to foreign policy, where necessary at the 
expense of intra-European ties. Such a government would not seek to 
reduce the presence of U. S. nuclear forces in Britain, or impose a veto in 
their use. It would seek to maintain the current size of Britain's 
conventional commitment to NATO, while also continuing to implement 
equipment modernisation programmes for all three services. 
Unless there is a major shift in the policy of other NATO countries, 
or a growth in support for alternative policies within the Government 
party, the main problem such an approach will face is likely to be 
financial rather than political. Both the U. S. and Britain's major 
European allies would, at least under current administrations ? 
be likely to 
welcome a continued British willingness to bear a disproportionate share 
of NATO's military costs, while simultaneously playing a subordinate role 
to the U. S. in foreign and defence policy making. 
The financial problems that a continuation of current defence policy 
will encounter are, however, substantial. Since the 19501s, the U. K. 's 
rate of economic growth has been consistently lower than other West 
European states. If this trend continues, the government will find it 
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increasingly difficult to maintain a level of military spending roughly 
equivalent to those of France and West Germany. It will find itself faced 
with three choices. First, it could accept a further increase in the gap 
between the defence burdens of the U. K. and other NATO-European countries. 
Second, it might concede that the share that Britain's military effort 
takes in NATO's forces as a whole will have to diminish. Or, thirdly, 
savings in military spending might be sought that do not affect Britain's 
NATO contribution. We now assess the consequences of each of these three 
options in turn. 
The first option is the one pursued in the early 19801s. Although 
the U. K. 's GDP continued to grow at a slower rate than other European 
countries, the level of military spending increased more rapidly than 
elsewhere. The result was an increase in the proportion of U. K. national 
income devoted to defence from 4.5% in 1978/9 to 5.2% in 1985/6. By 
comparison, other NATO-Europe states continued to spend, on average, 
around 3.6% of national income on the military. . 
(36) 
After 1985/6, however, the British government has made clear that it 
does not intend to make any further real increases in military spending. 
Indeed, as we have already seen, there could be a decline of more than 
ten percent in the level of spending on conventional defence. Such plans 
if implemented, will create severe problems for the maintenance of 
Britain's position within NATO. For, if the arms race between the blocs 
in Europe continues, and this is reflected in continued growth in military 
spending of major NATO members, Britain will find it increasingly 
difficult to maintain its current share of NATO-Europe's military effort. 
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It is therefore possible that the next decade will be characterised 
by a stable, or rising, proportion of NATO-Europe's GDP being devoted to 
the military. This is particularly likely if the level of inter-bloc 
tension continues, and/or there is growing pressure for increased European 
contributions to NATO. In these circumstances, if we assume an average 
GDP growth in Western Europe of 3 per cent per annum, the resources 
devoted to the military by NATO-Europe will increase by 34% or more over 
the next decade. 
For Britain to maintain the relative position of its forces within 
NATO-Europe, it is likely to be under pressure to make a comparable 
increase. Yet if Britain's GDP growth rate continues to lag behind that 
of the European countries, acceding to such pressure would require a 
further increase in the proportion of GDP devoted from defence - from 5.2% 
in 1985/6 to as much as 6.3% in 1995/6. (37) In a period of low growth 
and declining oil revenues, even a Conservative government would find it 
almost impossible to sustain such an increased priority for military 
spending. 
It is possible, though not probable, that the next decade may see 
some easing of tensions and a relaxation in the pace of the arms race in 
Europe. NATO as a whole may find itself able to reduce the proportion of 
GDP it devoted to defence. As a result, Britain may find the pressures on 
its defence budget somewhat reduced. 
Such a scenario would not necessarily prevent a widening gap between 
the military burdens of the U. K. and its European partnets. If, for 
example, we assume NATO-Europe increases its real military spending by 
only one per cent per annum, while GDP grows at three per cent per annum, 
the average military burden would fall from 3.6% of GDP to 2.9%. If 
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Britain's economy grew at the slower rate of one percent per annum, 
however, keeping up with NATO-Europe would mean that the U. K. military 
burden would remain at 5.2% of GDP. The ratio between the U. K. and 
average European military burden would rise from 144% to 179%. Such an 
increase would be a significant increase in the relative burden placed on 
Britain's economy in international competition, one which a British 
government might be reluctant to accept. 
If the U. K. 's rate of economic growth continues to lag behind that 
of other NATO members, therefore, it is probable that it will be unable to 
maintain the current relationship between its total military effort and 
that of its main allies. For example, were the U. K. to continue to spend 
5.2% of GDP on he military, while West Germany continued to spend 3.3%, 
the difference in growth rates would mean that within a decade, British 
military spending would fall from 111% of West German spending at present 
to 91% in 1995/6. (38) Such a trend would in turn mean either a relative 
dimunition of the quality of Britain's forces relative to those of other 
NATO members, for example by a much slower introduction of new weapons 
systems; or it would require a reduction in the size of Britain's forces 
relative to those of its allies, for example by a reduction in the size of 
the Army and RAF contingents in Germany. 
Such reductions in the quality or quantity of Britain's NATO 
contribution, would be certain to reduce its bargaining power within the 
Alliance, perhaps leading to the displacement of British officers from 
some senior NATO commands. Such a development would bring the trade-off 
between nuclear aad conventional military commitmentieven more sharply 
into focus. 
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The government currently argues that such difficult choices will not 
be necessary, and that the resources available over the next decade are 
sufficient to finance both nuclear and conventional committments. The 
main thrust of policy in the late 1980's will be on measures to increase 
efficiency in military support and procurement. It is hoped that these 
measures will enable planned programmes of equipment modernisation to be 
completed without further increases in funding. (39) 
A number of recent studies have suggested that there may indeed be 
scope for substantial increases in efficiency, especially in procurement 
policy. (40) Yet the extent for savings is likely to be severely limited 
by the policy of "buy British" in arms procurement, which in many cases 
leaves the MoD reliant on monopoly suppliers. Moreover the trend towards 
increased European collaboration, insofar as it replaces national with 
European monopolies, is unlikely to radically alter this constraint. 
As a result of these considerations, there is a growing body of 
opinion arguing for a policy of opening up procurement to genuine 
international competition. Defence economist Keith Hartley recently 
argued that: 
"If society wishes to introduce more cost 
efficiency into weapons procurement, then 
competition is a possible solution. A 
competitive procurement policy for the UK would 
have the following characteristics: 
1. A willingness to shop around for weapons and 
not to restrict purchases to UK firms. 
2. Abolition of entry barriers into the UK 
market, allowing foreign firms to compete for 
British defence business. 
Clearly the introduction of real competition into 
UK weapons markets will be opposed by those firms 
currently benefitting from protection. Change is 
likely to be costly, but tax payers will be 
eternally grateful! " (41) 
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Such a policy would undoubtedly help to increase the cost- 
effectiveness of Britain's military spending. It would allow, for any 
given level of spending, a greater military capability. And it might 
therefore contribute to the postponement of cuts in the strength of UK 
front-line forces. It would, however, be fraught with political 
difficulties. For it would bring the government into direct conflict with 
the industrial interests, and associated MP's, who provide much of the 
domestic support for high levels of military spending. It would be highly 
questionable, therefore, whether the perceived political costs of reducing 
the protection from overseas competition, given to arms producers would be 
any less than those resulting from cuts in the military effectiveness of 
the armed forces. 
If radical changes in the policy of "buy British" are ruled out, a 
government which sought to maintain its current position in NATO might 
turn instead to 'out-of-areal commitments for savings. In this area, 
however, a Conservative government will also face difficult problems. It 
would require a significant change in policy for a settlement to be 
reached, that would allow a withdrawal of forces from the major 'out-of- 
area$ commitment, the Falklands. Moreover, by the late 1980's, the 
immediate savings from such a move will be relatively small. On current 
plans, the marginal costs of the Falklands commitment will have fallen to 
E124 million by 1989/90 - less than 1% of the total military budget. 
(42) 
If a Falklands settlement can be reached, and consequent savings 
made, there might then be a greater willingness to contemplate a further 
reduction in Britain's general capabilities for 'out-of-areal operations. 
Such capabilities, however, are now largely dual purpose in nature - 
I 
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designed for use both in Europe and elsewhere. We shall therefore return 
to the consequences of such a policy - which would probably be largely at 
the expense of the Royal Navy's surface fleet - in the next section. 
To summarise, a Conservative government in the late 1980's and 
1990's is likely to attempt to continue the main elements of current 
policy. Its success in this effort will'depend to a large extent on the 
overall performance of the economy. If Britain's rate of economic growth 
continues to lag significantly behind those of its major European allies, 
and the MoD is unable to secure large savings through more efficient 
weapons procurment, cuts in the contribution to NATO conventional forces, 
at least relative to other countries, will become inevitable. The 
political consequences of such a decline could negate any possible 
prestige gains from the Trident programme. Certainly they would ensure 
that the trade-off between nuclear and conventional forces continues to be 
a source of considerable political controversy. 
4. The Gaullist Ootion 
If financial pressures on the defence budget increase, there are 
some who would wish to respond by giving increased emphasis in foreign and 
defence policy to what are perceived as specifically national roles and 
national interests. This was the central argument of Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Hill-Norton, who was Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of 
NATO's Military Committee: 
.1 
.... particularly since the middle 1960's Britain has been at extreme pains to prove herself the 
best of European and Atlantic Allies. She has 
done her national interest considerable damage in 
the process ..... It is now time to re-establish 
our autonomy as a medium power, to provide forces 
- as do our Allies - which most effectively 
safeguard the national interests wherever 
appropriate". (43) 
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A focus on specifically national tasks, in this formulation, would 
involve top priority being given to (a) independent nuclear forces, both 
strategic and tactical; (b) conventional defence of the UK homeland; and 
(c) an independent capability for intervention outside the NATO area in 
defence of perceived national interests. It would mean that the bulk of 
savings in any Defence Review would come from the Army and RAF's forces 
assigned to Central Europe. As Michael Chichester and Conservative MP 
John Wilkinson have argued: 
"in the face of escalating defence costs 
and budget limitations the rigid maintenace of 
the Brussels Treaty commitment by the UK to 
maintain three divisions and a tactical air force 
permanently in Western Europe in peacetime until 
1992 is now creating an unacceptable degree of 
imbalance in the structure of the British armed 
forces. A renegotiation of this commitment has 
become a matter of urgency". (44) 
Such an option undoubtedly would appeal to some of the more national 
1st elements of political opinion, and might be one to which Mrs Thatcher 
and her colleagues would turn if a defence review becomes inevitable. It 
would accord with the suspicion of European integration still widespread 
in the Conservative Party, and which is a particular characteristic of Mrs 
Thatcher's leadership. Given the electoral dividends from the 1982 
Falklands war, and emphasis on national rather than Allied interests, it 
might also be perceived as a means of forging a new consensus on defence 
and foreign policy. 
Such an approach could be characterised as 'Gaullist' in its clear 
parallels with the policies pursued by France in the 19601s, and to some 
extent in subsequent years. President de Gaulle and his immediate 
successors gave top priority to the force de frappe and to France's 
capabilities for rapid overseas intervention while cutting back sharply in 
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forces for conventional war in Europe. They appeared to succeed in 
forging a remarkable political consensus behind a policy that clearly put 
perceived national interests above Alliance ones, even to the extent of 
remaining outside NATO's integrated military command structure. 
It seems most unlikely that a British government will attempt a 
fully fledged Gaullist option. For it would require, at the very least, 
an end to the current dependence on the United States for the maintenance 
and modernisation of the strategic nuclear force. And, were national 
interest to be given top priority, it is at least possible that British 
Gaullists would also demand the removal of US bases from UK soil, as 
France did in the 1960's. 
A policy of this nature would, in current circumstances) , 
be likely to be supported by a majority of the British public. It would, 
increase the perceived legitimacy of the, ýnational nuclear force by ending 
its reliance on US systems and support, and would respond to the majority 
view that Britain needs its own 'Bomb'. The expulsion of US nuclear bases, 
and possibly others as well, might also be welcomed by many on the Left 
and Right as an assertion of national will against a power now widely seen 
as, at best, insensitive to British interests. It is ironic that, of all 
the options theoretically open to a British Government, this is perhaps 
the most improbable. For it appears inconceivable that any of the major 
British political parties would wish to expel US nuclear bases without 
also wishing to end Britain's own nuclear commitments. 
Even if a neo-Gaullist option did not involve the expulsion of US 
bases, it would involve substantial problems for the government. A 
British-produced nuclear force would be considerably more expensive than 
Trident since it would have to involve independent research and 
development in areas of technology, such as ballistic missiles, in which 
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British industry has little recent experience. There is little doubt 
that, given sufficient resources, Britain could develop an independent 
strategic nuclear force. The experience of France, which spends 20% of 
its military budget on nuclear systems, (45) may suggest, however, that 
the cost of such a move would be unacceptably high. Without a prior US 
decision to cut off aid to Britain's nuclear force, it is difficult to 
imagine a British government voluntary taking on such problems. 
It is nevertheless possible that a Conservative government might 
consider a diluted form of neo-Gaullism, which combined an increased 
emphasis on specifically national priorities with a continued acceptance 
of the special nuclear relationship with the US. This would involve a 
continuing acceptance of US nuclear bases and the US dependent Trident 
programme. Where it would differ from current policy would be in the high 
priority given to global intervention capabilities, and general purpose 
maritime forces, over commitments to NATO's Central Front. 
Such a policy could allow Britain to make a greater military 
contribution to the US's efforts to maintain Western dominance outside 
Europe. In addition, it would allow Britain to concentrate its resources 
on the area where it is said to have both a 'comparative advantage' and an 
immediate national interest - its air and sea forces for defence of the 
North-East Atlantic. By contrast, UK air and land forces committed to the 
collective defence of West Germany would be left to bear the brunt of any 
economies needed in the next major defence review. Britain's European 
allies, it could be argued, would eventually adjust to such a change, just 
as they did to France's withdrawal from the integrated military command in 
the 19601s. 
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There would, however, be substantial opposition to such a 
reorientation from those who argue that Britain's current commitments in 
Central Europe play an important role in maintaining NATO's political 
cohesion. Although the British forces in Germany constitute only 6% of 
total NATO inplace strength (46) substantial reductions in this proportion 
would, it would be argued, be likely to induce other NATO members to 
rethink their commitments too. The already considerable pressure in the 
US Congress for reduction in the size of the US Army in Europe would be 
certain to increase. Similar forces would also be unleashed in Holland and 
Belgium. As Ken Booth has argued: 
"A run-down of Britain's conventional 
contribution to the Alliance, notably the British 
Army on the Rhine (BAOR), would have a far 
reaching effect on the perceptions of our 
allies ... it only requires a 'show of reluctance' 
on the part of the Europeans to meet their 
commitments - especially by major allies like 
Britain - and, the USA administration might find 
the pressures for reduction irresistible. " (47) 
The probability of such a 'domino' effect may be somewhat 
exaggerated. A reduction in the size of BAOR to 30,000 would constitute 
only a marginal reduction - of around 2% - in NATO's in-place strength. 
One has to assume that the commitment of other countries to the Central 
Front is extremely tentative if one is to believe that such a reduction 
could not be accepted without a total disintegration of NATO's defences in 
the Federal Republic. For such a withdrawal would leave the fundamental 
interests of the major countries with large troop commitments in the 
Central Region unchanged. The United States, with 282,000 active forces 
in the Central Region, West Germany with 426,000, and the Benelux 
countries, with 176,000, may be unlikely to quickly replace the 25,000 
departing UK troops. (48) But it seems at least possible that they will 
not, as a result, make large reductions of their own. All these countries 
already face considerable political, demographic and financial pressures 
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for troop reductions. Changes in the size of BAOR would, in comparison 
with such pressures, be unlikely to play a dominant role in determining 
the extent to which such reductions take place. 
Even if other NATO countries do not accelerate troop reductions as a 
result, however, a substantial reduction in Britain's commitment to the 
Central Front would involve political difficulties for the government. 
Most of its European allies would see such a move as further confirmation 
of the ambiguity of Britain's commitment to West European co-operation. 
It might also be seen as an attempt to preserve a military 'fall back 
option' for defence of the British Isles at the expense of that of Western 
Europe as a whole. Such perception could have damaging consequences for 
the UK in a wide range of negotiations in' both NATO and the EEC. The 
preference for the nuclear force, developed through a relationship with 
the US, over commitment to European cooperation would be seen as a clear 
echo of the events of 1962, and might have similar consequences. A 
partial withdrawal from the Central Front would be almost certain to mean 
the relinquishment of some of the senior NATO commands. that the UK 
currently hold. Perhaps of greater significance, it may also contribute 
to British isolation from moves to forge greater European co-operation in 
defence and foreign policy, and in arms procurement. 
It is possible that many Conservatives might accept such 
consequences as a necessary price to pay for the retention of a national 
nuclear force, the preservation of a blue-water Navy, and the continuation 
of the special relationship with the US. Such a course might be seen as a 
reassertion of the traditional orientation of foreign and defence policy, 
in the context of which the permanent commitment of troops to the European 
continent might be seen as a temporary aberration. 
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For a government to yield to such arguments, however, would require 
a clear-reversal of the trend in foreign policy toward increased European 
ties that has been under way since the 1960's. -And the possibility of 
such a trend would undoubtedly ensure that those members of the 
Conservative Party who favour closer industrial links with Europe, such as 
Michael Heseltine, would resist fiercely any reduction in BAOR. 
Nor will the US necessarily support a British move towards a more 
national and transatlantic military posture. Some sections of the US 
armed forces, notably the Navy, may welcome the retention of, or increase 
in, Britain's current surface fleet. But it appears unlikely that the 
Royal Navy would ever be permitted to develop forces of such a size that 
they could make a militarily significant addition to US capabilities for 
intervention outside Europe. The US is likely to continue to encourage 
participation and support by the UK and other European powers in 'out-of- 
area' conflicts. The purpose of such support, however, will be primarily 
to legitimise conflicts which are often potentially controversial within 
the US, and in which it may be thought important that not only American 
lives are'lost in the pursuit of interests supposedly shared by other NATO 
member governments. The US government cannot realistically expect, and 
may not even desire, a level of European forces that would begin to match 
US power projection capabilities. 
Moreover US decision-makers are much less inclined than their 
counterparts in Whitehall to view the relationship between their two 
countries as 'special'. The US is prepared to support the UK nuclear 
force in order to secure the continued loyalty of a reliable ally, ensure 
a continued base for US nuclear forces, and prevent moves towards a 
radical rethink of UK policy. Were the British government to propose 
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reductions in its commitment to NATO's conventional defences, however, 
large sections of US opinion would perceive such a move largely in terms 
of a general reluctance by European countries to share the burdens of 
alliance defence. And even to the extent that sympathetic members of the 
US elite did recognise the need for a British defence review, they would 
probably favour cuts in the UK nuclear force rather than in conventional 
force levels in Germany. 
Despite such potential opposition, it is at least possible that a 
Conservative government will decide to respond to a severe budgetary 
crisis by making cuts in forces committed to Central Europe. For such a 
change of emphasis to resolve the budgetary crisis, however, a transfer of 
forces from Germany to the UK would not be enough. It would also require 
a reduction in the numerical strength of the Army and the Air Force, an 
abandonment or major curtailment of equipment programmes for these 
services, and perhaps early retirement of some existing weapon systems. 
It might well be found necessary, if existing economic pressures for cuts 
in military spending intensify, to make cuts as sharp as those made in the 
late 1950's. At that time, the size of BAOR was reduced by 22,000, plans 
for a new fighter aircraft were abandoned, and the Second Tactical Air 
Force in Germany was cut by half in numbers in one year. (49) 
Prediction of events over the next decade is an inherently 
hazardous business. Yet the multiple obstacles that would confront a 
9nationalist' option in defence policy must make the probability of it 
being adopted relatively small. Indeed it now appears, as it did in the 
early 1980's, that if large cuts in commitments to Central Europe are 
ruled out, and the government remains committed to a national nuclear 
force, it will be the Navy's surface fleet that will be most at risk if a 
major defence review becomes necessary. The reaction of Britain's 
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European allies to reductions in naval forces in likely to be less 
vociferous than if cuts were made on the Central Front. And, with the US 
Navy having grown rapidly in strength in recent years, the military need 
for a particular size of British contribution to NATO's efforts in the 
North-East Atlantic may have diminished. The number of major ships - ASW 
carriers and assault ships -might be reduced, and any ambitions for full- 
scale carriers could be finally ended. The number of frigates and 
destroyers could be reduced from the current level of around 50 to 40 or 
less. 
Were such measures to be taken, they might prove sufficient to 
stabilise the level of spending on conventional naval equipment, balancing 
increases in the resources devoted to submarines and more modern weapon 
systems with a reduction in the number of surface ships. There must be 
some doubt, however, as to whether they will be enough to reduce 
significantly the share of non-nuclear naval spending in a static , or 
falling, total procurment budget. To do that, much deeper cuts in the 
Navy than were envisaged in the 1981 Review might then become necessary. 
I Such cuts would, however, be difficult to reconcile with a 
continuing government commitment to a meaningful 'out-of-areal role for 
the Royal Navy. The 1982 Falklands War stretched the armed forces to 
their limit, and provided the major reason for the reversal of most of the 
1981'plans for reductions in the surface navy. Were those plans to be 
revived, then the aspiration for Britain to have a continuing capability 
for major. intervention outside Europe would have to be severely curtailed. 
Yet as long as the Falklands dispute remained unresolved, cuts in the 
surface fleet could leave Britain vulnerable to a resurgence of Argentine 
military power. The current reduction in Argentine military spending 
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suggests that a challenge to British control of the Islands is not 
imminent. But this trend would be reversed if no political solution is 
found, or the government in Buenos Aires is changed. Certainly the need 
to prepare for such contingencies sets limits to the extent to which 
Britain can reduce its surface fleet, and its carriers and assault ships 
in particular, significantly below currently planned levels. Some 
reductions may still be possible, but it is doubtful whether they can 
provide sufficient savings to make major economies in other areas of the 
defence budget unnecessary. If the government is unwilling, or unable, to 
reach a settlement with Argentina, therefore, it may be forced to make 
reductions in Central Front capabilities, with all the political 
consequences that this is bound to involve. 
If the government faces a major defence budget crisis in the late 
19801s, its commitment to Trident will increasingly be seen, by both 
Britain's allies and by the British public, as being at the expense of 
major conventional capabilities. As a result the support for the 
programme is likely to diminish further. In these circumstances, even a 
government committed in principle to an independent strategic nuclear 
force may decide that it must be given a lower priority than under current 
plans. The next section discusses the potential implications of such a 
re-orientation. 
5. The 'Centrist' Option 
A large section of informed opinion now supports cancellation of 
Trident, while simultaneously favouring the maintenance both of an 
independent strategic nuclear force and of US bases. Such a policy is 
currently the official policy of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and 
it appears, of the Liberal Party. There may also be significant numbers 
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of Conservative and Labour MP's, dissatisfied with their own Parties' 
current positions, who would in some circumstances support such an option. 
If no single party has an overall majority after the next general 
election, an alternative of this nature - which may be labelled the 
2centrist option' -would be likely to be seriously considered as 
government policy. 
One of the arguments presented in favour of this option is that the 
Trident project will involve an increase in destructive power that is 
unnecessary for a 'minimum deterrent' force and which could threaten the 
prospects for arms control. Yet, if this quantitative escalation were the 
main reason for opposition to Trident, policies could be constructed which 
would effectively meet this criticism without cancellation of the entire 
project. A decision could be made, for example, to limit the number of 
warheads to a level that was judged 'acceptable' to public opinion and 
compatible with NATO's position in arms control negotiations. Such a 
reduction would be most likely to take the form of limits on the number of 
warheads per missile, since this would facilitate rapid expansion in 
numbers in the future were developments in Soviet and US ABM defences 
thought to make it necessary. (5-0) 
Indeed recent unconfirmed reports in the New Statesman claimed that 
the government was concealing how few nuclear warheads Britain is actually 
capable of producing. (51) These reports were inconsistent with all 
previous estimates of Britain's stockpile. (52) Were they to prove to be 
reasonably accurate, however, it is possible that the government could use 
such estimates to discredit the proposition that Trident represents a 
massive escalation in nuclear firepower. And, if pressure from the US for 
an arms control agreement appeared to make it necessary, verification 
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measures could probably be devised to assure the Soviet Union, and 
sceptical sections of the British public, that the UK's Trident missiles 
were not armed to their maximum capability. 
A further option of this type for the-government to consider would 
be to reduce the number of Trident submarines on order from four to three. 
(53) This would be similar to the Wilson government's 1964 decision to 
cancel the order for a fifth Polaris submarine. Because of the much less 
frequent need for refits with Trident compared with Polaris, this would 
not require any reduction in the number of boats on station at any one 
time. It would have the advantage of allowing savings of at least E550 
million and perhaps as much as E1000 million in capital costs alone. (54) 
For this proportionately small saving, however, the government would have 
to expose its successors to a much increased risk of accident or 
vulnerability to hostile ASW. In addition, since it would be the fourth 
boat in the series that would be cancelled, most of these savings would 
not be realised until towards the end of. the programme in the mid and late 
1990's. This might well be the decisive factor in persuading a new 
government against a three-boat option. (55) 
It must be recognised that, for those who favour an independent 
strategic force in principle, the 'escalation' arguments for Trident 
cancellation have always been secondary. As we have indicated these could 
be accommodated by appropriate adjustments to the programme. And even 
arguments based on the destabilising effects of Trident's counterforce 
potential, though still valid, are likely to have less force in potential 
debate if the number of warheads is limited to, say, 200 to 250 compared 
with the 500-900 currently discussed. For such a capability - with 3 or 4 
warheads per missile - would appear of marginal relevance in comparison 
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with the thousands of counterforce weapons that both the superpowers are 
likely to have developed in the 1990's. (56) Because of the requirement 
for boat refits, perhaps as few as 100-150 would be ready for use at any 
one time. Even in the unlikely event that Trident could be used with 
counterforce accuracy without US assistance, such a capability is unlikely 
to be viewed as adding significantly to the increasing strategic 
instability which the arms race between the superpowers is likely to 
create. It is more likely, given these trends - and the possibility of an 
arms race in space in particular - that Trident, like Polaris, will be 
viewed by other nuclear powers as militarily irrelevant, and effectively 
unuseable by a British government acting alone. 
The central argument against Trident by those who nevertheless 
favour a British strategic nuclear force is not doctrinal or on grounds of 
'escalation'. It'is, and always has been, financial. It is feared that 
the project will divert considerable resources away from conventional 
defence commitments. It is argued that Trident will require an increased 
proportion of the defence budget to be devoted to nuclear weapons at a 
time when both NATO commanders and the majority of the British public want 
an increased emphasis on conventional defences. 
A central question for these supporting a 'centrist' option, 
therefore, is whether there exists a plausible Polaris replacement option 
that could be substituted for Trident, and which could provide significant 
financial savings. By April 1988, it is estimated that around E1650 
million will already have been spent on Trident, and perhaps another E1000 
million committed. (57) For an alternative system to be significantly 
cheaper, therefore, it will probably have to cost less than E7000 million 
(at 1984/5 prices) for worthwhile savings to be made. If the real cost of 
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Trident increases faster than expected, however, it is possible that as 
much as E8000-L9000 million could be allocated to an alternative system 
while still yielding some savings. 
From the discussion in Chapter 5, we 
clear that a cheaper, yet credible, Polaris 
Some alternative forces - such as Poseidon, 
cruise missile submarines - may not prove m 
and would also be less adaptable to changes 
1990's and 2000's. 
have seen that it is far from 
replacement option exists. 
Trident, C4, or dedicated 
ich cheaper than Trident D5, 
in Soviet defences in the 
Other alternatives, such as using dualcapable attack submarines as 
launch platforms for cruise missiles, may appear relatively cheap. But 
they would be perceived by many as less effective as a 'last resort 
deterrent' than the small Polaris/Chevaline force is at present. Were 
such a force to be adopted as the replacement for Polaris, it would be 
likely to command even less public support than Trident does at present. 
Those who believe in a military-rationale for an independent nuclear force 
could claim that a force whose survival in a prolonged conventional war 
could not be guaranteed would be unreliable and a poor substitute for 
Trident. Moreover, such a force would invite a renewal of the criticism, 
expounded by Robert McNamara in the early 1960's, that: "weak nuclear 
capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to 
obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. " (58) 
Instability would, indeed, be increased if the British government felt 
that its strategic nuclear force could not be 'held back' through a crisis 
or limited war. As John Simpson has pointed out, 
"such a threat would have low techAical 
credibility compared with that posed by the 
Polaris and Trident systems. Many would argue 
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that in the,. event of hostilities it would invite 
a pre-emptive strike, and that it is more 
dangerous to possess a technically incredible 
strategic deterrent than no nuclear weapons at 
all. " (59) 
There are growing indications that members of the SDP and Liberal 
I 
parties recognise the problems involved in many of the national 
replacement options. As a result, there has been increasing discussion of 
possible nuclear collaboration with France. The 1985 SDP defence policy 
statement, for example, argues that: 
"We want to explore opportunities for nuclear 
weapons that are less dependent on the United 
States and more loosely connected with our 
European partners, as one of the purposes of the 
British nuclear force is to insure against the 
possibility of a future change in American policy 
of providing a nuclear guarantee to Europe. " 
(60) 
If the British government had wished to pursue such an option, 
however, the most appropriate time to have done so would have been in the 
late 1970's, before momentum had built up behind Trident. To adopt it in 
the late 1980's would involve a number of difficulties which, although not 
insurmountable, would be bound to weigh heavily in the minds of a new 
British government, particularly if it were unable to rely on a stable 
majority in Parliament. 
Firstly, the US government might perceive such a policy as based on 
suspicion of its own reliability as an ally, and could react by reducing 
the extent of its own commitments to NATO. The potential for US distrust 
could increase further were a UK deal with France to involve the use of 
information and technology first acquired from the US in the joint US-UK 
project. If such a distrust did develop, it could threaten Anglo-American 
ties in other areas, notably in joint intelligence operations. 
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For those in the US urging a greater self-reliance on the part of 
the European states within NATO, a shift in British orientation towards an 
Anglo-French deal would not necessarily be seen as undesirable. It might 
be perceived as an opportunity to reduce the US's reliance on 'first use' 
in defence of Western Europe, with France and Britain taking on the role 
relinquished by the US. 
Given its continued commitment to a US nuclear 'umbrella' in Europe, 
however, a British government would have severe misgivings about 
encouraging such a trend of thought in the US. They would fear that, the 
more that a European nuclear force becamý a practical possibility, the 
more the US would pull back it own forces. Indeed, it is possible, as one 
US analyst has proposed, that the US might even at some stage in the 
process threaten to withdraw its 'umbrella' entirely unless the European 
build a credible strategic force: 
"As long as wishful thinking Europeans delude 
themselves about the reality of American 
deterrence it will remain politically difficult, 
if not impossible, for European governments to 
accept responsibility for strategic 
deterrence.... Probably the only form of 
pressure strong enough .... is an American threat to disassociate its strategic forces from 
Europe's defence unless the Europeans bite the 
bullet. " (61) 
Secondly, even if the US were willing to accept a cancellation of 
the Trident programme in good spirit, it would also be necessary for the 
UK to enlist the support of the French government. Given the historical 
experience of mistrust between the two countries, and the considerable 
technical problems involved, such support could not be guaranteed. At the 
very least, a period of intense negotiations would be needed between 
adaption of a new policy in principle by the UK and a final agreement. 
This delay would increase the political ýisks for the British government 
contemplating such a course. For, if it cancelled Trident immediately on 
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taking office, it could not be certain that a deal with France could be 
reached at an acceptable price. If the government were to continue 
Trident pending the outcome of negotiations, however, the costs of 
cancellation would continue to mount every month. 
Thirdly, it is not impossible that these obstacles could be 
surmounted, particularly if the British government had a secure 
parliamentary majority and was therefore able to weather short term 
pressures. It is questionable, however, whether collaboration with France 
would provide a system that would be much less expensive than Trident. In 
order to be viable into the 21st century, both the cruise missile and 
ballistic missile options proposed would require substantial investment in 
command and control, counter-counter-measures, and probably in independent 
intelligence capabilities. 
Were Britain to purchase French SLBM's, it would acquire either the 
M4 missile, already in service, or the M5 missile, which is due to enter 
service with the French Navy in the mid 1990's. (62) In order to provide 
a force that has some chance of penetrating Soviet ABM defences in the 
21st century, acquisition of the M5 would appear to be the preferable long 
term option. The severe financial pressures on the French defence budget 
created by nuclear spending, however, could lead to its postponement or 
cancellation. If this occurs, Britain would have to buy the M4. if it 
wished to proceed with purchase of a French SLBM, despite some doubt as to 
whether such a system would constitute a credible force beyond the year 
2000. (63) 
Such a system, although it would carry a considerable risk that it 
would need substantial modernisation within a few years of entering 
service, would be unlikely to prove much less expensive than the more 
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sophisticated Trident D5 system. Only 14% of Trident project costs are on 
the missiles themselves, with perhaps a further 10% on related systems. 
(64) The cost has been substantially reduced because Britain has to pay 
only a nominal amount - E91 million at 1984-5 prices - towards US R&D 
costs. (65) Were Britain to enter collaboration with France, however, it 
would have to pay much more for development costs, especially if the M5 
project went ahead. On the cost of the missiles themselves, therefore, 
the UK could find themselves paying more in total than for Trident in 
return for a system that was much less sophisticated or durable. 
Nor is it clear that large savings could be made by reducing the 
expenditure on other items currently included in projected Trident 
spending. Expenditure on new submarines, together with associated 
tactical weapon systems, will still be necessary if a dedicated force is 
required. Indeed the more that has been spent on the Trident submarines 
by the time of a decision, the more likely it is that the M4 or M5, and 
new missile tubes, would simply be fitted into these. Substantial spendiny 
on warheads and shore construction would still be required; and, were US 
assistance to be ended, increased resources might have to be devoted to 
facilities for servicing the new missiles. In total, therefore, it is haY4ý 
to see a justification in purely financial terms for a decision to abandon 
Trident in favour of a purchase of French ballistic missiles. If such a 
decision is taken, it would have to be based on criteria other than cost 
comparisons. 
There would also be problems were a British government to attempt to 
convince France of the merit of a joint cruise missile programme. 
Technical development of cruise missiles, as compared with ballistic 
missiles, is at a relatively early stage. Substantial, and continuing, 
investment may be 
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needed to maintain a force capable of penetrating the Soviet 
countermeasures that could be developed over the next 25 years. In 
addition to the missile technology itself, the European states would need 
to acquire the support facilities necessary to operate a cruise missile 
force independently. As David Owen has pointed out: 
"if a European cruise missile is to be built and 
to be independent for its ground-hugging TERCOM 
guidance from American mapping information, it 
will need to be updated by information from 
European satellites. " (66) 
At least until the feasibility of a cruise missile force is proven, 
however, it seems likely that France will feel that it has to continue to 
invest large sums in the development of ballistic missiles. Although the 
British government may be prepared to abandon ballistic missiles in favour 
of cruise, France would, at least initially, be more likely to try to do 
both. The inevitable consequence of such a policy would be further stress 
on France's ability to sustain the level of its conventional forces, and 
further strains within NATO. 
Given information currently available, therefore, it appears that an 
Anglo-French strategic force would not contribute significantly to easing 
Britain's defence budget crisis in the late 19801s. Britain would still 
find itself under pressure to cut its conventional commitment to NATO 
while increasing the resources devoted to its strategic nuclear force. 
Such a shift in priorities might not take place in Britain alone. It 
could be paralleled by developments in France, where there might, as a 
result, be some support for Britain's position. It would, however, reduce 
the resources available for the improvement of NATO's conventional forces, 
the need for which has been a central feature of the arguments put forward 
by 'centrist' opponents of Trident. And, particularly if purchase of 
French SLBM's were financed by cuts in UK forces in Central Europet it 
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would be seen in this light by West Germany. 
A move designed to demonstrate 
British commitment to co-operation between NATO's European members might 
a fl. then havejentirely opposite political effect. 
6. Delavinq Polaris Replacement 
Both the national and Anglo-French alternatives to Trident, 
therefore, could prove either infeasible or undesirable once a new 
government has studied the options carefully. In these circumstances 
there would be two choices: either to continue the Trident programme, 
possibly with a reduced number of missiles or warheads, or to accept that 
there might be no replacement for the Polaris force once it reaches the 
end of its lifetime. 
A policy of maintaining Polaris, but making no provision for its 
replacement, would not be inconsistent with the position of these 
politicians who have argued that Britain's nuclear force is simply a 
'contribution' to NATO's nuclear deterrent, and who have denied the 
validity of independent rationales. Moreover, it would not necessarily be 
unpopular if carefully presented. The government could stress that 
Britain's nuclear force would not be abandoned unilaterally, but would be 
retained for a decade or more. Even after Polaris left service, Britain 
would still possess tactical nuclear systems. Indeed these could be 
upgraded, for example, by fitting cruise missiles to Tornado, to provide 
some limited capability to attack targets in the Soviet Union. (67) By 
measures of this sort the government might hope to minimise opposition 
from those who believe Britain should have its own 'bomb'. It might even 
be possible, over a period of years, that many Conservatives would come to 
accept a compromise solution along these lines. 
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Moreover such a policy would be able to gain substantial support 
from those who opp ose any role for nuclear weapons in defence policy as at 
least a step in the right direction. It would probably secure the support 
of large majorities in the Liberal and SDP parties, particularly if they 
were in government. Even in the Labour Party, support for such a policy 
could be mobilised. In general, 'centrist' politicians, whose main 
concern would be the political rather than military rationale for a 
British nuclear force, might see this option as an excellent way of 
reducing the degree of popular support for more radical measures of 
disarmament. 
It is difficult to predict whether such a policy would be feasible, 
even if a stable government could be formed from the parties most likely 
to support it. It would probably benefit from considerable public 
support, at least initially. And, by saving most of the funds allocated to 
Trident spending, it could help to postpone a defence budgetary crisis. 
Yet it would also be vulnerable to being reversed by those who still wish 
to acquire a replacement for Polaris, both in the Conservative Party and 
in the armed forces. At least until the Polaris submarines actually left 
service in the late 1990's, the need for an independent nuclear force 
would remain a matter for continuing political controversy. 
Moreover, such a policy would not meet the requirements of either - 
the peace movement or the Labour Party for-a radical new approach. For it 
would be based on acceptance of the fundamental tenets of the postwar 
interparty consensus on security issues. The 'special relationship' would 
continue to play a central role, with US nuclear bases being maintained 
and continuing commitment to a nuclear strategy for NATO being-made. 
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Indeed the phasing out o4 if accompanied with retention of both 
tactical nuclear weapons and U nuclear bases would be seen by Britain's 
allies as of marginal significance., It would be perceived as simply a 
further indication of Britain's result of continuing economic decline. 
Neither NATO, nor the world as a whole, would see it as based on a 
fundamental questioning of the foreign and defence policies on which the 
UK has based its security for the last 40 years. It will be the purpose 
of the final chapter of this thesis to discuss alternative policies based 
on precisely such a questioning. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined those options for the future of Britain's 
nuclear force which involve a continuing acceptance of the fundamental 
tenets of British and NATO defence policy. The continuation of such a 
policy, it is argued, may come under considerable strain as a result both 
of Britain's continuing economic decline, and of the additional burden 
imposed by the expensive Trident programme. In particular, the need for 
economies in Britain's conventional contribution to NATO may further 
undermine support for the retention of a semi-independent strategic 
force. 
Whether such options involved cuts in the maritime or the 
continental commitments, they would probably be associated with a decline 
in Britain's political influence within NATO. Provided that their 
rationale were seen as primarily economic, however, they could probably be 
contained without precipitating a fundamental crisis within NATO. It is 
possible that retrenchment in British conventional forces, particularly if 
it affected the commitment of 55000 troops to Germany, might strengthen 
the movement in the United States for a withdrawal of US troops. The 
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pressure for a reduction in the US presence in Europe, however, is likely 
to be more decisively influenced by other factors, of which domestic 
budgetary pressure and the general perception of European support for US 
global policy are perhaps the most decisive. British cuts in conventional 
forces would, I would argue, have a comparatively limited effect compared 
with these other factors. Provided that they were accompanied by 
continued support for NATO strategy, they could probably be contained 
without widespread consequences for the stability of NATO. 
The policies discussed in Chapter Eight, by contrast, are based on a 
fundamental questioning of the policies pursued by the US and by NATO. As 
a consequence, they would be much less likely to be seen as simply a 
response to economic decline; and much more likely to create instab; J41, 
within NATO. The case for pursuing such policies is the subject to which 
we now turn. 
li 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
IS THERE A NON-NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE? 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1950's, for reasons already discussed, there has been a 
significant minority in both the Labour and Liberal Parties opposed to 
the independent nuclear force and in favour of some form of non-nuclear 
defence policy. Until recently, however. these views have had relatively 
little impact on the actions in office of British governments. Even 
during periods of Labour government, as in 1964-70 and 1974-9, the impact 
of this dissident opinion has been mainly on the style of presentation of 
policy rather than on its substance. 
The last 6 years, however, have seen these more radical views 
gaining increased acceptance from secti6ns of political opinion 
previously committed to the prevailing inter-party consensus. The change 
in the policy of the Labour leadership has been particularly significant, 
with the adoption of a non-nuclear defence policy after its election 
defeat in 1979. The change in the position of Denis Healey, Defence 
Secretary in the 1960's and now Labour's foreign affairs spokesperson, 
indicates, moreover, that this shift in party policy has not been only a 
result of a shift in the balance of power towards the left within the 
Party. It also reflects the growing disenchantment of more middle-of-the- 
road Labour politicians with previous policy. (1) 
The change in the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties has not 
been as dramatic as in the Labour Party. Nevertheless, the Liberals have 
several MP's who are supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 
and others who would support more modest disarmament ý, ýjOiatives, such 
as the 'freeze'. Even the SDP, whose initial formation in 1981 was 
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precipitated in part by the LabourParty's adoption of a unilateralist 
stance, has many members attracted to a more disarmament-oriented defence 
policy, and it will find it difficult to reverse its stance opposing 
Trident. Were a non-Conservative government to be formed after the next 
General Election, therefore, it appears possible that defence and foreign 
policy will be subject to a more far-reaching reappraisal than at any 
time since the 1940's. 
The shift of opinion in Britain's main opposition parties is a 
result of several factors. The increase in tension between the 
superpowers in the late 1970's and early 1980's created a perception that 
the risks of war were increasing, and thus undermined support for nuclear 
deterrence. The policies and rhetoric of the Reagan administration 
further exacerbated the growing unease felt over the retreat from detente 
that had begun under President Carter. This unease was given added 
impetus, and focus, by the decisions, announced within months of each 
other, to deploy cruise missiles in Western Europe and to buy the Trident 
system to replace Polaris. 
The widespread concern over these developments was articulated most 
notably by a new generation of activistg, whose initial perceptions of 
international politics had often been decisively shaped by the 'first 
wave' of C. N. D. in the early 1960's, and the protests against the Vietnam 
war in the late 1960's, and were now beginning to take positions of 
influence in local and national politics. Combining in a well-organised 
peace movement, they helped to ensure that nuclear disarmament was placed 
near the top of the political agenda, and that both the Labour and 
Alliance parties were obliged to adjust their policies to take this 
change into account. (2) 
4 
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As opposition to nuclear weapons has gained more supportýwithin the 
major political parties, it has been accompanied by increasing interest 
in, and discussion of, alternative defence and foreign policies for 
Britain. Although this discussion is still at a relatively early stage, 
it has already produced a growing literature on 'non-nuclear defence', 
some of which provides an indication of the options which a disarmament- 
oriented government might consider. (3)' The purpose of this chapter will 
be to discuss the arguments for such policies, to discuss the problems 
that they are likely to encounter, and to assess the likelihood of their 
implementation. 
We begin in Section 2 by outlining the basic characteristics of a 
radical critiqueof the West's current reliance on a policy of nuclear 
deterrence. This critique is twofold: first, that current policy is 
immoral; and, second, that it is much more dangerous than its supporters 
claim. 
After thus outlining why existing policies are believed to be 
unacceptable, we discuss, in Section 3, proposals for alternative 
policies for Western Europe, and for the Western alliance as a whole, 
which are based on moving away from nuclear deterrence and reducing the 
risks of nuclear war. We discuss carefully the problems that may be 
involved with such proposals. 
Section 4 then considers the role that the British government could 
play in precipitating a new Western policy. In particular it discusses 
some of the specific measures-such as scrapping Britain's own nuclear 
force, expelling US nuclear bases, and working for No First Use within 
NATO - which have been suggested as being appropriate in bringing about 
such a policy. 
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Finally, in Section 5 we argue that, for radical disarmament 
policies to be fully successful, several conditions will have to be met, 
some of which are not under the control of the British government. It is 
possible that circumstances will be sufficiently favourable for a 
completely non-nuclear defence policy to be adopted and sustained. Those 
who support such a policy may, however, have to be prepared to accept, as 
a first stage, an incomplete accomplishment of their objective if more 
adverse circumstances prevail. It is doubtful, for example, whether 
radical disarmament policies, such as those proposed by the Labour Party, 
could succeed without support from at least some of Britain's NATO 
European allies, and without genuine, and substantial, reciprocation from 
the Soviet Union. And, since the long ýerm objectives of such policies 
will require sustained efforts over several parliamentary terms, it will 
also be essential to create a new consensus on security policy which no 
political party will feel able to overturn. 
2. The critigue of nuclear deterrence 
Central to most opposition to the policy of nuclear deterrence are 
two propositions. First, that it is by its nature morally unacceptable, 
and, second, that the risks of nuclear war which it involves are 
unacceptably high. Either of these two propositions, if correct, is, in 
my view, sufficient grounds for rejecting nuclear deterrence as the basis 
for long-term security. Together they constitute a powerful case for 
change. 
2.1 The moral case aqainst nuclear deterrence 
The moral case against nuclear deterrence has been most powerfully 
put in an abundant literature on the applications of the doctrine of the 
Just War. It has been argued that the use of nuclear weapons would 
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offend against most of the basic criteria which Judeo-Christian cultures 
have developed to assess whether acts of violence can be justified. In 
particular, the human cost of nuclear war would,. on any reasonable view, 
far outweigh any political gain for which it could conceivably be fought; 
and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep 
'collateral damage' -i. e. casualties amongst non-combatants - to 
acceptable levels given the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons 
and the difficulties involved in limiting the size of any nuclear 
exchange. (4) 
The recent discovery that a major nuclear war between the 
superpowers would be likely to create a global 'nuclear winter', with 
catastrophic consequences for the climate of the entire planet, has shown 
most dramatically that deterrence rests on a threat to carry out an act 
of genocide without parallel in human history. Even some of those who 
believed that the bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
morally justifiable in pursuit of the Allies' war aims would surely have 
had doubts as to the acceptability of an act of violence that would risk 
the very existence of human civilisation. (5) 
Some supporters of nuclear deterrence would argue, however, that 
they support such a policy only because of their confidence that the 
possession of nuclear weapons will deter their use by a potential 
opponent. Provided that each side possesses enough weapons to retaliate 
in the event of a first strike by the other, a 'balance of terror' will 
ensure that neither will use them. 
For the West's threat of nuclear retaliation to be credible, 
II 
however, it has not proved possible simply to rely on possession of 
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nuclear weapons. It has also required a continual effort to convince the 
Soviet Union that our leaders would actually use nuclear weapons in 
certain circumstances. In the circumstances we cannot assume that this 
effort is entirely based on bluff. In considering whether, as citizens 
I 
of democratic states, we are justified in consenting to'the possession of 
nuclear weapons by our leaders, we must assume that, in so consenting, we 
give our assent to their use in some circumstances. For, were a war to 
occur, there would be no opportunity for further consideration of the 
wishes of the general public; and we must assume that the political and 
military commanders with whom we have entrusted these weapons may use 
them in accordance with the plans developed in peacetime. Insofar as it 
is accepted that to intend to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances 
cannot be morally acceptable, therefore, we must also oppose a policy 
based on their possession. 
In recent years, however, increasing currency has been given to the 
argument that the use of nuclear weapons need not necessarily be morally 
unacceptable, provided that they are used in a limited way which pays due 
heed to the criteria of proportionality and discrimination. on which Just 
Var doctrine is based. (6) The development of lower yield warheads, 
together with much more accurate delivery systems, it is argued, makes it 
possible to reduce considerably the number of civilian casualties 
involved in a nuclear attack against legitimate military targets. 
The average yield of U. S. warheads has fallen from 1.2 megatons in 
1979 to 0.3 megatons in 1984, and that of Soviet warheads from 2.2 to 
0.5 megatons over the same period. (7) 
With the deployment of a new generation of highly accurate 
'counterforcel nuclear systems over the next decade, it is likely that 
these averages will fall further since, as accuracy increases, less 
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explosive power is required in order to ensure the destruction of any 
particular point target. Such a trend, according to the current U. S. 
Administration, would have the additional advantage that it would reduce 
the risks of precipitating the most extensive form of 'collateral damage' 
of all - the nuclear winter. (8) As one of the most influential 
American nuclear strategists, Albert Wohlstetter, recently argued: 
"We should make clear that we will not respond to an 
attack in any way that would have a substantial chance 
of causing a nuclear winter. We should be prepared to 
use discriminating offense strategies, tactics and precise 
weapons with reduced yields and deliberately confined 
effects -such as weapons that penetrate and explode deep beneath rather than at the surface of the earth close to 
an underground military target; and to direct our weapons 
at the military rather than at bystanders -to select targets 
of a sort, number and location that will accomplish an 
important military purpose and yet contain the destruction. " 
(9) 
The trend towards highly accurate, and lower yield, nuclear 
warheads has been gaining momentum for several years, and is likely to 
continue to do so over the next decade or so as the arsenals of the major 
nuclear weapon states become increasingly dominated by such weapons. (10) 
In addition, it is possible, over a rather longer time scale, that the 
development of 'third generation' nuclear weapons will reduce the 
incidental destruction involved in a nuclear attack to a level comparable 
to that from the use of conventional explosives. 
The technologies for such weapons, which are already being 
developed as part of the US Strategic Defense Initiative, would involve 
exploding a nuclear device, probably in space, and channelling the energy 
released into some form of directed energy. Such systems could, it is 
envisaged, be used as part of US defenses against Soviet ballistic 
missiles. The well-publicised 'X-ray laser' favoured by Edward Teller is 
an example of such a device. But the US also appears to be researching 
- 379 - 
the possibilities of using nuclear-driven directed energy weapons for the 
destruction of targets on land and at sea, including most of the military 
targets currently vulnerable only to direct nuclear attack. (11) 
The development of more discriminating nuclear weapons, of which 
directed energy weapons are the clearest example, would very considerably 
reduce the indiscriminate damage caused. It would thus, it appears, make 
the use of such weapons against missile silos no less morally acceptable 
than, say, the use of iron bombs against enemy airfields in the Second 
World War. Provided that the cause for which the war was being fought 
was just, and the damage caused was not disproportionate to the expected 
political gain, it might then be thought that possession of, and threat 
to use, 'third generation' nuclear weapons is, at a minimum, less self- 
evidently immoral than the possession of, and threat to use, the first 
and second generation versions. 
The development of more discriminating nuclear weapons illustrates, 
however, the pitfalls involved in a critique of nuclear deterre-nce that 
relies only on a consideration of the morality, or otherwise, of a policy 
based on certain threats. For, although the threats involved in the new 
generation weapons would be more in keeping with just war criteria, and 
indeed perhaps because they are, they are more likely to be carried out. 
The stability of deterrence as a system for keeping the peace could thus 
be reduced. The 'moral' criticisms of nuclear deterrence would have 
been, all least partially, answered only to have had weight added to the 
tstabilityl criticisms. 
It is, in theory, possible to argue that some small increase in the 
probability of a major war occuring, as a result of the development of a 
new generation of nuclear weapons, would be an acceptable price to pay 
for ensuring that, were war to occur, it would be much less catastrophic 
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than a full-scale nuclear war fought with the weapons of the 1980's. 
Such a proposition, however, relies on the assumption, inter alia, that 
the introduction of highly discriminatory new weapons would be 
accompanied by a total relinquishment of genocidal threats, and of the 
weapons necessary to carry them out. 
Such an assumption only has to be spelt out to be seen as most 
improbable. For it is likely that both superpowers will insist on 
maintaining a guaranteed capability to destroy the population of the 
other as long as the other has such a capability, (indeed 'third 
generation' nuclear weapons could easily be reconfigured to fulfil such a 
role). We could then have the worst of both worlds -a more unstable 
military balance between the two states, combined with a continual 
reliance, at least in the last resort, on'threats that are clearly 
contrary to the moral codes on which all the societies involved claim to 
be based. 
The development of this argument is based on speculation about 
technological developments that may, or may not, occur; and it may 
therefore seem rather marginal to consideration of the position in which 
the world finds itself today. Nevertheless it does, in my view, 
illustrate a crucial point about the nature of the nuclear debate; that 
attitudes to nuclear deterrence should not be based solely on 
consideration of whether it is morally acceptable to give one's consent, 
in certain hypothetical circumstances, for nuclear weapons to be used. 
It is also incumbent upon us to consider the outcome of various courses 
of action - i. e., to be concerned with a morality of consequences rather 
than, or at least as a complement to, a morality of intentions. 
That consideration of the acceptability of current policy must be 
based primarily on its potential consequences is an assumption widely 
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shared by most of those involved in the debate on nuclear deterrence, and 
on British security policy in particular. And it is because of differing 
assessment of the risks involved in existing policy - i. e., the perceived 
probabilty of nuclear war taking place if it is maintained unchanged - 
that there are differing views as to the'acceptability of nuclear 
deterrence. 
Thus it is important to note that the concern about the morality of 
actually using nuclear weapons is widely shared by many supporters of 
their possession. Where they differ from those who oppose nuclear 
deterrence is in their assessment of the risk of nuclear war taking 
place, given a continuation of current policy. For the fundamental 
assumption of supporters of nuclear deterrence is that the probability of 
nuclear war is very low indeed. As the British government argued in 
1981: 
"The East-West peace has held so far for thirty-five 
years. This is a striking achievement, with political 
systems so sharply opposed and points of friction 
potentially so many. No-one can ever prove that deterrence 
centered on nuclear weapons has played a key part; but 
common sense suggests that it must have done. Deterrence 
can continue to hold, with growing stability as the two 
sides deepen their understanding of how the system must 
work and how dangers must be avoided. Not since the Soviet 
gamble over Cuba in 1962 have we come anywhere near the brink. 
It is entirely possible, if we plan wisely, to go on enjoying 
both peace and freedom - that is, to avoid the bogus choice 
of "red or dead". (12) 
Given their assessment that deterrence 'works', and will continue 
to do so virtually indefinitely, its supporters then argue that it would 
be "an immensely dangerous and irresponsible act" to attempt to dismantle 
it. (13) The risks of nucleaý war would increase, not decrease, if we 
were to follow such a course. It would demonstrate the folly of an 
ethical approach to nuclear deterrence that did not give due weight to 
the consequences of actions, but focused solely on the immorality of a 
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provisional intent to use nuclear weapons, but an intent which, it is 
argued, will never have to be tested in action. To quote the 
government's 1981 White Paper once more: 
"Any readiness by one nation to use nuclear weapons 
against another, even in self-defence, is terrible. 
No-one -especially from within the ethical traditions 
of the free world, with their special respect for 
individual life -can acquiesce comfortably in it as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. We 
have to seek unremittingly, through arms control and 
otherwise, for better ways of ordering the world. But 
the search may be a very long one. No safer system than 
deterrence is yet in view, and impatience would be a 
catastrophic guide in the search. " (14) 
2.2 Do Nuclear Weapons Prevent War? 
There is no way of proving whether nuclear weapons have been the 
main factor in preventing war in Europe over the last 40 years, far less 
whether they can be relied upon to prevent war in future. Europe has 
experienced long periods of peace in the past without the possession of 
nuclear weapons, for example between 1871 and 1914. And the absence of 
war since the 1940's could be attributed as much to the existence of 
political stability and economic prosperity as to the deterrent effect 
of nuclear weapons. 
To the extent that military force has played a part in the 
preservation of peace, the existence ofunambiguous spheres of 
influence, as represented by the division of the continent into U. S. and 
Soviet-dominated alliances, might be seen by many as the crucial factor. 
The case that the existence of nuclear weapons, per se, has been the 
decisive factor in preventing war is insufficiently strong to act as a 
basis for long term security. The existence has probably induced some 
additional caution into the thinking of the leaders of the nuclear 
weapons powers, and may therefore have added some extra degree of 
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of nuclear weapons. Increased emphasis on the nuclear component of 
deterrence, by contrast, has tended to be associated with a perception 
that the 'threat' is less urgent, and that reductions in overall military 
spending can therefore be made - the shift to massive retaliation in the 
1950's is perhaps the best-example of such a period. 
This historical experience suggests that, even amongst Western 
leaders, there is an unwillingness to rely entirely on nuclear weapons to 
prevent a major conflict between the two superpowers and their allies. 
Yet, so far, the shifts of emphasis between nuclear and conventional 
forces have been essentially marginal in nature. At least in the UK, the 
dominant perception in the decision-making elite has been that the risks 
of war involved in current policy are extremely small-The main purpose 
of shifts in the emphasis of policy, therefore, is to reduce these risks 
even further. 
Yet there are several reasons why this optimism may be unfounded, 
and which suggest that the risks of nuclear war taking place over the 
next 50 years are unacceptably high. Increasingly, as the quote from 
Colin Gray makes clear, the critics of this assumption come from those 
considered 'hawks' as well as from the independent peace movements and 
left-of-centre political opinion. Their pessimism as to the robustness 
of nuclear deterrence is based on one, or in some cases all, of a number 
of factors - the changing nature of nuclear weapon systems, the problems 
of crisis stability, the dependence of nuclear deterrence on political 
stability, and the possible consequences of nuclear proliferation. 
The first consideration is that, in practice, the nuclear 'balance 
of terror' has never been as stable as the advocates of deterrence claim. 
The period since 1945 has been characterised by an intense competition 
I 
between the two superpowers to maintain a 'lead' or to 'catch up' in the 
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nuclear arms race. The widespread use of such 
that neither side is entirely willing to accept 
inevitable consequence of the mutual possession 
arsenals. Rather, it suggests a belief that it 
of an 'advantage' in the nuclear arms race, and 
national interest to seek such an advantage. 
concepts itself suggests 
that this stability is an 
of large nuclear 
is meaningful to conceive 
that it is in the 
For the concept of a 'lead' in the nuclear balance to have any 
meaning, however, there must be some sense in which one side can use 
nuclear weapons in pursuit of national policy, without the result being 
the destruction of the societies of all concerned. To put it in another 
way, in order for nuclear threats in an age of mutually assured 
destruction (M. A. D. ) to be credible, there must be some way in which 
nuclear forces can be used without leading to such destruction. If such 
a way is thought to exist for one side but not for the other, then it may 
indeed be argued that the side which possesses such a capability has a 
'lead' in the balance of nuclear power. 
It is in such a quest to make nuclear deterrence 'credible' that 
the military, and civilian 'strategists', have sought to develop nuclear 
doctrines and weapon systems for use in conflicts in which the targets to 
be destroyed are constrained in some way, often excluding attacks on the 
main centres of population of a nuclear-armed opponent. In US planning, 
it has been argued, there is an increasing trend towards 'nuclear war- 
fighting' and away from nuclear deterrence as it was publicly understood 
in the 19601s. Culminating in the promulgation of President Carter's PD- 
59 in 1980, and in the Defense Guidance documents of the Reagan 
administration, the US put increasing emphasis on 'counterforcel missions 
against Soviet missile silos and command centres in its declaratory 
policy and targeting criteria. (16) 
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This trend in US doctrine has been accompanied by, and is perhaps 
in large part a result of, technological developments which, it has been 
argued, could make a pre-emptive 'first strike' against Soviet nuclear 
capabilities a more feasible proposition than at any time since the early 
19601s. The development of highly accurate ballistic missiles, such as 
MX, Trident D5 and Pershing 2, threatens the ability of the Soviets to 
maintain a retaliatory capability in the event of a U. S. nuclear strike 
against their land-based ICBM's. Combined with the development of US 
Navy capabilities for destroying Soviet missile-carrying submarines, and 
the plans for anti-satellite and anti-missile systems, based in space or 
space deployable, it is clear that the United States is attempting to 
build an effective first strike capability. 
It is difficult to envisage that the weapon systems used to execute 
a first strike could function perfectly, in secrecy, and without warning 
the opponent of one's intentions. (Though it is possible that the 
development of counterforce non-nuclear weapons and directed energy 
weapons, combined with strategic defensive systems, over the next couple 
of decades could change this assessment). 
Despite the caution which such considerations should engender, 
experience suggests that the current race to acquire counterforce 
capabilities is likely to lead to increased tension between the two 
superpowers. Military and political leýders will tend to make worst-case 
assumptions about the high performance of enemy weapons and the poor 
performance of their own. As the U. S. debate on the 'window of 
vulnerability', which supposedly exposed its ICBM force to pre-emptive 
attack, shows, such perceptions can contribute to a worsening of 
international relations and to a growth in suspicion of one's rival's 
intentions. Recent Soviet statements suggest that their fear of future 
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U. S. first strike capabilities is a very real factor in the world view of 
their leaders. 
In summary, therefore, the high priority attached to keeping level, 
or ahead, in the race to acquire new generations of strategic nuclear 
systems does not suggest a stable order or a mutual acceptance that 
M. A. D. is here to stay. Rather it suggests a belief on both sides that 
the nuclear balance is relatively fragile and requires massive 
investments to be kept in being. Yet, if this is so, can one still argue 
that nuclear deterrence can be relied upon to work, irrespective of the 
wisdom of leaders on both sides, and irrespective of the development of 
technology over the next half a century and more? (17) 
The case that one should not so rely is considerably strengthened 
by reflecting on the second factor: the problems of preserving strategic 
stability in times of acute international crisis. For the real test of 
whether the existence of nuclear weapons can be relied upon to prevent 
their being used is not whether the leader of a nuclear weapons power 
would ever order their use 'cold' in a period in which there is no 
immediate casus belli. Rather, it is whether, during a major crisis or 
war involving one or both superpowers, there is a significant possibility 
of nuclear weapons being used, deliberately or inadvertently. 
As several influential studies have pointed out recently, periods 
of crisis are often characterised by extreme uncertainty as to the 
intentions of a potential adversary, and indeed by a lack of accurate, 
timely information. In such circumstances, simply following pre- 
programmed procedures can lead to a process of mounting tension and 
distrust, and even to the use of military force. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the U. S. and Soviet Union have never, simultaneously, put 
their nuclear forces on alert. Were they to do so, as Paul Bracken has 
argued: 
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taking necessary precautionary moves, the other side 
might see the precaution as a threat ..... it is not all that difficult to envision a political crisis leading 
to an alert, and the alerting process escalating until 
NATO was forced to disperse its nuclear weapons 
from their storage positions, or until conventional 
attacks were authorised against Soviet or U. S. 
submarines patrolling near enemy coasts. It is also 
possible to imagine a mutual alerting process reaching 
the point where interference or direct attack of 
satellites was undertaken, or where spontaneous 
evacuation of Soviet and American cities would occur 
for civil defence reasons. Few people would disagree 
that operating nuclear forces at such high states of 
alert in this environment could easily tip over into 
pre-emptive attacks and all-out war. Each nation might 
not want war but might feel driven to hit first rather 
than second. Instead of war versus peace, the decision 
would be seen as either striking first or striking 
second. " (18) 
Nobody would dispute that, given the continuing rivalry.; between 
the superpowers and their contest for influence worldwide, there will be 
periodic crises which could provide the environment in which increased 
nuclear alerts are plausible. A major war in the Middle East at present 
appears the most likely candidate for providing such a trigger given the 
nature of US commitment to Israel, the political instability of the 
region and the continuing Soviet interest in involving itself militarily 
in the area. 
Given the continuing possibility of radical political change in 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia, however, and the probability of nuclear 
proliferation, such a war is far from being the only candidate for 
'Sarajevo of the 1990's'. In any one crisis, the probability of 
escalation to nuclear war is likely to continue to be low. But it cannot 
be assumed that it will be negligible. And the development of fast 
response, counterforce, nuclear systems, together with anti-satellite and 
anti-missile weapons, is likely to exacerbate the instability that would 
be involved were a crisis ever to provoke a mutual alert of nuclear 
forces. 
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The third factor which induces caution as to whether nuclear 
deterrence can work in future is that current policy places as much 
emphasis on the role of preserving existing military alliances and 
political commitments - and in particular the continuing coherence of 
NATO - as it does on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons by themselves. 
Yet NATO has already been one of the most longlasting alliances in 
history. If the risk of nuclear war can be kept negligible only if the 
current alliance system is preserved, nuclear deterrence must be regarded 
as an insufficent basis for long term survival. For it is most unlikely 
that the societies of West and East will not continue to evolve, or that 
such changes will not affect their attitudes towards existing alliances. 
If nuclear deterrence is to be viable, therefore, ý it must be robust to 
quite major changes in the international political order. 
This proposition points to a major flaw in-the theology of nuclear 
deterrence. For it appears to be based on an overoptimistic belief in 
the rationality of human nature, and on the assumption of a mature 
awareness, at least by those leaders responsible, of the dangers and 
difficulties involved in the possession and use of nuclear weapons. This 
in turn assumes that the political process will never throw up leaders, 
in East or West, who act irresponsibly in this area; and that we can 
trust that they will behave, if not always completely rationally, at 
least with due caution and a degree of sanity, through future crises and 
conflicts. 
Yet it may be judged irresponsible, given recent history, to assume 
that never again can our states fall under the dominion of leaders - such 
as the Nazis - who might be tempted to break the implicit rules by which 
the nuclear game of chess has so far been conducted. Such a development 
may not appear likely in the near future. However, the rise of the 
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National Front in France, the inability of the existing parties to solve 
Britain's continuing economic decline, and the evident appeal of 
messianic religious sects in the United States all show that the 
potential for political extremism still exists, and might gain strength 
if major economic upheaval occurs. 
In the Soviet Union, too, although no immediate challenge to the 
Communist Party's leadership is now in prospect, one cannot entirely rule 
out such challenges in future. One should not forget that the Soviet 
Union is the only major socialist state to have existed since the 1950's 
without major popular upheaval. Whether it can continue to do so, 
particularly if forced to finance a continuing arms race by increased 
constraints on living standards, must be an open question. 
Yet it is true that, since acquiring nuclear weapons, four out of 
the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states have enjoyed a considerable 
degree of political stability; and even in the fifth - China - the 
potential for political disintegration may have been reduced since the 
1960's. (19) Even were we to assume, perhaps optimistically, that such 
stability were to continue, however, an assessment of the risks of 
nuclear war must also take into account a fourth factor; the likelihood 
that the number of acknowledged nuclear weapon states will not remain at 
five indefinitely. 
The process of nuclear proliferation has so far been slower than 
many people had expected in the period before the signing of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty in 1969. Since the Chinese exploded their first 
atomic device in 1964, no state has acknowledged that it has acquired a 
nuclear capability. 
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Several states - India, Israel, and perhaps South Africa - have a 
covert nuclear arsenal, or a capability to assemble nuclear weapons at 
short notice. Yet none of these countries appear so far to be attempting 
to build nuclear forces which would match those of even the small 
acknowledged nuclear weapon states. All three, for a variety of reasons, 
are likely to avoid an open nuclear declaration in the near future. The 
only event that, in the short term, is likely to disturb their existing 
policies would be the acquisition of a nuclear capability by one of their 
regional rivals Egypt in the case of Israel, Pakistan in the case of 
India. In the case of South Africa, there is no immediate possi6ility of 
a Black African state acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. 
Although the pace of proliferation appears to have slowed 
somewhat, however, it may be an illusory calm. The potential for 
proliferation still exists as long as (a) nuclear weapons are seen as a 
symbol of Great Power status, bringing a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council and increased international influence; (b) nuclear 
threats are implicit in intervention by the superpowers in conflicts 
involving non-nuclear powers, eg in Vietnam and the 1973 Middle East war; 
(c) it is thought that nuclear weapons must be acquired to create, or 
preserve, a regional balance of power. 
This last factor in particular means that, once additional 
countries 'go nuclear', a domino effect could occur and quite rapidly 
several states could acquire their own nuclear weapons. If, for example, 
Pakistan were to explode a nuclear device, then India might well expand 
its own nuclear weapons programme, and a regional arms race could soon 
spread to encompass other nations -e. g. Iran and Iraq - in the area. The 
spread of civil nuclear power over the last two decades has meant that 
4 
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the technical constraints on proliferation are much less important than 
in the past. (20) It is the perceived political, and to a lesser extent 
economic, cost of openly acquiring a nuclear arsenal that is at present 
deterring several states from doing so. 
Proliferation presents particular risks because it is most likely 
to take place in areas of the world where there are bitter unresolved 
disputes over territory, and in which large-scale non-nuclear warfare is 
now taking place - e. g. between Iran and Iraq - or has recently done so - 
e. g. between India and Pakistan. 
The case is far from proven that the introduction of nuclear 
weapons inýQ_ these areas will by itself induce such caution in the 
leaders concerned that it will deter war from taking place - as an 
incautious extrapolation of the experience of the thesis that nuclear 
weapons 'have kept the peace' in Europe might suggest. (21) For to 
expect nuclear weapons, by their mere presence, to freeze international 
relations and induce acceptance of a previously disputed status quo, is a 
most dangerous assumption. The fact that the two superpowers continued 
to co-ordinate their non-proliferation policies, even when their 
relations were at a very low ebb, indicates that they too believe that 
proliferation represents a danger which must be prevented, or at least 
controlled. 
2.3 The need for an alternative 
Both because of the moral objections to a 'defence' that relies on 
genocidal threats, and because of concerns as to the dangers of 
catastrophe that it involves, therefore, there are serious grounds for 
arguing that nuclear deterrence cannot be a wise long term policy. It 
would be indefensible to rely upon it to safeguard the peace of the world 
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indefinitely. An alternative solution to the problem will have to be 
found. 
The moral critique of nuclear deterrence, if taken alone, strongly 
suggests that there can be no justication for any policy based on the 
threat to use nuclear weapons, whether by one's own government or by that 
of an ally, whether in a first strike or in retaliation. ýGiven the 
existence of 60,000 of these weapons, however, it would clearly neither 
be practical, nor I would argue desirable, to urge the government of 
either superpower to adopt a policy of total-, and immediate, unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. 
It would not be practical given the overwhelming political 
consensus in both countries in favour of possessing nuclear weapons, at 
least as long as the other does so. It would not be desirable because 
such an act would be likely to create a degree of uncertainty and 
instability in international relations ihat would be likely to increase, 
rather than reduce, the dangers of nuclear war. The practical necessity 
of avoiding nuclear war, or at least reducing the risk of it taking 
place, would, in this hypothetical situation, have to override the more 
morally correct stance. In the short run at least, therefore, the 
possession of some nuclear weapons by the superpowers may be necessary, 
at least until satisfactory arrangements can be made for mutual 
verification of denuclearisation. 
But the rejection of complete unilateral nuclear disarmament by the 
United States, or the Soviet Union, does not mean that very large 
unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals, which nevertheless fall short 
of complete renunciation of nuclear weapons, should not be supported. 
Nor does it mean that the adoption of non-nuclear defence policies by 
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other nuclear states, such as France, the UK, or India, could not be a 
positive step. Indeed, in the long run, a complete alternative to 
nuclear deterrence must be found. Otherwise, sooner or later, nuclear 
war is bound to occur. 
2.4 Is nuclear superiority an answer? 
Our definition of the dual problem of nuclear deterrence - its 
moral acceptability and the risks of catastrophe it involves - is not 
in any way dependent on what view we take of the nature of the Soviet 
regime, or of its attitude to nuclear deterrence. Rather, our critique 
of nuclear deterrence so far has been designed to establish that there is 
a problem with current policy, and that-much greater urgency must 
therefore be attached to the quest for a solution. 
In defining the shape that such a solution should take, however, 
one's perceptions of the Soviet 'threat' are of vital importance. That 
this is so is clearly illustrated by the evolution of conservative 
thought in the United States. There a growing body of opinion, amongst 
whom must be included the President and Secretary for Defence, have 
expressed substantial agreement with both the moral and stability 
critiques we have outlined. As one of the most influential advocates of 
this view, Edward Teller, has argued: 
"We cannot hope that the policy of the balance of 
terror, where the terror is more certain than the 
balance, can deter war much longer". (22) 
Yet, because of the extreme pessimism of this school of thought 
concerning the Soviet Union, the possibility of a political alternative 
to nuclear deterrence is seen as very low. Instead, they have argued for 
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a policy of re-establishing US military superiority through'exploiting 
its greater potential for developing new technologies. The development 
of counterforce nuclear weapons is to be complemented by a massive 
investment in strategic defences, in anti-submarine warfare, and in 
high-technology conventional defences, with the ultimate purc. 
_ 
being to 
force the Soviets to make political concessions to US interests in 
recognition of its effective supremacy. As one recent survey of the 
American Right summarised this view: 
"The world vision of the new conservatives is 
internationalist and interventionist. Accepting a 1 ive-and-let-l ive stalemate with the Soviet 
ýj defeatism: a continuing war, both global 
and regional, between the communist and capitalist 
systems has to be acknowledged and accepted. Treaties 
between the United States and the Soviet Union are 
seen as snares and delusions. The Strategic Defence 
Initiativeis the centrepiece of conservative strategy 
star wars offers a defensive umbrella (although this 
is how the idea is sold to the public) the project 
will catapult American military technology far ahead 
of the Soviet Union's, reviving the pre-1970's era 
of American nuclear superiority". (23) 
The espousal of an aggressive version of 'containment' policy, 
moreover, is not a new phenomenon. Since the early 1950's theýconcept of 
'rollback' - of seeking to precipitate the collapse of the Soviet empire 
by all means short of invasion -has been a recurring theme in US 
government policy. (24) It is an argument that strikes a powerful chord 
in a country which is still by far the richest and most powerful nation 
on earth, and many of whose citizens feel frustrated by any limits to the 
exercise of that power. 
In the early and mid 1970's there were some signs that these 
tendencies in US policy were abating, as a result of the realisation that 
the Soviet Union had achieved effective nuclear parity, and because of 
the anti-interventionist mood that held sway in the aftermath of the 
humiliation in Indo-China. For a combination of reasons, of which 
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increasing Soviet intervention in the Third World was one of the most 
important, however, this mood did not last. 
By the end of the 1970's, a much more belligerent stance was 
adopted by the Democratic President Carter. And the advent of President 
Reagan then ensured that a very substantial part-of the conservative 
agenda would be enacted., It has been the increasingly aggressive stance 
of the US government, more than any other factor, that has been 
responsible for the major breach in the political consensus on defence 
that has occurred in most West European countries since 1979. Indeed the 
evolution of US policy will continue to play an important role in 
determining whether the supporters of nuclear deterrence in the UK can 
succeed in re-establishing that consensus. 
Perhaps the greatest danger in the emergence of a more assertive 
tone in US policy, however, is that it appears to be based, to a 
considerable degree, on wishful thinking. In particular, the proposition 
that strategic defences can 'make nuclear weapons obsolete', because it 
will make the search for political solutions appear less urgent, 
represents a sad attempt to escape from reality. 
Given the level of investment which is being devoted to them, it is 
certainly possible that by the end of the century a partially effective 
defence against ballistic missiles could be in place. But the idea that 
systems could be deployed that could guarantee in advance to prevent any 
nuclear weapons being used is quite fanciful. It would be impossible to 
have a foolproof defence for the defensive systems themselves without 
massive, and expensive, duplication of facilities. Perfect defences 
against nuclear bombers and cruise missiles would be needed in addition 
to those against ballistic missile attack. Some way would have to be 
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found to prevent, or at least minimise, the number of 'suitcase bombs' 
which Soviet special forces could smuggle into the United States; and any 
possible errors in the systems of command and control would have to be 
taken into account. 
Advocates of SDI would argue, with some force, that sceptics have 
always underestimated the pace of technological change, and proclaimed a 
particular idea impossible only a few years before it was in use. The 
fundamental difference in the area of military technology, however, is 
that the existence of a potential enemy, developing his own technologies, 
has to be taken into account. There*has never in history been a perfect 
defence against any weapon. Yet against nuclear weapons, unlike any 
weapon-before it, nothing less will do. Destroying 95% of a Soviet 
attack of 30000 warheads is of little use, for the remaining 1500 could 
still comprehensively destroy Western society. As long as the two 
superpowers maintain nuclear arsenals at or above their current sizes, 
Mutual Assured Destruction will be the inevitable consequence of an all- 
out war between them. 
It has been argued that, although SDI could not hope to provide 
foolproof defence against a Soviet first strike, it might be much more 
successful if SoViet nuclear forces had already been depleted in a US 
first strike. (25) Yet even this scenario is quite implausible. By 
taking countermeasures, such as placing forces on Launch-on-Warning and 
threatening to attack US strategic defensive systems pre-emptively, the 
Soviets could introduce, at the very least, considerable uncertainty into 
American calculations. 
Despite this 
) 
however, the possibility that defensive systems could 
be used in conjunction with'offensive ones in a first strike, is one that 
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both sides' military planners will be likely to take increasingly into 
account. Worst case planners will assume that adversary forces work as 
planned, while their own are plagued by error. In a crisis, they will 
become even more concerned to place forces, offensive and defensive, on 
'protective' alerts; and they will interpret parallel moves by the other 
side as confirmation of their intention to strike first. The dangers of 
inadvertent escalation, already a source of concern as we have seen, are 
bound to increase as the nuclear arms race increasingly involves 
'defensive' systems on land and in space. 
Going down such a road has been opposed not only by those already 
unhappy with recent trends in U. S. strategy - the liberal wing of the 
U. S. establishment, and West European social democrats. It has also been 
questioned by leading Conservative politicians in Europe, whose 
attachment to a M. A. D., version of nuclear deterrence is stronger than 
that of their American counterparts. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, expressed this discontent openly in a major speech in 
1985: 
"there would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot 
line of the twenty-first century, liable to be out- i flanked by relatively and demonstrably cheaper counter- 
measures. If the technology does work, what will be 
its psychological impact on the other side? President 
Reagan has repeatedly made it clear that he does not seek 
superiority. But we would have to ensure that the 
perceptions of others were not different". (26) 
Sir Geoffrey, like most establishment opinion in Western Europe, 
I 
still professes to believe that nuclear deterrence is a morally 
acceptable and low-risk means of ensuring peace. As the SDI debate 
demonstrates, however, this rather cosy acceptance of the status quo is 
now under attack from two fronts, both of which accept many of the 
criticisms of deterrence that I have already outlined: from 
conservatives in the US and increasingly in Western Europe, who argue 
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that technology, in the shape of SDI-related systems, could provide a 
I 
more satisfactory, and less risky, means of ensuring peace in future; and 
from those who argue that nuclear weapons must be made obsolete in some 
other way, involving co-operation with the Soviet Union and, in the last 
resort, a peaceful resolution of the conflicts between the superpowers. 
The attack on nuclear deterrence from the Right of the political 
spectrum has highlighted the inadequacies of current policy. Yet, for 
reasons already mentioned, the solutions they propose would be likely to 
increase the dangers of nuclear war in the medium term, and are most 
unlikely to fulfil their promise of making nuclear weapons obsolete even 
in the long term. It will be the purpose of the next section to explore 
whether the second alternative to nuclear deterrence -a long term 
political solution - has anything to commend it; and if so, what 
practical policies today can bring such an alternative closer. 
3. An Alternative to Nuclear Deterrence 
If one accepts that nuclear deterrence is, at best, a temporary 
expedient, therefore, there is a clear need for policies that will create 
the conditions for a lasting political settlement of the Cold War, and 
for the establishment of an international order in which nuclear weapons 
can effectively be outlawed. Such an objective is not likely to be 
achieved overnight; but it must nevertheless inform policy today if it is 
ever to be reached. For it is clearly the case that the ability of the 
human species to destroy itself, through nuclear war and perhaps in other 
ways too, cannot be 'disinvented'. What can be done is to establish a 
framework of international agreement within which the means for such 
destruction are themselves dismantled, and which can ensure that they 
can never be recreated. 
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Such a long term goal, thus stated, is bound to appear utopian and 
unrealistic to many. Yet it is no more than the countries of the United 
Kingdom, or in large part the states of Western Europe in recent decades, 
have achieved: a recognition that national sovereignty must be limited 
for the common good, and the institutionalisation of the belief that war 
is no longer feasible between the states concerned. 
The belief that such a long term solution is possible, however, 
requires a view of Soviet society that is, at a minimum, less bleak than 
is painted by the current U. S. Administration. It does not assume that 
the Soviet Union has no expansionist ambitions, or that all its 
disarmament proposals are genuine. But it does assume that there are 
strong forces within Soviet society that will recognise the common 
interest of East and West in preventing nuclear war; and that, at some 
stage, these forces will be prepared to make substantial concessions in 
the pursuit of this objective. 
In order to create a situation in which the international 
outlawing of nuclear weapons becomes politically feasible, however, it is 
obvious that the perceptions on both sides of the other must be radically 
changed. Partly this can be facilitated by greater cultural exchange, 
trade, and education, and by conscious encouragement of economic 
interdependence. But it will also require a greater readiness to avoid 
military intervention outside their own territories by the superpowers. 
And it will require the initiation of a disarmament process, with 
progressi . vely more stringent verification involved, that begins to 
increase confidence on both sides that the other can be trusted with 
further steps. 
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For such a process to succeed, it will not be necessary at every 
stage for there to be binding agreements made, or for every initiative by 
the West to be matched by the East. But disillusionment with a trust- 
building policy will soon spread if moves by one side are not 
reciprocated by the other. Unilateralism can break the deadlock in 
relations between the blocs. But it can only be a step towards bilateral 
or multilateral actions. At some stage, the Soviet Union must involve 
itself in the process if the public support in the West for a new policy 
is not to be eroded. The sooner it does so, the more likely that the 
momentum of a conciliatory policy can be maintained. 
Such an orientation clearly has a wide variety of implications for 
educational, cultural, economic and foreign policy. In this thesis, 
however, the main focus must be on those most directly related to British 
and NATO defence policy, and in particular on how changes in U. K. policy 
can contribute to an international process of resolving the armed 
confrontation between East and West. 
By focusing on the role of changes-in defence and disarmament 
policy in this process, it is not our intention to underestimate the very 
real political differences that exist between the two military blocs, 
nor the role that these differences continue to have in fuelling 
suspicion and preventing effective disarmament. Both in Europe and 
elsewhere, the two superpowers have competing interests and models for 
development. The repeated resort to military intervention by the Soviet 
Union to maintain its political domination in Eastern Europe has 
undoubtedly made it much more difficult for Western European states to 
explore alternatives to their present close alliance with the United 
States. And in the Third World both the U. S. and the Soviet Union have 
shown themselves willing to promote their own interests and ideologies by 
force. 
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Yet I would argue that the continuation of the build up in arms by 
the two blocs plays an important autonomous role in exacerbating these 
political differences. The arms build up relies for its legitimacy on an 
image of a potential military threat, and thus on promoting the percep- 
tion that the other side will consider resorting to military force. 
In relations between nations engaged in an arms race, the search for 
military advantage, and the possibility of being caught 'off guard' 
militarily, assumes a paramount importance. A process of mutual 
suspicion and fear, bred from within the structure of the arms race 
itself, then acquires a considerable momentum of its own which, although 
not entirely independent of the political conflicts between the 
antagonists, has the effect of making those conflicts much more difficult 
to resolve. 
This approach was succintly summarised in the introduction to the 
1986 SIPRI Year Book by Frank Blackaby: 
"... the technological arms race is damaging to world 
security, and ... if it could be brought under control this would contribute a great deal to a more stable 
world order. ... The much used quotation form Salvador de Maderiaga - 'nations don't distrust each other because they 
are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other' 
- is an inadequate statement of the relations between 
armaments and distrust. There is a reciprocal relation- 
ship. The build up of weapon systems itself creates 
distrust. An agreement that constrains or reduces 
weapon systems helps to create trust. " (27) 
Yet it is also important to remember that the military 
confrontation between the blocs is not caused entirely by a self- 
contained process of . __` _' 
mutual distrust. Although the tension on 
both sides is undoubtedly considerably exacerbated by the action-reaction 
process of the arms race, we should notJorget that there are also 
important conflicts of ideology and perceived 'interests' involved. 
Since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, with only a short respite during 
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the war aaainst Nazism, the Western powers have seen 'containment' of 
ar, L K: ý kv; 14, Y -L Vic 
Communism ýmilitary force in pursuit of this objective. The Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, has consistently proclaimed its commitment to a 
long term goal of world socialism. And, it has shown itself willing to 
accelerate the, supposedly inevitable, historical progress towards this 
goal by using its own armed forces, most notably in Eastern Europe. 
At least in the short run, it would be implausible to believe that 
the two superpowers would simply abandon their idetqogical competition, 
or that they would be able to resolve at short notice the many longstan- 
ding disputes between them. But it is perhaps more realistic to believe 
that, in the context of a general relaxation of tension, they would be 
willing to take measures that would reduce the risks of military 
conflict, and manage disputes without resorting to force. 
Indeed without such a process, support for a general programme of 
trust-building and disarmament would inevitably be reduced. Historical 
experience shows that the use of military force by either superpower, 
particularly if it is seen as expansionist rather than defensive, can 
have a serious effect on the prospects for overall relations. The 
increased Soviet willingness to intervene militarily in the Third World 
in the 1970's, for example, undoubtedly contributed to the adoption of 
more hawkish defence policies by the United States from 1978 onwards. 
In theory it may be possible to discuss mutual limitations on both 
nuclear and conventional arms entirely separately from current 
developments in Central America or Eastern Europe, or the plight of 
dissidents in the Soviet Union. In practice, however, although it should 
as far as possible be minimised, such linkage cannot be entirely avoided. 
For arms control and disarmament require a certain degree of mutual 
trust between the parties; and such trust is bound to be eroded by 
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actions that will be perceived as contrary to protestations of purely 
defensive intent. 
To discuss in detail the measures that could be taken to manage the 
competition between the superpowers, would require a book by itself. It 
is worth making three general points, however, which provide some context 
for our later examination of British defence policy options. 
First, it will be important that, within each superpower's sphere 
of influence, there be a greater emphasis on political and economic 
reform as a response to instability, and a marked reduction in resort to 
military intervention. Such a shift in direction will prove uncomfort- 
ablefor both superpowers. In the long run reforms that secure strong 
domestic political bases for regimes supported by one of the two 
superpowers would, in many cases, be extremely useful. 
In many cases, however, such a shift in emphasis may require at 
least tacit acceptance by the other superpower of certain spheres of 
influence. In Afghanistan, for example, the Soviet government appears to 
be anxious to reach some settlement that will enable them to withdraw 
their troops. Yet they feel they cannot do so if a pro-American or 
Islamic fundamentalist regime were to take the place of the current 
Afghan government. Only if the U. S. were prepared to accept some measure 
of continuing Soviet influence in that country, or at a minimum a 
guaranteed non-aligned status, is it possible that the conflict in that 
country could be resolved. 
Second, both states need to accept that it is not acceptable to use 
military force to undermine the sphere of influence of the other. In 
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Europe, where the dividing lines are clear and well-established, this 
rule has already been largely accepted. But it also has implications for 
the Third World. The world has so far been fortunate that Soviet and U. S. 
forces, although frequently involved in conflict, have never met each 
other directly. In Vietnam, for example, the Soviets never became 
directly invoved militarily, although considerable military aid was 
given to the North. Similarly the U. S. has been careful to avoid 
committing its own troops to conflicts - e. g. in Angola, Afghanistan, or 
against Syria - where the risk of direct Soviet involvement was judged 
to be high. It is important that this restraint is extended. 
Third, there should be an effort to 'loosen' the blocs, and to, 
encourage the development of 'Zones of Non-Intervention'. Mutual 
agreement by the Soviet Union and the major Western powers not to 
intervene militarily in particular regions could be reinforced with 
limitations on arms sales and joint efforts to seek settlement of 
disputes. Moves towards such a situation might be particularly useful in 
the Middle East. 
For the purposes of discussion of NATO policy, the most important 
area in which these principles might be applied is Central and Eastern 
Europe. In particular, a combination of political and economic reform in 
Eastern Europe, with encouragement of gradual Ide-alignment', appears to 
some commentators the best way, in the long term, of tackling the roots 
of the tension between the blocs in Europe. The continuing inability of 
the Communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR to secure 
broad popular, consent to their rule means that the threat of Soviet 
military intervention is always in the background. This greatly 
increases the political difficulties facing proposals for disarmament in 
Europe. 
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There are encouraging signs of a more wideranging policy debate 
within the Soviet Union, now that a new generation is taking control. So 
far, however, there is little indication of a major revision in policy 
towards Eastern Europe. However, such a revision will, at some stage, be 
a necessary component of a far reaching process of trust building in 
Europe. Our emphasis on military policy measures in this chapter, 
therefore, should not be seen as signifying a failure to recognise the 
importance of political reform. Rather it is, in part, a reflection-of 
our belief that measures to reduce the military confrontation can, over 
time, create a climate in which such reform becomes more feasible. 
Although most of the policies that we consider fall into more than 
one category, it will be convenient to divide them into three categories; 
first, measures designed to confine the role of nuclear weapons in 
Western policy solely to retaliation against a Soviet nuclear strike; 
second, measures designed, by both independent steps and bilateral 
agreement, to prevent developments in nuclear weapons technology that 
could be interpreted as designed to achieve a disarming first strike 
capability; and, Lhird, measures designed to reduce the fear of attack by 
conventional forces and, if possible, reduce the economic burden that 
these forces impose on the countries involved. A combination of policies 
in some, and perhaps all three, of these areas will be necessary if the 
long term goals of a disarmament-oriented policy are to be made 
realistic. The interrelationship between measures in each category is 
something we hope to make clear in the discussion that follows. 
3.1 Restricting the Role of Nuclear Weapons 
The main proposal in this category is for NATO, and in particular 
the United States, to adopt a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, 
which would confine the role of nuclear weapons strictly to retaliation 
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against enemy nuclear attack. The adoption of such a policy would, it is 
argued, enable large reductions to be made in-the size of today's nuclear 
arsenals, particularly of tactical weapons. It would, if adopted by both 
superpowers, enable a shift towards a 'minimum deterrence' regime, in 
which each side possessed only a small nuclear force, consisting of 
perhaps only a few hundred warheads. Such a reduction would ensure that 
nuclear weapons were "no longer the centrepiece of military planning" and 
would save considerable sums of money. (28) Yet it would still reassure 
each superpower of its ability to retaliate against nuclear attack by the 
other, or indeed by a third, perhaps clandestine, nuclear weapons state. 
(29) 
A policy of No First Use would accord with the views of the 
overwhelming majority of public opinion in Western Europe, as a recent 
survey has shown. (30) It would provide reassurance that the Soviet 
Union could not launch a nuclear attack on the West without some 
possibility of retaliation. Yet it would also enable a major 
'denuclearisation' of NATO doctrine and forces to take place. 
Such a policy would, of course, require changing the basic tenet of 
NATO's flexible response strategy, that it reserves the right to use 
nuclear weapons first in response to conventional attack. Yet, as our 
historical discussion in earlier chapters has shown, the rationality of 
First Use has been questioned by an important section of the US elite 
ever since the Soviet Union acquired a secure second-strike capability in 
the 1960's. There is particular concern over the possibility of 
'automatic first use' taking place as a result of the decentralisation of 
control over battlefield nuclear weapons that would occur were a 
conventional war in Central Europe to break out. (31) 
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Supporters of flexible response strategy would argue that the 
possibility of unauthorised first use contributes to deterrence of a 
Soviet attack, and ensures the 'linkage' of the United States to Western 
Europe's defence. Supporters of No First Use would argue, on the other 
hand, that the risks in such a stance are too great to justify any 
additional deterrent value that they may have. Making irrational and 
suicidal threats can, if they are believed, be quite effective in 
preventing an opponent from certain moves. But if, for whatever reason, 
they are disbelieved or ignored, as must be possible, then they are a 
recipe for disaster. If, moreover, political leaders may not have 
complete control over whether these threats are actually carried out, 
then the characterisation of the NATO posture that incorporates such 
threats as 'tantamount to a regional doomsday machine' seems a very 
accurate one. (32) 
Part of a No First Use policy, by contrast, would be to ensure that 
the possibility of unauthorised use was minimised. All nuclear weapons 
would be withdrawn from frontline forces; and the number of battlefield 
nuclear weapons would be drastically reduced. If any theatre nuclear 
weapons are retained, as a counter to equivalent Soviet weapons, (33) 
they should be as invulnerable to pre-emptive destruction as possible, 
and their command structures should be separated from that for 
conventional forces. (34) Medium range missiles deployed well back from 
the battlefield would be preferable to short range weapons deployed on 
it. And submarine-based weapons would more preferable. 
The initial logic of a No First Use policy would essentially be a 
unilateral one. Irrespective of whether one believes that the Soviet 
Union would be willing to use its nuclear weapons first, it makes no 
sense for NATO to do so. No First Use, therefore, is a policy that NATO 
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can adopt without a lengthy process of negotiation or reciprocal steps. 
Even without any equivalent Soviet moves, it would require the withdrawal 
of a large proportion of the US nuclear weapons currently in Europe. It 
is likely that all nuclear artillery shells and depth charges would be 
dismantled, together with most of the stock of gravity bombs. The 
current planned arsenal of 4600 warheads in Europe could be reduced to 
1000 or less, even without any equivalent Soviet reciprocation. 
Whether a policy of No First Use could lead to further disarmament 
measures would depend on the extent of Soviet'reciprocation. This 
linkage would be particularly clear, at least in the first instance, in 
the negotiations over Intermediate Nuclear Forces (I. N. F. ) in Europe. 
For a No First Use policy would remove what is, in reality, the main 
stumbling block, on the Western side, to the 'Zero Option' in Europe: the 
insistence on the maintenance of at least some intermediate range US 
missiles on European soil as a political symbol of the US's commitment to 
use its nuclear force to deter Soviet conventional invasion. If the West 
were to accept that the destruction of Soviet SS20's in Europe should be 
balanced by an end to any US Cruise and Pershing 2 deployment in Europe, 
it would effectively have accepted the main elements of the Soviet offer 
made in February 1986. 
I There can be little doubt that, if the two sides were committed to 
reaching agreement, a compromise could then be negotiated on the 
remaining points of contention. Discussion of British and French SLBM 
forces could be transferred to the talks on strategic forces. Indeed the 
Soviet willingness not to count existing forces in the Eurobalance 
already implies such a transfer. The Soviets would withdraw their short- 
range nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe, where they were supposedly 
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deployed'only as a 'countermeasure' to US INF deployment. - And the US 
proposal to allow a limited number of Soviet SS201s in Asia could be 
accepted. 
Were the Soviet Union, in such circumstances, then to retreat from 
its previous proposals, the timetable for further disarmament would, 
inevitably, be lengthened. NATO could still retain its No First Use 
policy, whose logic is, as we have seen, not dependent on Soviet 
reciprocation. But disarmament-oriented governments within NATO would 
then find it much more difficult to persuade their allieslo take further 
unilateral moves to reduce their nuclear forces in Europe. 
On the other hand, were the Soviet's 1986 offer to be proved to be 
genuine, the prospects for nuclear disarmament would be transformed. 
Once the West had abandoned its commitment to First Use, it would not 
only make a deal banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe 
a possibility. It would also mean that NATO's current opposition to 
nuclear-weapon-free zones could be reversed. For at present that 
opposition, like that to the 'Zero Option' on INF, is based on a fear 
that it would weaken the US nuclear guarantee. Were that guarantee no 
longer to be required, except in a second-strike capacity, the rationale 
for retaining US nuclear weapons in Europe, irrespective of Soviet moves, 
would no longer exist. 
As a first step in such a process, and in order to build 
confidence in the value of such measures, Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones 
might be established in Scandinavia, the Balkans and Central Europe. 
(35) Provided that both sides were satisfied by these steps, however, 
there is no reason why the process could not be extended to encompass 
Europe as a whole. There would of course be many problems involved, for 
example how French and Soviet strategic forces would be covered in such 
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an agreement, and one could not necessarily expect rapid agreement. If 
agreement could be reached, however, it would constitute a major symbolic 
and practical step towards a 'minimum deterrence' regime. It could be a 
model for similar Zones elsewhere, in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
And it would help to discourage, though by itself it would not be able to 
entirely prevent, further nuclear proliferation. 
The success of measures in this category, which are designed to 
confine the nuclear arsenals of both sides solely to a retaliatory role, 
would, however, depend in part on success in the second category, i. e. 
measures designed to prevent technological developments that would be 
perceived as contributing to a first strike capability. For, in order to 
have confidence in a 'minimum deterrent' posture, each side must have 
confidence that its own nuclear forces can survive attack, by nuclear or 
conventional forces, by the other. The more that potential first-strike 
forces are developed, therefore, the larger a minimum second-strike force 
will have to be to guarantee a given level of retaliatory destruction. 
Were measures to reduce the first strike threats to minimum 
deterrent forces to be very successful, 'the size of those forces could be 
very low indeed. Admiral Noel Gayler, former head of US forces in the 
Pacific, suggests that as few as 100 weapons on each side would suffice. 
(36) But such a small arsenal would only be possible if there were a 
high degree of confidence that it could not be substantially depleted by 
accident or by enemy action. Were it to be perceived to be vulnerable to 
a first-strike, such a force could actually be more destabilising than a 
rather larger one, say of 1000 warheads. And were first-strike 
technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, to be seen to be developing 
rapidly and without restraint, it is possible that arsenals even larger 
than those currently in existence might someday be seen as necessary. 
If, for example, US missile defences were thought to be 90% effective 
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and US ASW forces were believed to be capable of destroying 90% of Soviet 
submarines before they could launch their missiles (either in their bases 
or at sea), then the Soviet Union would need around 10000 warheads in its 
strategic submarines in order to be confident in its ability to have the 
100-weapon 'minimum deterrent' force that Admiral Gayler prescribes. On 
the other hand, if effective limitations could be placed on missile 
defences and strategic ASW capabilities, the requirement for a minimum 
deterrent force would be considerably less. 
Proposals for confining nuclear weapons to a retaliatory role have 
a logic of their own, independent of the balance of conventional forces. 
Yet there is little doubt that the case for a No First Use policy would 
be considerably strengthened if there were also a reasonable expectation 
that, were there to be a Soviet conventional invasion, the probability of 
defeat for the West would be low. Thus the measures discussed in the 
third subsection of this section, designed to reduce the fear of 
conventional attack, would be an important complement to nuclear 
disarmament proposals. 
It is an inescapable part of a No First Use policy-that one must be 
prepared to accept that there is some risk that one may have to surrender 
rather than be the first to use nuclear weapons, with the unacceptable 
risk of precipitating a global holocaust that this could involve. But it 
is not an essential part of such a policy that NATO would need to make 
large increases in its conventional forces in order to reduce that risk 
to a tolerable level. In reality, a growing literature on the 
conventional balance in Europe suggests that, with existing forces, NATO 
can already have a high degree of confidence in its ability to withstand 
a Soviet conventional attack. (37) A further strengthening of that 
confidence, for example by measures to reduce the capabilities of both 
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sides to launch surprise attacks, would undoubtedly reassure those in the 
West who have expressed concern that No First Use might make conventional 
war in Europe more likely. And mutual reductions in expenditure on 
conventional forces, whether by agreement or by independent actions, 
would answer those critics who contend that No First Use will require 
higher defence spending. 
3.2 Preventing First-Strike Developments 
One of the driving forces of the nuclear arms-race has been the 
attempt-by each side to develop weapon systems that can destroy the 
nuclear weapons of the other before they can be launched, or in some way 
render-them 'obsolete'. As we saw in section 2 of this chapter, in 
seeking to replace M. A. D. by American nuclear superiority, the New Right 
has been particularly vocal in supporting developments that are seen as 
contributing towards this objective. 
As we also argued, however, such developments are bound to lead to 
increasing mistrust between the superpowers, and in particular to 
increased instability in crises. Yet the underlying objective of the 
arms build up to achieve an effective nuclear superiority over the 
Soviet Union cannot, in reality, be achieved. For, as long as both 
sides maintain nuclear arsenals of the present size or above, Mutual 
Assured Destruction could not be avoided by the action of only one 
party. 
Both because it reduces the stability of the nuclear balance, 
therefore, and because it increases the level of forces that each side 
must maintain in order to possess a secure second strike 'minimum 
deterrent', the development of first-strike capabilities should be 
restricted as far as possible. In combination with the other measures 
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discussed in this chapter, such restrictions can reduce the risks of 
nuclear war even while nuclear weapons are still in existence. And they 
can increase confidence that, even with much reduced nuclear forces, 
neither superpower can gain any advantage from being the first to use its 
nuclear weapons. 
Measures to restrict first-strike potential have been a constant 
focus of debate in the arms control talks between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. Proposals have included: (a) measures to prevent 
the development and deployment of more accurate ballistic missiles, such 
as a complete 'freeze' on all new deployments of strategic nuclear 
systems, an agreement to halt all further nuclear tests, and a total ban 
on long-range missile testing; (38) (b) agreement to withdraw or 
dismantle some of the most threatening nuclear systems already in 
existence, e. g., Pershing 2 and the Soviet Yankee class submarines off 
the U. S. coast; (39) (c) a reaffirmation, and strengthening, of the 
1972 A. B. M Treaty, in order to prevent the testing and eventual 
deployment of strategic defences and anti-satellite weapons; (d) 
measures, both unilateral and bilateral, to increase the invulnerability 
of missile submarines, perhaps by agreement to, or acceptance of, 
'sanctuaries' for each side's naval forces. (40) 
All of these measures, and others, could be agreed provided 
that both sides accepted that current nuclear arsenals give neither side 
any useable overall advantage. Given this assumption, and given an 
acceptance that no such advantage should be sought, there should be no 
objection in principle to the first three of the proposals above. 
Provided that acceptable means of verification are available, and once 
the basic assumption of parity as both a reality and an objective is 
accepted, there could be no plausible objection to their implementation. 
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The fourth proposal, however, would involve restrictions on 
conventional, as well as nuclear, forces, and will therefore pose some 
additional problems, which we will discuss in the next sub-section. We 
mention it here simply to highlight the fact that nuclear arms control 
and conventional arms control cannot be entirely distinct, and the more 
that nuclear arms are reduced the more important that control over first- 
strike conventional weapons becomes. 
3.3 Restrictions on Conventional Forces 
It is clearly important that the partial nuclear disarmament 
measures already discussed will, at a minimum, make complete nuclear 
disarmament more likely. For this to be the result, however, they will 
have to be accompanied by growing mutual trust, and by a diminished fear 
of attack by the other. It is clearly important that the perceived 
probability of invasion is reduced, rather than increased, as a result of 
nuclear disarmament measures, whether they be unilateral or 
multi lateral . 
At the same time, it is important to recognise that, in all the 
societies concerned, there are organisations and individuals who have 
a vested interest in exaggeration of external military threats. Because 
of the high levels of military spending that can be justified, arms 
manufacturers can make higher profits, defence workers will be more 
likely to retain their jobs, and the armed forces can look forward to 
greater prospects of promotion and more modern equipment. It is not 
surprising therefore, that these groups will press for a 'worst case' 
analysis of a potential opponent's intentions. 
It would be wrong to believe that these 'military-industrial 
complexes' play a dominant role in determining threat perceptions, 
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either in the Soviet Union or in NATO members. But they do tend to bias 
decision-making against disarmament-oriented policies, and they can 
mobilise powerful political forces towards this end. Reducing their 
influence has to be an important part of a long term process of building 
confidence between the members of the two military alliances. 
Because of the need to reduce the fear of invasion, as well as 
because of the desirability of reducing the influence of the arms 
lobbies, it is important that, if possible, measures of partial nuclear 
disarmament are not accompanied by an increase in the level of 
conventional defence spending. There may be strong political arguments 
for such increases in the short run, both as a means of reassuring the 
general public of the government's commitment to defence in general, and 
in order to placate the armed forces and weapon manufacturers. In the 
long run, however, a build up in conventional forces, whether unilateral 
or bilateral, is bound to conflict with the general objective of mutual 
reassurance, particularly if the build up is concentrated on offensive 
forces. For it would be likely to lend credence to the ---VqYment 
that nuclear disarmament makes a conventional war in Europe more likely. 
Any defence policy is bound to involve some risks. But a proposed 
policy that can only reduce the likely casualties in a major European war 
- perhaps from billions to millions - at the expense of increasing the 
likelihood of such a war taking place would, understandably, be rejected 
by the general public. In both Western and Eastern Europe, though not 
perhaps to the same extent in the United States, the memory of World War 
Two is still too painful for politicians to support policies that appear 
to make a further, and perhaps more devastating, conflict more likely. 
Were the perception to become widespread that this would be the 
- 417 - 
consequence of denuclearisation of European defences, it would bring such 
a process very quickly to a halt. 
An important complement of nuclear disarmament, therefore, should 
be changes in the structure and disposition of conventional forces, on 
both sides, that can increase mutual confidence and security. This can 
be done by, as far as possible, structuring conventional forces in a 
manner that is clearly defensive rather than offensive; and by seeking, 
both through mutual agreement and reciprocal action, to reduce the size 
of military establishments and of defence budgets. We discuss these in 
turn. 
The need to ensure that conventional defences are structured in an 
unambiguously defensive manner is a common theme of most of the 
literature on non-nuclear defence for Western Europe. The Alternative 
Defence Commission, for example, favoured a posture of 'defensive 
deterrence' defined as: 
"having the capability to inflict heavy losses 
on any invading force, but at most only a limited 
capacity to mount offensive operations in the 
opponent's territory". (41) 
A move towards such a posture, to the extent that it can be 
accomplished, could be most useful in contributing to the easing of fears 
of attack. The less suitable an opponent's conventional forces are for 
offensive action, and the more clearly they are designed solely for 
defence, the greater the confidence of a potential opponent that its foe 
is unlikely to contemplate invasion. 
In seeking to develop a 'defensive deterrence' posture it will be 
necessary to examine current, and planned, developments in NATO 
conventional defences in order to assess whether they are compatible with 
such a direction. In recent years there has been growing emphasis in 
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NATO force planning on acquiring non-nuclear capabilities for offensive 
missions against Warsaw Pact forces. On the Central Front this has taken 
the form of a high priority being given to enhancing NATO's capabilities 
for attacking airfields, 'second echelon' troop concentrations, and 
command centres deep inside Eastern Europe. In the North Atlantic, it 
has been reflected in a growing emphasis on 'forward defence', ie 
attacking Soviet naval forces in their bases and in the surrounding 
waters rather than waiting for them to 'surge' into the Atlantic. 
NATO commanders justify these changes as being necessary to enhance 
the ability of conventional forces to defend Western Europe against 
Soviet attack. Soviet leaders could not be blamed, however, if they 
perceived them as measures designed to give the United States and its 
allies a capability for attacking, and defeating, the Soviet Union. The 
greater the resources that NATO devotes to these roles, the more that 
those holding such views within the Soviet Union would appear to be 
Justified; and the more remote the possibilities for trust-building would 
be. Indeed, if the political price for partial nuclear disarmament were 
to be a major offensive conventional build-up of this nature, one must 
have some doubt as to whether the net result will not be more, rather 
than less, dangerous. 
An increasing offensive emphasis in conventional forces, therefore, 
is likely to contribute to a 'worst case' interpretation of one's long 
term intentions; and could thus have adverse implications both for trust- 
building and for the possibilities of curbing the conventional arms race. 
Moreover, in addition to these effects on normal peacetime perceptions, 
it could also make war by miscalculation in times of crisis more likely. 
The crisis stability arguments apinst offensive conventional 
forces are similar to those developed earlier in this chapter against 
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counterforce nuclear forces. In a crisis, perhaps originating outside 
Europe, both alliances may feel it prudent to put at least some of their 
conventional forces on precautionary alert. Doing so may, however, 
itself increase fear of attack and lead to a process of mutual escalation 
in levels of preparedness. If one side then believes that it could gain 
a possibly decisive military advantage by launching an attack on the 
other, it may feel obliged to do so. Even though its leaders may have 
entered the crisis with no aggressive intent war may be perceived as 
increasingly inevitable, and the arguments for 'getting retaliation in 
first' may seem unanswerable. Such arguments will be given added force 
by the knowledge that a similar line of reasoning is likely to be 
followed by the leaders of the other side, who themselves may have had 
no intention to attack before the crisis began. 
The incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack with conventional 
forces, moreover, could potentially be more attractive than a nuclear 
first-strike. Provided that the risk of escalation to nuclear conflict 
were judged to be small, the attacker would not need to fear a global 
climatic catastrophe. And, unlike a nuclear first-strike, he would not 
need to destroy all of his opponent's forces in order to have gained an 
advantage. It would be sufficient to destroy enough of an enemy's forces 
to give the attacker a decisive advantage in the war that followed. 
Destroying 70% of an opponent's nuclear bombers and missiles in a first 
strike would make little effective difference to the scale of 
retaliation. But destroying 70% of an opponent's conventionally-armed 
bombers and missiles in a pre-emptive strike could, almost certainly, 
determine the result of a conflict in which nuclear weapons were not 
used. 
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Whether either side would, in practice, have the capability to 
launch a pre-emptive conventional attack, and destroy such a high 
proportion of opposing forces, depends inter alia on the type of 
offensive forces it possesses, and how they are deployed. The greater the 
pre-emptive capability of either side's conventional forces, the greater 
is likely to be the incentive, on both sides, for striking first once war 
is thought to be inevitable. It is therefore important to ensure that 
pre-emptive capabilities on both sides are kept below a level that might 
be thought to give a decisive advantage to the side that attacked first. 
It is because of such considerations that some of the proposals now 
being made for developments in NATO's conventional forces are potentially 
destabilising. The acquisition of 'deep strike' conventionally-armed 
missiles, for example, could give NATO a capability for destroying a large 
proportion of Pact aircraft on the ground before they could be used. 
Taking only a few minutes to reach targets deep inside Eastern Europe, 
such missiles could 'decapitate' Warsaw Pact forces and render them 
vulnerable to follow-on attack by NATO land and air forces. And the 
development of similar systems by the Soviet Union and its allies, which 
would threaten NATO aircraft and missiles, would make the incentives for a 
conventional first strike even greater. 
.1 
The situation with regard to forces for maritime warfare is, if 
anything, even more dangerous. NATO continýQusly monitors the positions of 
Soviet submarines and surface ships, and in times of crisis would allocate 
many of their own naval forces to tracking these vessels. Because of 
NATO's considerable lead in ASW technology, it has a capability to track a 
much larger proporfion, of Soviet forces than vice versa. The magnitude 
of this te(Wogy gap is, by its nature, not susceptible to precise 
assessment. Nevertheless, most of the open literature acknowledges that 
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it is considerable. Together with the geographical disadvantages that it 
faces, this technological inferiority could lead the Soviet Union, in 
times of crisis, to fear that its conventional navy, and much of its SSBN 
force, could be destroyed in a pre-emptive US/NATO attack. Such a view 
could lead the Soviets to adopt a 'trigger happy' posture, in which even a 
small-scale attack on their Navy would be seen as a part of a much larger 
operation, and would be dealt with accordingly. (43) 
Moreover, recent developments in U. S. maritime strategy also 
increase instability at a strategic nuclear level. For they threaten the 
one part of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal -their missile 
submarines - that are currently thought to be least vulnerable to a 
disarming first-strike. Were significant numbers of these submarines to 
be lost in a conventional war, either in port or at sea, Soviet fears 
that a U. S. counterforce strike against its land-based nuclear forces 
would follow would be intensified, and the. risks, of inadvertent 
escalation to nuclear war would thus be increased. 
In opposing these developments in NATO offensive capabilities, 
however, advocates of 'defensive deterrence' recognise that there may be 
a need for enhancing NATO conventional defences in other ways. Even if 
it is believed that-the balance of conventional forces in Europe is 
roughly equal, there will still be a requirement to match any increases 
in Soviet military preparedness. Western electorates will have to be 
reassured that their governments are committed to defence, if they are to 
continue to support disarmament-oriented policies. At the same time, 
some degree of reassurance will have to be given to the Soviet Union that 
improvements in NATO military strength are designed only for defensive 
purposes. 
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It will be a high priority of governments seeking to move towards a 
policy of 'defensive deterrence', therefore, to ensure both that any 
additions to military capabilities are primarily defensive in nature, and 
that existing forces are reorientated, as far as is possible, towards 
defensive missions. 
Amongst proposals for defensive enhancements to conventional ground 
forces are ideas for territorial defence, increased availability of 
reserve manpower, barriers and obstacles on the intra-German border, and 
the use of emerging technologies in enhancing anti-tank defences. Air 
forces, it is argued, should be restructured to place more emphasis on 
air defence and ground support roles, and the capability for deep strike 
should be given a much lower priority than at present. And maritime 
defences in the North-East Atlantic should be restructured so as to 
considerably reduce the emphasis given to 'forward defencel$44)Instead, a 
more defensive posture should be developed, probably involving greater 
emphasis on 'barrier defence' in the seas between Scotland, Iceland, and 
Greenland, and perhaps also involving greater resources being devoted to 
coastal defence of the U. K. and other NATO member states. (45) 
It is important to emphasise, however, that it is not the intention 
of a policy of 'defensive deterrence' to dispense with all forces capable 
of offensive missions. Not only would such a project be quite 
impractical, given that many forces can be used in both defensive and 
offensive roles. It also ignores the important role that counter-attack 
can play in responding to enemy attack. Some limited offensive 
capabilities will have to be retained both in order to be able to regain 
territory temporarily lost, and to ensure that an opponent's own 
territory cannot provide a complete sanctuary for his forces. 
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Some proponents of 'defensive deterrence' or 'non-provocative 
defence' would object that nothing less than a complete abandonment of 
any offensive capabilities will suffice. By favouring such a formulation, 
however, they may be in danger of forgetting that the purpose of 
restructuring conventional defences is not to create a risk-free 'model' 
defence, which would obviate the need either for resolution of the 
underlying political conflicts or for bilateral disarmament. It is to 
provide reassurance to the Soviet Union that the West poses no military 
threat to the Soviet Union or its allies, and to reduce the incentives 
for pre-emption in a period of crisis. In order to achieve these 
objectives, it is not necessary that the West possess no offensive 
capabilities. It will be sufficient for those capabilities to be reduced 
to a level where they would clearly be inadequate for either a major 
invasion or a pre-emptive first strike. 
Independent steps to reduce the offensive emphasis in Western 
conventional forces can play an important role in reducing the risks of 
crisis instability, and can provide reassurance that partial nuclear 
disarmament will not make conventional war in Europe more likely. Their 
impact would, however, be greatly increased if they were accompanied by 
parallel developments in Soviet conventional forces. NATO could 
encourage such developments both by dispersal and protection of its own 
forces, thus making Soviet deep strike weapons less effective, and by 
proposing agreed limitations on the development and deployment of forces 
that are thought to be particularly destabilising. 
ý Agreement not to deploy medium range conventionally-armed ballistic 
missiles, for example, would reduce fears of pre-emptive attack on both 
sides. The establishment of 'tank-free'zones' in Central Europe would be 
particularly usefulýin meeting Western fears of a Soviet Iblitzkreig'. 
The creation of 'sanctuaries' for submarines would reduce Soviet fears of 
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a surprise attack on its missile submarines. And agreement of limiting 
the size of military exercises. and on the siting of military observers 
in each other's territory, could reduce the ability of either side to 
mobilise for a surprise attack. (46) 
A process of reciprocation and mutual agreement would be 
particularly important in efforts to reduce the size of the military 
establishments on both sides, thus enabling cuts to be made in defence 
spending. The Western nations, having accepted that rough parity exists 
in conventional forces, could announce, for example, that they would 
increase their defence budgets at a rate no faster, in real terms, than 
the rate at which, on the basis of Western assessments, Warsaw Pact 
spending was believed to be increasing. If the prospects for 
reciprocation were judged to be promising, they might go further and make 
limited, and independent, reductions in their own defence budgets and 
invite the Soviet Union to do likewise. 
Because of their symbolic importance, reaching an agreement at the 
MBFR talks would clearly be a high priority, particularly since the two 
sides' positions are not very far apart. Although the initial reductions 
now being discussed are relatively small, a successful first stage 
agreement would have several important consequences. First, it would 
help to convince public opinion in the West that, despite previous 
propaganda, rough parity in conventional forces, at least in Central 
Europe, now existed. Second, it would act as a clear indication that, in 
reducing their reliance on nuclear weapons, both sides wished to ensure 
that a conventional arms build-up did not take place. And, third, it 
would allow both sides, if they wished, to make some modest reductions in 
the size of their armed forces, and in the level of their defence 
budgets. Such a mutual de-escalation could then be used as a catalyst 
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for further cuts, 'to take place both by mutual example and by second and 
third stage MBFR agreements. 
4. Can The U. K. Contribute To-The Disarmament Process? 
If the general case for moving towards an alternative to nuclear 
deterrence is accepted, those involved in the debate on security policy 
in Britain must then consider how best U. K. policies can contribute to 
the adoption of such an alternative. In doing so they must acknowledge 
that there can be no independent British solutions to the problem of 
security in the-nuclear age. By its nature the threat of nuclear 
holocaust is a global one, and can ultimately only be lifted by 
international action. Britain cannot opt out of the world system. 
Rather, whilst recognising that it must operate within the realities of 
that system, it must consider what steps it can take to change those 
realities in the direction it desires. 
A disarmament-oriented British government should have a much better 
chance of playing a significant role as a catalyst for international 
disarmament than almost any other state outside the two superpowers. It 
is the only one of the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states in which 
there is not a domestic political consensus in favour of retention of a 
national nuclear force. Because it makes a major contribution to NATO 
forces in Europe, its policies could not be easily ignored in the 
deliberations of that organisation, in the way that the views of Greece 
or Denmark have been. Its potential influence on the debate within the 
United States would be enhanced by the close historical and cultural 
links between the two countries. And, because the U. K. played an 
important, albeit ultimately subsidiary, part in the origins of current 
Western policies in the 1940's, the psychological impact of its 
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abandoning those policies, of which it had been a keen advocate for 40 
years, should not be underestimated. 
Britain in the 1980's has less influence, economically or 
politically, than at the time of Yalta and the formation of NATO. Yet it 
still ranks as one of a number of medium ranking industrial states - 
along with France, West Germany, and Japan -which are economically 
significant and could exercise a substantial measure of autonomy in 
foreign policy. If there has been littleýuse made of this potential in 
the past, it has been because British governments have, for the most 
part, been content to permit the U. S. to take a dominant role in Western 
foreign and defence policy. 
Moreover the continuing decline in Britain's economic strength, 
although it has had the effect of reducing its importance in comparison 
with other medium-sized powers, also opens up opportunities for more 
radical policies. As Chapter 7 made clear, one of the consequences of 
decline has been an intensification of pressure on the defence budget 
which is likely to require a significant retrenchment in Britain's 
military capabilities, and has added to the political pressure for a 
reconsideration of the commitment to an independent nuclear force. 
It would be possible for the U. K. government to adjust its defence 
programme in line with the country's economic decline in such a way as to 
minimise the effect of adjustments on NATO policy. It could present any 
necessary reviews and retrenchment as being consistent with a continuing 
commitment to reliance on nuclear deterrence. Much as in the withdrawal 
from 'East of Suez' in the 19601s, a reduction in Britains conventional 
contribution to NATO could be-represented as a move that was necessary to 
reflect economic realities. It would even be possible, though inevitably 
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more difficult, to represent a refusal to replace Polaris as an 
adjustment to decline. For, provided Britain continued to allow U. S. 
nuclear bases to be stationed on its territory, and took part in NATO 
preparations for tactical nuclear roles, the wider repercussions of such 
a move might prove to be relatively limited. 
If the analysis of this Chapter is accepted as correct, however, 
such a course - of reluctant adjustment to economic decline - would not 
be the best one. Instead the opportunity presented by the economic need 
to review military commitments should be used as a catalyst to start a 
process of international disarmament going. 
The idea that unilateral initiatives can help to bring about 
tension reduction is one that has received increased attention in recent 
years. The peace movements in Western Europe, though not to the same 
extent in the U. S., have urged unilateral restraint in NATO nuclear 
weapons deployments. And the new Soviet leadership, under Mikhail 
Gorbachov, has demonstrated its interest in the idea by steps such as its 
moratorium of nuclear tests and its withdrawal of limited numbers of 
troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia. (47) 
Generally the discussion of unilateral initiatives to curb arms 
races has focused on actions taken primarily in the hope-of eliciting 
reciprocation from the potential adversary. (48) In the case of British 
nuclear disarmament, however, it would be the purpose of an initiative to 
elicit a favourable response both from the Soviets and from Britain's own 
allies in NATO. (49) The central purpose of British action would be to 
create opportunities for disarmament and tension reduction between the 
two superpowers, rather than the promotion of British-Soviet detente in 
isolation. 
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For the British government to commit itself to a policy of 
independent initiatives, designed with the express purpose of breaking 
the cycle of tension between the blocs, would require a rejection of some 
of the fundamentals of current foreign and defence policy. 'In relations 
with the United States, it would signify a much greater willingness, 
where necessary, to take an independent stance in foreign policy. In 
relations with the Soviet Union, it would be likely to mean that Britain 
would no longer accept a U. S. veto on the progress of those relations. 
And it would mean that the government would no longer accept that nuclear 
deterrence was an, adequate basis for long term security, with the 
implications for so much of foreign policy that this implies. Whatever 
particular measures a government felt able to take immediately, it would 
be these basic changes in outlook, and in the desired role for Britain in 
the world, that would be most important. 
Perhaps the most difficult change for the British establishment to 
accept would be the changed relationship with the United States. The 
adoption of an independent, disarmament-oriented, foreign policy would 
almost certainly be seen as a challenge to both current U. S. policies and 
to the U. S. 's leadership role within the Western world. It would involve 
a more or less explicit refutal of the main tenets of the 'special 
relationship' to which British leaders have attached such weight in the 
past. Even under a more liberal U. S. President than Ronald Reagan, it 
would be likely, at least initially, to provoke a hostile response from a 
superpower anxious to preserve its control of the Western side of the 
arms control process. 
The possible measures that might be taken by a British government 
that was willing to make these radical changes in foreign policy have 
been a focus of party political debate for several years now, at least 
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since the change in Labour Party Policy that took place soon after its 
defeat in the 1979 General Election. By 1986 Labour appeared firmly 
committed to substantial measures of nuclear disarmament. And many of 
the prominent leaders of the SDP/Liberal Alliance, whose attitude could 
prove crucial in a 'hung' parliament, also appear to be sympathetic to 
some unilateral disarmament initiatives by the U. K. 
In assessing the potential effectiveness of the various British 
measures proposed, I will focus my attention on the extent to which they 
could contribute to the three policies outlined in Section 3 of this 
Chapter -a shift towards a 'minimum deterrence' regime by the 
superpowers; the prevention of destabilising first strike developments in 
nuclear forces; and a reduction in the fear of attack by conventional 
forces with, if possible, a reduction in the economic burden that those 
forces impose. Although there may be other objectives involved in a 
policy of British, disarmament initiatives, I believe that these are by 
far the most important. 
Measures taken by a British government are likely to have the 
greatest direct effect on progress on the first and third of these 
overall objectives, i. e., on moving towards a 'minimum deterrence' 
regime, and on reducing the risks, and costs, involved in conventional 
defences. Britain has a major role in NATO plans for both nuclear and 
conventional warfare in Europe, both as a base and as a provider of 
significant forces. As a result it could exercise considerable leverage 
on NATO to make major changes in its 'flexible response' policy, and to 
reverse the recent trend towards increased emphasis on offensive 
conventional forces. Unlike action by one of the smaller member nations, 
British dissent could not simply be 'footnoted'. The size and importance 
of British bases and forces would ensure that. 
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The direct leverage which a British government could have on the 
development of destabilising first strike nuclear forces would, however, 
be considerably less. The cancellation of Trident would not 
significantly diminish the U. S. 's counterforce capability in the 1990's. 
And a refusal to allow British firms to bid for 'Star Wars' contracts 
would be unlikely to have a major direct effect on the timetable of the 
U. S. programme. At least for the foreseeable future, only the two 
superpowers can take steps that would have a major direct effect on the 
development of first strike capabilities. 
The indirect effectiveness of British initiatives is more difficult 
to judge. Were Britain to openly announce its intention to disband its 
nuclear force, it could have a significant effect on attitudes towards 
nuclear weapons throughout the world. If presented as a considered step 
aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, rather than simply an economy 
measure, it might swing the balance of the argument in some of the 'near- 
nuclear' states, such as India and Pakistan, away from acquiring nuclear 
status. And it would, at a minimum, be likely to generate a series of 
major national debates in the U. S., France, the Soviet Union and China. 
It is unlikely that any of the four other nuclear weapon states would, as 
a result, follow Britain's unilateral lead. It is, however, more 
plausible that it would make them more open to multilateral disarmament. 
The indirect and 'demonstrative' effects of Britain abandoning its 
national nuclear force are likely to depend, to some extent, on how it is 
presented, and on the reactions of the two superpowers to British moves. 
In the long run it may be that the example of a nuclear weapons state 
being willing to adopt a radical new way of thinking will have a profound 
catalytic effect on moving the world towards a more secure future. For 
such effects to become apparent, however, the British policy must first 
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be sustained in the short term. And it is likely to be the direct effects 
of that policy, favourable or otherwise, which will determine whether 
British unilateral initiatives are sustained, or whether, like the 
Kennedy experiment of 1963,, they are abandoned without making a serious 
dent on the course of the arms race. (50) 
i 
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will focus on the direct 
effects of British disarmament initiatives. We will look in turn at four 
types of measures which a radical U. K. government may consider, assess in 
what ways they could effect desirable changes on the policies of NATO and 
the superpowers, and discuss some of the obstacles that they might face. 
4.1 Giving Up Britain's Strategic Nuclear Force 
The first possible U. K. government measure which I consider is an 
abandonment of the commitment to the retention of a national strategic 
nuclear force. As I have already argued, the military rationales for 
this force are dubious at best. There is some doubt as to how 
independent it would be in times of crisis. There is little doubt that 
its retention, at least under current circumstances, involves a degree of 
dependence on U. S. policies that imposes severe constraints on a 
government's ability to take initiatives that conflict with the policies 
of the U. S. adminiýtration of the day. 
As the last Chapter discussed, it is possible that a decision not 
to replace Polaris, and thus an acceptance that Britain's strategic 
nuclear role should eventually cease, would be seen as little more than 
an adjustment to the realities of decline. Were a disarmament-oriented 
government interested in using its strategic nuclear force in order to 
facilitate wide reaching changes, therefore, it would be important to 
send an unambiguous signal that the primary purpose was to act as a 
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catalyst for international progress towards disarmament. In order to do 
this it would be vital to retire the existing strategic force, i. e., 
Polaris, well before it had reached the end of its life. In practice 
this probably means before the mid-1990's. 
The premature decommissioning of Polaris, without its replacement 
in the strategic nuclear role, could, in my view, play an important part 
in creating a radically new climate for superpower arms talks. It would 
constitute the most important challenge yet to continued reliance on 
nuclear deterrence by any major state. ' With that reliance increasingly a 
subject of political debate in both East and West, it would undoubtedly 
give encouragement to those with similar perspectives elsewhere. 
Crucial to the impact of such a step in the short term would be 
that the Soviet Union takes measures of reciprocation that are clear and 
widely understood. In 1986 the Soviet government reaffirmed its 
commitment to make 'equivalent reductions' in return for Polaris. (51) 
Now that such a commitment has been made, the catalytic effect of Polaris 
decommissioning depends, to a large extent, on it being kept. 
It is likely that any arms agreement reached by the superpowers in 
the near furture will be limited in scope. On this assumption, bilateral 
steps of disarmament by the U. K. and Soviet Union could have important 
symbolic value, and should encourage those arguing for a more 
conciliatory line within the U. S. Particularly if a bilateral process 
involved the acceptance of new verification measures by the Soviet Union, 
it would help to increase trust in the U. S. concerning Soviet 
intentions. 
The retiral of Polaris might, at least initially, lose the 
government some public support. If taken immediately after a General 
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Election, however, the electoral cost of this policy will have diminished 
by the time of the next contest, provided that, by that time, the 
catalytic effects of British action on the international climate are 
clearly visible. 
Moreover, while the scrapping of Polaris would be unpopular 
domestically, it would in other ways be easier to implement than other 
unilateral steps. Because it would be perceived as a primarily national 
weapon system, designed to fulfil domestic political needs, it would be 
unlikely by itself to precipitate a storm of protest from Britain's 
allies. Even if other countries felt that the British decision was a 
wrong one, they would probably feel that it had only a marginal effect on 
their own policies. Unlike the other types of measures -involving 
tactical nuclear forces, U. S. bases, and conventional forces -it is most 
unlikely that a British government would feel it necessary to carry out 
more than a formal process of consultation with its allies before 
implementing its policy. 
Even if Polaris were retired without other unilateral measures 
being taken, however, there would probably be considerable implications 
for Anglo-American relations. Firstly, an independent initiative of this 
type would be seen as a challenge to the basis of the arms control 
policies of the Reagan Administration. And, secondly, it would be likely 
to lead to a reappraisal of the 'special relationship' that still-exists 
between the two nations, especially in intelligence matters. Even if all 
the funds saved from Polaris and Trident were diverted to conventional 
forces, it would probably be seen as signifying a weakening of British 
commitment to European defence, at least by the hawkish forces that 
currently hold sway in Washington. (52) 
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Nevertheless, if a bilateral trade-off between Polaris and 
equivalent Soviet systems were the main result of a new British policy, 
the US government1would be unlikely to feel that it would be in its 
interests to precipitate a major crisis. It might hope that it could, 
with'little difficulty, circumvent additional pressure for Soviet - US 
detente that this deal would create. And it would be thankful, given the 
policy position of the Labour Party in opposition, that British action 
was limited to this area. 
The reaction of Britain's European allies to such a deal would also 
be much less pronounced than if NATO strategy or the presence of US 
nuclear bases were brought into question. Their attitude would probably 
depend to a considerable extent on US and Soviet responses; and might 
well vary from country to country. 
While the German SPD and the smaller member states might guardedly 
welcome the policy as a move away from Great Power illusions, others, 
especially on the political Right, would be disappointed at the blow it 
would deal to any aspirations for a European nuclear force. Since 
British nuclear disarmament would leave, France as the only country in 
Europe with a strategic nuclear force, it would make any proposal for 
replacing a US 'umbrella' by a European one even more unpalatable than at 
present. And, gi'ven the similarities between the rationales developed 
for the French and British nuclear forces, it would be hard for the 
government in Paris not to see the British decision as a clear criticism 
of French policy, and as a threat, at least in the long term, to the 
political consensus within France behind that policy. 
Although the British government could expect considerable, and 
initially adverse, reaction from its NATO allies to Polaris retiral, 
however, it is likely that their strongest protests would be reserved for 
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those measures that directly affected their own policies and forces. I 
now turn my attention to these. 
4.2 Ending Britain's commitments to tactical nuclear forces 
The second type of measure which a radical British government is 
likely to consider concerns the UK's current commitments to tactical 
nuclear forces as part'of NATO's 'flexible response' policy. All three 
of Britain's armed services currently have a tactical nuclear 
capability, either with UK or US warheads. (53) 
Were a British government to be serious about denuclearisation of 
its own forces, the removal of these capabilities would appear to be a 
logical accompaniment to a retiral of Polaris. Indeed without the 
retiral of Britain's own tactical warheads (as distinct from US warheads 
that would be available under the 'dual key' system), the UK government 
could not claim to have become a non-nuclear nation. It would remain 
relatively easy for a successor government to rebuild a national nuclear 
arsenal. And, because it would require the retention of some of the 
existing facilities at Burghfield and Aldermaston, it might reduce 
substantially the financial savings from denuclearisation. If a British 
Government were willing to take the political risks involved in Polaris 
decommissioning, it is therefore probable that it would also wish to 
divest itself of all other nuclear weapons in its possession. 
Moreover the removal of tactical nuclear capabilities from British 
forces could be used to back up demands for NATO to make drastic 
reductions in the size of its nuclear arsenal in Europe, and to move 
towards a policy of 'No First Use'. Since, even under predominantly 
conservative governments, NATO is making substantial reductions in the 
number of nuclear warheads it has in Europe, it should be possible for 
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such an approach to gain at least some concessions from Britain's 
European allies. 
The ultimate success of such demands, however, would depend 
crucially on political developments in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
It is hard to imagine that a Christian Democrat-led government would be 
willing to adopt a No First Use policy, given its previous commitment to 
flexible response. While they would be willing to contemplate further 
reductions in warhead numbers, there is little doubt that they would 
oppose strongly a direct challenge to some of the fundamental tenets of 
flexible response. It would only be in the event of the Social 
Democrats returning to power, perhaps with the support of the Greens, 
that a Labour government would be likely to encounter much sympathy for 
demands for a major rethink of NATO strategy. 
Were the new British policy to involve not only the retiral of its 
own, nuclear forces but also a denuclearisation of its Army units, which 
operate artillery pieces and short range missiles using US nuclear 
warheads on a 'dual key' basis, the directness of the challenge to NATO 
strategy would be even more apparent. It would be more likely to provoke 
a major dispute within NATO than either the retiral of Polaris or even 
than the withdrawal of other national nuclear forces. For while Polaris, 
and to a lesser extent other nuclear forces, are perceived as being 
concerned essentially with national roles, and thus as a matter primarily 
for British decision, nuclear-capable forces held by BAOR are seen as 
being committed to collective defence. Almost all NATO members, 
including 'non-nuclear' members Holland, Belgium, West Germany, Turkey, 
Greece and Italy, operate comparable systems. The sharing of nuclear 
tasks in this way is seen as an important symbol of all members' 
commitment to the nuclear elements of flexible response policy; and 
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recent attempts by the Netherlands even to reduce the number of such 
tasks it undertakes have been met with opposition from other member 
governments. For a major member nation such as Britain to withdraw its 
commitment to these systems would thus have a clearer relationship to 
NATO policy as a whole than the retiral of Britain's own nuclear weapons, 
strategic or tactical. 
The clear challenge to NATO policy that a British withdrawal from 
tactical nuclear capabilities would represent would, however, be an 
advantage to a government seeking to change that policy. It would oblige 
NATO, at a minimum, to start a major debate on the-role, if any, of 
nuclear weapons in its defence. And it-would clearly make Britain's new 
policy not only a matter of national discussion within the UK, but one 
that opened up discussions within every other NATO member state. 
The success of British proposals for changes in NATO policy would 
depend primarily on the extent to which opinion in other NATO countries 
shifted in its direction. This in turn'would depend both on the extent 
to which Soviet reciprocation was judged to be significant, and on the 
outcome of elections which may be decided on issues quite unrelated to 
security policy. In a 'best case' analysis, an SPD-led administration in 
Germany would be joined by Socialist governments in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Norway, and a liberal Democrat succeeding Mr Reagan in the 
United States. The new Soviet leadership would reinforce its disarmament 
proposals with major concessions on verification, and would demonstrate 
further its commitment to detente by other foreign policy initiatives, 
for example in Afghanistan. In such a coincidence of circumstances$ a 
Labour government might find that proposals for a No First Use policy, 
and for a negotiated Nuclear-weapon Free Zone in Europe, would attract 
widespread support from NATO members. 
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Even in a less favourable conjunction of political circumstances, a 
radical British government could reasonably expect to achieve some 
progress in forcing NATO to make further reductions in its nuclear 
stockpile in Western Europe. It would be likely to find it extremely 
difficult to persuade conservative governments to adopt a declaratory 
policy of No First Use. Given the widespread scepticism of the need for 
battlefield nuclear weapons, however, it may be possible to win over 
allies to significant reductions beyond the 4600 target now being 
implemented by General Rogers. 
Negotiations between Britain and its NATO partners on these 
questions, however, are likely to be seen as a secondary question on the 
agenda if the UK government is also committed, as is the Labour Party at 
present, to: 
"the unconditional removal of all US nuclear weapons 
and nuclear bases from British soil and British waters 
...... the current roles of some US forces and facilities in Britain are unacceptable. These 
include the Cruise missile bases, F111 bases and the 
nuclear submarine bases. 
Labour will therefore take appropriate action to 
ensure that the US government removes its nuclear 
weapons and nuclear delivery systems from British 
territory and British territorial waters'. (54) 
As the next section will discuss, this is almost certainly the area 
in which a disarmament-oriented British government would face the 
toughest opposition from its NATO partners. Were a Labour government to 
seek to implement this demand, it would undoubtedly be an important 
factor in determining the progress of negotiations within NATO on 
proposals for reductions in short-range systems and for negotiated 
nuclear-weapon-free zones. On the one hand, such a policy might 
encourage conservative governments, particularly in the US and West 
Germany, to believe that concessions on other issues in nuclear weapons 
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policy would serve only to encourage British radicalism. On the other 
hand, they may believe that a move towards Britain's position on No First 
Use and Nuclear-weapon-free Zones would help to defuse pressure for the 
rapid removal of US nuclear bases from the UK. 
4.3 Removinq US Nuclear Bases in Britain 
The issue of the United States' nuclear bases in the UK could not 
be avoided by a radical British government. After West Germany and the 
US itself, no other nation plays host to so many US nuclear weapons. 
According to estimates made by William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, 1332 
US nuclear weapons are deployed in the UK in peacetime. By comparison 
3396 are deployed in West Germany, 549 in Italy, 489 in Turkey, 164 in 
Greece, 81 in the Netherlands, and 25 in Belgium. (55) 
In addition to bases housing nuclear weapons, the UK also hosts a 
number of American military facilities which would play a key role in 
plans for the prosecution of nuclear war in Europe. These include 
facilities for intelligence gathering, communications, command and 
control, and anti-submarine warfare. (56). Most of these have important 
missions in conventional warfare in Europe in addition to their nuclear 
roles. Without physical British control over their operations, however, 
it would be difficult for a British government to ensure that they did 
not also support US nuclear forces. 
There is general agreement that, of all the measures that might 
form part of the disarmament agenda of a radical British government, it 
is the proposals to expel US nuclear bases that would be most disruptive 
of Britain's relations with its NATO allies. The retiral of Britain's 
own nuclear force might be viewed with disquiet, especially by those in 
the US who would fear a diminution in UK domestic commitment to a heavy 
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defence burden. British proposals for No First Use, particularly if 
accompanied by a withdrawal of participation in all nuclear tasks, would 
be seen as representing a major shift in the balance of argument within 
NATO on an issue which has become an increasing focus of debate in recent 
years. Although it would be difficult t1o assimilate these proposals, 
however, they would not be seen, for the most part, as being incompatible 
with a process of gradual reform of NATO strategy. 
A UK commitment to the removal of all US nuclear bases from its 
territory, however, would be viewed, however inaccurately, not only as a 
challenge to NATO's current policies, but also to its very existence. 
Because it would involve US forces, it would be seen as being based on a 
questioning of the US role in Europe, and indeed on a more general anti- 
American sentiment. As a Conservative Minister recently argued: 
"The Labour party's commitment is, one of the most 
damaging and serious defence commitments to be made 
by any political party in this country... Many 
Americans will say that if Britain or Europe does 
not want them, they should start to pull out. They 
will start to pull out. They will pull out not only 
their nuclear but also their conventional assets. (57) 
Yet despite the opposition that it would encounter, both from 
inside Britain and from overseas, a policy of seeking to remove US 
nuclear bases from Britain has strong arguments in its favour. 
Firstly it would be necessary to take such a step if a commitment 
to a genuinely 'non-nuclear' defence policy were to have credibility. If 
the British government is convinced that it is morally wrong to prepare 
for the use of nuclear weapons, or to play a part in such preparations, 
the continued consent to the use of British territory for the deployment 
of such weapons would clearly be unacceptable. 
Secondly, the removal of US nuclear bases, like the other measures 
of denuclearisation already discussed, could play an important part in 
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persuading Britain's NATO allies to support a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in 
Europe, and thus in facilitating the move towards a 'minimum deterrent' 
regime. Such a radical change in US and NATO policy would not, of 
course, be accomplished without difficulty. The crisis generated by a 
British demand for the removal of US nuclear bases, however, could be a 
productive one if it were to help to start the process of rethinking that 
is needed if there is to be any chance of breaking with the long- 
established NATO consensus on these questions. 
The two arguments in favour of the expulsion of US nuclear bases 
do, for the most part, reinforce each other. Yet they could, 
nevertheless, suggest rather different approaches, particularly on the 
timing and tactics of a British policy. For, although it is at least 
conceivable that NATO may, over a period of time, move towards a minimum 
deterrent posture, it is unrealistic to suggest that the US can be 
persuaded to give up all its own nuclear weapons, at least until the 
Soviet Union does likewise. If one's opposition to US nuclear bases is 
based primarily on a rejection of any association with nuclear weapons, 
there would seem to be little more merit in refusing to house nuclear 
bases, but continue in a military alliance with a nuclear weapons power. 
Immediate withdrawal from NATO would then be the most consistent action 
to take, whether or not such a step were judged likely to move NATO as a 
whole towards a minimum deterrent posture. 
In my view, however, it is possible to resolve the tension between 
the two arguments. It may at present be necessary for the US to possess 
a minimum deterrent force, as long as the Soviet Union does. For it must 
be recognised that, whether or not formal guarantees are made to allies, 
the US strategic nuclear force may make some contribution to the 
deterrence of Soviet use of nuclear weapons, and vice versa; and it would 
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therefore be undesirable for either superpower to give up all its nuclear 
weapons until the other'also agreed to do so. 
Such a recognition, however, would be perfectly consistent with the 
creation of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in Europe. Such a Zone would be a 
powerful symbol of the dramatic narrowing of the role of nuclear weapons 
that a 'minimum deterrent' regime would,, entail. It would outweigh the 
additional deterrent effect, if indeed any exists, of basing US nuclear 
forces in the UK as a symbol of its nuclear 'guarantee'. (58) 
The argument for using the removal of US nuclear bases as a means 
of changing NATO policy would appear particularly strong, in current 
circumstances, when applied to the deployment of 160 ground launched 
cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth (the latter due to be 
completed by 1988). The deployment of these weapons has been justified, 
at least in public presentation, as a necessary response to the Soviet 
deployment of SS20's. Yet the Soviets have now offered to scrap all 
their SS201s within range of Europe if all NATO INF forces were removed 
from Western Europe. Provided that this proposal is genuine, the main 
obstacle to a 'zero option' agreement is likely to be the support within 
NATO for INF deployment as a necessary symbol of the US nuclear 
guarantee. Those holding this point of view argued against the US 'zero 
option' proposal made in 1981, and were instrumental in ensuring that the 
US response to the 1986 Soviet offer of a European zero option was a 
negative one. (59) 
Were a radical government to takeý'office in the UK, however, it 
could use its commitment to removal of Cruise missiles from its territory 
as a means of isolating those within NATO who oppose an INF deal on these 
grounds. With Britain clearly determined to go ahead in any case with 
its policy, the US might feel that a deal with Moscow on INF would be a 
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face-saving way to avoid the humiliation that would result from a 
unilateral expulsion. Britain's European allies, fearful of the 
consequences-for NATO of an escalating 6onfrontation between the US and 
the UK, might well decide the benefits from acceptance of the major 
Soviet concessions embodied in their 'zero option' outweighed the 
doctrinal and political costs involved in withdrawal of INF. 
It would clearly be in the interests of a disarmament-oriented 
British government to encourage the development of such a 'best-case' 
scenario. Not only would it allow the US to withdraw its INF forces as 
gracefully as possible, and thus reduce the possibility of its adopting 
an overtly hostile posture towards the new British government. It would 
also, along with the process of Soviet reciprocation over Polaris, 
demonstrate very clearly that unilateral initiatives by Britain can play 
a role in 'breaking the logjam' between the superpowers. And, finally, 
if the principal of a 'zero option' for one class of nuclear weapons were 
established, either in Europe or globally, the case against it for 
nuclear weapons as a whole would be considerably weakened. The 
possibility of a negotiated Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in Europe, could-then 
be placed very firmly on the political agenda. 
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the 156 nuclear- 
capable F-111 bombers stationed. at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath, together 
with the 600 or so nuclear weapons deployed on these bases. (60) 
Although, it has so far been resisted by the US, there is no reason why 
these systems could not be withdrawn as part of a process of reciprocal 
reductions by the two superpowers. (61) Certainly a British commitment 
to removing the nuclear role of the F-1111s, unilaterally if necessary, 
might help the US to reassess the need for retaining them. 
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The nuclear, role of the F-111 bases, and of the nuclear depth bomb 
storage facilities at Machrihanish and St Mawgan, would in any case be 
less necessary were NATO to adopt the 'No First Use' policy that a 
radical British government is likely to propose. The removal of nuclear 
weapons from these facilities would be a logical accompaniment to the 
denuclearisation of Britain's own nuclear forces which I discussed in the 
last section. Since it would involve US forces rather than national 
ones, the adverse reaction from the Americans would certainly be greater. 
Yet it is at least possible that this will increase the leverage that 
proposals to take these steps will give Britain in negotiations over 
changing NATO strategy. 
It will be more difficult to use opposition to First Use in 
relation to the presence of US Poseidon ballistic missile submarines at 
the Holy Loch. These boats are clearly strategic systems, one of whose 
roles is to provide the US with a second-strike capability. Opponents of 
asking the US to vacate this base are likely to argue that, if the UK 
wishes to be 'protected' by the US seco6d-strike deterrent, it cannot 
oppose taking some part in its servicing and support if asked to do so. 
A British government that was committed to removal of all other US 
nuclear bases from its territory is unlikely to be impressed by this 
argument. For to allow the Holy Loch base to continue to service 
ballistic missile submarines would undoubtedly diminish the symbolic 
impact of its commitment to a non-nuclear approach. Instead it would be 
likely to point out that, if the US were committed to minimum deterrence, 
it could base all its nuclear weapon submarines at its own ports. Given 
the enhanced range of modern ballistic missiles, there is no logistical 
necessity for them to be based in Europe in order for them to be within 
range of targets in the Soviet Union. (62) 
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Despite this, it is clear that a British demand that the US 
withdraw all its nuclear forces from its territory will provoke a major 
crisis within NATO. Considerable pressure will be put on the new 
government by the US and other allies. It is possible that this pressure 
will include the severance of many of the intelligence links which are as 
important as the nuclear bases to the 'special relationship'. It is not 
impossible that sanctions taken against Britain will also include 
measures designed to weaken the British economy. Certainly it would be 
naive to suppose that a disarmament-oriented British government may not 
find it considerably more difficult to obtain economic assistance from 
its NATO allies than a government pursuing a more orthodox foreign 
policy. 
Whether the government could resist such pressure, or whether it 
would decide to dilute its policies in order to reduce it, cannot be 
predicted in advance. It would depend on the ability of its leaders to 
mobilise public opinion on its side, and on whether it could count on the 
support of any of its major NATO partners. It would depend also on the 
extent to which Britain's new policy led to a significant shift in 
informed opinion in other NATO countries, which at present has never even 
seriously considered the type of policies suggested by the Labour Party. 
Perhaps most important of all, the extent to which British 
initatives are successful in creating a new international climate will 
depend on developments in the Soviet Union, both in terms of the general 
process of reform now beginning to take place, and in terms of the degree 
of Soviet reciprocation to British initiatives. 
The changes in Soviet policy since Mr Gorbachov's accession to the 
position of CPSU General Secretary in March 1985 give grounds for 
optimism in this regard. There is increasing evidence that the Soviet 
leadership is considering seriously a much broader range of options in 
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foreign and defence policy than in the past. (63) And there appears to 
be a growing willingness to tolerate public debate and dissent, 
symbolised perhaps most clearly by Dr. Sakharov's release from exile in 
December 1986. 
If British initiatives are to be successful, however, these trends 
in Soviet policy will need to accelerate. On the arms control front in 
particular, Soviet reciprocation for British actions will need to be both 
clear and wideranging. In the first instance it will need to include at 
least equivalent reductions in nuclear arsenals for the UK's destruction 
of its nuclear forces. But, perhaps of greater long term importance, it 
will also have to include a demonstrated Soviet willingness to take other 
steps, concerning both nuclear and conventional forces, that indicate a 
genuine willingness to move away from current military postures. 
4.4 Restructuring Britain's Conventional Forces 
So far in this section we have been discussing initiatives that the 
British government could take that involve nuclear forces. As was 
discussed in Section 3, however, developments in the conventional arms 
race are in some ways as important to control. Although it would not be 
appropriate to discuss in detail possible changes in the structure of 
conventional forces in this thesis, I will therefore briefly mention 
those changes in conventional force planning that have the most direct 
bearing on discussions of the nuclear arms race. 
one of the first areas which a new government should review is the 
process of threat assessment which currently underlines general 
declaratory policy, as well as detailed force planning. Official 
assessments of the overall balance of f6rces are currently constructed in 
order to ensure that the Soviets are seen to have a massive superiority 
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in conventional forces. Little account is taken of the growing 
literature that suggests that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are 
approximately evenly balanced in Europe. (64) 
The widespread perception of Soviet conventional superiority which 
NATO governments foster would have to be countered if Britain was to 
convince its NATO allies to adopt a policy of 'No First Use'. Although 
public opinion polls already show a large majority in support of such a 
policy, the spectre of Soviet conventional superiority , if not 
countered, could overturn this support. As a matter of priority, 
therefore, a new government would have to exert its control over those 
agencies within the MoD which generate threat analyses. (65) 
Secondly, a radical government should consider what measures it can 
take in order to move NATO's conventional forces towards a less offensive 
defence posture,. In particular, it should look at the role of the Royal 
Navy in US plans for 'forward defence' in the North-East Atlantic, and in 
Britain's contribution to deep strike missions on the Central Front. By 
using the substantial contributions that the UK makes in these areas as a 
lever, it should seek to ensure that NATO as a whole moves towards a less 
destabilising posture. 
Thirdly, the new government should be wary of the argument that 
denuclearisation requires more spending on conventional defences. Such 
an argument cannot be justified by reference to the balance of 
conventional forces in Europe that exists at present. And, although 
domestic vested interests and foreign pressure may need to be 'bought 
off' in the short'term, it would be dangerous for a radical government to 
rely on raising defence spending as a means of appeasing opposition to 
denuclearisation. For the weakness of the British economy is such that a 
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new government could not finance increases in defence spending without 
politically damaging reductions in welfare and economic programmes. It 
would be difficult for such cuts to be sustained by a government that was 
also insisting on'the need for detente and reduction in international 
tension. Indeed, once the government has survived the immediate crisis 
caused by denuclearisation, we believe it should seek to make substantial 
reductions in the burden of defence spending, and of military R&D in 
particular, on the economy. (66) 
Changes in these three areas are closely linked. A less 
pessimistic view of the balance of conventional forces between East and 
West would lessen the pressure for retaining current levels of 
conventional defence spending, particularly if the members of the Warsaw 
Pact were to make reductions in their own military budgets. A less 
offensive defence posture would involve the abandonment of roles and 
projects which, precisely because they involve long range attack against 
Soviet-dominated territory, are inordinately expensive. It could 
therefore, ceteris paribus, assist the process of reducing the level of 
defence spending. Were such a policy to be adopted, it would be bound to 
have wideranging implications for Britain's armed forces, for procurement 
policy, and for military planning. 
Firstly, a reorientation of policy in this direction would 
probably mean a further reduction in the emphasis given to the 
military's 'out-of-area' role, particularly if a negotiated settlement of 
the Falklands dispute with Argentina could be reached. The retention of 
an $out-of-areal role, except possibly for disaster relief, UN 
peacekeeping and similar ventures, would be seen as inconsistent with a 
policy that, in other respects, emphasised the need for Britain to 
abandon the trappings of past grandeur. And, if the need for substantial 
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savings in defence spending is accepted, it is probable that forces most 
closely associated with non-NATO roles would be most vulnerable. 
If the case for reducing further Britain's already limited 
capability for out-of-area intervention were accepted, the Royal Navy's 
surface fleet would bear the brunt of the resulting economies. The size 
of that fleet, and in particular the need for aircraft carriers, has 
traditionally been justified, at least in part, by the flexibility they 
provide for intervention outside Europe. Were that capability no longer 
required, the case for retaining a surface fleet of the current 
sophistication and cost would be weakened. 
Secondly, spending on the Royal Navy could be further reduced by a 
reappraisal of its role in the defence of the North-East Atlantic. At 
present, the US Navy, with the support of the Royal Navy, is putting 
increasing emphasis on preparations for attacking Soviet SSBN 
tsancturies' in and around the Kola Peninsula. This forward deployment 
is often justified as a means of tying down Soviet naval forces in the 
defence of their SSBN's, and thus preventing their deployment in missions 
against Western merchant shipping. It is a policy, however, that is 
clearly inconsistent with an attempt to make conventional forces, as far 
as possible, unambiguously defensive. In a crisis or limited non-nuclear 
conflict, it would be extremely destabilising and would be bound to 
increase Soviet fears of a first strike. 
A reassessment of the balance of naval forces between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact might also lead a new government to question the need for the 
Royal Navy to continue to enjoy its current priority. According to one 
recent study, the US and its allies now enjoy a considerable global 
advantage in naval forces, with 16 large-deck aircraft carriers to zero 
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for the Warsaw Pact, and 479 major surface ships (over 2000 tons) to the 
Soviet bloc's 145. (67) The rapid growth in US naval expenditure in 
recent years has, if anything, increased the Western lead. As a result, 
a significant reduction in the UK's contribution to NATO's maritime 
forces could be accomplished without relinquishing the West's substantial 
overall advantage. 
Thirdly, a disarmament-oriented government will want to look 
carefully at the RAF's commitments to the defence of NATO's Central 
Front. Such an examination would have to encompass a thorough review of 
the programmes and doctrines of the RAF. It would have to consider in 
what ways force structures could be changed in a more clearly defensive 
direction, taking into account the results of a revised assessment of the 
Soviet military threat in this region. 
Perhaps the most obvious change that would have to be considered 
would be a reduction in the assets deployed in 'deep strike' roles. At 
present the RAF's Tornado GR1 squadrons in Germany are intended to be 
used mainly for offensive missions, both conventional and nuclear, 
against targets inside Eastern Europe. As part of a policy of 'defensive 
deterrence' it would make sense to reallocate most, if not all, of these 
aircraft to other missions. This conclusion may be reinforced if recent 
reports of a confidential NATO study prove to be correct. This study is 
said to have calculated that: 
"NATO aircraft attacking enemy aircraft will lose 
almost as many aircraft as they knock out on the 
ground. However, NATO's air defences on the central 
front are expected to shoot down four or five enemy 
aircraft for each NATO aircraft that is lost in air 
combat". (68) 
A change in the RAF's emphasis from offensive to defensive missions 
would not only affect Tornado GR1, and associated programmes such as that 
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for a long-range stand-off missile. It would also enable the Ministry of 
Defence to look again at other parts of the RAF budget. Some defence 
analysts have. argued that the cost ofýEuropean Fighter Aircraft could be 
dramatically reduced were it to be designed without the requirement for 
optimising offensive as well as defensive roles. (69) Were this indeed 
to be the case, the potential for financial savings could be 
considerable. 
Finally, a restructuring of conventional forces would involve a 
review of current Army doctrine and forces. The possibilities of 
adopting postures less dependent on mobile, and potentially offensive, 
forces - such as tanks - would have to be examined. The government would 
need to question the incorporation of doctrines such as Air Land Battle 
into NATO plans for ground warfare. My initial impression is that the 
changes in the British Army consequent upon the adoption of a defensively 
oriented conventional defence would be less than those required for the 
other two services. 
Clearly, changes as comprehensive'and wideranging as those touched 
on here would encounter considerable resistance from sections of the 
armed forces, and from some of Britain's NATO allies. As a consequence, 
the process of implementation of these changes would probably be a 
relatively slow one. However, it is at least arguable that changes in 
the structure of NATO's conventional forces could contribute as much to 
stability and trust on Europe as could the removal of nuclear forces. In 
my view, therefore, it will be important for a disarmament oriented 
government not to neglect conventional force reform altogether in order 
to concentrate on nuclear disarmament. Jhe two processes may develop at 
different speeds. But both will have to be pursued if Britain is to make 
its full potential contribution to achieving a more stable system of 
military security in Europe. 
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Conclusions 
In this Chapter I have argued that an alternative to nuclear 
deterrence as the basis for international security must be found; and 
that one of the central purposes of Britain's foreign and defence policy 
must be to help bring about such an alternative. 
The continuing decline in Britain's economic position may provide 
an opportunity for a radical shift towards a disarmament-oriented policy, 
which in turn could make a major contribution to the search for such an 
alternative. As previous Chapters have made clear, one of the 
consequences of decline has been to intensify pressure on the defence 
budget, and thus to force choices between military commitments. Partly 
as a result, the political consensus in support of Britain's semi- 
independent nuclear force, which has been steadily eroding, has come to 
an end. There is a real possibility that Britain, one of only five 
recognised nuclear weapon states, could decide to cease to be a nuclear 
power. 
As a contribution to international efforts to move the world 
towards a minimum deterrence regime, and as part of a transition towards 
a non-nuclear security system. I believe that such a step could have a 
decisive political impact. Particularly in the debate within NATO, it 
could facilitate a more constructive Alliance position in East-West arms 
talks. Provided that the UK were able to mobilise support from other NATO 
member states, it might also be possible to move NATO as a whole towards 
a 'No First Use' policy. 
To be effective, such a policy would have to overcome formidable 
obstacles. Its success would depend in part on the extent to which the 
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new Soviet regime responded to British initiatives in ways that were 
internationally recognised as substantial. Perhaps even more crucially, 
it would depend on the ability of the British government to weather the 
crisis in its relations with its allies that would undoubtedly result 
from such a radical shift in policy. 
In both these areas, the fate of a disarmament-oriented foreign 
policy might be, to a considerable extent, dependent on political 
developments over which the British government had little, or no, 
control. While a 'best case' scenario - with the SPD in office in 
Germany and Gorbachev delivering on his radical promises on disarmament - 
can be envisaged, it is also not difficult to see that such a scenario is 
only one of many. It is quite possible that instead a disarmament- 
oriented UK government would have to sustain its policy through several 
years without dramatic 'logjam-breaking' effects, and during which it was 
an isolated voice within NATO. 
Adverse international factors could in turn increase the 
difficulties that a radical government would have in maintaining 
sufficient domestic political support for its policies. So far the 
independent peace movements, and the political parties that support their 
main proposals, have been unable to convince a majority of the general 
public of the case for giving up Britain's own nuclear force. While the 
old consensus has been broken, therefore, there is no indication that a 
new one can be developed easily. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
The story of Britain's nuclear force is now almost half a century 
old. Since the discovery in 1940 that an atomic bomb was a technical 
possibility, the perceived need for such a force has been a central 
element of the policy of successive governments. It remains so today. 
Yet much has changed in fifty years. In the 1940's Britain was one 
of the three Great Powers which, in the aftermath of their victory over 
Germany and Japan, decided the outline of the settlement that provides the 
basis for European politics to this day. It still possessed a global 
empire, and had fought in three continents to defend it. Few could 
foresee that the next period would see an acceleration, rather than a 
halting, in the process of national decline. 
Yet, over the decades that followed World War Two, Britain's 
relative economic standing fell sharply, as it failed to keep up with the 
rapid growth rates of most other major industrial powers. By the mid- 
1980's, the UK's share of world exports of manufacturers had fallen to 
7.7% from 20% in the mid-19501s. Even Italy, until recently regarded as 
Europe's poor relation, now seems set to overtake Britain in total GDP. 
This decline in economic power inevitably brought with it an 
undermining of Britain's military and political influence. Although they 
continued to devote a relatively high proportion of national income to the 
military, successive governments still found themselves forced to retreat 
from one after another of the wideranging military commitments of the 
19401s. Increasingly the limited resources available for military 
spending were focused on the UK's role in NATO. 
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This retreat from Great Power status was not accepted without 
considerable resistance from leaders whose views has been formed in the 
years of Empire, and whose feeling of national greatness had, been 
reinforced by victory in two world wars. As a result, the foreign and 
defence policies pursued since 1945 have been largely geared to the 
perceived needs of a power seeking to preserve its position in the world, 
or at least to slow the erosion in that power. Both during the Second 
World War and thereafter, Britain's main foreign policy concern has been 
conservative, not revisionist, seeking to preserve the status quo rather 
than to change it. 
The argument of this thesis has been that this policy has served 
neither Britain's'economic interests, nor its security interests. It has 
tied, Britain into a dependent relationship with the United States, thus 
helping to prevent. the emergence of a fully European-oriented foreign 
policy. It has contributed significantly to the maintenance of a level of 
arms spending that has had serious adverse consequences for economic 
performance. And, perhaps most importantly, it has acted as an obstacle 
to any real consideration of alternatives to containment of the Soviet 
Union as the fundamental objective of foreign policy, or to reliance on 
nuclear weapons as the means for implementing that policy. 
The possession of a quasi-independent nuclear force has played a not 
insignificant part in encouraging this process of resistance to the 
consequences of economic reality. The exclusive Atlantic nuclear 
relationship is still seen as an indication of Britain's special position 
as a 'bridge' between Europe and the US. The perception of major power 
status which the nuclear force symbolises has in turn increased the 
pressure for high military spending, and rendered unthinkable the 
proposition that Britain should spend no more on the military than 
countries, such as Italy, with similar levels of economic wealth. 
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Although the objectives of the nuclear weapons policy pursued for 
the last 40 years have varied little, and the alternation between Labour 
and Conservative governments has made little apparent difference to 
policy, the political consensus supporting the possession of the nuclear 
force has been less than total since the 1950's, and in recent years has 
disappeared altogether. Continuing economic decline, and the budgetary 
pressures which accompany it, have made Great Power illusion appear to be 
of questionable relevance to many of the leaders of the 1980's. And the 
upsurge of protest against nuclear weapons in the early 1980's now appears 
to have tipped the balance of the argument on these questions in at least 
one of Britain's major political parties. 
Because the previous consensus of nuclear weapons policy has been 
broken, there must now be a real possibility of a government being elected 
within the next decade committed to a radically different defence and 
foreign policy, a central part of which will be the abandonment of the 
attempt to remain a nuclear weapons state. 
The outlines of the alternative on offer are not entirely-clear. In 
my view, however, 'such an alternative must include an end to the 
commitment to maintain a"special relationship' with the US, if that 
commitment stands in the way of achieving other objectives. For, at least 
in its current, form, that relationship is a major block to any radical 
changes in existing policies. Its nature is that Britain has geared its 
policies as much, if not more, to possible US reactions as to an 
independent assessment of the Soviet threat. Britain's motives have been 
largely conservative: to ensure continued US support for its national 
nuclear force, to prevent any possibility of the US abandoning its 
commitment to the defence of Western Europe, and to tolerate Britain's 
military role outside Europe. The last of these motives has declined in 
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importance since the withdrawal from East of Suez. As US aid to Britain 
in the 1982 war with Argentina showed, however, it is not entirely 
irrelevant even today. 
Given the policies which a radical British government would wish to 
pursue, it is in any case likely that the US would be unwilling to 
continue to give the UK any special status, for example in access to 
intelligence. If a new government is to implement its policies it will 
have to accept this. For to continue to cling to the special relationship 
as an essential part of policy would amount to giving the US a veto over 
the UK's direction. And, given the likely complexion of US governments in 
the near future, this would halt any disarmament-oriented policy in its 
tracks. 
However, any new policy cannot be simply about Britain's national 
role in the world and its own national interests, on the assumption that 
the rest of the world remains as it is. It must also take account of, -and 
may be geared towards, the responses of other states to British steps. 
Indeed, to a considerable extent, the rationale for a radical new policy, 
particularly on the question of changing NATO strategy, must be about 
using independent British moves in order to encourage change in the 
international security system as a whole! Chapter 8 discussed some of the 
details of such moves. 
Because of their preponderant military power, the future of the 
world security system in the next few years will depend primarily on the 
policies of the two superpowers. Medium size powers, such as Britain, can 
have some positive effect, both directly and through their influence on 
the debate within, and action of, the superpowers. But they cannot on 
their own determine the direction even of the alliance, if any, to which 
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they belong, far less of the East-West system as a whole. There are very 
definite limits to the powers of a disarmament-oriented British government 
to influence the actions of other states. 
An alternative British defence and foreign policy must therefore, in 
my view, have both a 'maximum' and a 'minimum' track. The 'maximum' track 
would consist of working towards a fundamental change in the European 
security system, involving a major reduction in the role of the two 
military alliances in ensuring stability. It would see international 
willingness to accept considerable restraints on national sovereignty, for 
example in nuclear technology, as in the interests on international order. 
And, as a concomitant to a radical reduction of the role of the military 
in ensuring national security, it would permit large reductions in 
military spending, particularly in those countries, such as the UK, which 
currently spend most on defence. 
This track, however, depends more on the action of others than on 
those of the UK. It would require the Soviet Union to make much more 
progress toward openness in its military deployments than it has made in 
recent years, and to accept a radical change in its relationship with the 
countries of Eastern Europe. It would also require a decisive defeat for 
the hawks on the US, and an awareness in that country that there are no 
unilateral technological solutions to the security of the West. A British 
government can use its power, and its example, to facilitate such changes. 
In the end, however, they will be determined more by the internal 
political dynamic of the two superpowers than by the UK. 
As a result, it is therefore necessary for a British government, 
while it gears its policies to the attainment of these broader objectives, 
to have a more 'minimum' programme which provides for a new role for the 
country within a world that has not fundamentally changed. The use of 
British actions as a lever for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in 
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NATO strategy must be accompanied, insofar as it is possible, with an 
attempt to adjust the level of Britain's military spending to one more 
appropriate to the country's economic resources. And, in the absence of 
any radical change in Soviet foreign policy, a 'minimum' programme must 
seek ways of promoting a new detente between the blocs in Europe in order 
to provide space for more positive long term developments. 
Britain cannot change the world on its own. But, by pursuing a dual 
policy of this sort, a radical government in Britain can make a major 
contribution to constructing a safer world. Indeed the conjunction of 
several circumstances may provide more opportunity for Britain to do this 
than any other medium power. Both because of the peculiar nature of 
Britain's relationship with the US, and because of the budgetary pressures 
resultant from economic decline, Britain is the only existing nuclear 
weapons state in which the unilateral abandonment of its nuclear force is 
a real possiblity. In adopting a new role in the world by such action, 
Britain may find that it can influence the course of world effects more 
than it has in the last four decades. The stakes are so great that it 
must be worth a try. 
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